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THE SLMM REPORT

2002–2008

THE OPERATION – THE ORGANISATION

The official account of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission,
compiled by the mission, 2008–2009

SLMM /
SRI LANKA MONITORING MISSION

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THE SLMM REPORT 2002–2008

Compiled by
the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)
as the final report from the Head of Mission (HOM)
to the Royal Norwegian Government as Facilitator,
and for public distribution.

Copenhagen
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documentation, is also found on:
www.slmm.info

ULTIMATE OVERVIEW:

2002 CFA signed: SLMM established
2008 CFA abrogated: SLMM terminated

6 years of field operation
322 international monitors
123 national staff members
350 mill NOK in total expenses

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2002–2008

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READERS' GUIDE:

The SLMM Report is the final and complete account on the operation and the organisation, 2002–08, compiled by the mission. The report is aimed at documenting various dimensions and aspects of the operation, through a number of articles within three main sections, plus introductory texts and a set of appendixes.

The report is written also with an aim to offer insight into diverse operational and organisational aspects; sub-sections and articles are composed in order to make sense, even if the document is not read as an entity. Consequently, some information will appear in more than one article, always linked to the specific topic in case.



The SLMM was established by the Parties to the CFA in 2002; liaising, monitoring and reporting until the termination of the operation in 2008.

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Acronyms

| | | | |
|--------------|--|--------------|--|
| ACF | Action Contre la Faim | HNMT | Head of Naval Monitoring Team |
| ADC | Aide de Camp | HQ | headquarters |
| AI | Amnesty International | HRW | Human Rights Watch |
| AMM | Aceh Monitoring Mission | HSZ | High Security Zone |
| AOO | Area of Operation | IS | Iceland/Icelandic |
| AOR | Area of Responsibility | ICG | International Crisis Group |
| CFA | Ceasefire Agreement | ICR | Incident and Complaint Report |
| CO | Communication Officer | ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| COC | Code of Conduct | ICRU | Iceland Crisis Response Unit |
| COO | Chief Operations Officer | IDP | internally displaced person |
| COS | Chief of Staff | IIGEP | International Independent Group of Eminent Persons |
| CCO | Chief Communications Officer | IMS | Incident Management System |
| CFO | Chief Finance Officer | IPCS | Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies |
| CIO | Chief IT Officer | IPKF | Indian Peacekeeping Force |
| CLO | Chief Logistics Officer | ISGA | Interim Self Governing Authority |
| COO | Chief Operations Officer | JIC | Joint Implementation Commission |
| COS | Chief of Staff | JHU | Jathika Hela Urumaya |
| CP | Check Point | JMC | Joint Military Commission |
| CPAO | Chief Personnel & Administration Officer | JVP | Janatha Vimukhti Peramuna |
| CTO | Chief Telecoms Officer | KKS | Kankesanthurai (naval base) |
| DB | Disciplinary Board | LA | Legal Advisor |
| DK | Denmark/Danish | LAN | local area network |
| DHOM | Deputy Head of Mission | LKR | Sri Lanka rupee (currency) |
| DO | District Office | LMC | Local Monitoring Committee |
| DSR | Daily Situation Report | LO | Liaison Office/Officer |
| E/E | Exit/Entry (points) | LTTE | Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam |
| EPDP | Eelam People's Democratic Party | MFA | (Norwegian) Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| EPRLF | Eelam People's Revolutionary Front | MOD | Ministry of Defence |
| EU | European Union | MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| EUR | euro (currency) | MR | Monthly Report |
| FDL | Forward Defence Localities | NERF | Sri Lanka Northeast Reconstruction Fund |
| FI | Finland/Finnish | NGO | non-governmental organisation |
| FragO | Fragmentary Order | NMT | Naval Monitoring Team |
| GOSL | Government of Sri Lanka | NMT-J | Naval Monitoring Team–Jaffna |
| HNMT | Head of Naval Monitoring Team | NMT-T | Naval Monitoring Team–Trincomalee |
| HLO | Head of Liaison Office | NO | Norway/Norwegian |
| HOD | Head of District | NOK | Norwegian kroner (currency) |
| HOM | Head of Mission | | |

| | |
|---------------|--|
| Norad | Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation |
| NPC | National Peace Council of Sri Lanka |
| NRC | Norwegian Refugee Council |
| OO | Operation Order |
| PA | People's Alliance |
| PID | Presence in District |
| PIO | Press and Information Officer |
| PM | Prime Minister |
| POC | Point of Contact |
| PLOTE | People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam |
| PTA | Prevention of Terrorism Act |
| P-TOMS | Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure |
| PS | Peace Secretariat (of the LTTE) |
| PSM | Peace Secretariat for Muslims |
| PW | Political Wing (of the LTTE) |
| R | retired |
| RNG | Royal Norwegian Government |
| RMC | Regional Maritime Committee |
| RO | Regional Office |
| ROO | Region of Operation |
| RRT | Rapid Response Team |
| SCOPP | Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process |
| SDN | Sub-Committee on De-Escalation and Normalisation |
| SE | Sweden/Swedish |
| SF | Security Forces (of GOSL) |
| SGI | Sub-Committee on Gender Issues |
| Sida | Swedish International Development Agency |
| SIHRN | Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and East |
| SR | Special Report |
| SLA | Sri Lanka Army |
| SLAF | Sri Lanka Air Force |
| SLFP | Sri Lanka Freedom Party |
| SLMC | Sri Lanka Muslim Congress |
| SLMM | Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission |
| | |

| | |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| SLN | Sri Lanka Navy |
| SNR | Senior National Representative |
| SLMM | Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission |
| SLPS | Sri Lanka Police Service |
| SO | Security Officer |
| SOMA | Status of Mission Agreement |
| SOP | Standing Operating Procedures |
| SPM | Sub-Committee on Political Matters |
| STF | Special Task Force (of the GOSL) |
| TAC | Temporary Accommodation Centres |
| TMVP | Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Palika |
| TNA | Tamil National Alliance |
| TNT | Tamil New Tigers |
| TPF | Tamil Peoples' Forum |
| TRO | Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation |
| TT | Tasking Table |
| TULF | Tamil United Liberation Front |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNP | United National Party |
| UPFA | United People's Freedom Alliance |
| VHF | Very High Frequency |
| WA | Weekly Assessment |
| WMR | Weekly Monitoring Reports |
| WSR | Weekly Summary Report |
| ZOS | Zone of Separation |

Summary – by Section

THE SLMM REPORT COVERS
A BROAD SPECTRUM OF ISSUES – WITHIN THREE SECTIONS

The SLMM Report is a comprehensive account of the mission's operation, organisation and performance during 2002–08, with an emphasis on the field operation carried out between March 2002 and January 2008.

The *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)* was an independent and impartial international instrument established by the Parties to the *Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)* of 2002. This report is the SLMM's own account of the operation and organisation, composed and compiled by the Head of Mission (HOM) serving at the time of termination; an authorised historical documentation for public use, contributing to the understanding of the monitoring mission and the transparency of the Process.

For a more detailed disclosure of the report as a product and the reporting as a process, please refer to the article 'Scope' on page 14. The following is a brief, executive summary of this document's core content; the three sections looking into the key dimensions of the operation:

PART 01: 'OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW'

The SLMM was established as a result of the Peace Process entered into by the two main belligerents of the Sri Lankan conflict – and the Parties to the resulting Agreement: the *Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL)* and the *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)*; a process facilitated by the Norwegian government at the request of both Parties. By signing up to a set of commitments within the CFA, the ultimate goal of the process, was to establish a lasting political solution to the conflict. However, despite an initial will to adhere to the commitments, there was a resurgence of violence and frequent violations of the Agreement, with the Peace Process collapsing, and the Parties resorting to outright warfare.

The SLMM was mandated through the CFA, although the mandate was unspecified, and had to be interpreted by the HOM, who was tasked with developing the mission *concept* and *structure*, deploying the monitors in March 2002. By analysing the mandate (the CFA), the HOM extracted a set of main *assignments* and specified *tasks*; others tasks were implied, or added. The core of the assignment was to assist the Parties in complying with the CFA, and to act on disputes. This was done by establishing a non-military monitoring mechanism chosen by the Parties to be headed by a retired military officer appointed by the Norwegian government, composed of international monitors from the five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway,

and Sweden), supplemented by Sri Lankan nationals in support functions. Six districts designated in the CFA were defined as SLMM's *Area of Responsibility (AOR)*, whereas the entire country was considered its *Area of Operation (AOO)* – implying a priority of presence and efforts to the North and East of Sri Lanka.

According to the prescription of the CFA, the SLMM established a *permanent presence* in the six designated districts, at the same time choosing to establish its *Headquarters (HQ)* in the capital Colombo. The field monitoring activities were carried out primarily from six *District Offices (DO)* and by two *Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT)*; the naval monitoring was discontinued in 2006. *Liaising Offices (LO)* to the respective Parties were established to facilitate communication with and between them, as directed by the Agreement. As part of the concept, a set of modalities and methods were developed; the main operational modalities being those of *monitoring*, *liaising* and *reporting*.

With slight alterations, the mission concept and structure largely remained in place until 2006–07, when major adaptations, both regarding the operation and the organisation took place, partly as a consequence of a drastically reduced mission force, partly due to a radically altered operational environment – reducing mission capacity and severing operational security. In 2007, the traditional field monitoring had to quite an extent been rendered irrelevant, and the HOM enforced a *reorientation* of the operation and a *redesign* of the organisation, in particular shifting focus from incidents on a micro level to developments on the macro level – as the military situation evolved from isolated confrontations to outright warfare.

There was no provision for an external governing body, and neither the Parties nor the Facilitator/Co-sponsors exercised any formalised governance of or authority over the SLMM, leaving the HOM to head the organisation and to direct the operation, also deciding on mission priorities. Neither did the CFA make any provisions for a withdrawal of the mission, other than the abrogation of the Agreement itself, which eventually occurred, in January 2008 (ref. Appendix 3).

PART 02: 'OPERATIONAL REVIEW'

The SLMM executed its field operation on a continuous around-the-clock basis, largely within the six districts designated within the CFA, comprising its AOR. During its tenure, the SLMM carried out its assignment as stipulated in the CFA, applying the main all along. Throughout this period, the *mandate* (the CFA) remained unchanged. At the same time, SLMM's operational *environment* – politically and militarily – changed profoundly, strongly impacting the position of the mission, and at times, its ability to carry out its tasks.

The very existence and role of the SLMM was challenged by parts of the Sri Lankan public, and the mission was often portrayed and perceived as partial and biased, mainly towards the LTTE, *although* at times *being* criticised by both Parties. The position of the SLMM, influencing on its operation, gradually – and eventually, profoundly – changed for the worse throughout the operational period, largely reflecting the deteriorating relations between the Parties, the stalling of the Peace Process, and the escalating violence, including military attacks carried out – by both Parties – on land and at sea, as well as from the air. Such acts became more frequent especially from 2004 onwards, with a marked escalation in 2006, after which the conflict moved steadily towards renewed, fully fledged war, as reported by the SLMM in 2007–08. Notably, as of 2006, both Parties took to employ heavier arms, including artillery shelling and air strikes, with large-scale military offensives launched by the GOSL in July proving significant, regaining areas controlled by the LTTE for the first time since the signing of the CFA, demonstrating political will to pursue the military path.

In reality, the situation in the AOR underwent a gradual development from *relative peace* at the inception of the operation in 2002 to *de facto war* between the Parties at the time of termination in 2008 – after a decline in relations between the Parties, from cordiality, via distrust, to hostility. To some extent, military confrontation between the Parties continued more or less unabated from 2002 on, despite the formal cease of fire. Consequently, the SLMM throughout the operation received complaints regarding violations of the Agreement, including military activities and political violence contravening the letter as well as the spirit of the CFA.

A notable change, especially in the East of the AOR, took place with the 2004 internal split within the LTTE, creating the Karuna faction, which was not party to the CFA. In the wake of the split, the political violence increased, particularly in Tamil areas, as did child recruitment; two aspects routinely monitored by the SLMM.

By and large, the internal assessment of SLMM's *achievements*, is that the mission was able to execute the operation according to the chosen modalities and defined priorities throughout its

“...the situation in the AOR underwent a gradual development from *relative peace* at the inception of the operation in 2002 to *de facto war* between the Parties at the time of termination in 2008.

tenure, albeit not to quite the same extent as of mid-2006, as in the earlier phases of the operation. This was due to various reasons, including organisational capacity and operational security, as well as the less cooperative stance of the Parties, which increasingly inhibited monitors' access to scenes of incidents and areas of conflict, as well as restricted the mission's access to key personalities and crucial information.

PART 03: 'OPERATIONAL RESOURCES'

The SLMM was manned and financed by the five Nordic countries, at the request of the Parties to the CFA; in addition, the EU at a time contributed a minor share of the running cost of the mission. The operational resources comprised three main elements; human resources, logistical resources, and financial resources.

Human resources comprised international monitors seconded from the Nordic countries, all recruited and trained locally, according to national priorities and routines, hardly to SLMM requirements and standards. When designing the mission, prior to deployment, the notion was of a small structure of less than 20 monitors, with the chosen set-up requiring approximately 45, reaching a maximum strength of approximately 60 in 2005, before being halved in 2006, following the withdrawal of monitors from EU member states. Altogether, 319 individuals served as international monitors with the SLMM (with Norway contributing the largest share); 123 national staff members were recruited during the course of the operation. The issue of including nationals from other countries was raised, but would have required an amendment of the CFA.

Logistical resources comprised a variety of physical infrastructure and services needed for the mission and operation to function appropriately. Designed with a distributed presence and an anticipated short operational period, neither establishing a logistics unit within the mission nor being able to draw on a home base, logistics represented a considerable challenge to the mission. Among these were security precautions, as the Parties reverted to military confrontations, and the operational environment deteriorated, including improved systems and personal gear. Functional communications equipment was also a security provision – and priority. Logistical implements were normally acquired from the local market, including transportation and communications means, as well as offices and accommodation; security gear was acquired locally and internationally.

Financial resources comprised contributions from the Nordic co-sponsors to the running costs of the SLMM, plus the total cost connected with the recruitment and deployment of monitors from the respective country. The estimated total cost of the SLMM, 2002–08, amounts to approximately NOK 350 million. Providing the largest number of monitors, and covering much of the initial costs, Norway contributed the largest share of the combined expenses of the mission/operation: close to 40 percent. In addition to the Nordic governments, the European Union (EU) Commission contributed towards the costs in 2003 and 2005. The main cost components of the entire operation were those of human resources, followed by logistical requirements.

In Brief: Sri Lanka

THE COUNTRY

The history of Sri Lanka records two millennia of human settlement. Positioned at a crossroads of maritime routes, the island has for some time been exposed to and influenced by a range of cultures, and was contested by European colonial powers: Portugal, the Netherlands and Great Britain. Hence, it has developed a unique civilisation with a multi-ethnic population and culture. Calls for independence resulted in internal self-rule in 1947; in 1948 full independence was gained under the name of Ceylon, to become Sri Lanka in 1972. Since independence, political power has shifted following pluralistic elections, with civic strife evolving in the 1970's, and the Tamils taking up arms, resulting in bouts of war.

The geography of Sri Lanka is that of a small island state in the Indian Ocean, with approximately 21 million inhabitants with a diverse cultural background. The Sri Lankans share a land area of 66,000 km², much of it being laid to forest, including several protected areas, and extensive territorial waters. The majority of the population is made up of the Sinhalese ethnic group, the main minority groups being Sri Lanka Moors and Indian and Sri Lankan Tamils – the latter often considered as one Tamil nation. The Sinhalese dominates the South and West of the country; the Tamils are found predominantly in the Northeast and in the capital Colombo. A sizeable Muslim minority is found around the island.

The economy of Sri Lanka is diversified, with agriculture and fisheries, industry and services. The island contains a variety of natural resources, and with about 80 per cent of the population living in rural areas, agriculture is the main occupation and major source of income. Rice is the predominant crop for small hold farmers. Ceylon became famous for its tea, grown mainly on plantations, as are coconut and rubber. Food processing constitutes a major part of industry as does textile and apparel production; making up a substantial percentage of the export market. The conflict has hit the economy hard, not excluding a once thriving tourism industry; the 2004 tsunami added to the burden, not least affecting the fisheries.

[See pages 18–19 for an extended introduction.](#)

THE CONFLICT

The civic strife in Sri Lanka has surfaced intermittently in the way of violent confrontations – particularly between supporters of a Tamil nation-state, the Sinhalese majority and the country's government – since the 1970's. In the early 1980's, the political and cultural contradictions escalated into military conflict, largely between the *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)* and the *Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL)*, reaching a level of civil war. The conflict has ethnic as well as political dimensions, with the Tamil minority fighting for independence or autonomy for those parts of the country with a Tamil majority. The conflict, which has seen extensive human rights violations, has affected large parts of the population, particularly in the Northeast. The latest of several military campaigns against the LTTE resulted in the GOSL regaining control of the whole territory in 2009.

[See pages 20–22 for an extended presentation.](#)

The Peace Process in Sri Lanka which lead up to the 2002 *Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)* and the establishment of the *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)*, started with discrete contact via the *Royal Norwegian Government (RNG)*, acting as middleman, in 1999. With the stated intention of both Parties (the GOSL and the LTTE) to search for a peaceful and political solution to the conflict, the RNG responded positively when requested to serve as Facilitator. Bringing the Parties together within a joint framework towards a ceasefire was aimed at eventually working out a peace accord. The CFA was signed in February 2002, committing the Parties to resolve the conflict and restore normalcy. After political changes on the government side, and as a consequence of the Parties gradually reverting to military action, the Peace Process in effect came to a standstill in 2006.

[See pages 23–29 for an extended presentation.](#)

The Ceasefire Agreement was entered into by the Parties on 22 February 2002, the first ceasefire in seven years, in which the GOSL and the LTTE committed themselves to “find a negotiated solution to the ongoing ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka”. The Parties considered bringing an end to the hostilities as a step on the road towards negotiations on a lasting solution, and agreed to the establishment of an international, third-party instrument to monitor and verify the Agreement – the SLMM. A major role of the mission was to assist the Parties in adhering to the commitments made through the Agreement, some being of an overall and general nature (mainly cessation of hostilities and the restoration of normalcy), others being specific in relation to the situation on the ground. The CFA formally existed until it was unilaterally abrogated by the GOSL on 2 January 2008.

[See Appendix 1 for the full text of the CFA.](#)

SRI LANKA IS a constitutional republic;
a fully independent state since 1948, until 1972
known as Ceylon.

SRI LANKA IS a scene of conflict;
a multi-faceted civic strife with political controversy
and military clashes.

In Brief: The SLMM

DEFINITION: The SLMM was an international, independent and impartial organisation established by the Parties to the 2002 CFA, as a non-military and self-governing third-party instrument to monitor and verify the Agreement mainly through a field operation.

MANDATE: The SLMM was mandated through the CFA, which stipulated its assignment and main tasks. The core assignment was to monitor the CFA, to assist the Parties in complying with their respective commitments – and verifying their adherence to the Agreement.

GOVERNANCE: The SLMM was created by the Parties to the CFA, requesting Norway and the Nordic countries to assist in establishing, deploying and financing it. Neither the Parties nor the Facilitator, or any other entity, locally or internationally, constituted a governing body.

ASSIGNMENT: The SLMM was assigned through the CFA on several specified issues. Main tasks included to liaise with the Parties, establish lines of communication between them, and to assist them in complying with the commitments entrenched in the CFA.

OPERATION: The SLMM was carrying out its assignment mainly in the way of a field operation, permanently present, with international monitors (and national staff) in six districts, in Colombo and in Kilinochchi. The key modalities were monitoring, liaising and reporting.

TERMINATION: The SLMM was terminated in 2008, following the abrogation of the CFA by the GOSL. The operation terminated with effect of January 16; the organisation was dissolved in December 2008, following an extensive administrative termination process.

ORGANISATION: The SLMM was a non-military instrument constituting up to 60 international monitors seconded from the Nordic countries, supported by 60–70 national staff members, reduced to about 30 monitors when personnel from EU member states were pulled out in 2006. The SLMM was led by a *Head of Mission (HOM)* through his *Headquarters (HQ)* in Colombo and deployment through *Liaison Officers (LO)*, *District Offices (DO)*, and *Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT)*. Downsizing and a deteriorating security situation called for a reorientation of the operation and a restructuring of the organisation at central and local levels in 2006/07.

[See Part 01, 'Operational Overview' for a detailed presentation.](#)

OPERATION: The SLMM operated according to its mandate and priorities, applying three main modalities: *monitoring*, *liaising* and *reporting*. The field operation was conducted through a distributed deployment in the *Area of Responsibility (AOR)*: the LO's (one to each of the Parties), six DO's (Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara) and two NMT's (Jaffna and Trincomalee) coordinated with the HQ and the HOM; liaising with the Parties, chairing Local Monitoring Committees (LMC), receiving complaints, enquiring into alleged violations, and patrolling constituted major elements of the operation.

[See Part 02, 'Operational Review' for an extensive presentation.](#)

RESOURCES: The SLMM human resources consisted of monitors from the Nordic countries and staff from Sri Lanka, with a combined strength varying between approximately 90 and 130. The professional backgrounds of monitors were mixed; a substantial number had a background in military or police service, the majority experience from international assignments. The mission acquired a mixed assortment of logistical resources. The SLMM was jointly financed by the five Nordic governments (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), with total allocations estimated at NOK 350 million, costs related to the monitors constituting the major share.

[See Part 03, 'Operational Resources', for a detailed account.](#)

ACHIEVEMENTS: The SLMM was established as part of the CFA, in an atmosphere of optimism for a political solution, and was terminated with the CFA, in a state of war. Its achievements have to be related to the assignment, i.e. mainly to assist the Parties, a task that became increasingly difficult with their diminishing commitment to the CFA. The SLMM neither had enforcement mandate nor capacity, and its task was not to prevent the resumption of war. For a long time, the SLMM played a key role in bringing the Parties together (*liaising*), in defusing tension locally (*monitoring*), and providing situation information (*reporting*).

[See Appendix 11 for external considerations.](#)

**THE SLMM WAS a monitoring mechanism;
an independent international instrument to monitor
a ceasefire agreement.**

**THE SLMM WAS NOT a peacekeeping operation;
not an instrument to verify a peace accord or to enforce
a peace agreement.**

Key events and developments, 2000–08

| THE PEACE PROCESS | | THE MONITORING MISSION | |
|-------------------|---|------------------------|--|
| 2000 | The role of Norway as third party facilitator to a peace process between the GOSL and the LTTE becomes official; Erik Solheim appointed Norwegian Special Envoy. | 2000 | |
| 2001 | Ranil Wickramasinghe becomes Prime Minister after UNP coalition victory in election; ceasefire is declared by the LTTE, reciprocated by the GOSL. | 2001 | |
| 2002 | Both Parties extend ceasefire, until a formal CFA, often criticized in the public, is signed by LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran and PM Ranil Wickramasinghe, and a number of steps are taken towards normalisation, incl. the opening of the A9; the LTTE opens offices in GOSL-controlled areas. Three rounds of peace talks are held; four sub-committees established. Through the Oslo Declaration, the Parties agree to explore a federal solution. | 2002 | The SLMM is created through the CFA, and deployed shortly after the signing, Nordic monitors establishing a HQ in Colombo and permanent presence in six designated districts, adding two naval monitoring teams, with Maj Gen (R) Trond Furuhoide as Head of Mission. The Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) is issued. |
| 2003 | Three rounds of peace talks are held, until the LTTE unilaterally suspends further talks, presenting its plan for self-governing authority. President Chandrika Kumaratunga declares a state of emergency; Norway suspends its role as Facilitator due to ambiguity regarding political power in the South; donor conference held in Tokyo – Co-Chairs established. | 2003 | The SLMM deals with the issue of the territorial waters, not covered explicitly by the CFA, following serious incidents at sea. A number of meetings between the Parties and within local communities facilitated. Maj Gen (R) Trygve Tellefsen appointed HOM, succeeded by Brig (R) Hårup Haukland. The Operation Order (OO) is issued. |
| 2004 | An internal LTTE conflict ends in a split, with Col Karuna setting up a faction not party to the CFA, escalating intra-Tamil violence. Mahinda Rajapakse becomes PM following SLFP-led coalition election victory. Norway's foreign minister Jan Petersen meets twice with the President of Sri Lanka and the LTTE national leader. Tsunami strikes, killing more than 35,000. | 2004 | The SLMM is challenged by the LTTE split, observing increased paramilitary activity and political assassinations, and increase in child recruitment in the East; assisted in the elections in the North, and in relation to the tsunami, also hitting two District Offices (DO), without loss of life. Maj Gen (R) Trond Furuhoide reassumes position of HOM. |
| 2005 | Following the tsunami, the joint Post-Tsunami Operation Management Structure (P-TOMS) is established. Under escalating violence, Sri Lanka's foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar is killed, and the Co-Chairs calls on the LTTE to end political assassination, on the GOSL to disarm paramilitary groups in the North-East; attempts to resume peace talks fails. PM Rajapakse defeats former PM Wickramasinghe in election, in which the Peace Process was an issue, becoming President. | 2005 | The SLMM composition is discussed with proposals of more countries being involved; the issue of control of the air is raised, whilst naval monitoring increase on request from the SLN. Monitoring the situation following the tsunami and preparations for the elections adds to the tasks; mission security scrutinised. Brig (R) Hårup Haukland appointed HOM. |
| 2006 | The Parties to the CFA meet in Geneva, in February and October – for first peace talks since 2003. The LTTE is listed as a terrorist organisation by the EU. Violence escalates with attacks on civilian and military targets; Deputy Head of the SCOPP, Ketesh Loganathan is among the victims. Norway appoints Jon Hanssen-Bauer as Special Envoy. | 2006 | The SLMM DO in Batticaloa is attacked with explosive device; HQ relocated to Ward Place. Monitors from EU member states withdrawn due to lack of security guarantees from the LTTE, strongly reducing capacity, calling for redesign of structure and deployment. Temporary withdrawal of all monitors to Negombo due to security threats. Maj Gen (R) Ulf Henricsson appointed HOM, succeeded by Maj Gen (R) Lars J. Sølberg. |
| 2007 | The military conflict is stepped up, the LTTE for the first time using light aircraft in attacks on GOSL targets, while political violence continues, and the Peace Process as such has in reality come to a halt. LTTE political head, S.P. Tamilselvan is killed by a SLAF aerial attack. | 2007 | The SLMM carries out a redirecting of the operation, with a reconceptualised and restructured organisation and re-established focus on dialogue, with redeployment of monitors reflecting the changing operational environment and mission capacity, also enforcing stricter security measures. |
| 2008 | The GOSL unilaterally abrogates the CFA. | 2008 | The SLMM field operation is terminated. |

For detailed chronologies of the Conflict/Peace Process, and the SLMM/Operation, please see appendixes 7 and 8.

HOM's Report & Reflections

THE HOM'S FINAL REPORT AND
CONCLUSIVE REFLECTIONS ON THE 2002–08 OPERATION OF THE SLMM

This report comprises the records of a venture with an impressive production of activities in Sri Lanka, 24/7 – for six consecutive years: the field operation carried out by the SLMM within the Peace Process on Sri Lanka.

In a historical perspective, the 71 month operation of the *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)*, within the millennium-long history of this beautiful and bountiful island, hardly accounts for more than a passing remark. In a political perspective, the SLMM, realistically speaking, played a rather limited role – both considering the conflict history preceding our arrival on the scene, and the unfolding events after our departure from the country.

Nevertheless, the SLMM was an integral part of the unique *Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)* entered into by the *Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL)* and the *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)*; two Parties whom the SLMM worked closely with – and, easily ignored during the operation and possibly forgotten afterwards: whom we worked for.

This report – and specifically: the following reflections – harbour the luxury of retrospect; invigorating insight and reflexion around an extraordinary volume of recorded experiences, inviting the crucial next step: begin fixing deficiencies immediately.

The SLMM was born in a critical moment of sudden opportunity; an operation that is concluded. Preparations for the next peace process breakthrough – and another operational opportunity – must be done before the occasion occurs. When the alarm bells chime, it is too late to prepare.

REPORT

This report from the SLMM, on the operation and organisation, is the account by the mission itself; our final official contribution to the once promising efforts of finding the lasting political solution to the Sri Lankan conflict, towards



MILITARY MAN: According to the CFA, the SLMM HOM was to be a retired army officer. Major General (retired) Lars J. Sølberg, i.a. drawing on a vast military experience from Norway and the USA, including that of Chief of Staff of the Norwegian Army, served the SLMM as its last HOM, 2006–08, and as such being responsible for the termination of the operation and the organisation.

which the CFA was meant to be a stepping stone – and the SLMM an instrument. That said, the SLMM Report should certainly not be the last words written in regard to this mission, its role, its performance – and possibly, the missed opportunities that, with the fortune of hindsight and time for reflection, may be uncovered when looking into some of the disputable choices made when drafting the CFA, designing the SLMM – and directing the operation. There are still opinions to be voiced, arguments to be heard, and lessons to be learned.

So far, the general view of the achievements of the SLMM are predominantly favourable, as reflected in the sections 'Internal considerations' (Appendix 10) and 'External considerations' (Appendix 11) of the report.

When delving into the details of this story, cutting through some of the most heated public outbursts of the time – and moving beyond the often self-centred appreciations coming to force during a stressful operation – one is left with an impression of an organisation that by and large influenced positively on its surroundings in the prevailing situation and atmosphere, which at times unquestionably had a calming effect on the conflict, especially on the local level.

This report is not the appropriate vehicle for subjective appraisal of achievements, neither is it suited for objective evaluations of strengths and weaknesses of the operation and the organisation. However, embedded in the report, there are themes that ought to raise attention for those interested in generically improving the *operational dimension* of future peace processes through tangible enhancement efforts – such as the SLMM – designed to go hand in hand with the political and the diplomatic pursuits.

“With the SLMM history now chronicled, and the Peace Process of which we were an integral part having come to a close, the time is ripe to put our experiences to good use: moving beyond the past – learning for the future.

Not so much during the ongoing operation as in its aftermath, and during the compilation of this report, it has become strikingly apparent that there are several aspects of this category of operations that harbour a considerable potential for improvement. This includes numerous technical, tactical, and operational aspects, but also issues of a more fundamental – political and structural – character.

As the SLMM's final Head of Mission (HOM), it was my duty to conclude the operation and terminate the organisation. As part of terminating the organisation, it became my challenge – and privilege – to document the history of the mission, based on its own records, subsequently opting to draw attention to certain key aspects of this unique operation that may call for further scrutiny, with the aim of improving future missions. With the SLMM history now chronicled, and the Peace Process of which we were an integral part having come to a close, the time is ripe to put our experiences to good use: moving beyond the past – learning for the future.

REFLECTIONS

The following discussion touches upon a few aspects of a generic nature, where the SLMM experiences denote the most valuable insight – for further deliberation.

Mandate and Mission

This report explains how the two Parties, through the CFA – specifically in its Article 3 – *mandated* the SLMM to perform its mission. The SLMM, however, not only regarded the CFA to be its *mandating* document (although the notion ‘mandate’ actually does not occur in the Agreement), but also literally used it as *the mission mandate document*. Subsequently, any other designated *mandate paper* was never produced.

Following this, stipulations often to be found in a designated mandate, as provision for mandate duration or mandate periods, coherent overall mission assignment, objectives for the mission performance; as well as specific terms for cessation of the monitoring operation, were not established for the SLMM.

This report describes how this formal arrangement worked rea-

sonably well as long as the general atmosphere was supportive of the spirit of the Agreement and towards the activities of the SLMM. However, it also points out that the CFA interpreted as mandate, with the lack of specified stipulations, eventually implied a locked posture for the mission regarding how to – if and when so desired – discontinue the monitoring without causing the ceasefire arrangement to collapse. Further, by perceiving the mere CFA as mandate for the mission, the SLMM was left with restricted flexibility to adjust the operation to altered surroundings; limiting options for advantageous adaptation when ground realities during time grew radically different from the conditions forecast in the Agreement.

For future preparation of related ventures, it should be considered whether a political document such as the CFA – even though it formally institutes the monitoring mechanism and provides it with a series of specified tasks – is suitable as *the* mandate on which organisational and operational specifications should be developed.

It is obviously possible to consider this political document the formal paper that *mandates* the monitoring means, as well as provides the *idea, intention* and *direction* of the operation. A formal, formulated mandate, instructing the mission and defining its operational objectives and tenure could subsequently be restated in more functional wording – by the mission – including the necessary provisions for the organisation as well as the operation.

Organisation vs. operation

This report states, already on the cover, that it deals with the SLMM both as an institutionalised *organisation* and an enduring *operation*. This is deliberate wording by the termination team. During the SLMM tenure, as the records show, the notion ‘mission’ has over time been given various contents, resulting in sometimes confusing information.

Generically, all ventures comprising two or more individuals and seeing some duration will consist of the elements ‘producer’ – ‘production’ – ‘product’. In our case, these are constituted by the ‘*organisation* SLMM’ – ‘*the operation* executed by the organisa-

“... the records illustrate that the SLMM in its uniqueness broke new ground for possible expansion of civilian operational support and enhancement to political/diplomatic peace efforts – also in predominantly military conflict environment.

tion SLMM’ – and ‘the results produced through the SLMM operation’. In order to wisely allocate resources, establish production objectives, and organise a well functioning management structure, a clear idea of the three principal elements of the venture is required.

This report exposes a lack of adequate awareness towards this aspect regarding the SLMM venture. Consequently, tracing resource allocation – particularly financial expenditure – connected to the various monitoring modalities and methods, in order to identify in which areas successful results (products) of the operation (production) performed by which organisational elements (producers) are achieved and with which inputs, has not been possible. Thus, in reverse order, it has not been practicable to allocate funds and manpower to those modalities and methods where successful achievements could be reached – most cost-efficiently.

As part of this shortcoming, a thorough assessment of the specific expertise vs. general competence required to execute the mission according to the assigned tasks and set objectives was lacking, as was a mission-specific recruitment and task-specific training in the Nordic contributing countries, coordinated within and between the recruiting and seconding agencies.

There are a number of perfectly good reasons why these aspects were not identified and proper applications were not implemented during the operational tenure. In retrospect, however, the mission records represent a most useful potential as a means for analysis and experimentation – when aimed at designing a more traceable resource allocation system for this category



LEARNING LESSONS: The SLMM operation belongs to the past, the experiences gained and the lessons to be learned from the SLMM, as an operation and an organisation, belongs to the future – future monitoring missions, argues the last HOM, Major General (retired) Lars J. Sølberg, in his conclusive reflections from the mission he was heading.

of non-military peace – and humanitarian – operations for the future.

Preparedness and professionalism

This report renders the accounts of an impressive volume of activities performed in Sri Lanka over the six-years of operation. But it also presents an organisation that by way off its staff, its structures, its systems and its tools was entirely an ad hoc construction of hasty design; thus in several ways immature in nature and in search of improved efficiency throughout its duration.

On the other hand, the records illustrate that the SLMM in its uniqueness broke new ground for possible expansion of civilian operational support and enhancement to political/diplomatic peace efforts – also in predominantly military conflict environments. The potentials – advantages and benefits – in making use of non-military, operational actors, rather than uniformed military units, in intra-national conflicts should, for the future, not be underestimated.

In order to execute qualified ‘civilian’ ventures of this kind, it is however – as with all undertakings – essential to be prepared for the task.

When a government decides on deploying a *military* formation to perform a peace support operation of sorts, the respective Ministry of Defence (MOD) turns to the nation’s armed forces and orders the deployment of a suitable unit/force – to include adequate home-based sustainment and management capabilities.

When the respective armed forces accept such a task, it – evidently – does not begin to recruit, train and equip the force there

“... the records conveyed in this report raise a wide variety of issues, primarily of a more executive character, that stands out for further discussion.

and then. The by far most predominant function of armed forces is to be a *force provider*; i.e. to continuously recruit, train and equip personnel and develop systems to maintain a force base – a pool – from which prepared units with trained individuals, at any time, can be drawn. The forces which at any given time are employed in an operation, represent only ‘the tip of the iceberg’ of the total armed forces structure – the result of a continuous production of competence and capacity, of constant preparedness.

Universally, within the defence sectors of modern democracies, a MOD executes a political decision to employ a force on behalf of the current government (and normally: the parliament), then turning to the armed forces as the professional service of the sector, for it to execute the mission. The ministry will neither constitute the function of managing the operation, nor the function of providing the force for it. There are a number of good reasons – both political and professional – for this principal division of responsibilities and tasks between the political and executive levels.

The glaring contrast to these – quite logical and commonly acknowledged – arrangements is the utter absence of parallel, institutionalised systems for preparation, directing, and sustainment of *civilian peace support operations*.

This report points to the apparent need for a methodical approach to these principal – to some extent even constitutional – questions of how to develop a *designated capability* for training and equipping contingents as well as developing competency and systems for qualified operational civilian peace support employment.

Operational considerations

This report indicates a requirement for increased future consciousness when constructing *formal documents* with fundamental operational consequences. In addition to the areas of a principal character touched upon above, the records conveyed in this report raise a wide variety of issues, primarily of a more executive character, that stands out for further discussion.

One of these is the question of how to constitute a governing mechanism for an organisation such as the SLMM – if at all hav-

ing one. Peace support operations – civilian and military – are normally launched by, and represent, an institutionalised body; i.e. international organisations such as the UN and the OSCE; or national institutions such as armed forces, police forces, health authorities or other permanent and formally institutionalised structures. Deployed from within such frameworks, ‘home bases’, operational ad hoc constructions such as the SLMM would be able to draw on crucial direction and critical support.

The SLMM was established without any designate governing, directing, or sustaining body, except for the informal network constituted by the recruitment agencies appointed by the respective Nordic ministries of foreign affairs, and points of contacts within the MFA’s.

In the absence of a governing body, the SLMM was vested with an extensive freedom of action, but also with considerable judicial and practical challenges as to formal ownership, relationship with other stakeholders, status as an international organisation, and to which institute of laws, rules, and regulations the organisation was subordinated. In the actual situation no severe problems were faced in this respect until the termination process, as the mission fortunately saw no fatalities or severe accidents that could have seriously challenged the judicial status and chains of responsibility. The issue, however, calls for further assessment before a similar undertaking again is impending.

Regarding other pressing operational issues, the absence of regional and national level *joint monitoring* and *verification mechanisms*, in addition to the prescribed Local Monitoring Committees (LMC) institute at the lowest level, is a phenomenon that requires further exploration. In regard to these issues, there were relevant examples at the time of designing the SLMM, and even more experiences to draw on today, i.e. from Aceh, Kosovo and the Sudan; Sri Lanka adding to the comparative material.

Likewise, the absence of *measurable stipulations* within the mandate (or corresponding documents) as a means for directing the monitoring efforts related to clear objectives, is an experience to be discussed. In line with this, to further improve management capability, a process to create a *tailored information technology*

“One should bear in mind that armed forces, qua organised profession, has been methodically developed throughout three millennia of evolving warfare, whereas non-military operational mechanisms as a profession, for most practical purposes yet has to be invented.

tool for directing and controlling monitoring, verification, and other civilian peace-support modalities – in the future crucially necessary in order to hook up with adjacent information processing systems – needs to be initiated as soon as possible.

In addition, a further look at the notions *verification* and *monitoring*, in light of defining *ends*, *ways* and *means* for undertakings that are tasked to perform both, is clearly needed. With regard to the CFA, the chief SLMM assignment is easily interpreted as that of *verification*, yet, a *monitoring* mission was designed.

On the operational *support* side, there is good reason to look into different options for entirely outsourcing the logistical sustainment to professional supply agencies, to include transportation, finance detail, and local personnel administration – a large area, ripe and ready for fresh approaches and innovative solutions. A corresponding area of paramount importance, and which became pressingly relevant to the SLMM towards the end of its operational tenure, is that of *security* – calling for a host of aspects to be considered, including that of intelligence gathering.

Finally, the entire *concept for the termination* of ventures such as the SLMM needs thorough scrutiny. Several of the perspectives outlined in the paragraphs above apply to this.

This report is not deliberating these operational aspects beyond documenting how the operation handled them; not judging the applied solutions successful or flawed. Most certainly, however, further analysis of these areas will bring valuable insight in order to establish solutions that prove more efficient in future composition of complex missions of a comparable nature.

The challenge

From a perspective of comparison, based on experience and reflection by a Head of Mission, the concept of running non-military peace support operations in a foreign affairs sector, supervised by a MFA as practised in the case of the SLMM, appears somewhat immature and stumbling, when compared to concepts for military peace support operations directed by a MOD in a defence sector.

Consequently, in order to reach adequate standards, some glaring misconceptions and misconstructions need to be rectified – conceptually as well as practically.

However: One should bear in mind that armed forces, qua organised profession, has been methodically developed throughout three millennia of evolving warfare, whereas non-military operational mechanisms as a *profession*, for most practical purposes has yet to be invented. The trade of qualified civilian operational peace enhancement is still in its prologue measured up to its counterpart, the profession of waging war.

To facilitate growth of this juvenile trade, instituting appropriate platforms for conceptual and technological development is necessary – as modest parallels to what has been the case in military sectors for centuries.

The SLMM experience provides in this respect a magnificent starting point.

At any rate: Procrastinating preparations for support of the next peace process breakthrough is the least recommendable course of action. When deployment bells chime, it is too late to qualify.

This report being the last official communication from the SLMM and the HOM, I respectfully greet the stakeholders with whom we interacted as an independent, impartial instrument invited by the Parties to assist them in their courageous peace endeavour; and accord my sincere appreciation to the international monitors and national staff who contributed greatly to the daring venture which the SLMM indeed was – at times with substantial personal risk.

Major General (R)
Lars J. Sølvsberg
SLMM Head of Mission,
2006–08

The Scope

THE SLMM REPORT AIMS
AT DESCRIBING THE ORGANISATION AND DOCUMENTING THE OPERATION

The SLMM was established in February 2002 and terminated in December 2008, with the operation on Sri Lanka ceasing in January 2008. This report is intended to document the six years of SLMM's existence, including the termination process.

This conclusive of the *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)* has been compiled as part of the termination project following the end of the operation itself. The report aims at documenting the history – the assignment, activities and achievements – of the mission, 2002–08 as follows:

Formally, the report is written by the SLMM Head of Mission (HOM), reporting to the Facilitator to the Peace Process, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway – according to the stipulation of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) that established the SLMM.

Practically, the report is compiled by a termination team working with the HOM, published as a public document contributing to the transparency and accountability of the SLMM – towards the Parties, the Sri Lankan society and other stakeholders.

Technically, the report is comprised of three main parts:

Part 01, 'Operational Overview' aims to give the reader a brief background to the *operational setting* in which the SLMM was established and operated, including the country's conflict and the Peace Process that eventually brought about the mission – all presented from the perspective of understanding the operational environment of the SLMM, seen from the position of the mission. The subsequent articles describe the *operational approach* of the SLMM, and the *operational execution*.

Part 02, 'Operational Review' aims to present an overall account of the operation, substantiated by a detailed account of the mission's activities, according to the assignment. The 'Overall Review, 2002–08' is a condensed overview of the entire operation, tracking main challenges and developments, activities and achievements. 'Annual Reviews, 2002–07' contains a more detailed account of each year, drawing a picture of the external environment as well as the internal developments, both highly relevant to the conduct of the operation. 'Monthly Reviews, 2002–07' comprises a detailed account, on a month-by-month basis, of the unfolding developments pertaining the operation – followed by a brief account of the termination of the operation and organisation, in 2008.

Part 03, 'Operational Resources' aims to account for the combined resources utilised by the SLMM, i.e. the human, logistical and financial resources.

The overall aim of *The SLMM Report* is threefold:

- a) to serve as a feedback to all stakeholders involved;
- b) to record the history of the SLMM, contributing to the history of Sri Lanka;
- c) to offer information and inspiration, and indicate lessons, for other missions.

NOTE TO READERS:

Regarding the compilation and publication of this report, the following should be noted:

- In accordance with SLMM's status as an independent organisation, the report is compiled by the SLMM termination team, and authorised by the HOM, who alone is responsible for its content.
- In accordance with the mechanism for financing the termination of the SLMM, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), has funded the compilation and publication of the report.
- In accordance with the idea and implementation of the SLMM, the contributing countries to the mission have been included in the reporting process; as have former HOM's and monitors.
- In accordance with the practise during the operational phase, the Facilitator has been consulted in the reporting process, however without influencing on nor formally accepting, the content.
- In accordance with the establishment of the SLMM and practise during the operational phase, the Parties were informed about the reporting endeavour, however without influencing on the product.
- The descriptions of the SLMM and its operational concept are based on historical documents issued by the mission during the course of operation. The report presents compilations that could only have been done in historical retrospect.
- The information presented in the Operational Review is based on SLMM's continuous reporting throughout its period of operation. Consequently, there is no new reporting as such, but the data is now compiled in another way, aimed at a structured and comprehensive documentation.

01: OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW

Operational Setting
Operational Approach
Operational Execution

The SLMM was designed and deployed to assist the Parties who had entered the CFA. Facilitated by Norway, the Peace Process entered a new stage in 2002, opting for a peaceful solution to the conflict – aided by the SLMM in its monitoring, liaising and reporting capacities. However, political developments altered the situation, with the Parties reverting to war.



The SLMM was an integral part of the Peace Process, aiming to find a lasting political solution to the ethnic strife in Sri Lanka.



OPERATIONAL SETTING

The SLMM was the chosen mechanism to monitor the Ceasefire Agreement resulting from the Peace Process in which Norway acted as the Facilitator to the main antagonists of the conflict in Sri Lanka, and the Parties to the Agreement: the GOSL and the LTTE.

The Country

SRI LANKA IS A DIVERSE COUNTRY WITH RICH CULTURAL TRADITIONS AND A LONG HISTORY OF EXPOSURE

Sri Lanka is an island state in the Indian Ocean with approximately 21 million inhabitants. It is divided into nine provinces and 25 administrative districts, with Colombo as its commercial capital. The country is ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse.

Sri Lanka, a captivating South Asian country, lies at a crossroads of maritime routes in the Indian Ocean. The island has been exposed to a broad range of cultures and ideas, typically personated by power-seeking adventurers and occupants from nearby India and later from European colonial forces. The foremost identity groups are the Sinhalese, the Tamils and the Muslims.

HISTORY

Sri Lanka has seen human settlement for more than two millennia, with the major ethnic groups (Sinhalese and Tamils) and the dominant religions (Buddhism and Hinduism) making their impact through interaction with India.

With time Sri Lanka still developed a unique identity. The country was ruled by foreigners for 450 years; in sequence by the colonial powers of Portugal (1505–1658), the Netherlands (1658–1796) and Britain (1796–1948). With the advent of nationalist movements in the early 20th century, the road towards independence was set, with internal self-rule accorded in the wake of World War II and dominion status conferred in 1947. Parliamentary elections the same year saw the *United National Party (UNP)* winning a majority and Don Stephen Senanayake became Ceylon's first Prime Minister. Full independence was gained on

4 February 1948. In 1972 Ceylon became the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.

GEOGRAPHY

Sri Lanka's land size of 66,000 km² is about the same as that of Ireland. The climate is tropical and the physical diversity wide-ranging. Many regard Sri Lanka as a "green paradise", as much of the island is covered by natural forest. The country has 24 wildlife sanctuaries. The vegetation in the *Wet Zone* of the Southwestern and Central Uphill region is especially rich. The soil is also fertile in the *Dry Zone* of the Southeastern, Eastern and Northern regions, although cultivation and flora in these areas depend more on irrigation and timely rains. The rainfall in the country is determined by monsoon winds that sweep across the island from the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, respectively. The main southwestern monsoon normally occurs from June to October, whereas the heaviest rains in the North and East typically fall between October and January/February.

PEOPLES

With nearly 21 million inhabitants, Sri Lanka has a population density of more than 300 people per km², which is one of the highest in Asia. The majority Sinhalese dominate in the South and West, while the island's largest minority, the Sri Lankan Tamils, live mainly in the North/Northeast and in the capital. Most Hill Country Tamils, whose ancestors came to the island as plantation workers in the 19th century, dwell in the estate areas of the central highlands. The Muslim population, which consists of both Moors and Malays, are scattered around the island and form a majority in the Southeastern Ampara District. Other minorities include the descendants of European colonists (Burghers) and small groups of indigenous people (generally called Veddahs).

Sinhala, an Indo-European language, is the native tongue of the Sinhalese. All Tamils and most Muslims speak Tamil, which is part of the Dravidian linguistic group; the two alphabets are unrelated. English is spoken competently by 10–15 per cent of the population and is commonly used in public affairs. The majority of Sinhalese are Buddhist, Tamils are predominantly Hindu and most of Sri Lanka's Muslims practice Sunni Islam. Sizeable minorities



POPULAR PARADISE: Sri Lanka is a tropical island in the Indian Ocean, well endowed with natural resources – and beauty; often referred to as a 'paradise' attracting colonialists as well as tourists.

of both Sinhalese and Tamils are Christians and of the Roman Catholic faith, although Protestants also make up an influential and resourceful group. The socially stratifying caste system (originating from India) is prevailing in Sri Lankan society, though its rigidity and discriminatory effects have diminished somewhat in recent years.

SOCIETY

Sri Lanka's commercial capital Colombo is a busy, colourful, and quite modern city. A large number of Sri Lankans (about 80 per cent) live in rural areas, where village settlement has been the traditional pattern of dwelling. Thus, agriculture has historically formed the backbone of Sri Lanka's economy. Many villagers rely on a mix of different types of subsistence farming, with the main crop for the majority of Sri Lanka's smallhold farmers being rice.

A part of the cultivation sector was modernised under British rule through the development of larger plantation areas for tea, rubber, and coconut. In 1970 plantation crops made up over 90 per cent of the country's exports, although by 2006 this share had dropped to 15 per cent. Today food processing and export-oriented production of textiles and apparel, as well as light industry, construction, telecoms and banking, are thriving parts of the economy. About 800,000 Sri Lankans work abroad, mostly in Arab countries, and remittances are a vital source of income for their dependents on the island.

Effective welfare policies, especially in the early post-independence years, have given Sri Lanka a creditable literacy and health record. Adult literacy rate is above 90 per cent and average life expectancy at birth (according to official data) is 75 years.

The country's Executive President is elected for a period of six years and holds power to appoint (and dismiss) members of the cabinet and to dissolve the parliament. Members of Parliament are also elected for a period of six years. The country's nine provinces are ostensibly run by provincial governments, although in reality these have limited power. The administrative structure of the state is composed of government appointed officers at District, Division and Grama Sewaka (village) level, respectively. Sri Lanka's legal system is a complex mix of English, Roman-Dutch, Muslim, Kandyan and Jaffna Tamil law.

The 2004 tsunami took a heavy toll in terms of human and material costs; approximately 37,000 people lost their lives, close to 450,000 were displaced and property worth an estimated USD 1.5 billion was destroyed. Furthermore, insurgencies warfare (in particular the *Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)* rebellions of 1971 and 1987) and the long-running military conflict between state forces and the *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE)*, have caused extensive human suffering and inflicted huge material costs over the years. The JVP later joined electoral politics, to become a political party represented in Parliament.

“ Sri Lanka has seen human settlement for more than two millennia.

| | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| Name | Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka |
| Independent | 4 February 1948 |
| Capital | Colombo (commercial); Sri Jayawardenapura Kotte (political) |
| Area | 65,610 km ² |
| Coastline | 1,340 km |
| Population | 21 million |
| Ethnic groups | Sinhalese (74.5 %); Sri Lankan Tamils (12 %); Muslims (8 %); Indian Tamils (5 %); others (0.5 %) |
| Religious affiliation | Buddhist (70 %); Hindu (14 %); Christian (8 %); Muslim (8 %) |
| Official languages | Sinhala and Tamil; English widely used |
| Economic sectors | Services (58.4 % of GDP); industry (29.9 %); agriculture (11.7 %) |
| Govt. military spending | 2002: 54.7 billion SL rupees (3.3 % of GDP); 2008: 157 billion SL rupees (3.6 % of GDP) |
| Human Development | 2002 HDI value: 0.74 (ranked 96 th of 177 countries); 2009 HDI value: 0.76 (ranked 102 of 182 countries) |
| Major trading partners | Export: USA, EU, India, Russia, UAE Import: India, EU, Singapore, China |

Sources:

GOSL Department of Census and Statistics
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP)
World Trade Organization (WTO)
CIA World Factbook



See page 204 for political leaders

The Conflict

SRI LANKA HAS SEEN VIOLENT CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE FORCES AND TAMIL REBELS FOR THREE DECADES

Sri Lanka has witnessed intermittent civic violence since the 1970's, escalating into armed conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) in the early 1980s; later that decade developing into open warfare. Several attempts at reaching a peaceful settlement have failed.

The conflict between the LTTE (commonly known as the 'Tamil Tigers') and the GOSL constitutes the background to the peace process leading to the signing of the *Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)* and the consequent establishment of the *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)* in 2002. The upsurge in violence in the subsequent years, including the re-escalation to warfare, was a constant factor framing and constraining the execution of the SLMM operation.

[See Part 02; 'Operational Review', for a detailed account](#)

Since 1983, political constraints have resulted in several periods of military conflict between the LTTE and the GOSL as well as prior and continued conflicts within the Tamil community. This political-military conflict has caused severe harm to Sri Lankan society, affecting a large part of the civilian population (particularly in the North and East) with severe repercussions for the country's economy. Estimates of casualties vary widely; from approximately 70,000 to several times that number and many more injured, even before 2008–2009. More than 1.5 million Sri Lankans, mostly Tamils, have fled their homes because of the war. Many have resettled abroad, whereas an estimated half a million remained internally displaced by early 2008. As the major brunt of warfare has happened in the North and the East, people in the South have only to a limited degree witnessed the war. However, as the conflict influenced heavily on economic and



MONITORING MISSION: The SLMM was established by the two Parties to the Sri Lanka conflict. An international escorting LTTE cadres on leave, LTTE in the Vanni.

social conditions over several years, the effects have indirectly been experienced by most Sri Lankans.

As the main protagonists of the military conflict, the LTTE and the GOSL were the two official Parties to the Peace Process which in 2002 brought about a formal CFA, leading to the formation of the SLMM. Although acting out a conflict with grave consequences, both sides can be correctly described as disciplined and structured entities. Overall, the GOSL represents a state bureaucracy with well-defined democratic institutions and duly organised military capacities under political control. Autocratic and clearly different from a state in several respects, the LTTE nonetheless also acted as a highly disciplined actor with unambiguous lines of command and effectively assigned responsibilities, at times enforcing public structures within its areas of control. These structural characteristics offered a platform on which an outside actor (be it a peace facilitator or a monitoring mission) could potentially relate to the two sides in a meaningful and mutually responsible way; as long as there was agreement on and commitment to the overall goal and purposes of such a relationship.

POLITICAL CONFRONTATION

The Tamil-Sinhalese conflict has historical, political and cultural roots. It has been fought by military means since the 1970's, with several periods of armed clashes, conventional warfare and a protracted struggle between the LTTE and the GOSL. Other Tamil groups have also taken up violent action in the course of the conflict, although they have later generally aligned themselves with the state forces (in part due to the threat posed to them by the LTTE). As such they were not explicit parties to the CFA. Likewise, the parties remaining committed to non-violence in their struggle for Tamil rights (some represented in Parliament) were not direct signatories to the CFA. Most of them, however, united under the banner of the *Tamil National Alliance (TNA)* and accepted the LTTE as representatives of the Tamils in the peace talks with the Government.

Although both Sinhalese and Tamil myths ostensibly "explain" the conflict (with reference to ancient history and age-old animosity between Sinhalese and Tamil kings) most scholars agree that an ethnic awareness (relating to race, language, religion and



SEPARATING ZONE: The conflict for several years divided Sri Lanka in areas controlled by the respective parties. SLMM monitor in a Zone of Separation with GOSL soldiers.

politics) was first formed in a significant way in the years leading up to independence in 1948. The struggle for political power before and around the time of independence was principally based on *class* more than ethnic identity. However, the colonial experience established some basic conditions for conflict which were further exploited after the British left the island. Myths and narratives were effectively used in the political agitation that emerged, which increasingly came to be framed by an ethno-nationalistic vocabulary.

The model of democracy adopted at independence in 1948 led to a majority system in which the Sinhalese would always control the country's parliament. Subsequent policies within education, language and religion reinforced what the Tamil minority saw as discriminatory favouritism by the Sinhalese majority, contributing to the subsequent conflict. Particularly infamous, in the eyes of the Tamils, was the 1956 language act (the so-called *Sinhala-Only Bill*) which elevated the majority language above that of the Tamil and Muslim populations. Widely seen as a scrupulous election tactic to win the support of the southern masses, the justification for the move was an alleged need to rectify a colonial-time inherited Tamil overrepresentation in professional occupations such as medicine, engineering and academia. Thus, mainstream Sri Lankan politics was already by the mid-1950's framed by an ethno-nationalistic discourse. Along with state-sponsored resettlement schemes in areas which many Tamils

consider part of their traditional homeland, this sowed the seeds of what was to become a long drawn out conflict between successive Sinhalese-dominated governments and several Tamil opposition groups and parties.

In response to the ethnicity based "standardisation" policy for university admission introduced in 1972, a new constitution affording Buddhism the 'foremost place' and reconfirming Sinhala as the country's only official language, the main opposition party at the time, the *Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF)*, in a 1976 resolution, officially called for the Tamil people's self-determination in their own homeland ('Eelam'). This move became significant for the way the conflict has later been understood; namely as one in which Sri Lankan sovereignty and unity, as defined and defended by the Sinhalese, stands against LTTE separatism and the Tamils' proclaimed right to self-determination.

MILITARY CONFRONTATION

Tamil claims for autonomy did not lead to any notable change in the state set-up and gradually the balance shifted from constitutional politics to militancy. The few organisations that remained committed to democracy and non-violence soon came to play a secondary role, as most Tamil groups transformed their struggle into armed resistance. The LTTE, who won prominence by attacking state forces and officials as well as members of competing Tamil groups, was however an armed group from its inception.

First emerging in 1972 under the name the *Tamil New Tigers (TNT)*, a splinter group of the Tamil student movement, the LTTE was formed on 5 May 1976 under the leadership of the 21 year-old Vellupillai Prabhakaran. Born in the small town of Valvettithurai on the northern shore of the Jaffna peninsula,

“The Tamil-Sinhalese conflict has historical, political and cultural roots. It has been fought by military means since the 1970's, with several periods of armed clashes, conventional warfare and a protracted struggle between the LTTE and the GOSL.



CONFLICT COST: The conflict took a heavy toll on, with a large number of casualties on both sides, civilians and soldiers alike.

Prabhakaran joined the Tamil nationalist movement as a youth and purportedly carried out his first political assassination by shooting Alfred Duraipappah, the mayor of Jaffna, in 1975.

Prabhakaran belongs to the relatively lower Karaiyar caste. Traditional Hinduism is not a major factor in the LTTE ideology, the prime source of direction and inspiration for the members of the organisation is Tamil nationalism. Prabhakaran once declared his goal to be ‘revolutionary socialism and the creation of an egalitarian society’. LTTE leaders justified militarism by claiming that such means are required to defend the nation against the stronger state enemy. This, they alleged, is witnessed by the fact that many years of non-violent Tamil opposition proved to be ineffectual, futile and obsolete.

The GOSL responded to the armed struggle of the LTTE by enacting strict security measures, in particular the 1979 *Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)*, which removed a whole range of legal restrictions on the part of the security forces. Agitation for Tamil independence was criminalised in an amendment to the Constitution a few years later. The conflict escalated rapidly, turning into warfare, after the 1983 *Black July Pogrom*. The killing of thirteen government soldiers by the LTTE sparked riots all over the island during which mobs killed more than 1,000 Tamil citizens, burning Tamil owned houses, shops and factories. Thereafter, the LTTE–GOSL conflict manifested itself as a destructive and repetitive series of assassinations, bombings and minor skirmishes (including conventional war battles) in-between relatively calm but short-lived peace lulls.

EARLY PEACE ATTEMPTS

The first ceasefire was agreed upon in June 1985. Peace talks commenced in Bhutan’s capital the following month, only to be called off after two days. The *Thimphu Principles*, articulated by the Tamil negotiation team, have since remained a cornerstone of Tamil demands vis-à-vis the government. Borrowing much from the TULF 1976 resolution, the principles insist on the recognition of the Tamils as a distinct nation, the recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils and the recognition of the right to self-determination of the Tamil nation.

An *Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF)* was deployed to Sri Lanka in 1987 as part of an accord which made Tamil an official language alongside Sinhala and also committed the government of J. R. Jeyawardene to accept a merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces to allow some degree of autonomy for the Tamils. A referendum to confirm or reject the merger was postponed every year after 1988. (In October 2006 the Supreme Court ruled the merger unconstitutional; a decision seen by many as a set-back for reaching a political settlement.) The IPKF operation proved a failure. More than 1,200 Indian soldiers and 2,000 Sri Lankans were killed in less than 30 months, by which time both the GOSL and the LTTE demanded the Indians leave the island.

In 1989, the LTTE asked for mediation assistance from the United Nations but the GOSL was against an internationalisation of the conflict to that extent. The subsequent years became years of gross human rights violations on the island. The LTTE resumed its struggle against the security forces. The GOSL simultaneously had to react to a southern revolt organised by the *Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)*. Brutality characterised the actions of all parties involved. The criminalisation of Sri Lankan politics and the undermining of human rights, that have made the conflict so dangerous for civilians, date mainly from this period.

In May 1991, one year after the withdrawal of Indian troops from the island, a suspected LTTE cadre blew herself up at an election rally in Tamil Nadu, India, killing India’s former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and a dozen others. India outlawed the LTTE the following year and the region’s most powerful state has since played a detached and limited role in the LTTE–GOSL conflict and related peace efforts.

Several actors tried throughout the 1990s to bridge the gap between the protagonists. Short-lived cessations of hostilities were agreed in the first months of the new millennium and then again in 1994–1995. The talks held during the temporary halts in fighting were promising for a while but proved unsustainable. A small team of international monitors invited to oversee the 1994–1995 ceasefire was never able to commence work as the parties did not agree on the final modalities. The LTTE withdrew from the 1995 talks after having felt belittled by the composition of the GOSL team. Subsequently, the GOSL embarked on a ‘twin-track strategy’ of political devolution and intensified military action; a campaign known as *war for peace*. This dual approach apparently only increased the LTTE’s and many Tamils’ distrust in the GOSL’s motivation for power sharing. At the same time, the way in which the LTTE ruled and exercised its military power, contributed to undermine the organisation’s image. International opinion increasingly came to regard the LTTE as an obstacle to peace in Sri Lanka.

A new phase in the peace process emerged at the turn of the millennium when the Royal Norwegian Government was eventually approached to act as a facilitator.

More on the Peace Process on pages 23–29

The Peace Process

SRI LANKA HAS SEEN SEVERAL ATTEMPTS AT CREATING PEACE
– ALSO THROUGH OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE

Several attempts have been made to resolve the Sri Lankan conflict with the help of outside actors, including the deployment of an Indian peacekeeping force in the 1980's. The latest Peace Process, facilitated by the Royal Norwegian Government (RNG), led to the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA).

Peace attempts in the 1980's and early 1990's failed and the sliding into new rounds of intense warfare towards the end of the millennium revoked calls for another attempt to find a peaceful solution. In November 1999, the *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)* overran much of the territory held by the *Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL)* forces in southern Mullaithivu and northern Vavuniya.

In December 1999, Chandrika B. Kumaratunga, shortly after being re-elected President, revealed that Norwegian diplomats had been trying to establish a platform for peace negotiations between the LTTE and the GOSL. Their efforts had met with little success. However, diplomatic preparations for a possible peace process were set to continue when both President Kumaratunga and LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran, in early 2000, formally invited the RNG as official Facilitator of a Peace Process between the two Parties. The stated aim was to transform the military conflict into a situation of normalcy and peace.

THE INITIATING PERIOD

On 1 April 2000, the RNG appointed Member of Parliament (MP) Erik Solheim as Special Envoy to Sri Lanka. The ongoing shuttle diplomacy was thereby strengthened through intensified contacts with the Parties and frequent consultations with India. On the ground the war continued. After fierce fighting, the LTTE, in April 2000, captured the strategically important Elephant Pass and the Lyakachchi military complex.

The RNG's role at this stage was essentially to be a channel for communication and to serve as a discussion partner between the GOSL and the LTTE. The chief task was to stay in regular contact with the Parties, suggest confidence-building measures while gauging their true interest for peace, attempt to further rouse their motivation for a halt in hostilities and eventual negotiations. Meanwhile other countries levelled diplomatic pressure, trying to convince the Parties to abandon the war path.

Accompanied by Norway's Ambassador Jon Westborg (then a senior in Colombo's diplomatic corps) and Foreign Ministry official Kjersti Tromsdal, Erik Solheim on 1 November 2000 made headlines in Sri Lanka by visiting the rebel-held Vanni for talks

with the LTTE leadership – Prabhakaran's first meeting with a foreign diplomat in seven years.

However, there was no military pause until the LTTE, on Christmas Eve 2000, declared a one-month unilateral ceasefire. The unilateral halt in fighting was extended three times, with the LTTE strongly criticising the GOSL for never reciprocating the move.

In July 2001, the LTTE destroyed more than a dozen military and civilian aircraft at Sri Lanka's main air base and only international airport. Four months earlier the LTTE had been listed as a terrorist organisation by the United Kingdom, the third country to make such a move, after India and the USA.

No further progress in terms of rapprochement between the Parties was reported until elections were held in December 2001. On a pledge to open talks with the LTTE, the opposition coalition, led by the *United National Party (UNP)* and supported by the *Tamil National Alliance (TNA)* – both of which accepted the LTTE as representatives of the Tamils in any future peace talks – won with a slender margin. Ranil Wickramasinghe became Prime Minister and entered into a fragile cohabitation with President Kumaratunga. In the political landscape of Sri Lanka, the two leaders were generally not considered to be on very good terms.

The LTTE announced another unilateral ceasefire on 21 December 2001. This time, the GOSL responded positively and reciprocated the move. Six days later the new cabinet asked the RNG to resume its facilitating role.

“Diplomatic preparations for a possible peace process were set to continue when both President Kumaratunga and LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran, in early 2000, formally invited the RNG as official Facilitator of a Peace Process between the two Parties.

The Ceasefire Agreement

The Peace Process was taking an important step forward when the already in-effect cessation of hostilities, on 22 February 2002, was officialised through the first formal *Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)* between the GOSL and the LTTE in seven years.

The truce made it possible to restore a certain level of normalcy in the Northeast as well as in the Capital (Colombo) and the rest of the country. Besides regulating the ceasefire and mandating the *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)*, the CFA included measures to improve living conditions for the local population. The break from war signalled by the CFA was welcomed both nationally and internationally; India, the USA, the EU and several of its member states, as well as the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, all vowed support to the agreement and to the facilitative efforts of the Royal Norwegian Government (RNG).

The CFA is included as Appendix 1

The lifting of travel restrictions and removal of check-points indicated that change was imminent. War-affected people in the North were again able to buy goods from the South at normal prices and families separated by the GOSL–LTTE frontline could reunite when the A9 highway was reopened for general public use for the first time in 12 years. Expectations were high; hope and optimism flourished. Refugees began returning from abroad in considerable numbers, especially from India. Charitable organisations expanded their development programmes, with positive effects for education (e.g. renovation of school buildings), health (upgrading of health centres and services) and other sectors. These measures, not least the opening of blocked roads for normal transport and trade, were a major political impetus behind the ceasefire move.

The Parties

The two formal Parties, the GOSL and the LTTE, entered into the CFA. There were several other actors on the political scene in Sri Lanka – also in relation to the conflict – who were not, however, formally part of the RNG facilitated process and subsequently not signatories to the CFA. Consequently, the SLMM was designed to interact directly with the two designated Parties to the CFA specifically. At the same time, with the Agreement's emphasis on the return to 'normalcy', the SLMM was implicitly expected to relate also to other stakeholders, predominantly within Sri Lankan civil society.

Although not specified in the CFA, the major gateways for official interaction with the Parties were through their respective peace secretariats; the *Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP)* – the GOSL body coordinating and facilitating the Peace Process – and in parallel the *Peace Secretariat (PS)* of the LTTE.

To the SLMM, itself a creation of the CFA, the two official signatories to the agreement had to be treated as equivalent Parties regarding liaising, monitoring and reporting. Both Parties committed themselves not only to the ceasefire but also to aid the

SLMM in conducting its mission, including the implementation of the major operational pre-requisitions of guaranteed security and unrestricted access.

The fact remained, however, that one Party was the legally appointed government of the republic of Sri Lanka (i.e. the formal body of a sovereign state). Therefore, the relationship with the GOSL also carried another dimension; that of judicially formalising the presence of the SLMM and its staff in the country. This was done through the *Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA)*, formally entered into between the RNG and the GOSL, with pre-conditions accepted in writing by the LTTE. Furthermore, the GOSL also took upon itself the specific task of providing the SLMM with air transportation within Sri Lanka, the SLMM itself lacking such means.

The SOMA is included as Appendix 2

Although the GOSL remained party to the CFA until its abrogation in 2008, the GOSL cabinet changed along the way. At the time of signing the CFA in 2002, Ranil Wickramasinghe was Prime Minister. In 2004 he was replaced by Mahinda Rajapakse, whose election campaign disapproved of several CFA stipulations. When, in the subsequent year, Rajapakse won the presidential elections, party colleague Ratnasiri Wickremanayake took over as Premier. The two were President and Prime Minister, respectively, when the GOSL in January 2008 decided to abrogate the CFA.

Whereas the GOSL was an internationally recognised body, the LTTE was a disputed organisation, both nationally and internationally, to the extent that it was designated a 'terrorist' group by a number of countries, excluding formal contacts. Furthermore, within Sri Lanka, several Sinhalese parties disputed the legality of the CFA, bringing the issue to the Supreme Court in 2007. The SLMM, however, continued to treat the LTTE (who exercised de facto control over parts of the country while exerting a self proclaimed authority with its own structures) as one of two Parties to the CFA, therefore one to which the mission had to relate. At the same time, in the eyes of the international community, the GOSL was formally responsible for the state of Sri Lanka and its entire territory, including territorial waters and airspace.



PEACE PLANNERS: The Peace Process continued after the Sri Lanka elections in 2004 and 2005, when Mahinda Rajapakse took over as Prime Minister and then President, until it stalled in 2006. The President meeting Norwegian Minister of International Cooperation, Erik Solheim in 2006; Special Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer to the far right.



AGREEMENT ARCHITECTS: The CFA was signed under the Premiership of Ranil Wickramasinghe (centre); the Peace Process facilitated by Norway, with (from left) Ambassador Jon Westborg, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vidar Helgesen, and Special Envoy Erik Solheim playing key roles.

The SLMM

The SLMM was explicitly established and implicitly mandated by the CFA, as an instrument to enhance the effect of the Peace Process. The main task of the SLMM was to assist the Parties themselves in adhering to their commitments. Additionally, the SLMM was, in certain circumstances requested to assist the Facilitator in pursuing the process beyond the tasks inscribed in the CFA.

For a description of the mandate, see pages 36–37

The notion of an international, non-military monitoring mechanism was introduced at an early stage in the process of the creation of the CFA, although it was not part of the first draft. Both Parties expressed a desire for a mission which would monitor compliance and be primarily connected to the *Forward Defence Localities (FDL)*. The idea was to keep the mechanism small initially and to expand as the effect of the CFA became more comprehensive.

The option of a United Nations mission was ruled out (so as not to internationalise the conflict) and a number of potential contributors to what was deemed to be a civilian mission were excluded, for various political reasons. India, a regional great power, was involved in the deliberations and (as did the Parties) expressed trust in Norway, arguing the case of a Norwegian-led Nordic monitoring mission. Due to its key role as Facilitator, the RNG expressed considerable reluctance to take Part 01n monitoring the ceasefire. It was requested to assist also in establishing, financing and manning the SLMM and in appointing its Head

“The SLMM was explicitly established and implicitly mandated by the CFA, as an instrument to enhance the effect of the Peace Process.

of Mission (HOM). The RNG, however, remained hesitant. With the prevailing urgency, the “window of opportunity” open and consensus over the need to establish a monitoring mechanism, the RNG finally agreed to take on the dual role of Facilitator and lead nation in the monitoring mission.

Consequently, the Parties formally requested that the RNG help set up the SLMM and appoint its HOM. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) tasked retired members of the Norwegian Army to carry out the initial design of the SLMM and approached the other Nordic countries to join the mission. The initial planning of the SLMM took place in parallel with the finalising of the CFA.

The first members of the mission, with HOM Maj Gen (retired) Trond Furuhoide, arrived in Sri Lanka on 2 March 2002, a week after the signing of the Agreement on 22 February. This launched the operation of the SLMM in Sri Lanka.

For an in-depth presentation of the SLMM, see pages 35–52



NORDIC NOTABILITY: The five Nordic countries were the underwriters of the SLMM, and in February 2005, HRH Princess Victoria of Sweden (second from left) visited the Swedish Embassy in Colombo, meeting Swedish monitors.

The Facilitator and the Co-Sponsors of SLMM

Sri Lanka's recent Peace Process was supported by several countries, with the RNG serving in the capacity as Facilitator and the joint group of five Nordic countries providing monitors to the SLMM and jointly financing the operation.

With respect to the SLMM, the Nordic countries acted as an entity – a group of co-sponsors responding to the call for support from the Parties – coordinated by the RNG. Shortly after the signing of the CFA, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden all agreed to second monitors and contribute with core funding to the SLMM.

The background to the RNG's engagement in the Peace Process in Sri Lanka is basically two-fold: Firstly, the RNG's close and long-time relationship with Sri Lanka as a state including its contact with both Parties to the conflict; secondly, the RNG's policy and track record of involvement in political peacemaking processes, with facilitation in several conflicts – as well as contributions to international peacekeeping. The bilateral development co-operation programmes commencing in 1967 have been a key element in the long-term relationship between Norway and Sri Lanka. In later years, much of this co-operation were directed towards projects directly and indirectly aiming to contribute to the Peace Process.

All Nordic governments have, at some stage and to some degree, developed bilateral relations with Sri Lanka. Sweden started its development cooperation in 1958 and Iceland made Sri Lanka one of its main partners in development co-operation in the course of the Peace Process. Finland and Denmark also co-operate with Sri Lanka and all the Nordic countries have, at various times and in different ways, established diplomatic representation in Colombo.

See Part 03; 'Operational Resources' for Nordic contributions to the SLMM

The Peace Talks

Assisted by the Facilitator, the Parties soon began to prepare the ground for direct talks, as envisaged and premised by the CFA. Six sessions of top-level peace talks took place during 2002–2003, in Thailand (three times), Norway, Germany and Japan. Two final rounds of talks were held in Switzerland in 2006 – with a new GOSL delegation following the 2004 and 2005 elections.

In between these sessions, the RNG remained the key point of contact for the Parties and others with a stake in the conflict and/or process. The role of Facilitator also included preparations for and co-organisation of donor conferences to secure financial support for war recovery efforts in Sri Lanka. The SLMM, acting on a request by the Facilitator, assisted the LTTE in the practical preparations necessary for being able to attend peace talks abroad.

In September 2002, twelve days before the first session, the GOSL de-proscribed the LTTE who had demanded a removal of the ban to be able to negotiate as a recognised party and stand on an equal footing with the GOSL in the talks. Lifting the ban, the GOSL took a critical step to effectuate direct communication between the two sides.

The ambience in the *first session* was good; the RNG, as the chair, only had to direct the conversation loosely. The Parties demonstrated receptiveness and a genuine will to search for solutions; both seemed earnest and sincerely committed to resolving critical issues. In the first session priority was given to the normalcy aspect of the CFA. The Parties agreed to establish a joint task force for humanitarian and reconstruction activities; its main focus was to be on mine action and resettlement and rehabilitation of *internally displaced persons (IDPs)*. In addition a special committee for resolving issues related to state-declared *High Security Zones (HSZ)* was decided upon.

In the *second round* of talks, the Parties decided to jointly improve the volatile security situation in the East and to establish peace committees for problem solving at community level. A number of sub-committees were agreed upon, designated to focus on matters such as de-escalation and normalisation (SDN), immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation needs (SIHRN) and gender issues (SGI). These committees were launched and made operative during the period of peace talks. Another sub-committee, projected to focus on political matters (SPM), never kicked off.

The Facilitator informed the President and the opposition of all major developments during the process. Muslim leader Rauf Hakeem, who had struck a separate deal with LTTE leader Prabhakaran in April 2002 and was a member of the GOSL delegation in the six initial rounds of talks, was also well informed. However, the two Sinhalese nationalist parties, the *Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU)* and the *Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)*, ignored invitations to joint discussions by the Facilitator.

A significant outcome of the *third session* was the decision to explore a federal solution within a united Sri Lanka, based on



DIRECT DIALOGUE: During 2003, the Parties on several occasions met in the Zone of Separation (ZOS) at Omanthai, in order to discuss CFA-related and humanitarian issues.

the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples. In the Oslo Declaration of December 2002, the Parties agreed to explore a solution based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka. The Parties acknowledged that progress on the political issues had to be supported by the continued consolidation of the CFA.

Nonetheless, the slow rate at which agreed steps were being implemented led to disappointment and mistrust, especially on the part of the LTTE. Their frustration surfaced on the issue of HSZ's which they considered an occupation of Tamil land. The GOSL representatives, on their part, amid rumours that the LTTE were establishing new camps while the talks were on, felt that the LTTE did not deliver what it had promised in terms of security.

In April 2003, the LTTE suspended the direct talks, giving three main reasons for the unilateral withdrawal, of which one was supposed attempts by the GOSL to marginalise the LTTE vis-à-vis the international community. In particular, the LTTE criticised that a preparatory meeting for a donor conference in Tokyo was held in

the USA, where to the LTTE, being listed as terrorist organisation, could not go. With the top-level talks suspended, the activities and meetings of all the designated sub-committees also came to an end.

[See Appendix 7 for details re the main events](#)

THE MIDDLE PERIOD

The Tokyo donor meeting in June 2003 pledged USD 4.5 billion in economic assistance to Sri Lanka conditioned by progress in the Peace Process. The gathering was organised by Norway, Japan, USA, and the EU, these afterwards constituting themselves as Co-Chairs of the process. The LTTE boycotted the conference, resisting diplomatic efforts to persuade them to attend.

Four and half months after Tokyo, the LTTE presented its provisional plan for the transfer of political power from Colombo to an *Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA)* for the Northeast. While formally respecting Sri Lanka's sovereignty, the proposal implied self-rule in most fields and suggested an LTTE-dominated administration should govern the region for a period of five years, after which time elections should be held.

Five days after the LTTE presented its proposal, the President, on 4 November 2003, declared a state of emergency on grounds that the country's security and sovereignty were at risk. President Kumaratunga also took control of three ministries and suspended the usual functioning of the Parliament. Ten days

“A significant outcome of the third session was the decision to explore a federal solution within a united Sri Lanka, based on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples.

later the Norwegian MFA announced that the Peace Process was on hold until the political crisis had been resolved.

In early March 2004, Karuna Amman, the Eastern military commander of the LTTE and a member of its delegation to the peace talks, defected. Severe fighting for control of the LTTE-held pockets in the East between the Prabhakaran and Karuna factions broke out.

The parliamentary elections in April 2004 were won by the *Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)*-led alliance, including the JVP, the JHU and the *Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP)*. A government loyal to the President, with Mahinda Rajapakse as PM, assumed power and the state perspective on the Peace Process changed. The new GOSL administration renounced the status that had previously been granted to the LTTE when the negotiations got underway and criticised the format of the Peace Process for setting out the path for a separate state. Nonetheless, on 22 April the President requested the RNG to resume its role as Facilitator.

In the following months of uncertainty, Norway and other countries tried to create a platform for talks on which the Parties could agree. The Co-Chairs expressed concern and stated that the Parties must resume negotiations in order to prevent international attention and support from shifting to other parts of the world. However, both Parties' interest in and loyalty to the CFA continued to decline.

The December 2004 tsunami caused a tragic loss of life and widespread destruction in the coastal areas of Sri Lanka. Hopes emerged that the recovery phase might bring the disputants closer to each other and make it more likely that the stalled Peace Process could be restarted. Discussions over the control of relief funds ultimately led to the establishment of the *Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS)*, a mecha-

The Co-Chairs

The involvement of Japan, the USA, and the EU was important, especially in the middle period of the Peace Process. Following the Tokyo donor meeting in 2003, this troika, together with Norway, established the Co-Chair constellation.

The Co-Chairs were established in order to monitor the Parties efforts and support initiatives which could lead to progress in the attempts to foster peace. However, the donor strategy of linking aid to peace conditionality worked only to a limited degree. The end result was that humanitarian assistance in general and tsunami and war recovery efforts in particular were further politicised. In the later stages of the Peace Process, the Co-Chair mechanism proved of little value as it became apparent that the policies and priorities of the partaking states differed. In consequence, the Co-Chairs link to and influence over the conflict disputants as a group gradually diminished. For the Facilitator, however, the Co-Chair group constituted a valuable inroad to informal contact and co-ordination of efforts.



KILLINOCHCHI CONNECTION: Norway was invited by both Parties to exercise a facilitating role in the Peace Process, working closely with the respective leaders all through the period of engagement. Norwegian Peace Envoy Erik Solheim meeting LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran in 2006; LTTE PW Leader S.P. Thamilselvan in the middle.

nism granting the LTTE, the GOSL and Muslim representatives influence over the allocation of tsunami aid in the Northeast. However, due to a Supreme Court ruling the apparatus was never put in place and the opportunity (indirectly produced by the tsunami) for settling old differences was not grasped.

The period from mid-2004 throughout 2006 was characterised by growing instability, in part due to an increase in aerial and artillery attacks, bomb blasts and extrajudicial killings. The downward slide into brutality and violence threw both the CFA and the overall Peace Process into a deep crisis.

THE LATE PHASE

Presidential elections, as well as a new pre-scheduled vote to parliament, were held in 2005, both won by the SLFP. PM Rajapakse took over as Head of State after defeating CFA underwriter Ranil Wickramasinghe with a nominal margin of 50.3 percent of the votes. The LTTE enforced a boycott of the presidential elections in the North.

The Parties met again in Geneva in February 2006 – four years after the signing of the CFA and nearly three years after last sitting around the same table. The objective of the talks was to save the CFA from total collapse. The two day session, chaired by the Facilitator, produced a promising consensus on urgent tasks each Party was to undertake in the following weeks. However, the concessions and promises made during the talks were never honoured. Instead, both Parties' violations of the CFA continued to escalate.

In June 2006, the RNG asked both the Sri Lankan President and the LTTE to reaffirm in writing their commitment to the Peace Process, which both sides eventually did. Five months later the GOSL enquired about the status of the Peace Process by writing to the Facilitator.

The second and final round of talks in Geneva (October 2006) did not produce agreement on any major issue and failed to lay to rest any concern that the Peace Process would not recuperate soon.



APF/SCANPX

EXIT EU: A consequence of the EU listing of the LTTE as a 'terrorist organisation' in 2006, was the withdrawal of all SLMM monitors from EU member states – including the HOM, Major General (retired) Ulf Henricsson.

The discussions proved that the initially constructive and optimistic dialogue had been reduced to rather disconnected, one-way speech acts of condemnation and denigration. Correspondingly, the influence and standing of the Facilitator had been significantly reduced. Norway's new Special Envoy, Jon Hanssen-Bauer who replaced Erik Solheim in March 2006 after the latter joined the RNG the previous year, visited Sri Lanka seven times in 2006.

The SLMM participated as an observer at both Geneva talks. Requested by the Facilitator, the SLMM prepared a report for each of the two meetings, the so-called 'Geneva Reports', broadly outlining the implementation of the CFA as well as assessing the situation.

See the Geneva reports on:
www.slmm.info

The mutual recognition and parity between the Parties, as spelled out by the CFA, changed visibly in the course of the Peace Process – primarily because of the internal split in the LTTE and the new GOSL stance on the question of LTTE representativeness. Under the new circumstances both Parties repeatedly expressed disappointment that the Facilitator as well as the SLMM did not criticise the other side more harshly.

The terror-listing of the LTTE by Canada and the EU in 2006 was followed by a harshening of the vocabulary used by both Parties and a downscaling of the SLMM after personnel from the partaking EU member states had to leave. The GOSL's policy

“ By the end of 2006, the Parties were effectively back at war. In September 2007, the GOSL announced that it had defeated the LTTE and liberated the people in the East. On 2 January 2008, the GOSL decided to abrogate the CFA.

towards foreign diplomats (including the Facilitator) who wanted to meet with the LTTE leadership in Vanni was also tightened. The increasing pressure being placed on the LTTE from the outside world not only added to their isolation but to the widening of the gap between the signatories to the CFA. It also made the international community less able to directly engage with and influence the GOSL's most important adversary – and Peace Process counterpart.

By the end of 2006, the Parties were effectively back at war. In September 2007, the GOSL announced that it had defeated the LTTE and liberated the people in the East. On 2 January 2008, the GOSL decided to abrogate the CFA; written notification to this effect was handed to Norway's Ambassador Tore Hattrem in Colombo the following day by Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama. The 2002–2008 ceasefire remains the longest lasting period in which the Parties to Sri Lanka's civil war agreed *in principle* to cease hostilities.

The Monitoring Mission

THE SLMM WAS ESTABLISHED AS A UNIQUE MECHANISM FOR A SPECIFIC PURPOSE

Conceived within the Peace Process and constituting an integral part of the CFA, the SLMM was a key feature of the implementation of the Agreement. The mission was an independent instrument established especially for this purpose – agreed upon by the Parties, supported by key stakeholders.

The *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)* was conceptualised within the course of finalising the *Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)*, yet fully designed and deployed over a short span of time, following the signing of the Agreement. Asked to assist in the establishment of the mission the Facilitator, i.e. the *Royal Norwegian Government (RNG)*, undertook to develop the basic structural approach, with the operational concept developed by the mission itself, in parallel with the deployment. Responding to requests from both Parties and with support from India, the RNG also agreed to establish, finance and – albeit reluctantly – man the mission, also appointing the *Head of Mission (HOM)*.

THE SLMM CONCEPTION

The idea of an impartial mechanism independent of the Parties, assigned an instrumental role in the implementation of an eventual ceasefire agreement was brought to the table at an early stage of the Peace Process. Supported by both Parties and seconded by other key actors, the notion of a non-military mission created by others than the established international structures such as the United Nations or the European Union was readily incorporated into the CFA. Here, what became the SLMM was accorded a far-reaching, albeit rather unspecified, function in the all-important task of assisting the Parties in adhering to the commitments they had entered into through the CFA.



DESIGNATED DISTRICTS: The SLMM was established within the framework of the CFA, to be present in six designated districts in Eastern and Northern Sri Lanka. The early SLMM office in Batticaloa.

Being conceived and constructed in an atmosphere of good will and great optimism, the impression of the Facilitator, agreed to by the Parties, was that of a lean structure with a limited timeframe – monitoring and verifying the proceedings towards the next stage in the process: a peace accord. Although the main emphasis of what was interpreted as the SLMM's mandate within the CFA was on *verification*, the chosen instrument became a *monitoring* mission, which was structured and staffed accordingly, with focus on continuous field monitoring although verification of specific clauses in the CFA was carried out. One of the few precise provisions regarding the SLMM in the Agreement is that of an instructed permanent presence in six designated districts. Hence, monitoring in six districts was one of the determining directions when designing the mission.

See also a presentation of the districts, pages 32–34

The operation was not limited to these districts, defined as the *Area of Responsibility (AOR)*; the SLMM was expected to monitor CFA-related developments throughout Sri Lanka, constituting its *Area of Operation (AOO)*. Although an early idea of a mechanism composed of 16 monitors was soon shelved, the initial set-up was only marginally larger at twenty plus, before the HOM soon raised the requirements, reaching approximately 40–45 monitors; a number that peaked at approximately 60 before it was abruptly halved in 2006.

See also 'Mission Structure', pages 47–52

THE SLMM CHARACTER

The monitoring mission was decidedly a non-military – 'civilian' – mechanism, and although the HOM was required to be a (retired) army officer, the SLMM was neither armed nor uniformed. Furthermore, and more decisively, it held no enforcement power to apply, and barely any formalised authority to lean on.

Like other mission-specific instruments, the SLMM had to be tailored to the assignment and tuned to the actual situation. Unlike most other missions, usually drawing on established structures with existing resources – including trained personnel, tested systems and tailored competency – the SLMM was neither assembled nor prepared as a unit; individuals were recruited from five

countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), to be assigned specified positions upon arrival in the operational area.

Although inspired by UN peacekeeping missions and structures, the SLMM differed from those on several counts: not only was the SLMM not deployed by an international organisation, it entirely lacked a governing body – it also lacked a distinctive mandate, and, logically, a provision for mandate revision and extension. Furthermore, there were no terms within the CFA for terminating the mission – other than through the abrogation of the Agreement as such, which eventually occurred in January 2008. Without such a formal provision, the question of how the SLMM could be withdrawn, and on whose decision, if so desired, was not clarified.

The *idea* of, as well as the *intention* with, the SLMM may have been somewhat vague in the early stages, and would likely vary between the Facilitator and the Parties. Even with the Facilitator, within the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), not familiar with designing and deploying field missions, the opinions on and guidance toward the SLMM would not necessarily be entirely coherent. For these reasons, the absence of definite stipulations and regulations, and particularly due to the void of formal governance, there was naturally a lack of *instructions* from the prime stakeholders – the Facilitator and the Parties – as to how the monitoring instrument should best be utilised.

See also 'Mission Mandate', pages 36–37

THE SLMM CONSTRAINTS

The SLMM was designed and deployed within a certain historical and political context, within a window of opportunity for a ceasefire agreement; the chosen mechanism was a model both Parties, and other stakeholders, could agree on. In the intensive period leading up to the finalisation of the CFA – and the establishment of the SLMM – there were attempts to gather lessons from other relevant missions. In a situation with more time and leeway, other – different – prescriptions may have been chosen, e.g. drawing on relevant experiences regarding the notion of *verification* vs. *monitoring* from the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in former Yugoslavia, and models for *joint monitoring* structures from the Joint Military Commission (JMC) in the Sudan.

See also 'Mission Concept', pages 38–46

Moving from the designing table to the field operation, flaws in the CFA became apparent, as seen from the operational point of view of the SLMM, contributing to the constraints and challenges facing the mission. Despite often cordial and at times constructive relation with the Parties, they harboured an ambiguous stance toward the mission. Although they never formally challenged the existence of the SLMM, both Parties criticised the mission when so doing served their respective interests. The Parties rarely approached the SLMM from their common platform, the CFA. And, lacking a joint forum, they never aimed

“Consequently, the SLMM was designed on the basis of – and with experience from – military operations, rather than civilian missions.



STEIN J. BJØRGE/ATEMPROSTEN/SCANPIX

CIVILIAN CAPACITY: The SLMM was defined as a civilian mission – unarmed and without enforcement capability – although largely designed with experience from military operations. SLMM monitor outside Killinochchi in Northern Sri Lanka.

at governing the mission, making it their own instrument in real terms.

Joint, formalised forums for the purpose of implementing the CFA, and regular and direct contact between the two Parties not being established, left the SLMM to facilitate and chair such meetings on an ad hoc, rather than a regular basis. In the initial phase of the operation, with a prevailing cooperative stance from the Parties, this was a feasible option. As of 2003–04, it became increasingly difficult to arrange such encounters, and there were no other provisions to facilitate regular contact, such as the deployment of liaison officers from the Parties to the SLMM HQ, or with each other.

Without formal governance, and with the HOM formally standing accountable neither to the Parties nor to the Facilitator (otherwise than for financial accounting to the RNG), the SLMM was indeed an *independent* instrument. This was not only the case in principle, but also very much in reality, and it was largely left to the HOM to direct the mission, based on his interpretation of the CFA and a continuous assessment of the situation, and the priority of resources.

In the execution of the operation, the SLMM was constrained and challenged on several counts: The *operational resources* were not necessarily matched with the defined tasks and evolving challenges, and resources were commonly considered in the traditional fashion of financing manpower and logistics, not inviting innovative approaches to developing and implementing improved systems.

See also Part 03; 'Operational Resources'

The *operational environment* caused other major challenges, as the operation proceeded. Particularly from 2004 and decisively from 2006, the environment deteriorated, and the constraints increased, including a worsening working relation with the GOSL in particular, and with both Parties denying SLMM monitors access to areas of conflict and scenes of incidents, impeding the mission's ability to execute the operation.

See also Part 02; 'Operational Review'

The Districts of the AOR

THE SLMM OPERATED MAINLY IN SIX DESIGNATED DISTRICTS IN THE NORTH AND EAST OF SRI LANKA

The SLMM conducted its field operation in six districts designated in the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA): Three in the Northern Province and three in the Eastern Province, including the Vanni.

This combined area constituted the *Area of Responsibility (AOR)* of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), which furthermore was mandated to operate throughout Sri Lanka, the entire country constituting its *Area of Operation (AOO)*.

The Republic of Sri Lanka is divided into nine provinces, the first level of administrative division. The *provinces* are divided into 25 *districts*; each district is divided into units known as divisions. The districts constitute the main administrative unit.

The provincial divisions in the Northeast have caused considerable political controversy, and on 16 October 2006 the Sri Lanka Supreme Court ruled that the September 1988 proclamations by former President J.R. Jayewardene temporarily merging the two provinces in the north and east were null and void. Consequently, on 1 January 2007 the north-eastern Province was formally demerged into the Northern and Eastern provinces.

The attempted merger, which was pending a referendum to be formalised, was strongly opposed by Sinhalese nationalists. The two provinces constitute roughly one third of Sri Lankan territory, and contained the strongholds of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

In accordance with the CFA, the SLMM maintained a permanent presence in six districts in the north and east, mainly through District Offices (DO), partly by Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT – in Jaffna and Trincomalee), plus a Liaison Office to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the Vanni (LO LTTE in Kilinochchi). The designated districts, with respective DO's were:

| | |
|--------------------|------------|
| Jaffna | DO1 |
| Mannar | DO2 |
| Vavuniya | DO3 |
| Trincomalee | DO4 |
| Batticaloa | DO5 |
| Ampara | DO6 |

Vanni is a geographical region, formally one of Sri Lanka's electoral districts, covering the administrative districts of Mannar, Mullaitivu and Vavuniya in the Northern Province.

The following articles offer a brief introduction to the districts monitored by the SLMM, aiming to give a concise background to the geography, economy and history, as well as on the conflict setting in which the mission operated locally.

Jaffna


| | |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| Area: | 1,114 km² |
| Population: | 651,000 |

Jaffna is the Northernmost district of Sri Lanka, constituted by a peninsula and islands. The population is almost entirely Sri Lanka Tamils, most of whom are Hindus, with a significant Christian minority. The Palaly military complex is a key base for the SLA and the SLAF, with the harbour at Kankesanthurai significant to the SLN, being the location of the Northern Naval Command. With the CFA, an Exit/Entry (E/E) point to the LTTE-controlled area was established at Muhamalai.

Prior to the war Jaffna had many small scale manufacturing and food processing industries. Now, the primary economic activities are related to agriculture and trading, with remittances from the Tamil Diaspora sustaining many families.

For centuries, Jaffna was the capital of a Tamil kingdom before being conquered by the Europeans. The seat of literary culture, it hosts the Jaffna College dating back to 1819; the University of Jaffna, the main higher educational institution for Sri Lanka Tamils, opened in 1974. With the foremost concentration of Sri Lanka Tamils in the island, Jaffna has for decades been the main base for Tamil nationalist and opposition groups. From 1985, the LTTE was in control of most of the peninsula, with Jaffna its administrative and political stronghold, until overtaken by the SLA in 1995, forcing several hundred thousand to relocate to the heartland of Kilinochchi and Mullaithivu. The entire Muslim population was expelled by the LTTE in 1990. During the war, the civilian population endured massive breaches of human rights; extensive areas were declared HSZ's, preventing people from returning home.

Jaffna hosted SLMM's DO1, and NMT-J. Geographically, the islands constituted operational challenges in terms of access. Smuggling and harassment of civilians was, however, monitored. Jaffna being separated from the rest of the GOSL-controlled area shaped the focus of the SLMM – initially with regular monitoring of civilian crossing at the Muhamalai E/E point. With the closure of the A9, the SLMM monitored the effects of decreasing trade and transport. The activity of the LTTE political representatives was closely monitored; likewise the strong presence of the EPDR Political violence and killing was monitored, as was civil society. The many HSZ's presented the SLMM with several tasks, including monitoring the return of civilians.



Mannar

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|-------------|-----------------------|
| Area: | 1,963 km ² |
| Population: | 152,000 |

Mannar is the westernmost district in the Vanni region. Geologic evidence suggests that the 48 km long Adam's Bridge, separating the Gulf of Mannar from the Palk Strait, represents a former land connection between India and Sri Lanka. The entire population is Tamil-speaking, for the most part Christian, with sizeable Muslim and Hindu communities. Pesalai church is the country's largest and the Madhu Shrine is sought by pilgrims. Thiruketheeswaram Hindu temple is one of five ancient Sivan shrines on the island.

The primary economic activities are crop cultivation, fisheries and animal husbandry as well as commercial business. Employment opportunities are highly seasonal, and there are no institutional facilities for tertiary education. The war and frequent displacements drastically changed the economy; much infrastructure was destroyed, jungle swallowed once populated areas. Several thousand acres of irrigable farmland remains uncultivated due to intense military activity over several years in the Katukkaraiikulam area. With the CFA, an E/E point between the GOSL-controlled and the LTTE-held parts was established at Uliyankulam. During the whole CFA period, the district was divided between the GOSL-controlled Mannar Island and town area and the predominantly LTTE-controlled mainland.

Mannar hosted the SLMM's DO2. Geographically, the district posed several challenges for the SLMM. There were vast disputed areas south of the A14 road, particularly in the area of Silavatturai and Wilpattu National Park, in which control shifted between the GOSL and the LTTE. The Uliyankulam E/E point was regularly monitored, particularly in the context of civilian travel around religious holidays and the LTTE arrangements. With a high percentage of Sri Lanka's total fishery resources located between Mannar and Jaffna, conflicts occurred frequently at and in relation to the sea. Also, Mannar was a centre for smuggling of goods, weapons, and people. As a result of the smuggling, local society was influenced by criminal elements. In addition, the military presence was strong, and the LTTE Sea Tigers had numerous camps along the coast. The LTTE vessels from the camps were engaged in training and smuggling at sea. Moreover, the Sea Tigers had offices in Mannar. Recruitment was a common problem in the district.

Vavuniya

| | |
|-------------|-----------------------|
| Area: | 1,642 km ² |
| Population: | 200,000 |

Vavuniya is the large northeastern district of Sri Lanka. As the foremost transit area to the Vanni (and previously to Jaffna) it is regarded as the "gateway" to the north. The overwhelming majority of the population are Sri Lanka Tamils, with a notable Muslim and Sinhalese presence in the Southern part.

The economy is predominantly agricultural, however with declining output and farming income as a result of the long conflict. Animal husbandry is often combined with cultivation. Inland fishing (in tanks) has by tradition been another vital source of livelihood in some villages. Following the signing of the CFA, an E/E point between the 'cleared' and 'uncleared' areas was established on the A9 highway at Omanthai, opening for increased business.

A landlocked but militarily significant area, Vavuniya was for a long time divided between the LTTE-controlled north and the GOSL-controlled south (including Vavuniya town). While the damaging effects of the war are particularly evident in the Northern part, from which virtually the whole population was displaced, military activity and restrictions were omnipresent also in the town and on all roads leading to it. For several years Vavuniya was a frontline town. In addition, the area faced the problem of paramilitary groups. Instability and unpredictable violence was a feature of everyday life before the CFA and from 2006, leading to frequent displacements and other human suffering.

Vavuniya hosted the SLMM's DO3. Early on, the SLMM focused mainly on monitoring freedom of movement between the LTTE- and the GOSL-controlled areas, and verifying the Parties' compliance to the CFA on the Omanthai E/E point. Liaising, with facilitation of meetings between the Parties as the FDL's was another focus. Meanwhile, the strong presence of Tamil groups such as the EPDP, the EPRLF, TELO, and PLOTE warranted monitoring of their activities. The SLMM moreover monitored the establishment of the LTTE political offices in Vavuniya. Confrontation occurred regularly between the LTTE and the Tamil factions. As the armed conflict shifted from the east to the north in the end of 2006, Vavuniya became a very volatile area, with both Parties, and the Tamil factions, involved in killings, abductions, torture, abuse and extortion against each other and the civilian population.

Trincomalee

| | |
|-------------|-----------------------|
| Area: | 2,616 km ² |
| Population: | 413,000 |

Trincomalee is the Northernmost district of the Eastern Province. Historically, almost the entire population was Tamil-speaking, but from the 1960's onwards there has been a major influx of settlers from the South, altering the ethnic break-down. While most people remain Tamil-speaking, all major ethnic and religious groups make up substantial shares of the total population. About 41 percent of the inhabitants are Muslims; 35 percent are Tamils; 24 percent are Sinhalese.

The main income-generating activities are agriculture and business, including international trade, with fisheries being hampered due to security regulations. Tourism was a sizeable industry, and the economy was thriving before the conflict. Trincomalee town is situated on a peninsula north of Koddiiyar Bay, one of the world's largest natural harbours – a strategic advantage that has shaped its history.

The protracted nature of the conflict transformed Trincomalee into a heavily militarised and polarised district that has undergone waves of violence and displacement since the late 1980s, with the port turned into a hub of the SLN (with its Eastern Naval Command located here), and with an important air base.

Trincomalee hosted the SLMM's DO4 and NMT-T, and was strategically important due to several reasons – all of which influenced the focus and activities of the mission. The district was a transit area for the LTTE cadres moving between the north and the east, and confrontations occurred regularly between armed cadres and the SF. Trincomalee town was planned as an administrative centre for the LTTE, long controlling much of the Northern shore, as well as Sampoor. The SLMM monitored CP's between the GOSL- and the LTTE-controlled areas. Disputes over demarcation lines and establishment of new military camps by both sides were regularly monitored. Symbolic acts often led to tension; conflict related to land was also common. In Muttur, confrontations between Muslims and Tamils occurred. As the conflict escalated between the LTTE, government forces and the Karuna faction the number of IDP's increased. Abductions, abuse, torture and killings in relation to the armed conflict and the displacement of civilians thus shaped the activities of the SLMM, particularly from 2006. The SLMM monitored the activities of the LTTE political representatives in Trincomalee until the offices closed, as well as the activities of the TMVP.

Batticaloa

| | |
|-------------|-----------------------|
| Area: | 2,463 km ² |
| Population: | 486,000 |

Batticaloa covers a long stretch of the Eastern coastline. Close to 75 percent of the population is Tamil, the remaining mainly Muslim. The Mamangeshwarar temple is one of the holiest places for Hindus on the island, and there are many mosques. Situated on an island, Batticaloa town is linked to the mainland by road and railway, and hosts the Eastern University of Sri Lanka and an air force base.

Batticaloa is a traditional trading centre, especially for agricultural products. Prior to the military conflict there were large-scale shrimp farms and a vibrant fish and rice processing industry. The tsunami in 2004 added to the difficulties and hardships. Threats, extortion, and robberies plague the business community.

Held by the LTTE during the 1980's, Batticaloa was retaken by the GOSL in 1991. In 2002, the GOSL-controlled Batticaloa town and the wider parts of the district while the LTTE held pockets of smaller towns and villages. Other Tamil groups exercised control over specific activities and areas, resulting in an unstable security situation with structural violence as well as direct and physical violence in the form of disappearances, rapes and killings. Following the LTTE's internal split in 2004 and the GOSL campaign to eject the Tigers from the East, the district was again marred with heavy fighting.

Batticaloa hosted the SLMM's D05. The focus and activities were to a great extent shaped by Tamil infighting, armed confrontation between the Parties, and ethnic conflict. The SLMM monitored CP's and the areas separating the GOSL- and the LTTE-held areas. Disputes over demarcation lines and establishment of additional military camps by both sides were regularly monitored. There were recurring conflicts between the LTTE and the SF, and in mid-2006 armed confrontations broke out. The LTTE-split originated in Batticaloa, and the resulting violence was monitored. In 2007, after the LTTE had largely withdrawn from the east, Batticaloa witnessed yet another violent Tamil conflict as the Karuna faction split. The SLMM monitored abductions, child recruitment, abuse, torture and killings related to the armed conflict as well as the conditions and situations for the many IDP's. The SLMM monitored the activities of the LTTE political representatives until the LTTE offices were closed, as well as those of the TMVP.

Ampara

| | |
|-------------|-----------------------|
| Area: | 4,431 km ² |
| Population: | 652,000 |

Ampara is the Southernmost district of the Eastern Province. The district is multiethnic, multi-religious and multicultural; Muslims and Sinhalese predominate, with around 40 percent each, and the Tamil community is significant Tamil, at approx. 19 percent. Other ethnic groups live in the area.

Although under the general control of the GOSL forces when the CFA was signed, the district was claimed by the LTTE as part of the Tamil homeland. The A11 main road runs across Ampara linking it to Monaragala in the south and Batticaloa and Trincomalee in the north.

Income and livelihood are based mainly on agriculture and fishing; more than 80 percent of the population is rural. Other economic activities include small scale industries, with larger enterprises producing cement, rubber and wood based products. In calm periods there is also some tourism. In economic terms, Ampara has been doing relatively well compared to the other districts in the east.

Ampara town is a hub for many bus routes and hosts the district hospital as well as several UN offices.

Like in the rest of the northeast, the people of Ampara faced displacement, destruction of homes and infrastructure, and the loss of life and livelihoods. A high number of single-headed households were a concern even prior to the tsunami, and the 2004 disaster exacerbated these problems. With more than 10,000 lives lost, Ampara was the district hardest hit by the tsunami. About 95 percent of those made homeless by the tsunami were fishermen, and as thousands of boats were also destroyed, their means of livelihood simply vanished. As a consequence many NGO's increased their efforts in the district.

Ampara hosted the SLMM's D06. Compared to the others it was a relatively calm district, although incidents did occur – some of them major – there was less political tension and armed confrontation. This shaped the activities and role of the SLMM, which often focused on civilian matters that were not necessarily CFA-related. There were, however, issues that shaped the focus of the mission – such as ethnic tension between the Muslims and the Tamils, as well as between Sinhalese and Tamils. In addition, the Yala National Park was a disputed area which neither Party fully controlled.

Vanni

| | |
|-------------|-----------------------|
| Area: | 2,751 km ² |
| Population: | 388,000 |

The Vanni region is largely made up of the Kilinochchi and Mullaithivu districts, which were the only districts fully controlled by the LTTE at the time the CFA was signed. The population is mainly Tamil, with the exception of a few individuals.

Vanni is the most war-affected part of Sri Lanka. Goods and resources have been lacking in most areas, and two decades of fighting greatly affected the infrastructure. Some improvement to hospitals, schools and roads was witnessed during the CFA period, especially in and around Kilinochchi town. During the military conflict, the administrative structure of the state formally remained in place, with the GOSL paying salaries to school teachers and health staff, and supplying food rations to officially registered IDP's. Yet, the parallel administration of the LTTE was in de facto control of these and all others sectors during the CFA period.

Subsistence farming in the form of animal husbandry and/or cultivation, including fishing are the main sources of income and livelihood. Some make a living engaging in small-scale business or occasional construction and craftwork. Though few could be said to live in direct hunger, the people of Vanni are generally poor, without assets or resources. The 2004 tsunami placed additional burden and strain on those living on the Eastern coast.

Historically the home of one of the last Tamil chiefs to challenge British rule in the island (Pandara-Vanniyan) and a hinterland used by landowning farmers from Jaffna, Vanni became increasingly important after the GOSL took control of Jaffna in 1995 and the LTTE shifted its headquarters there from the peninsula. This changed the composition of the population in the area, as many Jaffna residents also relocated to Vanni. Thus, most IDP's residing in Kilinochchi and Mullaithivu originate from the peninsula.

SLMM's LO LTTE was located in Kilinochchi. The SLMM monitored Vanni from its DO in Vanni. The LO was not set up to receive complaints, though some were delivered. SLMM monitoring in Vanni focused on major incidents such as armed conflict, aerial bombing and claymore mine attacks. The LO, mostly in cooperation with monitors from Vavuniya, often conducted on-site verification of incidents. Liaising in Vanni focused on maintaining an open dialogue with the LTTE at high level, enabling regular discussion regarding everything from freedom of movement for civilians and troops, the SLMM access, visits of the HOM, and foreign delegations, to the LTTE's perspective on the conflict and the Peace Process.



OPERATIONAL APPROACH

The SLMM was designed as an independent, impartial, international monitoring mechanism, provided for within the CFA. With an implicit mandate and explicit authority regarding the CFA, the Head of Mission was tasked with defining the operational concept and deploy the mission.

Mission Mandate

THE SLMM WAS MANDATED BY THE PARTIES THROUGH THE CFA, HOWEVER WITHOUT A SPECIFIED MANDATE

The SLMM was mandated through the CFA, on which the legitimacy of the mission and the authority of the HOM rested. Although not including an explicit mandate formulation or mission statement, the Agreement had to be interpreted as the very foundation for planning and executing the SLMM operation.

Through the *Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)*, the Parties defined the mission purpose and outlined the main tasks of the *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)*, establishing its basic framework. From the commencement of operation, Article 3 of the CFA was commonly considered to comprise the SLMM mandate. The Article describes the general idea, the formal platform, the principal monitoring and verification areas, as well as geographical stipulations and a number of specific tasks. However, it does not state an explicit mandate formulation or express a designated mission statement for the venture; neither does Article 3 contain the term 'mandate' within the agreed paragraphs.

Albeit lacking an explicit mandate, the CFA (supplemented by the *State of Mission Agreement, SOMA*) included a number of requirements for the SLMM – as well as commitments by the Parties. Parts of the CFA were not unambiguous, and the Parties inscribed into the document that the *Head of Mission (HOM)* was to be 'the final authority' regarding its interpretation.

See also '*Mission Structure*', pages 47–52

THE INTERPRETATION

— The CFA partly established the SLMM, partly instructed it, and partly indicated its mission and tasks. The document contains certain specified tasks, whereas others are implied in the intention of the Agreement, to be found in the spirit rather than in the letter.



Ranil Wickremesinghe
Prime Minister

CFA SIGNATURES: The Ceasefire Agreement was signed by the PM of Sri Lanka, Ranil Wickramasinghe, and the LTTE leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, respectively. The CFA constituted the mandate of the SLMM, albeit implicitly.

The HOM was not issued any formal operational order or directions other than those of the CFA. In order to design the organisation and plan for the operation, he had to interpret the Agreement specifically and assess the situation generally. The core of the CFA – with regards mandating the SLMM – was considered to be the prescription in Article 3: "conduct international verification through on-site monitoring of the fulfilment of the commitments as stated in the CFA". Hence, this was inscribed into the SLMM's *Standing Operating Procedure (SOP)* as the mandate of the mission.

In effect, the HOM, in conformity with the authority accorded him by the Parties through the CFA, concluded on an *implied mandate* on which he directed the operation, and which was generally accepted by the Facilitator and the Parties. Thereby, the SLMM was given the legitimacy to operate, and the HOM the authorisation to act in accordance with the inferred intention of the CFA.

Choosing the appropriate operational concept and organisational model, the HOM analysed the CFA and identified prerequisites and tasks. The analysis was combined with an assessment of the setting, including factors influencing the options, such as geographical distribution, physical infrastructure, and available resources – as a complete foundation for decision.

With no governing structure, there was no formal space for instructing or guiding the HOM as to how the CFA should be implemented and the operation conducted, neither initially nor during the development of the operation the following years. This gave the HOM ample and essential room to manoeuvre and direct the operation according to the prevailing situation, as well as an implied obligation to continuously assess the operational surroundings and initiate necessary adjustments at his own discretion, based on his general interpretation of the CFA.

Thus, as the only operational guideline, the CFA was continuously scrutinised. The intent and implications of the Agreement were discussed among the stakeholders, within the Sri Lankan general public, as well as internally in the mission. The HOM interpreted the CFA in view of directing the mission and assisting the Parties. At all times and in any situation, the HOM had



MONITORING MANDATE: The CFA did not include an explicit mandate, leaving it to the HOM to interpret it, even stating that the HOM “shall be the final authority regarding interpretation of this Agreement”. SLMM’s first two HOM’s (from the right), Trond Furuhoide and Trygve Tellefsen, together with LTTE leaders Anton Balasingham and Suppayya P. Tamilselvan, Kilinochchi, 2003.

to consider his options and issue his directions in view of the intrinsic understanding of the spirit, as well as the letter, of the Agreement. The succeeding HOM’s hardly interpreted the CFA and the mandate as such differently. Rather, to the extent, they developed diverging operational courses of action, this was based on analysis of the actual situation, less on any diverging understanding of the function and tasks accorded the SLMM.

The CFA was never subject to renegotiation, nor was it revised. Consequently, the mandate of the SLMM was never amended or renewed, as is the normal procedure in operations with a United Nations (UN) mandate. However, at the 6th round of peace talks, held in Hakone in March 2003, the Parties agreed to a *modification*, in accordance with para 4.3, aiming to strengthen the mandate and capacity of the SLMM, “for the mission to undertake preventive measures to avoid serious incidents at sea and on land”. However, with the peace talks halting this was never implemented.

A concerted effort to reinterpret the mandate and restate the mission for the SLMM, in order to redirect the operation, was carried out in late 2006, initiating a strategy process contemplat-

ing the future of the SLMM in light of preceding the disturbing developments and possible scenarios – adapting the mission to the radically altered ground situation. The CFA itself – and its implied mandate – remained the same; despite the radically changing situation it was supposed to be applied to. The operational environment of the SLMM gradually changed into conditions that were congruent neither with the intention of the mandate nor the design of the mission.

THE IMPLICATIONS

— The CFA specified a number of tasks for the SLMM, and implied others. In view of the great span of tasks, the extensive geographical presence prescribed, and the deteriorating operational situation, seen in connection with the resources available, the HOM had to make certain operational priorities – identifying *essential* tasks – in order to best fulfil the mission.

A number of *specified tasks* were accorded the SLMM through the CFA directly, whereas a set of implied tasks were deducted in order to fulfil the intentions of the Agreement. During the course of operation, some *additional tasks* were added. Despite some adjustments, most of the tasks remained the same throughout the operational period, with the exception of some rendered irrelevant.

[See overview of tasks in ‘Mission Concept’, pages 38–46](#)

“The intent and implications of the Agreement were discussed among the stakeholders.

Mission Concept

THE SLMM WAS ISSUED WITH AN OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
– INSTITUTING ITS OWN CONCEPT

The SLMM conducted a multifaceted mission during its operational tenure, 2002–08. The mission concept was designed considering the intention and tasks as well as the actual setting and previous operational – predominantly military – experiences.

The *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)* was created by the Parties to the *Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)* whereas the structural design was initiated by the Facilitator in parallel with the final drafting of the Agreement, in close consultation with the Parties. The operational concept was developed pursuant to the stipulations laid down in the CFA, which for all practical purposes constituted the mission mandate. Both the structural design and operational concept was reconsidered and readjusted during the course of the operation, although the formal framework remained the same.

MISSION

————— The SLMM was established as a unique instrument to monitor the ceasefire: an international, independent self-governing organisation running a field operation with monitoring, liaising and reporting as the main modalities through distributed presence in six designated districts in the North and East of Sri Lanka; a Liaison Office (LO) with the

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Kilinochchi, and a Headquarters (HQ) in the capital Colombo.

It was considered critical for the SLMM to stay politically impartial and operationally independent with respect to the Parties (and other actors), and the mission retained its autonomy as a formally independent organisation throughout its existence. Operationally there were, however, limitations to this independence, i.e. due to the fact that the SLMM depended on the Parties' will to secure its freedom of movement and access to areas it desired to visit in order to carry out its tasks, and at times due to limits of available resources.

The intention

The CFA constituted the mutual will of the Parties; and they themselves bore the responsibility for the subsequent implementation. Hence, the SLMM was established to *assist* – not to *enforce* – their compliance with the mutual commitments.

The SLMM did not exercise formal authority vis-à-vis the Parties and vice versa: the Parties could not instruct or otherwise directly influence the decisions of the *Head of Mission (HOM)* or his operations within the SLMM. At the same time, neither acting on behalf of any outside actor nor possessing any form of enforcement power, the SLMM was not accorded any mechanisms for instructing or sanctioning the Parties.

The framework

The CFA established and mandated the SLMM, stipulating the main operational framework and features, including the main tasks and the geographical presence. These were the main, explicit and implicit, directions given by the Parties, whereas other defining factors – particularly the resources available – were defined and decided by the Facilitator and the Nordic co-sponsors, contributing to the overall framework of the SLMM.

DEFINING CRITERIA

The concept of operation was based on the CFA, and the understanding that comes with it. Hence, a set of defining factors were explicitly as well as implicitly in place as guiding criteria for the HOM when the operation commenced, particularly:



ACCESS ASSISTANCE: Not being equipped with its own air transportation capacity, the SLMM depended on the service of the Sri Lanka Air Force when needing airlifts. Furthermore, the mission depended on both Parties for access to areas of conflict and scenes of incidents – not always permitted.



CIVILIAN SET-UP: The SLMM was established as a 'civilian', i.e. non-military, mission; non-uniformed and unarmed, albeit normally dressed in fatigues with mission markings. Morning brief at D04 Trincomalee, 2004.

- **The SLMM was to assist the Parties**
i.e. support the implementation of the letter and spirit of the CFA
- **The SLMM was to be civilian**
i.e. non-military in legal and practical terms – unarmed, without enforcement capability
- **The SLMM was to be kept small**
i.e. with limited geographical operational coverage
- **The SLMM was to operate for a limited time**
i.e. as a short-term mechanism to support a definite phase in the peace efforts
- **The SLMM was to be Nordic**
i.e. with monitors from Nordic countries, and jointly funded by those five nation states
- **The SLMM was to be a part of the process led by Norway**
i.e. an instrument of the CFA, an element of the peace process
- **The SLMM was to be independent**
i.e. without any formal governing body nor operational direction by the Facilitator
- **The SLMM was regulated by a bilateral agreement**
i.e. defined within a diplomatic context
- **The SLMM was designated to operate in six districts**
i.e. tasked to establish presence in specified parts of Sri Lanka
- **The SLMM HOM was designated sole interpreter of the CFA**
i.e. with an entirely independent function

“... the SLMM largely based its concept on experiences from military peace-related operations.

Although it was deliberately decided that the mission was to be a *civilian* undertaking, the founders were specific in their requirement for it to be lead by a military officer at general officer level, presently not in active duty and in a civilian capacity. The reasoning was based on the role of the SLMM as directly connected to a military conflict that constituted the very rationale of the CFA, which principally regulated an agreed cessation of military hostilities. The understanding of 'civilian' was in this context a turn of phrase to underline the prerequisite of introducing a *non-military* actor in the disputed areas of Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka.

In practical terms, this status of the SLMM implied that the mission monitors must be unarmed and dressed in civilian attire. Consequently, in legal terms the mission – as an operator in a theatre of an armed conflict – was not subordinated the international law of war, or subsequent regulations for belligerents in terms of its *modus operandi*.

Although a civilian (non-military) mission, the SLMM largely based its concept on experiences from military peace-related operations. The very concept of a 'civilian mission' was scantily scrutinised, and the mission took on a rather military character with regards to organisational structure and operational concept and procedures, developed by former officers of the Norwegian Army. These, and military/police officers from other Nordic countries, covered the majority of key positions throughout the operation. There was no provision given (neither from the Parties nor the Facilitator) that the SLMM personnel should not have a military *background* as long as appearing judicially as civilians while with the mission. Subsequently, a substantial share of the

SLMM: Main Assignments and Tasks

Based on this understanding of the Agreement and the intended role of the SLMM, the specified tasks extracted from the CFA, were these:

| CFA CATEGORY | ASSIGNMENT | TASKS |
|---|---|---|
| A: CFA [Ceasefire Agreement] | I: Assist the Parties' in complying with the CFA and settle disputes, and act on complaints | 01: Assist the Parties' in relation to the spirit of the CFA and adherence to their commitments 02: Assist the Parties' in implementing confidence-building measures as indicated 03: Act on complaints as to possible violation of the CFA, and assist the Parties in settlement of disputes |
| B: CEASEFIRE [Cessation of hostilities] | II: Monitor the cessation of hostilities and the separation of forces by and between the Parties | 04: Monitor the cessation of all military action by both Parties 05: Monitor the separation of forces and assist in drawing up demarcation lines 06: Monitor the movement of military goods into the area held by the other party 07: Monitor the disarming of Tamil paramilitary groups by the GOSL |
| | III: Monitor the freedom of passage of unarmed personnel from the respective Parties | 08: Monitor the initial non-movement of the Parties' military forces 09: Monitor the freedom of movement for unarmed combatants and assist in developing modalities 10: Monitor the freedom of movement for unarmed LTTE members |
| C: NORMALCY [Restoration of normalcy] | IV: Monitor the undertaking of indicated confidence-building measures by the Parties | 11: Monitor that the Parties abstain from hostile acts against the civilian population 12: Monitor that the Parties refrain from activities offending cultural or religious sensitivities 13: Monitor that the Parties' forces vacate places of worship, schools and public buildings 14: Monitor that the Parties introduce systems to prevent harassment of the civilian population 15: Monitor the unimpeded flow of goods and movement of people to/from LTTE-dominated areas 16: Monitor the steps to facilitate improvement of transportation and easing of fishing restrictions 17: Monitor that the Parties abstain for carrying out search operations and arrests under the PTA |
| | V: Liaise with the Parties and chair Local Monitoring Committees (LMC) in designated districts | 18: Liaise with the Parties through offices in Colombo and Vanni 19: Assist the Parties in establishing communication between resp. Commanders to resolve problems 20: Chair Local Monitoring Committees in each of the designated districts |

The implied and additional tasks are covered under the article 'Running the Mission', pages 57–69



FLYING FLAG: The SLMM was operational around the clock, spending considerable time in the districts patrolling – enquiring into incidents and showing the flag. As of 2006/2007, the SLMM logo was redesigned in order to be more visible, enhancing security.

monitors had military background, some remaining in regular service but on temporary leave from their normal position.

According to the CFA, the HOM was to be appointed by the Royal Norwegian Government (RNG) in its role as Facilitator of the Peace Process. There was no formal stipulation as to the nationality of the HOM; however, the originally expressed preference by the Parties was that of a Norwegian national.

The Facilitator defined another key dimension of the framework, in stipulating the mission manpower size and anticipating an operational timeframe, opting for a small organisation and looking at a *limited period* of engagement.

DESIGNATED AREA

An important defining and guiding aspect laid out in the CFA was the specification that the SLMM was to be present in six designated districts in the North and East of Sri Lanka: Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara – i.e. the main contested area of the conflict.

The tasks

A number of the SLMM's main – *specified* – tasks were outlined, explicitly or implicitly in the CFA. Other major – *implied* – tasks were defined on the basis of the intentions of the Parties regarding the Agreement and the mission, and seen in connection with the current situation – as interpreted and prioritised by the HOM. A few specified – *additional* – tasks were defined by the Parties during the course of the operation.

The deduction of a comprehensive list of actual tasks had to

be based on interpretation of the intentions of the Agreement and the intended role of the SLMM. Fundamentally, this was that the CFA was constituting the key framework for the Parties' respective and mutual commitments, with the role of the SLMM as an independent, third-party instrument assigned to assist the Parties in complying with these.

The two core components of the CFA were, in addition to the very character and spirit of the document, those of *cessation of hostilities* (ceasefire) and *restoration of normalcy*. Subsequently, the core of the SLMM role became that of supporting and promoting the Parties' adherence to the Agreement in these two very diverse areas, by monitoring and verifying their compliance by developing and operating efficient, credible and confidence-building measures and means.

MODE

Developing an appropriate organisational model and operational concept for the SLMM, the HOM interpreted the CFA and analysed the framework – including limiting factors, considering suitable solutions, eventually deciding on the chosen model and modalities.

The approach

The SLMM chose a strategic approach based on *visibility*, *accessibility*, and *transparency*, carried out through *exposed presence* in the *Area of Responsibility* (AOR).

The SLMM was intentionally made *visible* in the field through street front offices and easy-to-spot patrols with logo-marked vehicles, at times possibly creating an impression of a more volu-

minous structure in the East and the North of Sri Lanka than was actually the case. Exposure was also produced through public appearances at local civic venues, like gatherings of fishing, agricultural, and religious societies; as well as at the national scene through mass media, especially TV stations and newspapers, and in liaising with official political parties. The *accessibility* was granted by a 24/7 open door policy to both Parties to the CFA, and to the public through the District Offices (DO) and the subordinated geographically distributed Points of Contacts (POC) in rural areas in the East and the North. The *transparency* was carefully tended vis-à-vis the Facilitator, the Parties and the public by the chosen non-secrecy nature of communication and reporting.

The design

Although the SLMM was created through the CFA, the Parties exercised little influence on the *design* of the organisation, with the exception of certain defining prescriptions, notably that it should be a civilian mission composed of monitors from the Nordic countries, with an implicit decentralised structure.

The SLMM was *conceptualised* within the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and mainly *designed* by the HOM, for practical reasons largely after its initial inception and commencement.

The MFA, itself for natural reasons short of expertise in establishing field operations, called on the retired Norwegian Army officer, Brigadier Hågrup Haukland to conduct the initial pre-operation design. Consequently, the organisational structure and operational concept was by and large modelled on experiences from military peace support operations rather than concepts for civilian monitoring or verification missions (i.e. election monitoring operations, arms control verification mechanisms, or others).

The references

The SLMM was created uniquely for its specific purpose, in a unique operational environment, with a unique role and structure. At the time of designing the SLMM there were few comparable precedents of operational non-military missions from which to draw relevant experience.

One reference case in question at the time was the *Bougainville Peace Monitoring Group (PMG)* established in Papua New Guinea in 1998, a combined civilian/military operation monitoring a ceasefire. Another successful case was the *Joint Military Commission (JMC)* established to monitor the Nuba Mountain ceasefire agreement in the Sudan in 2002, another combined mission with a distinct military flair, yet resembling the SLMM in the way that it was created by the parties to the conflict through an agreement established by a group of co-sponsors, rather than by an international body. Another relevant example would be the *Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM)*, set up by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1998 to verify compliance by all parties in Kosovo with a United Nations (UN) resolution, and to report on progress and/or non-compliance. However, most existing examples – which consequently were drawn upon – were military, most of them established by the UN.

(The successful example of the *Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)* in Indonesia came later, being established in 2005, whereas its predecessor was designed and deployed more or less in parallel with the SLMM. The AMM was, like the SLMM, a civilian mission set up to monitor an agreement between two belligerents; a government and a non-state actor – however notably with different governing fundamentals.)

Consequently, the SLMM was designed on the basis of – and with experience from – military operations, rather than civilian missions. However, as was the case with missions such as the JMC and the AMM, the SLMM was designed within the framework of the local *peace process*.

The intention of the initiators was for the mission to constitute an integral part of the continued process that would be pursued along two parallel roads: 1) the SLMM to operationally oversee the achieved ceasefire ‘on the ground’; 2) the Facilitator to politically and diplomatically push for proceeded talks aiming at a committing conflict resolution.

CONCEPT

Based on the stipulations and intentions of the CFA, and considering the defining criteria and tasks constituting its main framework, the HOM was responsible for developing the SLMM’s concept. This was broadly divided into an *operations concept* for the actual (field) operation and a *support concept* for sustaining the operation – with an overall structural model as the very conceptual foundation of the mission.

The combined concepts were institutionalised within the mission’s main operational documents: the SLMM *Operation Order* (OO ‘Hermes’) first adopted in 2002 and revised in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006; further outlined and implemented through SLMM’s *Standing Operating Procedures* (SOP, particularly Part 3 – Operations), originally adopted in 2002, with subsequent revisions in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006.

The SLMM was designed with a *decentralised* field monitoring concept and a *centralised* operative support concept (see detailed descriptions below.) The chosen structural model was largely based on experiences from military organisations used in international peace operations, tailored to the mandate and resources of the SLMM.

One of the few conceptual provisions in the CFA was that the SLMM should establish a *headquarters*, although the location was left to the mission itself to decide; “in such a place as the HOM finds appropriate”. Considering several options, the HOM decided to locate the HQ in Colombo, i.e. at quite some distance from the designated AOR. In so doing, he covered another CFA provision, namely to establish an office in the capital.

“The SLMM was designed with a *decentralised* field monitoring concept and a *centralised* operative support concept.

Two other prerequisites of the CFA regarding deployment, was that the SLMM should establish an office in Vanni, and establish a presence in six designated districts. The offices in Colombo and Vanni were explicitly required for the purpose of liaising with the respective Parties.

Central level:

The SLMM HQ concept was basically that of a traditional military headquarters, designed to direct – and in this case, also to support – the field operation. The HQ was set up to serve the HOM in his dual capacity, partly as the mission commander in charge of the field operation, partly as an active participant in the peace process. Hence, the HQ comprised two general functions, the principal being the one continuously directing the field operation, the other – composed of only a few staff slots – constituting the HOM office in his capacity as peace process actor.

To direct the field operation, the HQ was organised with staff sections covering required areas of operational management, in particular operations, logistics, communications, as well as personnel and finance administration. As it was chosen not to establish separate support units in the SLMM, the support staff functions also constituted the operational providers of direct support to the local level when necessary.

Local level:

The HOM decided to establish one *District Office (DO)* in each of the six designated districts to operationally carry out the monitoring and verification tasks; in total covering the entire defined AOR. The DO's established a varying number of *Points of Contact (POC)* in selected locations within the districts. A *Liaison Office (LO)* was established in Kilinochchi and tasked to liaise with the LTTE primary bodies; liaising with the GOSL was dealt with from the HQ. Additional to the prescriptions in the CFA, the HOM decided – responding to an expressed anticipation from the Sri Lankan Prime Minister only days after commencement of operation – to establish two *Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT)* in Jaffna and Trincomalee, respectively.

With the establishment of DO's and the NMT's, the chosen concept was that of a *permanent presence* with *fixed locations* in the six districts, rather than alternative – and possible – mechanisms such as i.e. mobile patrolling teams from a forward HQ. However, from the DO's and NMT's, mobile patrolling monitoring was instrumental, and the widely scattered POC's offering limited office opening hours in actual/perceived hot spots, added additionally to an intentional distributed presence in the AOR.

The mission concept was developed on the basis of the initial 2002 CFA interpretation and parallel situation assessment. With changes in the operational environment and organisational preconditions, the concept was later adjusted, particularly from 2006. [See also 'Adapting the Mission', pages 70–74](#)

Operational Concept

The defining notions in the CFA prescribing the SLMM operational concept were primarily the instructions to conduct 'international verification' through 'on-site monitoring' as well as to 'liaise' with

the Parties and 'report' to the Norwegian government. A major conceptual perception was that the SLMM as a third-party institution was assigned to assist the Parties in complying with their commitments to the CFA – also beyond the specific accounts (tasks) detailed in the Agreement.

Consequently, the core *operational modalities* of the SLMM evolved into being monitoring, liaising and reporting, and the *operational concept* developed into that of a distributed *field operation* with a permanent presence in a wide geographic area with limited resources, based on a rather fragile ad hoc *field organisation* with neither political nor enforcement powers of any significance.

Utilising the chosen structure with a centralised HQ and decentralised field presence, the SLMM adopted the concept of a 'two level dual approach'. This meant that in the case of serious incidents, or potential incidents in the making, the HQ and DO's were to address the situation with the Parties at central and local level simultaneously.

OPERATIONAL AREA

The concept of applying a *geographical approach* for the mission by establishing a specified SLMM *Area of Responsibility (AOR)* was not prescribed in the CFA, but chosen as the basic conceptual construction for the operation. By this, the HOM institutionalised the geographical dimension as the preferred reference feature for the monitoring, rather than other possible aspects in the conflict scenery. In principle, the CFA, in pointing out the two main attention areas for the SLMM – monitoring/verifying (1) the cessation of hostilities and (2) the restoration of normalcy – opened for a multi-dimensional monitoring operation with a wide variety of possible courses of action, using a geographical reference framework being one. Subsequent to this approach, the 'entire Sri Lanka' was designated the SLMM *Area of Operation (AOO)*.

Making use of a geographical approach as basic reference, provided preconditions for the deployment as well as the employment of the operational resources (monitors, infrastructure, funding, working methodology) in the field. One consequence of the approach was a *decentralised* field-monitoring solution with permanent presence in designated locations. This assured the required presence in the six districts (the AOR) as stipulated by the CFA, but on the other hand, given the limited personnel resources, reduced the flexibility to shift efforts decisively between varying hot spots throughout the AOR as well as within the entire AOO over time.

OPERATIONAL MODALITIES

The main modalities of *monitoring–liaising–reporting* comprised the core of the SOP (Part 3 – Operations), and constituted the fundamentals for designing the field operation. The mission adopted a set of key operational methods and tools based on traditions of military operational staff procedures, gradually developing these as the organisation gained operational experience and as the ground situation changed.

MONITORING

Modality

Monitoring was the main modality prescribed in the CFA, performed throughout the AOR to comply with the assignments to enquire into alleged violations of the Agreement, and to verify implementation of the agreed commitments by the Parties. The core of this modality was to follow and depict the Parties' overall adherence to the agreed stipulations over time, and assist their efforts to act according to the CFA.

Methods

Not constituting a clearly defined task, monitoring was approached in a conceptual manner, and conducted as a multi-faceted method, addressing a wide range of aspects and activities by the Parties. Predominantly, the monitoring was executed through *physical presence* of monitors in the districts (and the capital), through *patrolling, meetings, observation and registration* in the AOR on land and off shore; as well as through receiving complaints and enquiring into alleged Agreement violations. During the first year(s) of the operation, physical verification of completion of agreed tangible commitments in the CFA represented a substantial share of the monitoring efforts. By facilitating public access points at the DO's and POC's, the SLMM established a set of efficient venues for monitoring

LIAISING

Modality

Liaising was the second major modality prescribed in the CFA, carried out through SLMM presence and interaction on both the central and local level, particularly with the Parties' respective peace secretariats and notably by way of chairing the *Local Monitoring Committees (LMC)*. Liaising was primarily aimed at assisting the Parties in – mainly indirectly – keeping in touch with each other, helping to resolve mutual problems, co-ordinate requirements, and facilitate confidence-building measures, furthermore to resolving issues/conflicts at the lowest possible level.

Methods

Liaising was mainly executed through continuous contact with the Parties, the Facilitator, and other stakeholders, by the way of *meetings* and other forms of communication, facilitating sharing of information and dialogue. Liaising with the Parties from physical premises in Colombo and Vanni, respectively was prescribed in the CFA, and constituted main channels for contact, whereas the LMC's in the six districts constituted significant arenas for dialogue on local level.

REPORTING

Modality

Reporting as such was a chosen modality, based on the prescription that the SLMM should report to the Facilitator as a means of communicating the results of its field monitoring, verification and liaising. Internally, continuous reporting from the field was a major part of the operational concept, collecting information from monitoring and liaising conducted at local level, assembled at the central level into updates on the situation and compiled into reports presented to the Facilitator, the Parties and published for the benefit of the public.

Methods

Reporting was carried out internally through fixed routines and formats on how and when to compile and dispatch information from local to central level. Similarly, the HQ compiled reports according to defined standards for the Facilitator and the Parties, most of which were made public on the mission web site. A part of the reporting was accumulating public statistics on complaints and incidents. A system of rulings was used as a way to conclude on enquiries into received complaints, and to communicate the conclusions to the Parties.

OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES

As a cornerstone of its operational concept, the SLMM decided upon a set of key operational principles, which was detailed in the SOP, guiding the way the operation was to be conducted:

– Credibility and Impartiality

The SLMM must be seen to be credible and impartial in all work.

– Adherence to the CFA

The SLMM will only accept tasks that are within the provisions of the CFA.

– Freedom of Movement

The SLMM monitors have unrestricted freedom of movement, with access to areas of violations.

– Consistency

The SLMM builds legitimacy and effectiveness through the consistency of operations conduct.

– Integrity

The SLMM coordinates its activities with both Parties, still retaining its own operational control.

– Authority and Decisiveness

The SLMM exercise its authority to make reasonable and valid decisions to assist the Parties.

– Accessibility

The SLMM presence through HQ, DO's and LO's enhances its accessibility 24 hrs a day.

– Rapid Reaction and Pro-activity

The SLMM reacts swiftly and pro-actively – centrally and locally – when incidents occur.

– Flexibility

The SLMM operates with maximum flexibility in order to ensure efficient operations.

Support Concept

The chosen support concept was tailored to the operational tasks the SLMM was mandated to carry out, the operational concept chosen by the HOM, and the resources (primarily manpower) available to the mission; i.e. the overall operational framework. Although being designed largely from military or police field experience, the civilian SLMM did not create any designated support *units* within its own structure, but support *functions* were established within the HQ staff configuration – a centralised logistical concept.

MISSION LOGISTICS

The HOM decided to construct his HQ staff with four key support functions, each headed by a senior staff officer; Chief Logis-

tics Officer (CLO), Chief Communications Officer (CCO), Chief Personnel & Administration Officer (CPAO), and Chief Finance Officer (CFO). In the main, these were in charge of respective functional areas, responsible for planning, procedures and procurement, etc within the SLMM. Neither of these functions were represented by designated staff positions in the distributed field organisation, but organised locally according to the respective Head of Office (DO, NMT, LO) discretion among the field monitors and national staff at hand.

With a small organisation geared on carrying out its field operational tasks of monitoring, liaising, and reporting, the logistical structure was kept to a minimum, and thus decisively dependant on the generally very efficient and skilled national staff personnel. Certain tasks that might have been included in the mission were taken care of on the outside, most notably personnel recruitment and basic training, as well as the crucial operational air and sea transportation support systems.

MISSION SECURITY


The SLMM established a dedicated position of Security Officer (SO) from the onset of the operation, developing and implementing security plans. For a period, between late 2006 and the reorganisation in 2007, when the focus on security was strongly enforced, the SO was a part-time position. Based on security plans and directions developed at HQ, the respective Heads of District Offices (HOD) developed local security plans, as well as contingency plans for the case of hastily evacuation.

More on Security in 'Adapting the Mission', pages 70–74

MISSION RESOURCES

The SLMM was provided with three main categories of resources for its operation; human resources, logistical resources, and financial resources. A detailed account of these is given in Part 03 'Operational Resources' in this report. As for the resource concept, the operational assets were predominantly allocated through the Norwegian MFA and the Nordic co-sponsors, and only to a degree designed by the HOM and the SLMM itself.

SLMM Operational Area, 2002–2008



STRENGTHENED SECURITY: Following the escalation of the military conflict in 2006, including aerial attacks in Vanni during the summer, the security of SLMM mission members was enhanced, including the construction of bunkers, this one at the LO LTTE in Killinochchi.

Human resources:

Composition

The international monitors were seconded to the SLMM from the contributing countries, and subsequently not recruited or selected by the mission itself. Initial training was carried out in the contributing country, though not according to training standard stipulations or direct involvement from the mission itself. The HOM however did issue a set of basic qualification requirements for monitors. National staff members were recruited by the SLMM in Sri Lanka, centrally at HQ and locally at DO's and NMT's and at the LO LTTE, to the extent possible with a balance of ethnic origins and diverse language skills among the contracted employees.

The number of monitors allocated to the SLMM was initially the result of dialogue between the HOM and the Facilitator; at a later stage – particularly in 2006 – the Facilitator in effect dictated the volume based on political considerations connected to the conflict development. The number of national staff was principally a matter for the mission to decide on within the accepted financial framework.

The SLMM was designed to be composed of monitors from the Nordic countries, and the actual composition was subsequent to the readiness systems within the different Nordic governments to second personnel. After 1 September 2006, when one of the Parties – the LTTE – in effect declared monitors from member states of the European Union (EU) unwanted by stating that their safety could no longer be assured, only individuals from Iceland and Norway could serve with the mission.

Competency

As the SLMM was designed a non-military monitoring undertaking with few precedents, personnel with previous experience from a similar operation could not be found. Operational civilian ceasefire monitoring expertise hardly existing, the chosen concept was for the contributing countries to recruit volunteers to be seconded to the SLMM, drawing on rosters of personnel with preferably some operational international background. Recruitment being left to the respective countries, the competency supplied to the SLMM was largely of a general nature, with a certain



SNL SAILING: Naval monitoring was not originally catered for, neither in the CFA nor the SLMM plans, but soon established, and operation from 2002 until 2006, when it was abrogated due to security reasons. One of the tasks of the naval monitors, sailing on board SLN vessels (picture), was to inspect LTTE boats.

degree of specialisation at HQ (i.e. logistics, finance, communications, information). Hence, the human resources were hardly tailored – or trained – for the general conception, the character, and specific functions within this mission.

The SLMM inherent competencies and capacity had at times to be supplemented and enhanced by external ad hoc expertise in defined areas, i.e. mission security, organisational improvement, cultural awareness, etc.

Logistical resources:

In-house

Although the SLMM intended to be – and remained – personnel-wise limited in numbers, it was geographically widely distributed, in areas with insufficient infrastructure, not least with respect to communications. Hence, the logistical demand – and security concern – regarding transportation and communication equipment was considerable. Being primarily focused on land monitoring, the SLMM equipped itself with a fleet of commercial four-wheel drive utility vehicles, most fitted with communication systems linked to its offices. The option to armour vehicles was considered as the security situation deteriorated in later stages of the tenure, but shelved due to financial considerations.

Despite carrying out naval monitoring at sea, it was decided not to acquire designated craft to be managed by the mission itself, but to conduct the sea monitoring on board vessels belonging to the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) as well as those of the LTTE with cadres on leave transport. The issue of arranging own coastal craft capacity

was conceptually considered and at a stage recommended by the HOM, but for political and funding reasons not realised.

Out-sourcing

For in-country air transportation, the SLMM was serviced – on request – by aircraft (fixed wing and helicopter) capability produced by the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF).

Recruitment and initial preparation of monitors was taken care of by agencies in the respective contributing countries, and a wide range of administrative support solutions were acquired commercially in the local market.

Financial resources:

The financing model established by the Norwegian MFA and the Nordic co-sponsors was:

(1) The SLMM running costs (expenditure) would be shared by the five participating countries according to an agreed formula; principally parallel to the size of the monitor contingent seconded from each country. The agreed assets were to be channelled through the Norwegian MFA and transferred to the SLMM Finance section in semi-annual portions.

(2) The individual personnel cost (i.e. wages, expenses) would be provided directly to the monitors from their respective home country, following national tariffs and regulations.

The resource situation is described in detail in Part 03; 'Operational Resources'

Mission Structure

THE SLMM WAS ESTABLISHED WITH A DECENTRALISED STRUCTURE TO CONDUCT FIELD MONITORING

The SLMM was structured to serve a field operation with a distributed geographical presence. It was modelled on a military structure, with a HQ of the HOM directing the field monitoring, liaising and reporting on the local operational level.

The *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)* developed an operational concept and organisational structure tailored to the given mandate, framework and tasks – with the aim of achieving optimal effect of limited resources. The basic structure framework remained in place throughout the operation – although with major adaptations, particularly in 2006 and 2007 due to the departure of monitors from member states of the European Union (EU) and the rapidly escalating conflict.

Physical presence in the designated districts was a key conception of the *Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)* and the SLMM. In accordance with the CFA, the first SLMM presence was established in Colombo, on 2 March 2002, with the arrival of the *Head of Mission (HOM)* and the first monitors. Subsequently, international monitors were deployed to the six districts as prescribed in the Agreement, including the *Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT)* deployed May–July.

OPERATIONAL COMPONENTS

The design of the SLMM as an operational structure reflected the intentions and indications of the Parties expressed in the CFA and outlined the mission and tasks. The choice of structural set-up was largely based on experiences extracted from various military peacekeeping missions. Hence, the ‘civilian’ mission came to resemble a ‘military’ structure, with key elements often applied in military organisations.

The outline of the organisational structure was designed in parallel with the finalising of the CFA, ready for implementation at the time of deployment. The structure was honed in the early phase of the operation and subsequently adjusted according to defined needs.

The way in which the SLMM was deployed in the field reflected the priorities of the Parties through the CFA, and operational decisions made by the HOM. The prescription of the CFA regarding deployment is found in Article 3 para 6, and states that

the SLMM “shall establish a headquarters in such a place as the HOM finds appropriate”. The HOM subsequently decided to establish his HQ in Colombo, in order to liaise with the *Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL)*, and an office in Vanni to liaise with the *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)*; the CFA merely required the establishment of an office in the capital.

Structurally

SET-UP

The basic organisational set-up was akin to the one often used in United Nations peace operations and in national armies: a simple and tested model encompassing a central HQ with staff elements covering key functions, and operational units distributed throughout the area of operation. In all parts of the SLMM structure, the manning was made up of *international monitors* supported by *national staff*.

The CFA stated that the SLMM “will remain a presence” in the designated districts, but the very concept of physical presence through permanent *District Offices (DO)* and temporary *Points of Contact (POC)* was designed by the mission itself, in order to establish and maintain presence and visibility – also covering the defined *Forward Defence Localities (FDL)*. Sea territories and naval monitoring were not explicitly covered by the CFA, and not originally planned for by the HOM. However, reacting to signals from the GOSL, the HOM soon deployed two *Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT)*.

Central level:

HOM

The *Head of Mission (HOM)* was the appointed leader of the SLMM – as an organisation as well as an operation. In effect, the HOM had a dual role. He (she) would have to conduct high-level liaising with and between the Parties, and maintaining close contact with the Facilitator as a contributor to the Peace Process; in addition to the obvious task of commanding the SLMM field operation as its leader as well as its general manager.

HQ

The mission headquarters (HQ) was established in Colombo after other options had been considered. The capital was chosen

“... the manning was made up of international monitors supported by national staff.”



HOM HQ: Centrally, the HOM established his HQ in Colombo, directing the field operation which was largely run through the distributed presence represented by the DO's, NMT's and the LO LTTE. From Colombo HQ, 2006.

mainly due to the value of being located adjacent to central political and military institutions, the main physical infrastructures of the country, and the embassies of the contributing countries – in particular that of the Facilitator.

The set-up of the HQ (however somewhat varying during the tenure) reflected the dual role of the HOM, with certain staff functions constituting a HOM office, principally supporting him in his *liaising capacity*. The remaining part of HQ – managed by the Chief of Staff (COS) – would serve him in his *commanding capacity*.

The HQ was normally staffed with approximately 12–16 international monitors, supported by approx. 5–15 national staff members in the early phase; national staff increasing to around 15–20 in the latter part of the operation. National staff members in the HQ served in capacities as assistants within the various

support staff sections, secretaries, interpreters and drivers, as well as in household support functions.

Local level:

LO


The *Liaising Offices (LO)* were part of the initial operational design of the SLMM, responding to the CFA's strong emphasis on liaising with the Parties. In reality, there was only one LO as such, the LO LTTE in Kilinochchi, as liaison with the GOSL was, in general, carried out from within the HQ structure, partly by a dedicated monitor (LO–GOSL).

LO LTTE was staffed with two (at times only one) designated international monitors; as of mid 2003 supported by two national staff members, serving as interpreter/driver and cook.

DO

The *District Offices (DO)* were the pivotal structural elements of the operational design of the SLMM, answering to one of the key stipulations of the CFA, that the mission should “maintain a presence” in the six designated districts (in which DO's were established). A Head of District (HOD) was the manager of all monitoring activities within the respective district, and held a crucial position with regards to successful liaising, verification, and reporting from his/her section of the mission Area of Responsibility (AOR). The SLMM mission concept established the HOD's with considerable freedom of action to pursue local initiatives at his/her discretion, deemed fruitful to the overall operational idea of the mission at the actual time. The DO structure was revised in 2007, subsequent to the conflict escalation, with the number of DO's reduced from six to four, and eventually replaced with two *Regional Offices (RO)* to monitor the North and the East as separate theatre entities. This was a response to a most dissimilar development of the reactivated hostilities between the two Parties and other factions in the two regions. The deactivated DO's were kept part-time active as *Sub-Offices*

SLMM organisational structure, 2002–2006*



* Until changes in effect after September 2006; see next page.

(SO) to the respective RO – with an exception of the Jaffna office, which for practical reasons had to be kept operational throughout the tenure.

DO's were normally staffed with approx. 3–5 international monitors, supported by national staff members, principally serving as Field Assistants (interpreters/drivers) and Administrative Staff. National staff numbers varied from one DO to another, ranging from 2–12. The number of monitors also varied between the DO's, somewhat reduced as of September 2006.
(See 50-51 for facts and figures)

POC

The Points of Contact (POC) were part of the DO set-up, with each DO tasked to establish temporary structures at anticipated or experienced hot spots within respective parts of the AOR to improve accessibility for the Parties and the public. One or more monitors manned the POC a few hours every week, mainly on a regular basis; some POC's were temporary.

NMT

The Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT) were not initially part of the SLMM structure design, as monitoring of territorial waters was neither instructed nor indicated in the CFA, but were added very shortly after commencing operations at the request of the GOSL, with NMT's established in Jaffna and Trincomalee. The establishment of a NMT largely corresponded with that of the DO's, with one monitor serving as the Head of NMT (HNMT). To some extent, the NMT's drew on support from the adjacent DO's in Jaffna and Trincomalee, including infrastructure and national staff. A third NMT was envisaged in early 2002, when the SLMM considered monitoring SLN high seas patrolling. However, the concept was thought to imply greater costs than gains, and was shelved. Naval monitoring was officially temporarily suspended in May 2006 due to incidents demonstrating unacceptable personnel risk level, not again to recommence.




LOCAL LEVEL: Locally, the LMC's constituted a vital mechanism in attempting to solve conflicts on the lowest possible level, as prescribed by the CFA. Norway's Special Envoy, Erik Solheim visiting the LMC Mannar, 2003.

NMT's were normally staffed with four to five international monitors, supported by national staff members employed by the DO. *For details on the DO's, POC's and NMT's, see Operational deployment next page*

LMC

The Local Monitoring Committees (LMC) constituted a major conceptual prescription of the CFA, but was not part of the SLMM structure as such. One LMC was established in each of the six districts and chaired by the respective SLMM HOD. The LMC's constituted a significant strategic initiative to facilitate joint handling of complaints and conflicts at the lowest possible

SLMM organisational structure, late 2006*



* After changes in effect from September 2006



POC PREMISES: The POC's were established in the districts in order to ease the public's access to the SLMM, and to launch complaints. The temporary POC office in Ampara, 2003.

level, serving the SLMM in an advisory capacity, and helping to establish a common understanding between the Parties and to assist the mission. All LMC's were made up of two members appointed by each of the two Parties correspondingly, plus the SLMM chair. The GOSL and LTTE appointees to the LMC's were selected among commonly respected members of civil society (such as retired judges, public servants, religious leaders, etc).

MODIFICATIONS

During the six years of operation, the deployment of the SLMM was stable and static until 2006, when the number of international monitors was halved, causing a reorganisation. Further major changes were made in 2007, caused by the increasing violence in large parts of the AOR, and decreasing security for SLMM personnel – as well as a strategic reorientation of the mission's core activities.

See 'Adapting the Mission', pages 70–74, for details

Functionally

All international monitors were nominally *monitors* albeit not always conducting field monitoring activities. At the HQ, monitors served in specific specialised staff functions within the operations-, administration-, finance-, logistics-, and communications sections respectively; each with a head person (composition and designations changing somewhat during the operational period): Chief Operations Officer (COO); Chief Personnel & Administration Officer (CPAO); Chief Telecoms Officer (CTO); Chief IT Officer (CIO); Chief Logistics Officer (CLO); Chief Finance Officer (CFO); Communication Officer (CO); Security Officer (SO). (In 2007 this set-up was redesigned, see the article on 'Adapting the mission'.)

“The SLMM commenced its deployment to Sri Lanka as soon as practicable following the signing of the CFA.

At HQ there were also specialised functions mainly serving the HOM directly, primarily: Aide de Camp (ADC), Press and Information Officer (PIO), and Legal Advisor (LA) (positions and functions varying).

OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT

The SLMM commenced its deployment to Sri Lanka as soon as practicable following the signing of the CFA, on 23 February 2002, and was basically deployed in Colombo and six designated districts in the North and East of the country, plus Vanni in the north.

Central level:

HOM & HQ


The Head of Mission Major General (retired) Trond Furuhovde arrived in Colombo on 2 March 2002, and the Deputy HOM/Chief of Staff (COS), Brigadier (retired) Hagrup Haukland together with five Norwegian monitors followed suit on 7 March, establishing the HQ at Hotel Lanka Oberoi (later renamed the Cinnamon Hotel) with effect of 13 March. By 24 March, the HQ was considered fully operational and on 13 June, it was moved to 399 Galle Road in central sea front Colombo. Early 2006, the offices were relocated to 76 Ward Place in Colombo 7 for security and accessibility reasons, where it remained until late December the same year. At this time all HQ staff except for the support functions were temporarily moved to the Taj International Airport Hotel in Seeduwa (Negombo) close to the Bandaranaike International Airport for security reasons. The HQ staff sections were reunited at 76 Ward Place in June 2007, following a positive SLMM security assessment.

Local level:

LO

The LO LTTE was temporarily deployed as of 29 March 2002, permanently from 3 April. As of mid July 2007, a dedicated LO to the GOSL was re-established operating from HQ, the function having been performed ad hoc by HQ staff from June 2003.

SLMM Deployment, 2006*



*After changes in effect from September 2006



DO DEPLOYMENT: The DO's constituted a core in the SLMM structure, immediately designed and deployed at the commencement of the operation. DO3 Vavuniya, 2006.

DO

The District Offices (DO) were deployed commencing 26 March 2002, with all six operational as of 3 April:

DO1 – Jaffna

DO: District Office no 1 was deployed on 3 April 2002 and covered the northernmost district of the SLMM, comprising the Jaffna peninsula and including the surrounding islands. DO1 remained as a separate SLMM district after the restructuring in 2006, and made up a part of the SLMM Northern Region after the redeployment in 2007, still with separate staffing and a semi-autonomous status.

POC: POC's were established at Delft, Kayts and Point Pedro, with Kayts (Velanai) the first to become operational, from 4 July 2002; followed by Delft, from 23 October. The POC Kayts closed early 2004, and was replaced with Point Pedro.

DO2 – Mannar

DO: District Office no 2 was deployed on 29 March 2002, and covered the westernmost district of the SLMM AOR, comprising Mannar District, Wilpattu National Park, and Mannar Island, including Mannar town. With the restructuring in 2006, DO2 was merged with DO3, the office subsequently used as POC by DO3. Following the redeployment in 2007, former DO 2 became part of the SLMM Northern Region.

POC: A Point of Contact was established at Silavatturai, opened on 6 December 2005, in particular to receive complaints from the Muslim population in that area.

DO3 – Vavuniya

DO: District Office no 3 was deployed on 30 March 2002, and covered the north-western part of Sri Lanka, wedged in between DO2, DO1, and DO4; its AOR mostly within the LTTE-controlled Vanni. The DO became the head office of the combined DO2 and DO3 districts following the restructuring in 2006, and after the

Deployment of DO's and NMT's, 2002

The SLMM District Offices (DO) were successively deployed after the monitors arrived and established a mission Headquarters; the Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT) following suit, making the original field structure fully operational.

| DATE | DO / NMT |
|------|-------------------------|
| 2603 | DO4 Trincomalee |
| 2903 | DO2 Mannar |
| 3003 | DO3 Vavuniya |
| 0104 | DO5 Batticaloa |
| 0104 | DO6 Ampara |
| 0304 | DO1 Jaffna ¹ |
| 3005 | NMT-T |
| 1207 | NMT-J ² |

¹ DO1 was temporarily deployed as of 3 April 2002, permanently from 18 April.

² NMT-J formally became a separate unit as of March 2003; naval monitors arriving in July 2002 were initially attached to DO1.



NMT NATIVITY: The NMT's were not originally planned for, but set up consequent to the expressed GOSL anticipation of naval monitoring. NMT members liaising with the SLN, Jaffna, 2004.

redeployment in 2007, Vavuniya became the SLMM Northern Region HQ, directing activities in all the former DO's 1, 2 and 3. **POC:** A Point of Contact in the original DO3 area was established at the offices of LO LTTE in Kilinochchi, operational from 9 December 2003.

DO4 – Trincomalee

DO: District Office no 4 was deployed on 26 March 2002, and covered the parts of the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka that surrounds Trincomalee town. No changes were made following the restructuring in 2006; after the redeployment in 2007, Trincomalee became the HQ of the SLMM Eastern Region, managing monitoring in all the former DO's 4, 5 and 6. DO4 and NMT-T shared an office building as well as accommodation.

POC: Points of Contact were established in Muttur, opened 5 November 2002, and in Sampoor, in April 2003.

DO5 – Batticaloa

DO: District Office no 5 was deployed on 1 April 2002, and covered large parts of the Eastern Province, most of which was controlled by the LTTE at the set-up in 2002. With the restructuring in 2006, DO5 was given responsibility for DO6, and after the redeployment in 2007, it merged into SLMM Eastern Region, in which former DO5 HQ became a SO.

POC: A Point of Contact was established in Valaichchenai, operational as of 25 July 2002.

DO6 – Ampara

DO: District Office no 6 was deployed on 1 April 2002, and covered the southernmost district of the SLMM, bordering the Yala National Park. With the restructuring in 2006, it was merged into DO5, and the office was subsequently used as POC by DO5. Following the redeployment in 2007, former DO6 HQ became a SO of SLMM Eastern Region.

POC: Points of Contact were established in Akkaraipattu, operational in June 2002; Pottuvil, operational in April 2003; Kalmunai, operational in May 2003.

NMT

The Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT) were deployed in May and July 2002 respectively, with both teams fully operational as of 12 July. However, the first naval monitors arrived 15 March, commencing ad hoc sea monitoring with the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) as of 11–12 April. Naval monitoring was suspended temporarily in May 2006, and never recommenced due to escalating hostilities.

NMT Trincomalee

Naval Monitoring Team Trincomalee (NMT-T) was deployed on 30 May 2002, and covered the territorial waters from Chalais south to Vakarai. Initially based in Colombo, with the first naval monitors arriving Trincomalee on 10 April, the NMT-T was subsequently deployed to Trincomalee, becoming operational on 30 May. NMT-T was co-located with DO4, and at the most, there were six monitors with the team.

NMT Jaffna

Naval Monitoring Team Jaffna (NMT-J) was deployed on 12 July 2002, and covered the territorial waters from Mannar Island, around the Jaffna Peninsula down to Chalais. The first naval monitors arrived Jaffna on 12 July 2002, at first as part of DO1; becoming a separate unit in March 2003. NMT-J was co-located with DO1, and at the most, there were four monitors with the team.



OPERATIONAL EXECUTION

The SLMM was established by the Parties to the CFA, and set up by the Facilitator, without a governing body. It was left to the HOM to develop the operational concept and structure, and to direct, run – and adapt – the operation and organisation in accordance with the mandate.

Directing the Mission

THE SLMM WAS DIRECTED
INTERNALLY BY THE HEAD OF MISSION, AND NOT EXTERNALLY GOVERNED

The SLMM was defined as an independent international organisation. Designed with no external governing body the mission was in effect governing itself while conducting the field operation – based on its given mandate, chosen concept and approved budgets.

The lack of any formal higher institution to instruct or guide the mission was a defining and rather unique feature of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), with its *Head of Mission (HOM)* accorded a wide-ranging (albeit fairly undefined) authority to lead the organisation and direct the operation. Although there were some prescriptions in the *Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)* aimed to steer the mission in a given direction and to carry out specified tasks, there was no direct governance conducted neither by the Parties to the CFA nor the Facilitator of the Peace Process during the operation.

Conceptually, ‘governing’ the mission is seen as the (external) guiding and governance of the SLMM as an organisation, whereas ‘directing’ the operation is seen as the (internal) management of the organisation for the purpose of conducting a field monitoring operation:

GOVERNING THE MISSION

When defining the character of the SLMM during the preparation of the CFA, the Parties did not establish – neither formally nor actually – any governing body through which the mission could be directed on a strategic level and toward which the HOM should stand accountable.

The only provisions related to mission governance prescribed in the CFA are:

- a) the designation of the HOM as the final authority in interpreting the Agreement;
- b) the decision that the HOM should be appointed by the Royal Norwegian Government (RNG) qua Facilitator to the Peace Process; and
- c) the instruction that reports from the HOM should be directed to the RNG.

Signing the CFA, the Parties established the SLMM and outlined the mission’s role and tasks, at the same time requesting Norway and the Nordic countries to recruit personnel and finance the mission. Not having been created and mandated, financed and deployed by an international body, but an ad hoc constellation of states, there were no inherent governing structures to apply, and neither was another way to govern the mission designed nor

employed. Although not easily perceived in the early phase of the operation, this governance vacuum became more pressing as the operational environment, including the mission’s relationship to the Parties, changed to the worse.

The question as to who ‘owned’ the SLMM – and consequently could have exercised governing power – was never clarified or formalised; be it the Parties who established the mission, the Nordic governments who financed the venture, or the RNG to whom the HOM was to report.

The Parties:

The Parties did not exercise any formalised governance of the SLMM; neither did they in any undue way attempt to influence the operation informally. There was no formal arena in which the Parties could (to the extent they would) jointly exercise any governing power, directing the mission or influencing the operation. With varying regularity, the HOM met with the political as well as military leadership on both sides, discussing the situation and presenting his intentions. The character of this liaison was mainly that of informing the Parties – not of discussing operational priorities or seeking their approval of operational dispositions.

However, operational matters were discussed as part of the liaising, as were concerns raised by the SLMM regarding its operational environment, including infrequent restrictions enforced by the Parties on the mission’s freedom of movement – which was one area where they could, and did, influence on the operation.

The Facilitator:

The RNG/Facilitator did not hold any formal authority over the SLMM, and did neither govern the way the mission was managed nor how the operation was conducted. Still, by appointing the HOM, the Facilitator could influence on the way the mission was managed – and even instruct the HOM (if so be on operational

“... this governance vacuum became more pressing as the operational environment, including the mission’s relationship to the Parties, changed to the worse.



NORWEGIAN NATIONALS: Norway played a key role in facilitating the Peace Process and establishing the monitoring mission; a dual role that caused confusion, although neither the Norwegian government nor the Nordic co-sponsors constituted any governing body for the SLMM. Three key players outside Norway's embassy in Colombo, from the left; HOM Trond Furuhoide, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vidar Helgesen, Ambassador Jon Westborg – all Norwegian citizens.

matters), at least as long as the position was held by a Norwegian national, who was formally engaged as a public servant with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). When the HOM was a Swedish national, he was appointed by and reported to the RNG, but seconded by the Swedish MFA, under contract with Sida.

The Nordic co-sponsors (the five Nordic governments) all supported the SLMM, politically and financially, their support being coordinated through the RNG/MFA qua Facilitator. Indirectly, the respective government could exercise some influence on the mission through the resources they made available, including the personnel they seconded. However, and although the five countries met twice a year to discuss the operation, neither the group as such nor the individual government attempted to levy any overt pressure on the HOM on how to carry out the operation.

These meetings were rather informal, held on a public servant level, and they never established any formalised body to coordinate their participation, or to govern the SLMM. Normally attending the meetings, the HOM was given the opportunity to present his ideas and plans – and the Nordic governments to communicate any concerns the other way.

The RNG played a prominent role vis-à-vis the SLMM; partly by being tasked by the Parties to appoint the HOM, partly through coordinating the Nordic support, partly by contributing the largest share of the mission resources, plus, as Facilitator to the

Peace Process keeping in close and regular touch with the HOM. At the MFA, administrative responsibility for the SLMM was vested with its Section for Peace and Reconciliation, political responsibility with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In this setting, the HOM exercised a routine working cooperation with the Special Envoy through relevant telecommunication means, as well as by meetings in Colombo and Oslo when practical and/or necessary. The most frequent running contact to the RNG qua Facilitator was channelled through the Norwegian Embassy in Colombo, with regular discussions between the Ambassador and the HOM. Neither of these official Facilitator representatives did however possess any formal powers to instruct the HOM or influence the operation.

See also the article on the Peace Process, pages 23-29

Still, by footing the bill the Nordic governments did have a say in how the SLMM was managed, and, to some extent, how the operation was conducted. Even though there was no formal power vested with the Nordic co-sponsors, in practise the HOM had to relate to the RNG and the other contributing countries especially on the defining issue of resources: Needing the approval for the annual budgets (structure and size) of the SLMM and for any request regarding secondment of monitors (numbers and qualifications), he depended on support for his priorities and proposals. Significantly, this influenced on the operational concept and conduct with respect to the size and equipment of the mission, e.g. on decisive operational issues such as acquiring designated adequate platforms for naval monitoring/patrolling (coastal ves-



DISTRICT DESIGN: The SLMM established DO's as the pivotal structural elements of its operations design, carrying out the bulk of monitoring, liaising and reporting – requiring extensive patrolling and enquiring in the field. Monitors with SLA at their Kilali camp, 2004.

sels) or air transportation (helicopters) – which to a considerable extent defined the operational concept and capability.

DIRECTING THE OPERATION

The HOM was responsible for leading the organisation and directing the operation. Having chosen a basically military design and concept, the military notion of 'command' was adopted rather than the more civilian idea of 'management'. Hence, a 'command approach' was applied for most of the period, until fundamental changes were made in 2007 (see the article 'Adapting the mission').

Mission command

The chain of command and mode of operation was defined in the *Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)* and *Operation Order (OO)*, both largely modelled on military procedures.

Central level:

HOM

The *Head of Mission* was appointed head of the SLMM, responsible for managing the organisation and directing the operation. As mission commander, the HOM directed the operation from his HQ through its Operations Section (from 2007; Operation Centre). In accordance with the stipulations of the CFA, the HOM liaised with the Parties and reported to the RNG qua Facilitator.

In the absence of an external governing body developing and adopting the main strategies of the mission, this task was vested with the HOM, who consequently would direct the SLMM on a strategic as well as operational level.

Consequent to the unique governing independence of the SLMM, and the specified authority as the sole interpreter of the CFA accorded him, the HOM held a rather unique position, far beyond what is normally vested in a force (mission) commander.

HQ

The *Mission Headquarters (HQ)* was the HOM's instrument in managing the mission and directing the operation.

The command structure was clearly defined, with the Deputy Head of Mission (DHOM) or Chief of Staff (COS) being second in command; the functions varied throughout the operational period, but both held the position of deputy – also the COS, unlike in most military organisations, mainly due to the small size of the staff. The Chief Operations Officer (COO) ranked third in command.

See also the article 'Mission Structure', pages 47–52

Local level:

The *District Offices (DO)* were the pivotal structural elements of the operational design of the SLMM. The Heads of District (HOD), and the parallel Heads of Naval Monitoring Teams (HNMT), were the managers of all monitoring activities within the respective districts (areas), and the leader of respective staffs, comprising international monitors and national employees. He/she held a decisive position with regards the overall success of on-the-ground liaising, monitoring and reporting within the SLMM. The mission concept provided the HOD's with considerable freedom of action to pursue local initiatives at his/her discretion.

Whereas the HOM constituted and exercised the strategic and – through the mission HQ – operational levels of direction, the subordinated HOD's represented and applied the tactical, executive level of the SLMM operation. Subsequently, the heads of DO's and NMT's reported – and stood responsible – directly to the HOM.

Mission priorities

With the extensive tasks stipulated in the CFA and within the existing framework – including limited operational resources – the HOM at any time had to make priorities and to adjust the operational direction and activities to the prevailing situation. Priorities were continuously made, based on interpretations of the CFA and the operational tasks, and by considering the current situation – the state of the political process and military conflict, as well as the resources available. Basically considered an operation with a rather brief tenure and without any superior governing body, no real SLMM strategies (organisationally or operationally) were developed, beyond the choices of a strategic nature made in designing the mission structure and developing the operational concept. The strategic approach and direction – vested with the HOM, was exercised mainly through his expressed intentions as well as orders, directives and guidelines, plans and procedures.

Mission evaluation

No formal *evaluation* as such of the SLMM, neither internally nor by external actors was carried out during the period of operation. With the SOP effective of March 2003, a 'SLMM Evaluation Concept (Logical Framework)' was included as a tool for the mission itself to analyse and evaluate the SLMM's relevance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. However, this was not implemented, and removed from the SOP in 2005.

In 2010, the Norwegian MFA commissioned an external evaluation of Norway's peace efforts in Sri Lanka, covering the period 1997–2009.

Running the Mission

THE SLMM WAS RUN AS
A PREDOMINANTLY FIELD MISSION WITH GEOGRAPHICALLY DISTRIBUTED PRESENCE

The SLMM conducted a field operation with a set of specified and implied tasks, making use of its chosen operational concept and organisational structure, developing a set of modalities and employing a variety of methods.

The *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)* applied an *operational* approach to its assignment, designing its structure and set-up to serve the purposes of a predominantly field oriented operation aimed at assisting the Parties to the *Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)* in complying with respective commitments to the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of normalcy.

A main feature of the SLMM's operational approach was to be highly *accessible and flexible*. Keeping an open door not only to the Parties at all levels, but also to the Sri Lankan public at all times, was a key strategy of the SLMM which also established a network of relevant relations in civil society and the diplomatic and political scene in Sri Lanka. These features, in addition to the operational framework itself, contributed to the way the operation was run, centrally and locally.

PLANNING

Managing the SLMM, organisationally and operationally, was founded on the structures implemented from the onset of the operation. In conducting current planning and operational execution, there was a close interaction between the *central level*, i.e. the *Head of Mission (HOM)* with his Headquarters (HQ), and the *local level* with District Offices (DO) and Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT), as well as the Liaison Office (LO). See 'Mission Structure'; pages 47–52 for a detailed description

Considered to be a venture of limited duration and size, the SLMM did not establish a designated planning capacity. Still, substantial effort was invested in developing a comprehensive range of procedures and plans to facilitate the directing and the running of the field operation.

Operational procedures

Running the SLMM as a mission was based on procedures laid down principally in the *Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)* documents and – for the field operation specifically – the *Operation*

Order (OO), *SOP Part 3 (Operations)* as well as a separate *Security Plan (SP)*. Additionally, the HOM occasionally issued *HOM Directives*, *HOM Guidelines*, and *Fragmentary Orders (FragO)*. Furthermore, *instructions* for various functions were issued, centrally and locally.

The baseline OO 'Hermes' was first adopted in 2002 and revised in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. It was further outlined and implemented through the SOP (particularly Part 3 – Operations), adopted in 2002, with subsequent revisions in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006.

Operational execution

Central level

Commanding authority was vested with the HOM, who exercised his directing role through the HQ, in particular making use of the Operations Section (2007; Operation Centre), headed by the *Chief Operations Officer (COO)* (2007; Operations Manager). The HQ in Colombo was fully manned during regular office hours 8–17, and staffed 24/7 by a designated duty officer. There was continuous telecommunication connection, as well as frequent meetings, between the HQ and the field units, with a *Head of District (HOD)* and a *Head of Naval Monitoring Team (HNMT)* in charge of the DO's and NMT's, respectively.

See 'Directing the Mission', pages 54–56 for details

Local level

At the local level, DO's were also in effect manned on a 24/7 basis; systems varying between locations. DO's were normally open for the public to hand in complaints during week-days office hours, 9–17. On temporary basis, monitors from the DO's manned respective *Points of Contact (POC)* for a few hours at a time, receiving complaints mainly from civilians – often combined with patrolling areas of the Area of Responsibility (AOR).

When patrolling, as a norm two monitors would travel together; on land normally one international monitor supported by a national staff member. As hostilities escalated from 2006 onwards the rule became to man patrols with international monitor pairs, often utilising two cars for security reasons. Sea patrols were normally carried out by one international monitor.

“A main feature of the SLMM's operational approach was to be highly accessible and flexible.

Main SLMM Modalities

1. Monitoring the Parties' conduct

Monitoring comprised the major part of the SLMM operation, and required most of its resources. The main *objective* of the monitoring activities was to continuously verify the Parties' adherence to their commitments through the CFA, including verification of specific obligations.

Operationally, monitoring was widely defined and extensively implemented, implying a multi-faceted approach including several aspects and employing various activities – principally in the defined AOR, partially in the entire AOO. The scope spanned from monitoring the cessation of hostilities (including military activities, separation of forces, and freedom of movement) to the restoration of normalcy (including hostile and offending acts towards the civilian population and the free flow of goods), with a particular emphasis on confidence-building measures. Monitoring implied extensive presence on the ground in the conflict-affected areas, in order to carry out first-hand collection of information – through own observations and other sources, including close contact with the Parties on local level. From 2002 to mid-2007, monitoring was mainly executed within the broad concept of *field monitoring* (on land and at sea). Due to the need for a strategic reorientation of the operational concept in 2007, monitoring was expanded to include three specific dimensions: field, policy, and information monitoring, respectively.

For operational details, see below

2. Liaising with the Parties and stakeholders

Liaising constituted a specific assignment in the CFA, and remained a prioritised activity of the operation. The main *objective* of the liaising activities was to assist the Parties in retaining a positive dialogue conducive to the ceasefire; additionally to establish a good working relationship between the SLMM and the Parties.

Operationally, liaising was primarily directed at the Parties, with the chief purpose of assisting them in fulfilling their respective commitments and in building mutual confidence, including helping in resolving problems, co-ordinating requirements, and facilitating confidence-building measures. Also, liaising was a main path for the SLMM to develop a working relationship built on confidence and cooperation with both Parties, as a key prerequisite for carrying out the mission. Direct contact with the Parties also provided the SLMM with vital information on the situation and insight into the positions of the Parties, respectively. The SLMM also engaged in *dialogue* and contact with other stakeholders in Sri Lanka, including civil society, international organisations and foreign embassies. In this respect, liaising should be seen also as an integral part of the dialogue the SLMM took Part 01n, and encouraged; the dialogue concept became a major strategic feature following the operational and organisational reorientations of 2007. To some extent, SLMM liaising also served the purpose of establishing or maintaining contact between the Parties and the Facilitator.

For operational details, see below



PLANNING PATROLS: The naval monitoring was done in close operational cooperation with the SLN, and largely carried out from on board its vessels. Members of NMT-T liaising with the Northern Naval Command at KKS naval base, planning for sea patrols off the Jaffna peninsula, 2005.

3. Reporting to the Parties, the stakeholders and the public

Reporting composed an essential element of the operation, albeit not being defined as a task in the CFA. The main *objective* of the reporting activities was to compile relevant information and to communicate the mission's findings – observations and conclusions – based on its monitoring and liaising. External reports were principally directed to the Parties, but available to all stakeholders.

Operationally, reporting internally within the SLMM, mainly from the local field units to HQ was continuously carried out on a tactical level in order to assemble an up-dated picture of the ground situation and keep track of operational developments. Compiling reports on SLMM's findings constituted a main approach on how to communicate monitoring results to the Parties, and as a way – through dialogue based on findings, within the framework of liaising – to assist them in honouring their respective commitments. As part of the reported feedback, the SLMM also compiled statistics and issued rulings, the latter communicating findings and conclusions on complaints. Strategically, the SLMM chose to report publicly on its activities and findings, through formalised, regular reports and on major rulings, i.a. by publishing on its web site. Formally, the information the SLMM gathered through the operational activities, was reported to the RNG (qua Facilitator), the Parties and the public. The mode and frequency of the external reporting varied throughout the mission period.

For operational details, see below



CONCEIVING COMMUNICATION: Among the specified tasks in the CFA, the SLMM was to facilitate communication with and between the Parties, as a way to solve conflicts and defuse tension particularly on the local level. SLMM COS Hagrup Haukland facilitating a meeting in Batticaloa, 2004, following clashes between Tamil and Muslim armed elements.

Patrolling personnel would stay connected to respective offices by radio and/or cell and satellite phones.

Operational objectives

Outside the provisions conveyed in the CFA, the SLMM was not assigned, nor did it itself define any sets of operational objectives for its undertaking. However, the overarching objectives – remaining valid throughout the operation – were commonly perceived by the monitors to:

- assist the Parties in implementing and adhering to their CFA;
- execute the operation according to the letter and intent of the CFA;
- contribute to the peace process by being an integral part of it

Operational tasks

While the wording of the CFA did not include either an explicit ‘mission statement’ nor established definite objectives for the monitoring and verification, the document did outline a series of specified and *implied tasks*. The *specified tasks* could be extracted from the letter of the CFA, whereas the *implied tasks* had to be deduced from the spirit of the Agreement, as interpreted by the HOM. Although the latter were not formalised with the Parties, they were clearly reflected in the operational activities, and thereby accepted. The Parties also accorded a limited number of *additional tasks* during the operational tenure, as part of the ongoing Peace Process.

SPECIFIED TASKS

The *specified tasks* were not listed a complete set of tasks to be executed, but a set of 20 clearly identifiable task are given through the CFA.

[See page 40 for comprehensive list](#)

IMPLIED TASKS

The *implied tasks* followed from the understanding of the CFA and its implications. These were essentially:

Facilitate meetings between the Parties

In accordance with the spirit of cooperation that created the basis of the CFA, and the specified task of assisting the Parties in establishing communication between respective commanders, the SLMM facilitated – and chaired – a number of meetings between the Parties at various levels.

Intercede in conflict situations

In accordance with both the two main dimensions of the CFA, the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of normalcy, the SLMM took upon itself, on occasions when deemed potentially fruitful and security-wise acceptable, to intercede in local conflicts that either had broken out or appeared imminent.

Support civil society

SLMM engaged with the civil society in a variety of settings during the operation. This activity was initially connected to public access to High Security Zones (HSZ) and places of religious worship, both areas covered by the CFA.

Furthermore, the SLMM monitored the working conditions for the legal Tamil political parties and contributed towards their ability to perform their meetings. In addition, the SLMM presence, with monitoring and liaising, reduced interference from both Parties towards the legal aid and support activities of Sri Lankan non-governmental organisations (NGO) and international non-governmental organisations (INGO). Specifically, the fishermen's associations in the North and the East were supported by the SLMM in their efforts to secure their lawful rights connected to fishing grounds access and the enforcement of fishing restrictions by national authorities.

ADDITIONAL TASKS

On a few occasions, linked to the peace process, the SLMM was accorded additional tasks, in addition to those included in the CFA. During the series of peace talks in late 2002 and early 2003, several measures were debated and decided on in order to bring the process forward and to build confidence between the Parties. One such measure was to establish a set of sub-committees:

At the 2nd round of peace talks, in November 2002, the Parties agreed to set up a *Sub-Committee of De-Escalation and Normalisation (SDN)*, comprising five District Committees. The HOM was tasked to assist the SDN, and the SLMM monitored the implementation of decisions and the progress made by the committees. Also, it was decided to establish a *Sub-Committee for Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN)*, a short-term mechanism for responding to the immediate needs of the population, also comprising five committees on district level. Here, the SLMM Heads of Districts (HOD) acted as moderators and secretariats for an initial period. At the 6th round of peace talks, in March 2003, the Parties agreed to take steps to further strengthen the security situation on land, including, with the assistance of the SLMM, the establishment of procedures for handling soldiers and cadres apprehended by the other party, when appropriate in cooperation with the ICRC.

At the peace talks in Geneva in early 2006, the SLMM was tasked to monitor the implementation of agreements made by the Parties at the first round of talks in February, and to prepare a report for the second round in October. In so doing, the SLMM was specifically requested to monitor and report on aspects not inscribed in the CFA: child recruitment and the presence of armed groups, as well as on the overall conflict and humanitarian situation.

See also 'The Peace Process', pages 23–29

Operational ends, ways and means

The SLMM was established to assist the Parties by *verifying* their adherence to the CFA. In so doing, the major focus of the operation was the same as that of the Agreement; the *cessation of hostilities* and the *restoration of normalcy*.

Consequently, for the SLMM the key words were *verification and monitoring*: According to the CFA Article 3, the mission was to “conduct international verification through on-site monitoring” – indicating the foremost role of the SLMM as to verify, and the main way to do so, to monitor.

In practical terms, the SLMM chose to expand the notion ‘monitoring’ into three modalities: *monitoring, liaising, reporting* – each executed through a number of operational methods. Matching this approach to the generally recognised model of ‘Ends–Ways–Means’, the ‘End’ for the operation was considered to be verification of the Parties’ adherence; the ‘Ways’ to be constituted by the three modalities monitoring, liaising, and reporting; and the ‘Means’ to be the wide range of operational methods and tools which subsequently were utilised by the monitors.

See also 'Mission Concept', pages 38–46

Intercession

In addition to these three main modalities, *intercession* was a means employed by the SLMM to exercise its authority. Rather than being a formally assigned function or task, this was an activity carried out with reference to article 3.12 of the CFA, aiming to resolve disputes in the conflict area at the lowest possible level. This implied interceding in potential conflict situations, with monitors employing non-enforcement mechanisms such as dialogue, information, and explanation.

Interceding as an approach was applied in the districts, and directed by the HOD's in cooperation with the HQ, which also corresponded to the so-called ‘two-level approach’ of the SLMM. This called for the mission – when notified about an incident under development – to intervene at local and central level simultaneously. On other occasions it was sufficient to intercede locally. Although not a formal assignment, the SLMM was much commended – by the Facilitator as well as by several key stakeholders in Sri Lanka – for interceding to defuse tension.

Confidence-building

Confidence-building measures made up a major part of the letter and spirit of the CFA, with the Parties committing themselves to a number of actions to enhance their mutual confidence – and the general confidence in the Peace Process, in Sri Lankan society as well as internationally.

From a SLMM operational point of view, confidence-building was principally intended to boost the confidence the Parties had each other, but the confidence the Parties had to the SLMM, as well as the confidence civilians had in the mission, was also of great importance.

Facilitating meetings between the Parties, and communicating positive news from one party to another were key confidence-building activities exercised by the SLMM. Another contribution was to assist in making civil society organisations and cultural and community arrangements flourish again. Aiding the Parties’ relations with civilian population, through mediating differences in important day-to-day occurrences such as fishing rights and access to paddy-fields, was a third.

“The SLMM chose to expand the notion ‘monitoring’ into three modalities: monitoring, liaising, reporting – each executed through a number of operational methods.



CONTRIBUTING CONFIDENCE: A main assignment given the SLMM, was to engage in confidence-building, as part of the process towards a return to normalcy. SLMM monitor meeting a Lankese civilian in Trincomale, 2005.

Except from facilitating meetings between the Parties, none of these examples of confidence-building measures were accorded formally to the SLMM. Rather, they were considered assignments implied by the CFA, or activities conducted in direct response to the reality that the SLMM met in the districts.

The SLMM engaged in regular communication with civilians, civilian leaders, and civil society actors not just as a confidence-building measure, but also to gather information. Staying in contact with civil society and community leaders to maintain a correct overall assessment of the situation in the DO's became increasingly important as access for the SLMM was restricted due to the security situation.

METHODS

The SLMM developed a set of operational methods in order to carry out its assignment, cf. the overview on next page. These were not prescribed in the CFA, but chosen by the HOM and his staff as appropriate and effective means, based on the operational concept and at all times considering the operational environment and mission capacities.

Most main methods remained constant throughout the operation. These included presence and patrolling in the districts and receiving and enquiring into complaints (*monitoring*); facilitating meetings with the Parties and communicating with key stakeholders (*liaising*); collecting information and compiling reports (*reporting*).

Operational preparedness

Building on the operational principles established in 2002, Operational Preparedness was added to the SOP in 2006, with the aim to establish a system that would guarantee a sufficient high level of preparedness in order to fulfil the tasks undertaken by

the mission while at the same time allow for flexibility to operate and move outside own AOR. Thereby, SLMM monitors should be 'prepared to solve their designated tasks on short notice at all times while on duty with a high degree of flexibility'.

Three levels of operational preparedness were defined, in which threat assessments, SLMM activities and current situation in the mission area were taken into consideration; preparedness levels were established by HQ OPS, which informed SLMM units:

- Green: When the situation in the AOR was calm and quiet, and the threat assessment was low.
- Yellow: When the situation in the AOR was tense, and the threat assessment was medium, and/or SLMM had planned events/actions.
- Red: When the situation in the AOR was insecure and dangerous, the threat assessment was medium to high.

See also 'Adapting the Mission', pages 70–74

OPERATING

In the ongoing operation, there were no practical division between the modalities and methods, which in effect were both interrelated and overlapping. Consequently, field monitors were engaged in a number of activities – within all three modalities – more or less simultaneously: One activity typically included elements of more than one modality, employing several methods and activities. For example, *patrolling* was a dominant *monitoring method* in the districts, serving several functions, such as demonstrating presence (showing the flag); collecting information and enquiring into complaints; interceding in conflict situations and carrying out confidence-building measures; liaising/relating to stakeholders and civil society.

How the operation was actually carried out – with respect to monitoring, liaising, and reporting, respectively – year by year and month by month, is described in the next section of this report, Part 02; 'Operational Review'.

EXECUTING MONITORING

Monitoring was initially, by and large, synonymous with on-site 'field monitoring', i.e. watching developments considered relevant with respect to the mandate, and looking into incidents that could constitute violations – by either Party. The main approach was, through various methods, to collect information by physical presence – including liaising – and to analyse these to reach conclusions to be communicated, especially regarding verification.

Verifying the Parties' compliance to their commitments entailed monitoring their conduct. Primarily, this was done by *observing* the relevant activities of the Parties, on land and at sea, mainly by *patrolling* the AOR, by *receiving complaints* on alleged violations of the CFA, and *enquiring* into such allegations. Most of the field monitoring was conducted by the six DO's, carrying out patrols, receiving complaints and conducting enquiries. The two NMT's basically performed their monitoring by on board inspection patrols by the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN). Monitoring on the central level (HOM/HQ) mainly included watching major political and

SLMM: Overview of main Operational Modalities and Methods

| MODALITIES ('WAYS') | OBJECTIVES ('ENDS') | METHODS ('MEANS') |
|--|--|---|
| MONITORING <i>Monitoring should be understood, in an operational setting, primarily as:</i> A multifaceted approach based on on-site presence, observation and engagement. | The main operational objective of the monitoring activities was to: Verify the Parties' adherence to their mutually agreed commitments regarding cessation of hostilities and the restoration of normalcy. | Monitoring was conducted through several interrelated activities and methods, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presence in the AOR • Patrolling the AOR • Accessibility to the public • On-board naval patrolling • Observing conduct and actions • Receiving complaints • Registering data • Compiling statistics • Enquiring into alleged violations • Inspecting scenes of incidents • Interviewing complainants a.o. • Verifying clauses of the CFA • Ruling violations of the CFA • Interceding in conflicts <i>As of 2007, monitoring was mainly conducted and coordinated through:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Field monitoring • Policy monitoring • Information monitoring <i>(See 'Adaptation' article for details)</i> |
| LIAISING <i>Liaising should be understood, in an operational setting, primarily as:</i> A comprehensive approach to foster dialogue, strengthen confidence, and defuse tension. | The main operational objective of the liaising activities was to: Assist the Parties to retain a constructive dialogue and a conducive relationship. | Liaising was conducted through several interrelated activities and methods, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arranging meetings • Meeting the Parties • Communicating with the Parties • Dedicating liaison officers • Facilitating dialogue • Chairing LMC's • Sharing information • Participating at events • Cooperating with relevant actors • Briefing stakeholders and visitors • Facilitating exchanges and releases • Accompanying LTTE representatives |
| REPORTING <i>Reporting should be understood, in an operational setting, primarily as:</i> An essential approach to document and communicate findings and convey guidance. | The main operational objective of the reporting activities was to: Compile information on findings related to the two above referred operational objectives, and communicate this in an appropriate, rational and wise manner to actors capable of influencing a positive situation development. | Reporting was conducted through several interrelated activities and methods, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collecting information • Reporting field information • Analysing collected data • Compiling external reports • Communicating findings • Informing stakeholders • Issuing statements |

military developments relevant to the mission and the Peace Process, in accordance with the mandate.

In addition to overall monitoring and verification, the SLMM conducted verifications related to specific clauses in the CFA – such as the evacuation of combatants from places of worship and school buildings in all districts, and the safe passage of unarmed soldiers and cadres in civilian clothing between LTTE and GOSL-controlled areas. Such verification exercises were conducted in cooperation with the Parties and relevant authorities, and were at the same time considered important confidence-building measures and means to restore normalcy.

Monitoring commenced as soon as the SLMM was deployed to the AOR, and the main methods were immediately applied, to be contained until the end of the operation, primarily an extensive patrolling activity, and the establishment of permanent presence through district units, mainly the LO LTTE, DO's, and NMT's, the latter until mid-2006. From the onset, the SLMM received complaints, and started to enquire into these, developing procedures and applications based on early experiences, including routine check-lists and tailored databases.

Whereas the SLMM carried out field monitoring on land as well as at sea, monitoring of the airspace was not included in the operational concept. The mission neither introduced air-to-ground monitoring using designated aircraft, nor utilised any form of satellite-based surveillance.

The implementation of monitoring as a modality varied somewhat, i.e. due to the fact that early in 2002, several of the actions to be verified were already carried out. The approach also changed to some extent, mainly because the changing military environment called for adaptations. Monitoring was carried out at central as well as local level:

Central level:

Monitoring at the HQ level consisted mainly on directing the field monitoring operation and collecting and analysing the information gathered in the districts, as well as watching the political and military developments, and the national and international media coverage relevant to the assignment and operation.

Local level:

Most of the monitoring activities were carried out at district level – by DO's and NMT's – and the key methods applied remained basically the same, primarily *presence* in the districts and *patrolling* the AO – allowing for receiving complaints and enquiring into them respectively, as well as inspecting scenes of incidents and intercede in tense situations.

“Whereas the SLMM carried out field monitoring on land as well as at sea, monitoring of the airspace was not included in the operational concept.

LAND MONITORING:

The SLMM started field monitoring on land as soon as international monitors arrived and DO's were established, performing regular monitoring within the AOR throughout the entire operation. The DO's continuously received complaints, routinely registering them – and normally enquiring into them until 2006/2007. Then the effort to enquire was deemed largely futile, in view of the developments in the field, with the number and frequency of violations coupled with the limited accessibility to major conflict areas, as well as the reduced capacity of the SLMM.

Patrolling the AOR was conducted mainly by the DO's on a frequent but random basis. Patrols, generally consisting of one of two international monitors assisted by one or two national staff members, were carried out throughout the AOR, all patrols originating from and ending up at one DO the same day. Patrolling was a low-level engagement that demonstrated SLMM's presence, and which was carried out principally to collect information, including looking into incidents and enquiring into alleged violations of the CFA.

Receiving complaints from the Parties – and from the civilian population – was a core monitoring activity. Complaints from one Party were often raised up with the other, as part of the liaison efforts of the SLMM. Complaints from civilians were, if deemed feasible and safe, and in agreement with the complainant, brought to the attention of the responsible authorities, the Parties, or other actors such as NGO's. Receiving and following up on complaints was an important instrument in terms of solving disputes on the lowest level possible and served as a confidence-building mechanism. All complaints received were logged and stored in the SLMM database; altogether the SLMM received a total of 12 678 complaints. The majority were issued by civilians coming to the DO's, or handed to the DO's by representatives of the Parties. In addition, some complaints were delivered at the HQ. As the AOR also covered several remote areas, the SLMM manned POC's on a part-time basis to facilitate for all civilians to issue their complaints.

Recording incidents that were reported or observed – by the Parties, the civil society or other stakeholders – was an important monitoring activity. The SLMM often discovered or was notified about incidents that were about to occur, under development, or had already occurred. These were often protests/demonstrations and clashes/hostilities between civilian groups (i.e. Muslims and Tamils in the East). The incidents were recorded in a SLMM database, and monitors regularly followed up on this kind of incidents to diffuse possible further escalation, in fact often defusing the situation completely.

Conducting enquiries into alleged violations of the CFA was another key monitoring activity that demanded a substantial amount of resources. Article 3 of the CFA, states that the SLMM was set up to enquire into “into any instance of violation of the terms and conditions of the agreement.” Article 3.11 further states that “It shall be the responsibility of the SLMM to take immediate action on any complaints made by either Party to the Agreement, and to enquire into and assist the Parties in the settlement of any dis-

pute that might arise in connection with such complaints.” When the SLMM received a complaint, or was notified about an incident, the mission could decide to conduct an enquiry. Enquiring entailed different approaches of gathering relevant information and – as far as possible – verifying the information, principally: interviewing witnesses; inspecting and documenting the incident scene; verifying and documenting material damages; verifying and documenting injuries; visiting the hospital or morgue for verification purposes; talking to civilians, organisations and authorities in the vicinity. Through enquiring, the SLMM sought to verify *numbers* and *chain of events*. The SLMM at times followed up on a complaint or incident over a period of time, in order to facilitate the situation for the victim and its family in the best way possible; abduction cases were for example followed up on when the mission perceived a possibility for facilitating a release. After an enquiry was completed, a report was written, and stored with relevant photographic documentation. The report could lead to a ruling. However, these enquiries should not be confused with *investigations* aiming at collecting evidence to be pursued in the judicial system. The appropriate Sri Lankan law enforcement authorities would from time to time also investigate incidents covered by the SLMM as possible CFA violations as criminal cases. It was paramount for the mission not to allow these different approaches to the same incident to be tangled into each other.

SEA MONITORING:

The SLMM took up sea monitoring in April 2002. Two designated Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT) were established, in May and July respectively, performing regular sea monitoring until May 2006, when it was suspended. The monitoring at sea – naval monitoring – encompassed several tasks and was carried out at the local level by the NMT’s, principally by the presence of naval monitors on board both offshore and inshore patrols carried out by the SLN.

On-board monitoring entailed a naval monitor being present on SLN vessels conducting patrols, as an important part of the NMT task of monitoring the marine patrolling of the SLN; hence also monitoring LTTE naval activities from this platform. In addition, naval monitors accompanied LTTE vessels on a few sea movements (leave transports) approved by the GOSL: verifying – through monitoring and supervising – the LTTE’s notified sea movements. The SLMM inspected and verified all LTTE vessels as well as all pieces of luggage before departure, when LTTE cadres were transported by sea from one LTTE-controlled area to another, in connection with leaves. An operational procedure was agreed between the Parties in accordance with the relevant provisions of the CFA, with an approval from the GOSL required for each LTTE sea movement, and requests forwarded by SLMM to SCOPP. The last LTTE sea movement took place in 2004; a planned movement was aborted as late as in spring 2006.

Naval monitoring from *Trincomalee*, carried out by the NMT–T was focused around the seas mainly from Trincomalee north to Mullaithivu. NMT–T monitors also monitored GOSL troop transports (leave) between Trincomalee and the Jaffna Peninsula. From *Jaffna*, the so-called Delft patrol covered the North-Western seaboard, monitoring smuggling, fishery protection, and LTTE Sea

Tiger activity. The NMT–J moreover regularly patrolled with the North-Easterly seaboard from Point Pedro to Chalais – monitoring LTTE Sea Tiger activity and fishery protection. Monitors of the NMT–J also participated regularly on patrols with SLN’s Special Boat Squadron (SBS) operating from Kilali in the Jaffna lagoon.

The NMT’s worked closely with the DO’s in Trincomalee and Jaffna respectively, frequently carrying out joint patrol enquiries. The NMT’s also supported land monitoring performed by the DO’s, according to demand and instructions.

Several serious incidents – including life-threatening experiences for SLMM monitors – took place during naval monitoring, which was subsequently suspended in May 2006 following an incident in which a monitor came under direct fire north of Mullaithivu. Monitoring at sea was never recommenced.

For details, see Part 02; ‘Operational Review’

EXECUTING LIAISING

Liaising was not detailed in the CFA, except for the provision of establishing offices in Colombo and in Vanni – in order to liaise with the GOSL and the LTTE leaders, respectively. Authority to liaise with the Parties rested with the HOM and was delegated to the HOD’s. The HOM further assigned ongoing, daily liaison functions to the LO’s, which acted on his behalf towards the two Peace Secretariats, which again acted on behalf of the leaders of the respective Party. Liaising was performed both centrally and locally: Typically by the HOM on the national level, and the HOD’s at the district level. The LO’s, representing the HOM, would then primarily maintain attention towards the central – national – aspects of the CFA commitments, but would, liaising being their core business, in practical terms operate in parallel on both levels.

FORMAL LIAISING:

Liaising with the Parties was a central modality for the SLMM as to build confidentiality and support a restoration of normalcy. Through liaising with the Parties, the SLMM conveyed relevant CFA-related information, carefully never revealing compromising information from one side to the other. Topics for dialogue varied a lot throughout the operation, subsequent to the prevailing situation, the general relationship between the mission and the Parties’ leaders, as well as the relationship between individual monitors and individual Party representatives. Dialogue and discussion with the Parties remained an important monitoring means in itself; information and viewpoints provided from the two sides at the two levels were adding substantially to SLMM insight and understanding of the conflict, and the (at the time) former belligerents’ positions and concerns on important matters – as well as the actual military and political state of affairs.

Facilitating meetings between the Parties appeared in 2002 and 2003 as an important task for the mission, and occurred frequently in this period. These were meetings between politi-

“ Liaising with the Parties was a central modality for the SLMM as to build confidentiality and support a restoration of normalcy.



MULLAITHIVU MONITORING: Naval monitoring entailed going on sea patrols, normally accompanying the SLN. In an incident outside Mullaithivu in 2002, two SLMM monitors were refused to return to the SLN boat and taken ashore – and in effect held hostage – by the LTTE, however soon left to go, in a serious violation of the CFA.

cal and/or military leaders of the GOSL and the LTTE, centrally as well as locally – constituting confidence-building measures. Locally, the HOD's chaired the meetings, and the topics discussed ranged from incidents and complaints to impediments on civilian life and the restoration of normalcy. The meetings were moreover an important forum for resolving misunderstandings between the Parties – often with the SLMM acting as the impartial verifier of facts – as well as a venue for exchanging success stories from cooperation between the Parties in the districts. In 2004, this role was reduced to comprise the GOSL local Military Commanders and local LTTE Military Wing leaders. In December 2005, this activity ceased all together.

In addition to this facilitation of meetings on behalf of the Parties, creating a space for them to speak directly with each other, the HOM, from time to time also invited local military and civilian leaders potentially influencing the adherence to CFA commitment for discussions with the SLMM on topics pertaining to their responsibilities within the different regions.

The SLMM was also accorded a role, by the Parties and the Facilitator, as moderator and secretariat in two national level Sub-Committees established as a result of the peace talks in 2002: the SIHRN and the SDN.

Central level:

HOM and HQ, with designated senior staff members carried out extensive liaison with officials of the Parties at the corresponding level. Liaising activities were characterised by ad hoc as well

as the periodic meetings to discuss a variety of policy issues or matters of grave importance. In addition to direct contact with political and military leaders, the HOM stayed in regular personal contact with the respective peace secretariats, the SCOPP and the PS-LTTE; typically on a weekly basis with the SCOPP, and roughly monthly with the PS-LTTE. As the SLMM reoriented its operation dialogue in 2007, a Dialogue Team was established, comprising both LO's (in Colombo and Kilinochchi) in addition to the HOM, DHOM/Mission Manager and designated members of the HQ Information Team. From June 2007, the SLMM and the SCOPP agreed to issue joint press releases following meetings between the two institutions.

Liaison Offices:

LO's were tasked by the HOM to liaise primarily between the SLMM and the Parties. As of mid-2003, the LO LTTE was also tasked to liaise between the LTTE and the Facilitator, on behalf of the HOM; as of mid-2004 furthermore to "liaise between the Parties as required" – and to "attend LTTE briefings and press conferences as appropriate" on behalf of the HOM; as of late 2005 also to "liaise with other organizations as appropriate", on behalf of the HOM. The LO's were in daily contact with the respective peace secretariats, normally handling a variety of minor issues that surfaced – from security clearances for SLMM monitors and visitors, to issues related to media coverage, and potential conflicts due to communicative misunderstandings. The LO's cooperated closely with the HOM in their dialogue with the Parties, and were instructed by him on how to handle specific issues. An important function of the LO's was to keep the com-

munication lines open and maintain good relations with the Parties’ representatives. From mid-2007 the effects of dialogue and liaison activities vis-à-vis the Parties was continuously assessed by the Dialogue Team, and a focus on challenging the Parties’ perspectives of the other Part, the conflict, and the effects of their actions and policies ensued.

District level

DO’s were tasked by the HOM to carry out regular as well as irregular liaising duties, providing ad hoc and day-to-day routine contacts between the SLMM and the Parties on local level. The aim was to reinforce trust and confidence, and solve conflicts on the lowest level possible. Meetings and communications were arranged ad hoc. I.a., the DO’s were tasked to “liaise and participate in meetings with the Parties and local leaders” in respective AOR. As of mid-2004, the DO’s were also tasked to “facilitate meetings between the Parties”. A core liaising task of the DO’s was to chair meetings of the Local Monitoring Committees (LMC); see below.

NMT’s were tasked by the HOM to carry out regular as well as irregular liaising duties with the (regional) naval commands of the respective Parties in their AOR’s. As of mid-2004, the NMT’s were tasked also to “liaise and facilitate meetings between SLN and fishermen’s societies”; as of late 2005 specifically to “liaise with the Sri Lanka Navy (SNL) and LTTE Sea Tigers deployed in the AOR”. The NMT’s were responsible for maintaining contact with the fishermen’s organisations in their respective areas, dealing with contentions arising due to strict fishing restrictions imposed by the Security Forces (SF).

LMC’s were not part of the SLMM structure, but the mission was instructed through the CFA to chair these local mechanisms to foster confidence and reduce tension. The LMC was an important confidence-building mechanism at district level, and a forum for resolving differences or conflicts on the lowest level possible. At LMC meetings, cases brought forward to the SLMM were raised, analysed, discussed and ruled upon – as a violation, non-violation, or deemed unfeasible to rule due to lack of information. On some occasions it was decided that further enquiries into the case was needed, and that the LMC members would participate in gathering more information. Through this mechanism, representatives of the Parties were encouraged to analyse violations done by the respective Parties. Thus, the Parties – through their appointed representatives – were sensitised to what commitment to the CFA and restoring normalcy for the civilian population entailed. All DO’s chaired regular (most often weekly) LMC meetings from 2002 until the summer of 2006. Then onwards, the LMC activity level varied from DO to DO, as did their successes in bringing the Parties together for constructive dialogue. The Northern DO’s (Jaffna, Mannar and Vavuniya) chaired meetings until the end of 2006. After that, due to the deteriorating security situation and the intensified conflict level between the Parties, the LMC system was halted, and never fully restored, although LMC meetings in some districts continued on an ad-hoc basis until the termination of the mission.

See Part 02; ‘Monthly Reviews’ for records on LMC meetings in respective District

INFORMAL LIAISING:

Liaising with other stakeholders and the general public was an additional key undertaking of the SLMM, which communicated with main stakeholders as well as Sri Lankan civil society at large. The relations between the SLMM and the latter, as well as the relationship with foreign embassies and international organisations present in the country was not regulated by the CFA, and subsequently subject to the discretion and priorities of the HOM.

Stakeholders

The SLMM mapped its environment and decided on which stakeholders – organisations, institutions, and persons – it considered important to establish and maintain relations with, in addition to the Parties and the Facilitator. Sri Lankan actors in particular included media and relevant NGO’s, and the Peace Secretariat for the Muslims (PSM), the latter brought into the peace process by the Facilitator. International actors included in particular embassies, the European Commission’s delegation, UN agencies, as well as a varying number of NGO’s and INGO’s.

Cooperation

Cooperation with NGO’s was regulated through the OO as well as HOM Directives, and included particular stipulations regarding relations to the *United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF)* and the *International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)*. The contact with UNICEF, “in connection with ‘child recruitment’” was included in governing documents from 2002/2003; with ICRC from 2004. With effect from late 2005, the cooperation with ‘other organisations’ – with UNICEF in connection with ‘child recruitment’ and with the ICRC regarding ‘abduction cases’ – was instructed to be kept to a minimum, in order to safeguard SLMM integrity. With effect from late 2006, an addition/specification was made in the OO, stipulating that such (limited) cooperation should be carried out only “as long as it is conducive to the fulfilment of the CFA”.

Media

The SLMM was instructed neither by the Parties nor the Facilitator on how to relate to the media, although the Facilitator in 2006 expressed concern about the chosen media policy and practice not being considered advantageous to the Peace Process. In particular national Sri Lankan media, but also regional

| SLMM General Stakeholder Chart | | | |
|--------------------------------|--|---|-----------------|
| Externally | PRIME STAKEHOLDERS | PUBLIC STAKEHOLDERS | Internationally |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – The Parties – The Facilitator – The Nordic Co-sponsors – The Co-Chairs group – Regional power – Nordic recruitment agencies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – International organisations – General public – INGO’s – Media – Academia | |
| Internally | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – SLMM international monitors – SLMM national staff members – SLMM suppliers | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – General public – Civil society in general – Peace secretariats – Diplomatic community – Relevant intern. organisations – Relevant NGO’s – Media – Academia | Domestically |

and international news sources, soon turned out to be important stakeholders in the Peace Process; also influencing the operation through varying public perception of the SLMM's impartiality. Media strategy and information policy was given some, but hardly very systematic, consideration in operational planning, although a Media Policy and Guidance was defined, warning that third-party exploitation of information given to the media could compromise and jeopardise the position of the SLMM. The target groups and purpose of the 'information operation' was outlined in the OO as to inform SLMM personnel about the situation, in order to improve situational awareness and security; to inform on the SLMM operation to the Parties, the local population and the media; to inform the contributing countries to the SLMM about the operation and its achievements.

See also *SLMM Press Releases*:
www.slmm.info

EXECUTING REPORTING

Compiling operational information and communicating monitoring findings through written reports was the main approach of the SLMM to convey the results of its independent monitoring. Reports were principally addressed to the Parties and the Facilitator; the majority were made available to the public through publication on the SLMM web site. In addition, as the system of non-regular rulings was introduced; all *rulings* were communicated to the Parties, rulings on major issues were made public.

The monitoring activities – as the primary modality of the operation – were aimed at gathering relevant *information* – establishing sufficient knowledge – for the SLMM to determine whether violations of the Agreement had taken place or not, and raise issues connected to incidents with the Parties. In order to acquire such knowledge, to be able to analyse and report on the situation, the HOM early on defined his Critical Information Requirements (CIR's), which for the early period of the operation, consisted of three aspects:

- i) Changes in the existing balance of military power
 - ii) Changes in relations between the Parties or relations with the SLMM
 - iii) Changes in Sri Lanka's political situation
- Later, as from 2005, another CIR was added:
- iv) Changes in Sri Lanka's security situation

This information was collected through the numerous means constituting the monitoring and liaising modalities. The information acquired and analysed by the SLMM was based on mainly three categories of sources:

- a) SLMM observations and complaints received
- b) Parties' communication through dialogue with the SLMM
- c) Media and other parts of civil society, i.e. open sources

In early 2007, a weekly tasking of the DO's by the HQ regarding information-gathering focus was initiated. Based on trends evolving in each district, as well as which issues were deemed important to raise with the Parties, or to notify the Facilitator or the Sri Lankan public about, the HQ tasked the DO's to target defined themes in their monitoring; providing explicit questions to be answered.



EXTENSIVE EXPECTATIONS: The SLMM faced considerable expectations upon assuming its assignment, with organizations as well as groups rallying to call on the mission, including launching complaints. From DO1 Jaffna, 2002.

REPORTS:

The SLMM issued internal as well as external reports. The *internal reports* summed up information gathered by the mission for further in-house utilisation and processing, whereas the *external reports* conveyed information deemed important for the Parties, the Facilitator or the public – in principle always aiming at verifying the Parties' adherence to the CFA commitments through depicting a true, recognised situation picture.

In 2006, the SLMM was specifically tasked to report on the Parties' adherence to their commitments in connection to the peace talks in Geneva, Switzerland.

RULINGS:

The SLMM instituted a system of 'ruling' as a way to conclude on enquiries into complaints regarding alleged violations of the CFA, and as a means of communicating the conclusion with the Parties and informing the public. Through the rulings, issued by the HOD or the HOM, the SLMM conveyed what it had monitored, what constituted violations of the CFA, and which one of the two Parties ruled to be responsible for the violation.

The system was not a provision of the CFA, but instituted by the SLMM. The mission considered this as an appropriate and efficient means to point out and make public violations of the CFA, and in doing so putting a pressure on the responsible Party to rectify their action or regret the offence.

During the first monitoring seasons, a ruling stated whether an incident constituted a CFA violation or not, based on SLMM enquires and discussions in the LMC's. Subsequent to this process, with active participation of the Parties, the ruling indicated the responsible Party. At later stages this procedure was amended (abbreviated), whereby the SLMM, based on its own enquiries, established a ruling decision without the preceding dialogue with the Parties though the LMC's.

Reports Overview

INTERNAL REPORTS

Incident and Complaint Reports (ICR)

| | |
|------------|--|
| Published: | by DO's (and HQ) |
| Purpose: | to immediately record statements from the complainant and/or involved persons, when notified about an incident or receiving a complaint. Produced mainly at the DO's; at HQ when complaints were delivered there, and when incidents occurred in the South |
| Period: | 2002–08 |

Daily Situation Reports (DSR)

| | |
|------------|---|
| Published: | by DO's for HQ |
| Purpose: | to provide HQ with current and relevant information on the situation, on incidents, complaints received, meetings attended, logistical and communication issues, the security situation, and other relevant activities in the AOR |
| Period: | 2002–08 |

Weekly Summary Reports (WSR) / Weekly Assessments (WA)

| | |
|------------|---|
| Published: | by DO's for HQ |
| Purpose: | to provide HQ with an overview and assessment of the general situation in each DO, a summary of incidents and complaints, as well as main activities. WA's were issued to give HQ an update on military and normalcy trends and developments in the AOR |
| Period: | WSR April 2002–March 2003 WSR/WA April 2007–January 2008 |

Monthly Reports (MR)

| | |
|------------|--|
| Published: | by DO's for HQ |
| Purpose: | to inform HQ about DO operations, to give an assessment of each district, and update HQ on communications, personnel, logistics, and finance |
| Period: | April 2003–June 2006 |

Special Reports (SR)

| | |
|------------|--|
| Published: | by DO's for HQ |
| Purpose: | to inform HQ on specific developments – or indications of new trends – in relation to the military situation and restoration of normalcy, looking at developments in the DO's. Compiled mainly at the DO's, and at HQ when incidents occurred in the South |
| Period: | 2002–08 |

OPS Summary

| | |
|------------|--|
| Published: | by HQ |
| Purpose: | to update the DO's on the situation in the AOR through a weekly summary from HQ Operations |
| Period: | January 2006–December 2006 |

EXTERNAL REPORTS

Monthly (Review) Reports (MRR)

| | |
|------------|---|
| Published: | by HQ |
| Purpose: | to inform the RNG and the Nordic co-sponsors on the mission status, the general situation in the AOR, and issues related to personnel, finance, logistics, and administration |
| Period: | March 2002–April 2006 |


Weekly Situation Reports (WSR) / Weekly Monitoring Reports (WMR)

| | |
|------------|--|
| Published: | by HQ |
| Purpose: | to inform the Parties, the RNG, the Nordic contributors, and other stakeholders about the current military and normalcy situation, especially in the North and East, with an overview of the information the SLMM had gathered from complaints and incidents from the previous week. The WMR's were distributed in two versions: one public and one to the Parties. Attached to the reports sent to the RNG and the Nordic co-sponsors, was an overview map indicating where the main incidents had occurred, and a Weekly Threat Assessment (WTA) sheet, indicating the threat level at various places within the AOR |
| Period: | October 2006–January 2008 |

Special Reports (SR)

| | |
|------------|--|
| Published: | by HQ |
| Purpose: | When incidents with special significance occurred, the SLMM forwarded SR's to the RNG. |
| Period: | Throughout the mission period |

SLMM Information Processes – Processing – Products, 2007



In April 2007, the HOM decided to suspend the regime of rulings altogether, ascertaining that, as a means to promote adherence to the CFA, the system had grown irrelevant, and at times even counterproductive in the prevailing situation. The radically increased numbers of very violent incidents, combined with the reduction of monitors from mid-2006, implied that the SLMM capacity to conclude on rulings based on enquiries was significantly reduced. Furthermore, the LTTE had at the time discontinued issuing complaints, and the ruling statistics consequently had ceased reflecting a true situation picture.

STATISTICS:

The information gathered through SLMM monitoring was collected in designated databases at the mission HQ from which statistics were generated. These tools designed to accumulate and analyse monitoring data, were to a certain extent developed within the mission.

The main statistic categories were:

- 1) complaints (complaints statistics)
- 2) killings and violence (incident statistics)
- 3) abductions (incident statistics)

The SLMM made the complaints statistics available to the Parties and the public on a monthly basis, but ceased doing so in April 2007, for the mere reasons as for the seizure of the ruling regime (see above). During the first years of the operation, the complaints statistics presented a fair indication of the situation on the ground, but as the CFA adherence deteriorated at an

exponential rate during 2006–07, the statistics rapidly ceased reflecting the actual situation. Even more so, adding to a risk of jeopardising the effects of the SLMM operation, mission statistic information increasingly tended to be misused by the Parties for propaganda purposes.

However, even during the later stage of the CFA period, upon request from key stakeholders (other than the Facilitator and the Parties), statistics of killings and abductions were presented under the clarification that the numbers were not entirely reliable. Despite acknowledged shortcomings, the SLMM incident statistics were perceived as the most accurate non-partisan figures available up to the abrogation of the Agreement.

The statistics were collected in the SLMM Incident Management System (IMS), and have been filed for eventual future documentation purposes.

See Appendix 9 for statistics on complaints and rulings

Securitywise, the SLMM maintained a system of safeguarding all sensitive information – hard copy as well as electronically accumulated documents and case files – disseminating only relevant, necessary information following careful scrutinising of the alleged purpose for any extracting of files. This policy is continued and enhanced post operation, through filing of SLMM archives in the National Archives of Norway in Oslo (since 2008); following a Protocol by the five Nordic countries bestowing the Norwegian MFA storing and safeguarding responsibilities.

Adapting the Mission 2006–07

THE SLMM WAS

ADAPTED TO THE CHANGING OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT WITHIN THE CFA FRAMEWORK

The SLMM conducted its operation during a period with accelerating changes evolving in the operational environment. Whereas the mandate remained unaltered, the development of realities on the ground called for operational adaptations.

The *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)* was deployed in an atmosphere of good will and calm in March 2002. At the time of termination of the operation in January 2008, the situation was characterised by alarmingly escalating violence on the ground in large parts of the *Area of Responsibility (AOR)*, constituting gross violations of the *Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)*.

From mid-2006 onwards, until the abrogation of the CFA, the SLMM was surrounded by continuous, accelerating changes – politically and militarily. Adapting to the altered preconditions became of vital importance in this period.

The shifting environment and evolving internal challenges, led the SLMM to implement structural changes and reorientation of its operational concept as of early 2007. By mission termination early 2008, shifts in several areas of operation and organisation had been implemented. The profound transfer to a more multifocal operation; addressing a wider range of aspects in the Parties' adherence to the Agreement – deemed vital for further effect – had, however, yet to be fully put into practice.

Focus in this chapter of the SLMM report is consequently resting with the actions taken to adjust the operation and the organisation in 2006–07, and the ideas behind them. This is not to forget that moderate structural alterations had been initiated to improve mission efficiency regularly throughout the entire operational tenure.

A CALL FOR REASSESSMENT AND ADAPTION

Autumn 2006: A double imbalance emerging

The SLMM was designed to fit the setting prevailing at its inception in 2002, soon to be established with a structural set-up that remained with only minor adjustments until 2006.

During summer 2006, the first significant restructuring was caused by the radical reduction of the number of international monitors following the de facto non-acceptance of monitors from European Union (EU) member states by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); a consequence of the EU listing of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation.

This in effect halved an already limited monitoring staff. Assigned the same mandate, tasks, and AOR, human resources became most inadequate, and a hasty rearrangement of tasks and locations for international monitors was required from 1 September 2006. Adding to these needs for reshuffling of resources was the suspension of naval monitoring as a separate development just prior to the LTTE decision. Naval monitors were at the time transferred to other monitoring duties within the SLMM organisation.

Following the departure of approximately 30 Danish, Finnish, and Swedish monitors by 1 September 2006, the remaining Icelandic and Norwegian monitors, almost similar in numbers, manned a temporary structure that comprised principally the same organisational elements as until then. All the six District Offices (DO) were initially retained, as well as the Liaison Office to the LTTE (LO LTTE) and the Headquarters (HQ) structure, but the number of staff covering each function was radically reduced. The Mannar and Ampara offices were after this serviced by international monitors only part time, and the capacity of most management functions was significantly reduced.

This solution soon proved imbalanced and scarcely functional, as the operation's ambition level in principle could not be lowered in order to thoroughly fulfil CFA stipulations. Parallel to these challenges, the overall conflict escalation and subsequent deteriorating security conditions surrounding the SLMM emerged at an accelerating rate following a series of very serious CFA violations during summer 2006.

In the course of the autumn months, public voices against the SLMM in the media increased noticeably, particularly in the Sinhalese newspapers. The organisation was repeatedly, from readers posting personal opinions to high-ranking officials publishing seemingly concerted viewpoints, accused of being LTTE biased and generally performing a non-conductive operation counter to Sri Lankan national interests.

Late 2006: Reassessment – and security hassle

As the combined effects of the fifty percent personnel cutback, the media back lash, the rising violence and a questionable



ADVANCING ARMORY: As of mid-2006, the armed conflict was stepped up by both Parties, heading towards fully fledged war, requiring the SLMM to adapt to the deteriorating situation. Tank on the move, August 2006.

security situation added up in the fourth quarter of 2006, the need for a comprehensive reassessment of the organisation and the operation became apparent. Consequent to this wide range of internal and external challenges, the *Head of Mission (HOM)* as of mid-October 2006 instigated a tentatively qualified reconsideration of the entire operational approach; how the mission conceptually and structurally could be adjusted to the prevailing conditions – given a continued CFA with no amendments.

While these reassessments were ongoing, even more serious security concerns occurred. Mid December 2006, the HOM was informed by proper sources about revealed assassination plans targeting named SLMM individuals. The monitors in question were rapidly relocated off the island, and the HOM was summoned to Oslo for consultations.

The severity of the security situation could hardly be exaggerated. Details could not be communicated within the Mission at the time, so as not to compromise sources of information. As moves to enhance security had to be made, affecting all SLMM staff, the situation understandably was perceived somewhat frustrating within the organisation. The incident indicated a culmination point of a deteriorating security situation for the SLMM staff; mirroring the state of affairs in the theatres of conflict and in the capital, where an unprecedented amount of unconfirmed information concerning anticipated attacks and retaliations was being circulated at the time.

Just prior to the threat episode, the HOM voiced security con-

cerns at the November 2007 meeting of the Nordic governments in Reykjavik. One of the options presented there, was a permanent or temporary withdrawal from Sri Lanka, including a possible termination of the operation – noting the core principle of ‘security first, operation second’.

New Year 2007: Dilemma and choice

The situation represented a most serious dilemma for the SLMM, as a self determined termination of the operation would imply the possibility of a de facto abrogation of the CFA – the mere ceasefire – since the SLMM constituted an indispensable mechanism to the viability and credibility of the Agreement. At the time, there was reason to believe that there were actors on the scene that would welcome a convenient reason for a CFA abrogation without taking the blame for being the origin of the destruction of the peace efforts. A delicate discernment of the SLMM being hostage to the situation was sensed.

Consequently, the SLMM was imposed with a severe responsibility, having to weigh security concerns for its own staff against the risk of causing ceasefire cessation.

As a decision point became apparent in the last days of December 2006, the HOM decided upon a course of action implying

“As a consequence of the alarming security situation in December, the HOM ordered all international monitors to relocate from the districts.



CAPACITY CUT: As of September 2006, the capacity of the SLMM was suddenly more than halved, when monitors from EU member states had to be withdrawn, leaving the mission with monitors from Iceland and Norway only.

continued operation, parallel to an active pursuit of a more efficient and secure operational concept and structure. The renewed *modus operandi* would have to display a significantly lowered public profile, and at the same time, a significantly improved dialogue – off record just as much as official – with both CFA Parties. This would be an attempt to turn the, at times, hostile sentiments into a more favourable, constructive cooperation atmosphere, and as such over time, improve SLMM reputation with both Parties; thus indirectly, presumably efficiently, also improve monitors general security.

As a consequence of the alarming security situation in December, the HOM ordered all international monitors to relocate from the districts to the Taj International Airport Hotel in the Negombo area north of the capital during the Christmas period 2006. National staff members were also offered leave from the districts, and those from the most vulnerable DO (Vavuniya) made use of the option. The LO LTTE was also recalled to Negombo, along with other monitors on two occasions in early 2007, although only for a few days.

Early 2007: Turtle shell posture/adaptation processes in parallel

Surrounded by this range of simultaneous challenges when gathered at a suitable venue at the Taj Hotel premises – although predominantly for security reasons – the staff would go through a series of workshops, making use of the situation, to expand the process of developing an adapted concept and structure for a continued operation.

To reduce risk and vulnerability, a reduction of the SLMM footprint in Colombo until the revised low profile strategy had taken effect was deemed important, as the inner city HQ and living quarters represented the largest concentration of international staff in the country; most easily targeted. A temporary relocation

of the HQ was therefore required, and as a preliminary solution the HQ's operational functions – and corresponding monitors – initially were transferred to the Taj Airport Hotel around New Year 2007.

Early 2007, the SLMM management searched for a more secluded and secure semi-permanent HQ location, preferably adjacent to the Bandaranaike International Airport. In March 2007 the HQ/Operation Centre in Temple Road, Negombo was put into operation, initially to be operated alongside the HQ/Support Centre in Colombo, which for practical reasons was not moved.

This relocation balanced security concerns with acceptable working conditions for continued operational management, in spite of the ever-worsening security situation in the country. The visible SLMM interface in Colombo was thus significantly reduced. This posture lasted until July 2007, when the security situation again was assessed to be conducive for re-establishing a united HQ in the city.

During this period of self-imposed 'off AOR exile' January – June 2007, renewed operational concepts and adapted structures were prepared and implemented.

THE OPERATIONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL ADAPTATIONS

Adaptation objectives

As the hostilities late 2006 and early 2007 took a more war-like turn, access to the conflict zones was becoming increasingly dangerous; impeded and undesired. Monitoring and reporting on single incidents thus, eventually, for all practical reasons became impossible, with the exception of a few very serious cases with multiple fatalities and excessive damage. Subsequently the SLMM efforts – in order to still favour the CFA assignments – would have to be elevated to a more overall regional level, at the cost of detailed patrolling and incident focus in the districts. The fact that the Parties in this period more and more openly disregarded Agreement stipulations, and pursued their respective interests with an increasing diversity of means, could no longer be disregarded.

In this setting, the process of preparing new possible courses of action from January 2007, was therefore directed towards introduction and/or improvement of three essential aspects in SLMM monitoring:

The most decisive objective for the repositioning and restructuring would be to expand the SLMM monitoring capability beyond the institutionalised field monitoring.

Seriously hampered in the traditional DO-based field monitoring, it was asserted beneficial to introduce a more broad reaching capacity of monitoring trends and patterns of the practical policies that the Parties exercised towards the populace in the East and the North. Parallel to this it was deemed advantageous to also establish a capacity for dedicated monitoring of the wide array of central and local information sources and information collectors. In order to effectively process and utilise informa-

“The fact that the Parties [...] more and more openly disregarded Agreement stipulations, and pursued their respective interests with an increasing diversity of means, could no longer be disregarded.

SLMM Deployment, 2007*



* In effect until termination of operation, January 2008

tion – and extract synergies – from these two new areas in the dialogue with the Parties, an improved analysis capability would also have to be established in the mission HQ.

(The practical policies presumed to be consequences of political aims and decisions by the Parties; the SLMM was, however, most deliberate in its decision not to engage in monitoring of national or regional politics, thus carefully limiting efforts to register applied practises affecting the population in light of the agreed stipulations in the CFA.)

These additional monitoring areas would complete, and to some extent replace – resource wise – the traditional field monitoring of incidents of a more tangible nature, as well as the inquiries into reported complaints.

A *second objective*, of a more procedural character, was to design and establish a more centralised management concept for the field activities, in order to be more responsive to the accelerating complex conflict scenario. The ability to quickly and efficiently shift – limited – monitoring resources from one point of attention to another, geographically as well as substantially, had to be increased.

The *third objective* was to enhance and systematise liaison capacity and ability towards both Parties, in order to facilitate much needed improvement of dialogue; not in the least to safeguard the mission security arrangements, as guaranteed by the Parties.

OPERATIONAL COMPONENTS

Central level

To achieve these objectives, both the structures and the working processes in the mission had to be conceptually revised. Consequently, the traditional military-equivalent HQ concept – well suited for direction of predominantly physical operations

by subordinated field units – was to be gradually replaced by a more adequate civilian approach, better suited for both directing and analysing monitoring efforts that in the future would be of a more intangible nature.

The bearing idea of this concept, was to identify the mission's production processes in easily recognisable functional sectors, lead by corresponding sector managers responsible for both planning, execution, processing and product completion within the respective sector; under the supervision and coordination of a *Mission Manager*, being the overall operation chief executive.

For the SLMM, at this time being very lean in manpower, it was no longer cost effective to separate central (HQ) staff efforts from the operational execution in separate 'field units' within one and the same functional sector: The functional sectors had to be covered seamlessly between central level in Colombo and local level in the districts. For instance: the Press and Information Officer (PIO) position would be replaced by an Information Manager position, responsible for the entire information sector, also to include tasking of information collection by corresponding information monitors at local level, and processing their return deliveries into relevant report productions in the HQ.

The revised executive HQ construction would then comprise two general areas: The management of monitoring activities – the core production – and the management of support activities. These were then labelled the *Operation Centre* and the *Support Centre*, respectively.

The expanded monitoring concept implied the new Operation Centre be divided into three sections – or 'cells', parallel to the three sectors of monitoring functions. The Field Monitoring Operation Cell, the Information Monitoring Operation Cell, and the Policy Monitoring Operation Cell then had their respective efforts coordinated by the Operation Manager, under supervision of the Mission Manager, who again assured feasible coverage from the Support Centre regarding logistical, financial, communication- and manning support for the monitoring initiatives.

In order to apply a more concerted monitoring effort, locally as well as centrally, the Operation Manager would gather representatives of the functional area cells – literally and figuratively – around a central venue/mechanism for assessments and production, named the Tasking Table. At the Tasking Table, cohesive tasking of the DO's (later, Regional Offices, RO's) would take place; as well as analysis of incoming reports and other information for assembly and production of the SLMM Weekly Monitoring Report (from mid 2007 the main SLMM product) for external distribution.

See also the article 'Running the Mission', on reporting, pages 67–68

“... a Dialogue Team comprising representatives of both LO's, the Regions and designated staff members in the Operation Centre was established.



DIRECTING DIRECTION: As of late 2006, the HOM considered it crucial to redirect the operation and redesign the organisation – coping with reduced staffing and increased hostility, also threatening the security of SLMM staff. New HOM, Lars J. Sølvsberg, November 2006.

The function of a Security Manager was institutionalised outside the Operation Centre and the Support Centre, to enhance the efforts towards comprehensive security and safety systems and procedures, adequate to the altered operational situation. Organisationally placed parallel to the Operation Manager, thus directly subordinated by the Mission Manager, the Security Manager was vested with wide authority to impose security regulations throughout the SLMM on behalf of the HOM.

Furthermore, a designated Liaison Officer Cell for interaction with the GOSL – co-located with the Operation Centre – was reinstated to facilitate the renewed focus on the assisting role of the SLMM and to enhance dialogue with the Parties. Additionally, to further enhance this initiative, a Dialogue Team comprising representatives of both LO's, the Regions and designated staff members in the Operation Centre was established.

Local level

To better reflect the distinctively different courses of development – and consequently, operational situation – in the Eastern and the Northern Provinces that evolved during early 2007, the AOR was divided into two *Regions of Operation (ROO)* where the six original offices (DO's) remained as local points of contact. Thus, in April 2007, international monitors were redeployed to Trincomalee, with the office there constituting the head office of the SLMM Eastern Region. In June 2007, international monitors were redeployed to the Vavuniya office, constituting the head office of the SLMM Northern Region.

Throughout the first half of 2007, prior to the physical establishing of the Region head offices, with the exception of Vavunia all original DO's remained – in varying capacities and roles – continually manned with national staff physically attending the premises. To compensate for reduced permanent international monitor presence in the AOR, regular *Presence in District (PID)* operations were carried out with bases in the temporary Negombo base, whereby monitors stayed in the DO's for 2–5 days at a time. In addition, they pursued continuous monitoring of the

situation in their respective DO's from the Negombo Operation Centre, through a variety of means of communication.

In this period, the additional concept of *Rapid Response Team (RRT)* operations was developed and practiced, responding to major CFA-related incidents – in the North and East as well as in the South of Sri Lanka – requiring short notice SLMM attention by a mobile team of international monitors supported by national staff.

As the three-dimensional monitoring concept was being implemented at the HQ/Operation Centre – central – level during the spring of 2007, this was mirrored at local level by assigning the policy- and information monitoring functions, respectively, to designate monitors at the District (later Region) Offices. The operational modalities – monitoring, liaising, and reporting – were as such not altered, but the approach and applied methods were adjusted according to the three-pronged concept.

To strengthen the professional approach in this direction, the SLMM during this period initiated requesting specialists with relevant academic and information functional background, to be contracted by the personnel providers in Iceland and Norway. Late 2007 this dedicated recruitment effort started to take effect, efficiently pursued by the agencies in Reykjavik and Oslo. Ironically, a number of well-suited monitors with the adequate professional background in these areas had just recently arrived when the CFA was abrogated and mission terminated in January 2008.

02: OPERATIONAL REVIEW

Overall Review
Annual Reviews
Monthly Reviews
Termination Review

The SLMM carried out its *assignment in six districts during six years of operation.*

Monitoring the situation and liaising with the Parties and other stakeholders in relation to the CFA, the mission continuously reported on the developments. The SLMM observed a gradual breakdown of trust and non-compliance to commitments – and an escalation of armed conflict.



The SLMM operated continuously – at the central level through the HOM and HQ, at the local level through field units in six districts.



AP/SANAPX



SLMM Operational Review

INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPLETE
SLMM OPERATIONAL REVIEW, 2002–08

The Operational Review section comprises the central records of the report, describing and documenting how the SLMM field operation was executed from its inception until its termination. The section is made up of an overall overview of developments throughout the entire operational period, detailed in annual reviews of the setting as well as the operation, substantiated by monthly reviews of operational activities.

In combination, these reviews aim at presenting a comprehensive overview of the actual field operation of the *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)* – described on three levels; *overall*, *annually* and *monthly*.

OVERALL REVIEW

The aim of the six year Overall Review (2002–08) is to present a general insight into the field operation, also tracking main developments during the period. Changes within the operational environments of the SLMM – the mission's setting – directly and indirectly influenced on the field operation as such, and consequently on the organisation. Additional to outlining these developments and changes, the Overall Review aims to assess the main achievements of the operation, seen in relation to the mission mandate and assignment.

ANNUAL REVIEWS

The aim of the Annual Reviews (2002–07) is to present a more detailed account of the operation, seen in conjunction with its operational setting, year by year. The annual reviews are compiled within a uniform structure:

NOTE ON REVIEWS:

It should be noted that this three-dimensional operational review does not, and cannot, contain the complete story of the SLMM field operation: partly because the space allocated doesn't allow for the complete account, partly because records were not kept with detailed presentation of all facets of a complex operation in mind. However, these accounts are considered to give a comprehensive picture of the operation, with the accompanying statistics further indicating the high level of activity.

For the operational accounts, the only sources used are the SLMM reports and files; for descriptions of the political and military setting as well as the proceeds of the Peace Process, supplementary, open sources have been used to compile the picture deemed necessary to place the operation in its proper context. Developments in the Sri Lankan political and military, as well as the international political and diplomatic, arenas included in this report have been incorporated due to their direct relevance to the SLMM as an organisation and the operation at the time, through the modalities chosen and operation executed.

Setting: The outline of the operational setting includes a presentation of the military and political situation and their influence on the SLMM, including a description of the Peace Process.

Operation: The outline of the field operation contains a description of the operational attention directed by the HOM, also seen in concurrence with resources available, with a main emphasis on the execution of the operation, divided into directing and running, as well as adaptations to the prevailing situation.

Results: The outline of the operational results should be read with reference to the mandate as well as the prevailing operational attention. As for dwelling with the achievements of the operation in this report, attention is given to the established priorities at the time – within the three main modalities of monitoring, liaising, and reporting.

MONTHLY REVIEWS

The aim of the Monthly Reviews (2002–07) is to detail the operational activities, adding specified information to the annual reviews. A separate description of the structure and content of the monthly review articles is found on page 138.

NOTE ON STATISTICS:

Statistics are presented in all three dimensions of the operational review; accounting for core activities of the SLMM, month-by-month, year-by-year, and per operational unit:

Complaints registered account for the total number of complaints (as to possible violations of the CFA) received by the SLMM through each unit of the mission.

Meetings recorded accounts for the total number of official meetings in which the SLMM took part, meetings of a general nature and liaising meetings in particular.

LMC meetings registered accounts for the total number of meetings of the Local Monitoring Committees (LMC) which the SLMM District Offices (DO) were tasked to chair.

Patrols at sea conducted by SLMM Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT) accounts for the number and type of patrols carried out by each NMT, on board Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) operational vessels.

Overall Review, 2002–08

SUMMARY OF THE SLMM'S SETTING, OBJECTIVES, ACTIVITIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS FOR THE ENTIRE OPERATIONAL PERIOD

The SLMM field operation was executed over a span of six years, covering 71 months, from deployment in March 2002 until termination in January 2008. Despite a gradually, and radically altered operational environment, politically and militarily, the mission continuously carried out its assignment, in accordance with the CFA.

The *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)* retained its position as an independent and impartial international mechanism, remaining in the *Area of Operation (AOO)* and covering its *Area of Responsibility (AOR)*, until the *Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)* was abrogated in January 2008.

This 'Overall Review' article aims to offer an overview of key dimensions and developments pertaining to the SLMM and the operation during the tenure, to be detailed in the following sub-sections, 'Annual Reviews' and 'Monthly Reviews'.

SETTING 2002–2008

Operational Mandate

The mandate of the SLMM, commonly understood to be constituted by part 3 of CFA, remained the same throughout the operational period. Although requiring continuous interpretation and consideration in view of a changing environment and adjusted operational attention, the mandate served as a constant foundation for priorities made by the *Head of Mission (HOM)*.

See also the 'Mission Mandate' article, pages 36–37

Operational Environment

Militarily, there were decisive changes during the period which influenced the mission's ability to carry out its assignment. The SLMM observed military developments at close range, primarily through its monitoring activities in the field, continuously reporting on events as they happened.

There were fundamental changes in the military environment from the inception of the operation in 2002 until the termination in early 2008: In reality, the situation in SLMM's *Area of Responsibility (AOR)* underwent a gradual development from relative peace to de facto war between the Parties, with a critical turn for the worse in 2006.

“The SLMM observed military developments at close range, primarily through its monitoring activities in the field, continuously reporting on events as they happened.



IMPARTIAL INSTRUMENT: The SLMM was established as an independent, impartial instrument by the Parties; the monitors liaising with the Parties on all levels. SLMM HOM, Maj Gen (R) Trond Furuhoide meeting Sri Lanka's Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), general Lionel Balagalle, 2004.

Despite the formal 'cease of fire' there were violations of the CFA from 2002, with political violence targeting political activists, human rights abuses affecting civilians and armed confrontations between the Parties – including tension and clashes between ethnic groups. Such acts were mainly carried out in the East and North, to a lesser extent in the South.

Armed confrontations between the Parties were limited in the early part of the operation – although there were a number of incidents, including clashes at sea in 2002 – escalating in 2003. Such acts – at sea and on land – became more frequent in 2004, increasing further, particularly on land, in 2005. The 2004 split within the *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)* contributed to the increase in military activity and political violence, as well as the increase in child recruitment. In early 2006, a marked escalation brought the armed conflict to a new level, with confrontations not seen since 2002.

Irreversibly turning to open warfare in 2006, the Parties employed heavier arms including artillery shelling and air strikes. The most obvious shift occurred in the middle of the year, with offensive operations, of which the large-scale offensive launched by the

Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) forces in the Sampoor area in July proved significant: for the first time government forces regained areas controlled by the LTTE – demonstrating a stronger political will to follow a military path. The LTTE responded with counter-offensives moving further away from the commitments of the CFA when crossing the Forward Defence Localities (FDL), near Muhamalai. As a result of these escalations, the A9 highway was permanently closed, further displaying the profound change in the relationship between the Parties and the character of the conflict. At the same time, 2006 saw another level of political assassinations emerge.

From mid-2006 onwards the military conflict moved in one direction only, with a significant increase in confrontations in 2007, including extensive GOSL air operations, and with the LTTE employing its own rudimentary air wing. The movement of forces and stepped-up government offensives observed in 2007 gradually appeared as a concerted military campaign in the making, brought to full force in 2008 before culminating in 2009. After 2005, the SLMM observed a military build-up, field monitoring showing movement of military resources into the conflict area, particularly by the GOSL. On the LTTE side, political claims and media reports indicated a parallel build-up not easily detected through field monitoring, yet observed through the increased military activity of the Tigers, on land, at sea, and even from the air.

The SLMM was clearly influenced by these changes in the military environment; particularly from 2006, when armed activities became more frequent, challenging the mission's capacity. At the same time the security situation deteriorated sharply, at times reducing operational capability. The field operation was further impeded by the Parties' reluctance to cooperate with each other or with the SLMM, in effect restricting the SLMM's access to areas of conflict and sites of incidents.

Politically, there were critical changes during the period, which also influenced the mission's ability to carry out its assignment. The SLMM observed political developments at close range through its monitoring and liaising activities, continuously reporting on evolving developments.



LTTE LIAISING: The SLMM was at times the main channel for communicating with the LTTE, conveying messages the Facilitator and presenting opinions to the GOSL. SLMM HOM, Brig (R) Hågrup Haukland and team meeting LTTE leadership, 2005.

Military build-up

Based on its field monitoring, the SLMM noted the employment of heavier arms – by both Parties – and a decisive escalation of the armed conflict during the course of its operation.

During the early years of the ceasefire a relatively limited number of violent incidents and military confrontations were recorded, with an increase following the split within the LTTE in early 2004. In this period, both Parties (as well as the breakaway Karuna faction) employed small arms. With political violence increasing and the LTTE launching attacks against the Security Forces (SF) and the Sri Lanka Police Force (SLPF) in 2005, small arms and hand grenades were still used. The first use of claymore mines during the CFA period, since to be frequently used, was recorded by the SLMM in December 2005.

Responding to the LTTE suicide attack on the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) HQ in April 2006, government forces directed extensive shelling at LTTE-controlled areas in the East, the use of artillery thenceforth becoming a regular feature of the armed confrontations during the remaining part of the SLMM operation. Also in response to this attack, the GOSL, for the first time since the CFA, launched air strikes against LTTE positions, carrying out aerial bombings in April and May 2006, becoming frequent in 2007.

Mid-2006 saw a large-scale military offensive – including the use of heavier arms: aerial bombings and artillery shelling in addition to claymore mines – by government forces in the area of Sampoor. The fighting established a new level in the conflict, with continuous military confrontations that were further escalated in early 2007, reaching low intensity war scenarios in the East and parts of the North. Both provinces experienced extensive air operations by the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF), including a substantial increase in air-to-ground targeting. The LTTE also launched aerial attacks, deploying its light aircraft – for the first time ever – on 26 March 2007.

Another feature of the intensified warfare was the use of special forces, and the SLMM recorded the first attack (with claymore mines) by the so-called SLA Deep Penetration Unit (DPU; also known as Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol, LRRP) within LTTE-controlled area in April 2006. The LTTE counterpart was constituted by the Black Tigers, commonly known as suicide cadres. These were, e.g. employed in the attack on the SLA HQ.

At the same time as observing military activities in the field, the SLMM took note of the Sri Lanka parliament's votes for increased military spending and the increase in armed personnel – especially after 2004–05 (following a decrease in 2002–03). Also, the SLMM noted reports on an unconfirmed rearmament and recruitment by the LTTE, said to considerably strengthen its military capability after the signing of the CFA.

There were essential changes in the political environment compared to the inception of the operation in 2002: From a spirit of commitment to the Peace Process, cooperation between the Parties and good will towards the SLMM, the Parties' growing mutual distrust 2004–05, cleared the path to war, rendering the process practically defunct and the mission, in part, irrelevant.

The CFA was entered into through the mutual consent and respective commitments of the two Parties, who thereby also agreed to establish the SLMM. One of them, the LTTE, was a non-state actor with a highly centralised leadership, representing coherence in the Party's relation with the SLMM. The other, the GOSL was popularly elected, subjected to public opposition – and replacement. Early in the period, political cooperation between the Sri Lankan President and Prime Minister (PM) on the Peace Process was wanting. PM Ranil Wickramasinghe of the United National Party (UNP) signed the CFA with sizable electoral support. At the same time he faced significant opposition in Parliament, and was criticised by the President for his handling of the issue.

Already in 2002, the CFA was challenged by the leader of the opposition, Mahinda Rajapakse of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Public hostility continued in 2003, when new peace moves were made, notably including a federal solution with autonomy for the Tamil-dominated areas. In the 2004 parliamentary election, an opposition coalition defeated the UNP, and Rajapakse became PM and formed a new cabinet – to be elected President the following year. The outcome of the 2004 and 2005 elections reflected a growing resentment against the Peace Process in the predominantly Sinhalese electorate of the South, and a strengthening of Sinhalese nationalist sentiments, implying a shift in GOSL policies, soon to be noted also on the military field.

At the same time, the LTTE stepped up its political rhetoric as well as military activity. In 2006, the LTTE leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, publicly shelved the option of autonomy, moving away from a political solution and reverting to armed struggle. The increasingly uncompromising stance exercised by both Parties continued in 2007, leading up to the renewal of fully fledged war.

The SLMM was clearly influenced by the changes in the political environment, with a notably growing resentment against its presence and activities after the political changes following the elections in 2004–05. Throughout the operational period, both Parties repeatedly reiterated their commitment to the CFA and their support of the SLMM.

However, from 2005 onwards, the SLMM experienced a less cooperative stance, with a growing repugnance apparent especially from 2006. This challenged the role of the mission, and in effect threatened its very existence as an instrument in the field. The ability of the SLMM to perform its task was also greatly impeded by the insistence of the LTTE that it could no longer guarantee the security of monitors from EU member states, with the consequence that monitoring staff were reduced to approximately half their initial numbers, which – together with a decreasing security situation – strongly undermined the mission's capability.

The Peace Process underwent crucial changes during the period, which was experienced by the SLMM, and which influenced the mission's relations with the Parties. The SLMM was itself a part of the process, witnessing it through liaising with the Parties and contacts with the Facilitator.

There were critical developments with regards to the Peace Process, which in 2002 created the CFA and established the SLMM. Implementing commitments in the CFA, and searching for a political solution in 2002–03, the process reached its zenith. Consequent to the growing mistrust between the Parties it decisively lost momentum in 2004–05 until it effectively went dead in 2006, with the unproductive Geneva talks.

After the signing of the CFA, the SLMM noted a dedication from both Parties to cooperate in implementing prescribed practical solutions locally, as well as seeking political solutions centrally. Locally, a number of efforts to follow up on the Agreement were made, with civilian as well as military representatives of the respective Parties working together under guidance of the SLMM. Centrally, the six rounds of peace talks – from September 2002 until March 2003 – constituted the main arena. Locally, the Local Monitoring Committees (LMC) became the chief venue, in addition to the many cooperation initiatives. As the LTTE suspended its participation in further talks in early 2003, there was no direct contact between the Parties on the highest level until 2006, when the relationship had turned confrontational, beyond the point of reparation – as proved at the two rounds of renewed talks in Geneva in 2006. These in effect ended the real Peace Process, and the attitude of the Parties, particularly the GOSL, towards the Facilitator became less cooperative – and welcoming, demonstrated by the fact that the Special Envoy of the Norwegian government was unable to visit Sri Lanka in 2007.

See also the 'Peace Process' article, pages 23–29

The SLMM was clearly influenced by the development of the Peace Process, of which it was an integral part. The actual gradual pullout from the process by both Parties, well before 2006, made the position of the SLMM – towards the Parties and in the public – less accommodating, reflected by repeated criticism and reduced cooperation, especially from 2005. Consequently, moving away from searching for political solutions to seeking military confrontation, the Parties created an environment less conducive for the Peace Process – and for the SLMM operation.

OPERATION 2002–2008

Operational Attention

Based on the SLMM mandate, the HOM directed the operation and adjusted his operational attention to the evolving military and political situation. The main focus of the HOM was at all times to carry out the operation according to the mandate, prin-

“The main focus of the HOM was at all times to carry out the operation according to the mandate, principally to assist the Parties in adhering to their respective commitments inscribed into the CFA.

cipally to assist the Parties in adhering to their respective commitments inscribed into the CFA.

In parallel with establishing the organisation in March 2002, the HOM developed modalities and procedures, launching the operation with land and sea monitoring capacities throughout the AOR and liaising capacities with both Parties, as well as commencing reporting on the situation and the operation. With incidents at sea constituting a critical challenge in 2002, with increased frequency in 2003, operational attention was especially devoted to developing modalities monitoring the sea territory. An escalation of ethnic tension in communities in the East called for particular liaising attention. Inter-communal tension remained an area calling for attention locally, particularly between Muslims and Tamils in the East. Liaising activities were also increasingly employed from 2004/05 to reduce the growing mistrust between the Parties. The split within the LTTE in 2004 called for attention to the consequences thereof, including the military activities of the Karuna faction – and other armed elements – and the increase in child recruitment. With the escalation of the armed conflict in 2006, and the dramatic reduction in monitoring staff, HOM was forced to direct more attention to the SLMM itself, restructuring the mission and enforcing security measures – an attention that was further increased in 2007.

Irrespective of the actual attention and priorities, the main modalities of the operation – monitoring, liaising, and reporting – remained the same throughout.

See also the 'Directing' and 'Running' articles, pages 54–56 and 57–69

Operational Resources

The combined resources employed in the operation were constituted mainly by three categories; human, logistical, and financial resources:

Human resources:

The human resources remained fairly stable from the inception of the operation in 2002 (with a gradual increase of national staff) until a radical reduction of the number of international monitors in the second half of 2006 – influencing the mission's capacity.



ACCELERATING ATTACKS: The conflict was gradually stepped up from 2004, and in particular from mid-/late 2006, i.e. with GOSL advances that were halted by the LTTE, leaving the SLMM to facilitate the hand-over of 79 slain soldiers to the SLA. Kilinochchi, October 2006.

Logistical resources:

The logistical resources were continuously adapted to operational needs, also based on experiences with the functionality of equipment and systems – particularly communications systems used in field monitoring as well as current security concerns and needs.

Financial resources:

The financial resources remained fairly stable after the inception of the operation in 2002 until the termination in 2008, continuously adapted to suit operational challenges and logistical requirements, including the upgrading of security measures in 2006–07.

For further details, see Part 03, 'Operational Resources'

Operational Execution

DIRECTING:

Launching the operation in March–April 2002, the HOM developed operational and administrative procedures – defined and described particularly in the *Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) and Operational Order (OO)* – that constituted the core SLMM documents throughout the operation. As the operational environment changed, both documents were adjusted accordingly, including minor changes in operational principles and procedures, modes and methods. Opting to establish new modalities for naval monitoring in 2003, not covered by the CFA, the HOM was strongly criticised by the Sri Lankan authorities. Against an escalation of armed activity, particularly from 2005 onwards, the HOM at times suspended field monitoring, and naval monitoring ceased in 2006 following serious incidents – never to be resumed.

Directing the operation and being an actor within the Peace Process, the HOM occasionally issued statements commenting on the development of the conflict. Whereas he commended the Parties for their compliance and commitment to the CFA in 2002–03, stern warnings were issued in 2004–05, with an increase in political violence and targeted assassinations threatening the ceasefire and jeopardising the process.

RUNNING:

Carrying out the operation 2002–08, the SLMM continuously conducted field monitoring, liaising and reporting, largely based on operational principles and procedures developed in 2002–03.

The operation commenced only a week after the signing of the CFA, with the HOM and the first monitors arriving in Sri Lanka – setting up a temporary Headquarters (HQ) – on 2 March. Within four weeks the mission was operational in all districts and pre-designed locations.

The initial phase of the operation in 2002 differed from the rest of the period particularly through being more specifically defined by the CFA. The Parties committed themselves to carry out specified actions within a given timeframe (D-day +), activities which the SLMM was to verify through its monitoring – as well as assisting the Parties to perform. Thereby, the Parties demonstrated that the ceasefire yielded tangible peace dividends, affecting the daily life of the civilian population in areas

Operational phases

Seen in retrospect, the SLMM operational period, 2002–2008, can be divided into five phases, following a preparatory phase prior to the operation itself. The division, made from a SLMM operative perspective, is done to demonstrate the considerable variation in the environment, which also called for adjustments to the operational concept and organizational structure.

| | | |
|-----------|--|---|
| 2002–2003 | <p>Definition: The <i>initial period</i> of the operation with the implementation of the CFA; the establishment of the SLMM, commencement of the field operation, and development of operational concepts.</p> <p>Duration: Early 2002 – End 2003</p> | <p>Description: <i>The operational environment</i> was characterized by an atmosphere of public anticipation based on a spirit of cooperation, with the Parties committed to the CFA and confident in the SLMM, conducting a series of peace talks.</p> <p><i>The SLMM</i> was deployed to the entire AOR with access all along the FDL and direct access to the Parties on all levels – and to desired information. The SLMM enjoyed confidence and cooperation from the Parties and was met by expectations from the civilian</p> |
| 2004–2005 | <p>Definition: The <i>intermediate period</i> of the operation in which the SLMM remained fully deployed and operational, carrying out its assignment according to the mandate, but facing growing resentment.</p> <p>Duration: Beginning 2004 – Late 2005</p> | <p>Description: <i>The operational environment</i> was characterized by a growing opposition to the CFA and reduced acceptance of the SLMM following political changes on the GOSL side, and consequences of the split within the LTTE.</p> <p><i>The SLMM</i> was exposed to reduced freedom of movement, with access to areas of conflict and scenes of incidents limited, and the flow of information – from both Parties – diminished. Also, the mission was increasingly humiliated and misquoted in the media,</p> |
| 2005–2006 | <p>Definition: The <i>detrimental period</i> of the operation in which the SLMM continued its operation in full, but faced increased criticism from the Parties as well as other parts of Sri Lankan society.</p> <p>Duration: End 2005 – Mid 2006</p> | <p>Description: <i>The operational environment</i> was characterized by an intensification of the conflict and an increased number of violations, also due to the LTTE split and a stalemate in the Peace Process.</p> <p><i>The SLMM</i> was experiencing growing difficulties in keeping the channels to the Parties open, particularly after the LTTE closed down all its political offices in the East. The new Tamil actor, the Karuna group, established itself in the East and the SLMM had to find ways to relate to the faction, which was a part of the conflict</p> |
| 2006–2007 | <p>Definition: The <i>critical period</i> of the operation in which the SLMM experienced a highly inhibited capacity due to downsizing and a strongly reduced capability due to the deteriorating security.</p> <p>Duration: Mid 2006 – Mid 2007</p> | <p>Description: <i>The operational environment</i> was characterized by increased hostility between the Parties, with a decisive escalation of the military conflict and a growing animosity, verging on hostility towards the SLMM from large parts of society.</p> <p><i>The SLMM</i> was exposed to increased political attacks – from both Parties, including the decision of the LTTE to renounce security guarantees for monitors from EU member states, effectively reducing the mission's capacity. The escalating military activity in the</p> |
| 2007–2008 | <p>Definition: The <i>final period</i> of the operation in which the SLMM implemented the redesign of the organisation and the redirecting of the operation – in a situation of de facto warfare and a defunct CFA.</p> <p>Duration: Mid 2007 – January 2008</p> | <p>Description: <i>The operational environment</i> was characterized by a move towards large-scale military offensives and intensified warfare, in which the SLMM restructured its monitoring and intensified its liaising, improving its diminishing role and disrupted position vis-a-vis the Parties.</p> <p><i>The SLMM</i> found itself in an operative environment of outright warfare rendering field monitoring of single violations of a de facto defunct CFA impossible – and the mission itself far less relevant.</p> |

population who immediately started to file complains and sought protection and support. The LMC mechanism was established on the basis of a spirit of cooperation confidence, with the SLMM in a key role. Locally, the Parties conducted joint on-site monitoring and made serious efforts to meet CFA deadlines, assisted by the SLMM. Centrally, the HOM took a prominent position through open communication and media relations establishing the SLMM as a transparent monitor of the CFA, and a ruler of violations.

experiencing political and public resentment. The initial spirit of confidence vanished, and the violations of the CFA increased, with several serious incidents at sea, targeted assassinations of political leaders and large-scale child recruitment – all contributing to a gradual undermining of the trust civilians held in the SLMM. Some LMC members were forced to withdraw from active participation due to threats, but field monitoring was carried with continued support from the Parties.

but not a party to the CFA. The direct fighting between the military forces of the Parties left limited space for SLMM enquiries, and the access to, and the previously informal communication with, field commanders was limited, as most situations occurred within the HSZ's. Several major violations – bombings and assassinations – were publicly ruled by HOM and attracted massive criticism in the media from both Parties.

AOR further restricted its freedom of movement, as well as access to the Parties and to relevant information. Altogether, this strongly reduced the SLMM's capability to perform its tasks, and field monitoring and liaising was scaled down. The increasingly hostile situation, also directed at the SLMM in general and at certain monitors specifically, combined with the changing military reality in the East, forced the HOM to reconsider the operation and restructure the organisation.

For several reasons it was impossible to carry out the original operational concept and pattern of on-site monitoring, and the previous field monitoring was redirected and monitors redeployed; monitoring focus was changed from single incidents to major developments and events. SLMM's liaison activities, in particular towards the GOSL, were intensified and the position of the HOM was reimposed – improving the general relation with the Parties and achieving greater acceptance, until the operation had to be terminated following the abrogation of the CFA.



MISSION MEMBERS: The national staff members of the SLMM represented an invaluable resource to the mission, serving in various capacities with all field units and at HQ, throughout the operation. National staff at DO4 Trincomalee, 2006.

affected by the conflict; achievements which the SLMM, through its on-site monitoring reported to Sri Lankan society as well as the outside world. Main elements included by these committed actions by the Parties included separation of forces and freedom of movement, both with the involvement of the SLMM – including the orchestration of a number of high-level meetings between military commanders from both sides in the AOR. A main part of the CFA regarded measures aimed to restore normalcy, which included a number of immediate tasks for the SLMM, becoming a major area of monitoring, also calling for the active involvement of the mission. Not least, such measures included the unimpeded movement of people and flow of goods to and from areas controlled by the LTTE, and the establishment of Check Points (CP), with the SLMM present to monitor the easing of previous restrictions, particularly in Jaffna and Mannar. Another part of the normalcy aspect were the elections held in 2004 and 2005, both monitored by the SLMM; the mission also assisted in the running of elections in the North. At the turn of 2004/05, additional tasks were added as a consequence of the devastating tsunami severely hitting the Eastern coast.

The operation in 2002–03 was carried out in a positive atmosphere; a conducive situation for the SLMM to carry out its mission. Still, already in 2002 there were armed skirmishes between the Parties, including serious incidents particularly at sea, the latter calling for adjustments of the SLMM naval monitoring modalities and routines. Not covered by the CFA, the military activity at sea caused considerable challenges, and attempts by the HOM to develop preventive measures reaped strong criticism from the GOSL. In 2005, the question of control

“The security situation changed for the worse towards the end of the year, with incidents of direct fire and death threats against SLMM monitors.

of the air territory was raised, with reports – which the SLMM was not in a position to verify – that the LTTE was in possession of aircraft.

Another major feature of field monitoring throughout the period, all the way from 2002, was the need to monitor – and often intercede in – ethnic tension, particularly between Muslim and Tamil communities in the East, often related to land disputes. Through liaising efforts, SLMM monitors contributed to ease such tension, i.e. by facilitating meetings between the conflicting groups. The split within the LTTE in 2004 added another challenge to SLMM monitoring, the Karuna faction entering the field as another armed actor. Not being a party to the CFA, the SLMM could not engage in formal relations with the group, but observed military confrontations between it and the LTTE, and confirmed the existence of at least one Karuna camp in areas controlled by the GOSL.

With increased tension and growing distrust between the Parties in 2005, the SLMM found it difficult to perform a major part of its liaising activity: Conducting joint meetings with both Parties present had to be substituted by interlocution by the SLMM. In connection with the peace talks in Geneva, the HOM raised the issue of the lack of direct dialogue and of confidence. The SLMM was involved in the two Geneva talks in several ways, mainly by being tasked to monitor and report on how the Parties' followed up on the agreements made at Geneva I in February; concluding that to a large extent they did not.

With the considerable escalation of military activities as of 2006, the mission also found it more challenging to carry out its regular monitoring activities, partly due to a deteriorating security situation, partly due to the Parties' denial of access. In the latter part of the year, the SLMM's own reduction of monitoring capacity contributed to the demanding situation.

The security situation changed for the worse towards the end of the year, with incidents of direct fire and death threats against SLMM monitors, causing the HOM to order a temporary withdrawal from the districts in December, initiating a workshop aimed at re-establishing the mission, adjusted to the radically altered operational environment (see 'Adapting' below). The resumption of outright warfare between the Parties in 2007, made it necessary for the SLMM to redirect its attention and activities. The mere number of violations of the CFA made it futile to monitor and report on a detailed level, and both the recording of events and the ruling on possible violations were discontinued. Dealing with the challenging situation, modified operational concepts were introduced, mainly *Presence in District (PID)* operations and *Rapid Response Teams (RRT)*, both described in the Annual Review 2007.

[See also the 'Running' article, pages 57–69](#)

ADAPTING:

The organisational structure of the SLMM was designed at the time of the launch of the mission, the operational concept was developed in the early months of the operation. There were minor adjustments both organisationally and operationally

throughout the entire period of operation, with major changes taking place in 2006 and 2007.

[See also the 'Adapting' article, pages 70–74](#)

Organisationally

The main organisational adaptation initially was the establishment of Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT), deployed as separate units to Jaffna and Trincomalee in mid-2002. The first major change in the setup of the SLMM was consequent to the strong reduction in the number of international monitors in mid-2006, requiring an adjustment of field deployment and the DO structure – and for an increase in the recruitment from the two remaining contributing countries, Iceland and Norway.

Whereas the structural changes in 2006 were caused by the sudden downsizing of monitoring staff following external factors, the subsequent restructuring in 2007 was the result of an internal process within the SLMM. Taking the radically altered operational environment into account, the HOM directed a re-orientation of the operation, and consequent restructuring of the organisation.

[See also the 'Mission Structure' article, pages 47–52](#)

Operationally

The first major operational adaptation was the hasty establishment of a naval monitoring capacity. Neither the sea territories nor the Parties' respective naval forces explicitly covered by the CFA, the SLMM naval monitoring was not initially planned for, and the task was to cause considerable consternations in 2002–03. Also, earlier incidents involving naval monitors at sea called for the development of appropriate operating procedures.

Whereas the verification tasks of the SLMM for the early phase of the operation were specifically outlined in the CFA, the general monitoring and liaising assignment was of a more universal nature, connected to the core commitments made by the Parties: *cessation of hostilities* and *return to normalcy*. While operational resources, to a large extent, were tied to specified tasks in 2002, thereafter, the direction of resources was more a matter of priority, decided by the HOM. Furthermore, the development of the operational setting influenced the course of operation, which to some extent also went in somewhat different directions in different parts of the AOR, partly due to a dissimilar character of the local situation, partly due to differing priorities by the individual Heads of District Offices (HOD). To some extent this implied that the operation was driven by external factors as well as internal strategies, also influenced by public debate, not least the mounting pressure from human rights groups to the effect that the SLMM should involve itself with monitoring within this field, including the issue of child recruitment. Such changes in the course of the operation appeared in 2004–05, with increased focus on escalating political vio-

“The re-emerging war, combined with the 2006 reduction in monitoring capacity, contributed to the SLMM being less able to carry out its field operation.

lence during 2005 in particular, and on child recruitment which became an even more apparent feature of the conflict following the split within the LTTE in 2004.

Another decisive factor behind adjusting the operation was the escalation of the armed conflict, greatly affecting the security situation of SLMM members, particularly noticeable from 2005, and worsening in 2006 and 2007. Security concerns called for new monitoring concepts to be introduced, and the stepping up of military activities made the traditional field monitoring less feasible, with attempts to record all incidents futile. Consequently, the operational changes introduced in mid-2007 directed the monitoring focus on developments in the macro perspective rather than incidents on the micro level.

See also the 'Mission Concept' article, pages 38–46

ACHIEVEMENTS 2002–08

Internal Assessment

The results achieved by the SLMM throughout the operational period is difficult to assess, and was not reported on, as such, during the course of the operation. Neither was the SLMM evaluated during the operational period. From a SLMM perspective, the achievements are seen primarily in relation to the assignment accorded the mission, with specified as well as implied tasks, and the operational attention in any given period – all seen in conjunction with the prevailing operational environment and the available operational resources, i.e. the mission's ability to carry out its assignment.

Based on such an operational approach it is attainable to develop an appraisal of the mission's achievements, as considered from within the SLMM. Beyond this, the overall effects of the operation, seen from the perspective of the Peace Process and the Ceasefire Agreement, and from the position of the Parties and Sri Lankan society, the Facilitator and the co-donors, etc, has to be an issue for others to explore.

Considering the achieved results it is worth keeping in mind that the SLMM operated both on a central and local level and that the achievements and effects should be measured in view of the multiple functions of the mission. Furthermore, although the operation was a truly integrated one, it is appropriate to look into the performance and accomplishments within the three main operational modalities separately, i.e. the SLMM's monitoring, liaising, and reporting endeavours.

Operational Assessment

Seen in relation to the mandated assignments and additional tasks and objectives, further considering the prevailing operational environment, the SLMM – year-by-year – largely succeeded in carrying out the operation according to defined tasks and chosen priorities. A major change occurred from 2005, when the operational environment became less conducive, politically as well as militarily, and particularly from the middle of 2006, when the reduction in monitoring capacity added to the operational challenges.

The political development in Sri Lanka influenced the operation mainly indirectly. With the Parties' respective commitment to the



ASSESSING ACHIEVEMENTS: The achievements of the SLMM has to be considered against a proper understanding of its assignment – the letter and spirit of the CFA – and ability to perform its tasks throughout the operation, faced with great expectations, yet growing resentment, always with a limited capacity and capability. International monitors and national staff worked hand-in-hand.

CFA on the decline, the ability of the SLMM to actively assist the Parties in adhering to these commitments consequently weakened. In this respect, the developments on the government side, with the prime movers behind the Peace Process and the CFA losing the 2004–05 elections to sceptics and opponents, clearly made a difference, also for the SLMM, i.e. in the way of reduced readiness by the Parties to respond to the mission's liaising activities.

The military development in Sri Lanka influenced the operation more directly. With the Parties' respective escalation of military activities, in particular from mid-2006, also causing the security situation to deteriorate, it became more difficult to monitor a situation, i.e. a *de facto* war, that was hardly taken into account when the SLMM was designed. The re-emerging war, combined with the 2006 reduction in monitoring capacity, contributed to the SLMM being less able to carry out its field operation, which became particularly obvious in 2007, when security concerns as well as the Parties' restrictions on the freedom of movement became a hindrance.

Monitoring

The SLMM conducted its field monitoring activities throughout the operational period, carrying out a fundamental reorientation only in early 2007, moving from monitoring individual incidents to looking into the broader developments. Already in 2004, there was a notable increase in violence, returning to a pre-CFA level, which challenged the SLMM's ability to carry out its assignment, and especially from 2005 the mission became more incident-driven, the operation overtaken by events in the field more than before, as the military situation turned for the worse. With the conflict moving into a new phase with outright military confrontations in early 2006, and the Peace Process coming to a halt, the

“It should be noted that the SLMM was a main source of direct information for the Facilitator and the Nordic co-sponsors.

monitoring ability was further challenged, until traditional field monitoring was considered futile in an environment of outright war in 2007, strongly reducing the SLMM's ability to carry out its assignment, both for political and military reasons.

Initially, the main function of the monitoring was to verify the specific commitments in the CFA, and to advise the Parties' on the best way to adhere to these. In 2002 there was a positive atmosphere in which this assistance from the SLMM was recognised by both Parties, who cooperated with the SLMM – and each other. Although there was a growing resentment towards the SLMM also due to aspects connected to monitoring of sea territories, the cooperative spirit continued in 2004, both centrally and – even more so – locally. Throughout this period, reduced tension in areas with ethnic tension, chiefly in the East, was recorded, largely due to SLMM assistance and intervention. This ability to play a constructive and effective role in reducing local tension was gradually eroded with the escalation of military confrontations in 2005–06. At the same time, the SLMM faced declining credibility with the public and decreasing confidence from the Parties.

Liaising

The SLMM conducted its liaising activities throughout the operational period, centrally as well as locally. Liaising constituted a major part of the operation in the initial phase, contributing to the active cooperation between the Parties in fulfilling concrete commitments stipulated within the CFA. Initially, liaising was eased by the welcoming attitude towards the SLMM, and the common recognition by the Parties of the assistance from the mission. This atmosphere and attitude allowed for the early establishment of excellent relations between the SLMM and the Parties, also contributing to a positive approach from the Parties towards cooperating with each other, actively requesting the assistance of monitors when conflicts occurred in the districts.

Centrally, the cooperative spirit of the Peace Process cooled down in early 2003, following the LTTE pullout from the series of peace talks and its subsequent non-participation in the Tokyo donor conference. Locally, this detachment did not affect cooperation in 2003–04, with the SLMM still being able to exercise its assistance to the Parties, facilitating high-level meetings and defusing tension. With the growing distrust between the Parties also afflicting the work of the SLMM locally in 2005, the role of the LMC's, whose meetings were chaired by the SLMM became all the more important, as the only formalised venue for cooperation.

The position of the SLMM was impeded during 2006, with growing antagonism, particularly from the GOSL, resulting in a reduced level of contact centrally, largely limited to the peace secretariats. Following a reorientation of the operation and repositioning of the mission in early 2007, including the re-establishment of a dedicated LO to the GOSL and a closer working relation with the Secretariat for the Co-ordination of the Peace Process (SCOPP), the operational environment for the liaison activities improved.

Reporting

The SLMM conducted its reporting activities throughout the operational period, regularly reporting its findings to the Facilitator, the Parties – and the public. At all times, the SLMM served as a main independent source of information on the conflict situation in its AOR; collecting and compiling information based on its monitoring and liaising activities. With the military conflict being stepped up, the access for international organisations to the conflict area was limited, particularly from 2005 onwards. Consequently, with the SLMM as more or less the only international and independent body left to observe, the relative importance of the mission's continuous reporting increased. As the field monitoring of the SLMM, by and large, concentrated on incidents, this was reflected in the reports, until the refocusing on the macro perspective and major developments was adopted in 2007 – also reflected in the missions reporting scope.

It should be noted that the SLMM was a main source of direct information for the Facilitator and the Nordic co-sponsors, and through these bodies, indirectly, for other major powers concerned with the conflict, which were kept informed by the Norwegian government, drawing considerably on the on-site reporting from the field, conducted by the SLMM. Also, foreign embassies, international organisations and other NGO's received briefings from the SLMM upon request, and regularly used the mission as a prime source of information. From a facilitating point of view, the SLMM was a valuable instrument on the ground, following up on the CFA as such and supplying information, hence contributing to the Peace Process.

Basically, the SLMM aimed at assisting the Parties in the cessation of hostilities and the return to normalcy. In so doing, the SLMM carried out its monitoring, liaising and reporting operation, occasionally intervening in concrete conflict situations locally, reducing and defusing tension. In the first couple of years, following the signing of the CFA, a large number of Sri Lankans living in the core conflict areas experienced tangible peace dividends, easing their daily lives, not least due to the opening of roads and the lifting of transport restrictions, covering both people and goods. For some time this could be measured in general economic upturn, until developments reversed, from 2004–05. The initial success of the ceasefire should be ascribed to the actions taken by the Parties rather than to the presence of the SLMM, whose activities, however, helped facilitate the actions taken by the GOSL and the LTTE. Yet, for the local population in the area of conflict, the presence of international monitors implied some degree of security, and the SLMM became a channel to forward grievances – a way of being invited to voice concern and launch complaints.

External Considerations

The presence of the SLMM received considerable attention, nationally and internationally, throughout the entire operational period. In Sri Lanka, the mission soon came under criticism, in particular from those parts of the national political arena that were opposed to the CFA and what was considered political concessions to the LTTE in the first place; sentiments that were seconded by substantial parts of the Sinhalese media, while



FISHERMEN'S FRIENDS: One of the liaising tasks of the SLMM, carried out by the NMT's were to defuse tension at sea, including contention over fishing rights. SLMM naval monitors meeting the PPD Fisherman Society, 2004.

pro-LTTE organisations and media took on a more supportive stance.

For a selection of external considerations, see Appendix 11

OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTATION

During the operational period, March 2002 until January 2008, the SLMM recorded altogether 13,026 complaints, with the by far highest number in 2006 – and with the largest number of

complaints received by D05 Batticaloa. A total number of 23,199 general and liaising meetings in which the SLMM participated were recorded, with the highest number in 2005; the highest activity by the LO LTTE in Killinochchi. The SLMM chaired a total of 860 LMC meetings, and conducted a total of 2681 sea patrols – of which the by far largest share was troop transportations.

For tables, see next page, plus the respective Annual Review articles for each year

Complaints registered by the SLMM, 2002–08

| DISTRICT | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | Total |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|----------|--------------|
| DO1 Jaffna | 542 | 670 | 498 | 471 | 847 | 191 | 0 | 3219 |
| DO2 Mannar | 142 | 211 | 280 | 126 | 124 | 5 | 0 | 888 |
| DO3 Vavuniya | 194 | 483 | 405 | 255 | 389 | 146 | 2 | 1874 |
| DO4 Trincomalee | 157 | 452 | 364 | 432 | 626 | 111 | 0 | 2142 |
| DO5 Batticaloa | 672 | 639 | 427 | 635 | 1165 | 276 | 1 | 3815 |
| DO6 Ampara | 79 | 349 | 119 | 126 | 229 | 102 | 0 | 1004 |
| LO LTTE, Kilinochchi | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 17 |
| HQ, Colombo | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 26 | 31 | 0 | 67 |
| Year total/Grand total | 1786 | 2804 | 2095 | 2063 | 3411 | 864 | 3 | 13026 |

General and liaising meetings with SLMM participation, 2002–08

| DISTRICT | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | Total |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| DO1 Jaffna | 345 | 808 | 915 | 978 | 472 | 128 | 13 | 3659 |
| DO2 Mannar | 343 | 620 | 424 | 534 | 228 | 40 | 5 | 2194 |
| DO3 Vavuniya | 273 | 538 | 351 | 526 | 363 | 141 | 12 | 2204 |
| DO4 Trincomalee | 292 | 807 | 742 | 896 | 697 | 225 | 9 | 3668 |
| DO5 Batticaloa | 233 | 582 | 279 | 641 | 465 | 94 | 7 | 2301 |
| DO6 Ampara | 203 | 436 | 486 | 928 | 332 | 43 | 3 | 2431 |
| NMT Jaffna | 36 | 341 | 244 | 289 | 176 | NA | NA | 1086 |
| NMT Trincomalee | 50 | 175 | 299 | 157 | 77 | NA | NA | 758 |
| LO LTTE, Kilinochchi | 423 | 661 | 815 | 854 | 1083 | 1033 | 29 | 4898 |
| Year total/Grand total | 2198 | 4968 | 4555 | 5803 | 3893 | 1704 | 78 | 23199 |

LMC meetings chaired by the SLMM, 2002–08

| DISTRICT | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | Total |
|-----------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|----------|------------|
| DO1 Jaffna | 10 | 12 | 22 | 21 | 17 | 9 | 0 | 91 |
| DO2 Mannar | 32 | 41 | 40 | 39 | 32 | 11 | 1 | 196 |
| DO3 Vavuniya | 21 | 37 | 31 | 33 | 25 | 14 | 1 | 162 |
| DO4 Trincomalee | 29 | 13 | 15 | 16 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 74 |
| DO5 Batticaloa | 36 | 32 | 47 | 33 | 35 | 8 | 0 | 191 |
| DO6 Ampara | 29 | 41 | 35 | 21 | 18 | 2 | 0 | 146 |
| Year Tot/Grand Total | 157 | 176 | 190 | 163 | 128 | 44 | 2 | 860 |

Sea patrols conducted by SLMM – by NTM, 2002–06*

| YEAR/NMT | NMT-J | NMT-T | Total |
|--------------|------------|-------------|-------------|
| 2002 | 68 | 64 | 132 |
| 2003 | 151 | 326 | 477 |
| 2004 | 263 | 575 | 838 |
| 2005 | 243 | 652 | 895 |
| 2006 | 143 | 196 | 339 |
| Total | 868 | 1813 | 2681 |

* Sea patrols/naval monitoring was suspended in 2006

Sea patrols conducted by the SLMM – by type of patrol, 2002–06*

| Year/Type | FPC/FAC | Troop Trsp. | FGB | SBS | IPC | LTTE Sea Movements |
|--------------|------------|-------------|------------|-----------|------------|--------------------|
| 2002 | 106 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 8 |
| 2003 | 215 | 196 | 46 | 7 | 5 | 4 |
| 2004 | 126 | 429 | 233 | 11 | 35 | 2 |
| 2005 | 217 | 605 | 3 | 43 | 27 | 0 |
| 2006 | 86 | 190 | 0 | 13 | 50 | 0 |
| Total | 750 | 1428 | 283 | 75 | 117 | 14 |

* Sea patrols/naval monitoring was suspended in 2006



ANNUAL REVIEWS, 2002–2007

The SLMM executed its operation throughout six years, according to a defined concept and with a set of core tasks, until terminating in early 2008.



The SLMM was an integral part of the Peace Process, aiming to find a lasting political solution to the ethnic strife in Sri Lanka.

Operational Overview 2002

SUMMARY OF THE SLMM's SETTING, OBJECTIVES, ACTIVITIES
AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN 2002

2002 was the year in which the SLMM was established through the signing of the CFA, and when the operation commenced with establishing the mission as a key instrument of the Peace Process. The SLMM contributed to the positive atmosphere reigning in Sri Lanka following the Agreement, assisting the Parties in moving forward with the intention of finding a lasting political solution to the conflict.

SETTING 2002

Operational mandate

Mandated through the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was to assist the Parties in adhering to their commitments as stipulated in the agreement, by conducting international verification through on-site monitoring within six designated districts, and liaising with and between the Parties.

Operational environment

Militarily, 2002 was relatively calm, albeit with intermittent armed confrontation, in particular at sea; political and communal violence occurred from the start of the year, and to some extent continued even after the signing of the CFA. Such violence took place not least in the eastern districts, with the repeated clashes between Muslims and Tamils connected to social, economic and political issues, in particular the question of land and religious symbols; Muslims were also reportedly experiencing intimidation from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Leading up to the signing of the CFA, the LTTE announced (on 20 January) a one month extension (until 24 February) of the unilateral ceasefire. The Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) followed suit the next day – the extension lasted until the Agreement was signed on 22 February. By and large, the Parties adhered to their respective commitments, with few significant armed incidents. The first major breach of the CFA took place on 1 May, in way of a confrontation between a trawler controlled by the LTTE and a Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) vessel off the coast of Batticaloa.

Otherwise, the military landscape in 2002 was marked by constructive relations between the Parties. Following the signing of the CFA, military leaders from both sides, often through facilitation from and with the participation of the SLMM, and in an atmosphere of committed cooperation, repeatedly met and held talks, working on solutions to their mutual and respective commitments, and the challenges unfolding as the CFA was implemented. At the second round of peace talks in October (see below), the Parties agreed to establish direct communication between the commanders of the LTTE and the GOSL Special Task Force (STF) in the east, in order to improve the security situation.

Politically, 2002 saw a marked thaw in relations between the GOSL and the LTTE from the very beginning of the year, following the December 2001 electoral victory of Ranil Wickramasinghe of the United National Party (UNP) who engaged in the Peace Process initiated by President Chandrika Kumaratunga, and as Prime Minister (PM) signed a ceasefire with the LTTE on 22 February. Prior to this, in a conciliatory move to create an atmosphere conducive for peace talks to resume, the GOSL relaxed the economic embargo on the LTTE-held areas in the north (long requested by the Tigers) as of 15 January – easing transport, movement of people and essential goods. In early March, the Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, announced the establishment of a Check Point (CP) at Muhamalai, facilitating the opening of the A9 highway, which took place on 8 April. On 15 March, Wickramasinghe, in a goodwill gesture, visited the Tamil stronghold of Jaffna and the Forward Defence Localities (FDL) at Muhamalai – the first visit by a Sri Lankan PM to Jaffna since 1982.

The signing of the CFA played a prominent part in the political debate, with broadly based protests against the Agreement soon gathering momentum. PM Wickramasinghe's signing of the CFA on behalf of the GOSL was immediately criticised, including by the President – and was later challenged in court. In early May, the leader of the opposition, Mahinda Rajapakse of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) stated that the ceasefire was one-sided favouring the LTTE, and vowed in Parliament to campaign against it. The opposition was successful regarding several of its objectives, including the ruling by the Sri Lanka Supreme Court, that effectively the 'leave, stay or travel' pass system, implemented for the civilian population by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) in Vavuniya, was unlawful. Furthermore it succeeded in having the suggested '19th Amendment', restricting the powers of the President in dissolving Parliament after the completion of one year of existence, postponed. Another major issue was the annulment of the merger between the Northern and Eastern regions, which the Supreme Court eventually ruled as null and

“... the military landscape in 2002 was marked by constructive relations between the Parties.

void in 2006. Parallel to the opposition against the CFA, there was deep resentment against the de-proscribing of the LTTE – a precondition set by the Tigers for participation in direct peace talks. With the lifting of the ban on the organisation on 5 September, mass protests were launched by Buddhist monks and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).

As a consequence of the Peace Process, the LTTE was able to open political offices in the GOSL-controlled areas. In October, the Colombo High Court sentenced the LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran to 200 years imprisonment for involvement in the 1996 bombing of the Central Bank.

The Peace Process gained momentum in 2002, moving into a new phase with the signing of the CFA, separately by the LTTE leader Prabhakaran, on 20 February, and two days later by PM Wickramasinghe, coming into effect at midnight (00.00) Saturday 23 February. The Ambassador of Norway, Jon Westborg received the signed documents from the two in Kilinochchi and Vavuniya, respectively. The signing followed two periods of truce since the December 2001 election.

President Kumaratunga, who initiated the Peace Process and invited Norway to facilitate it, criticised the PM's handling of the affair as 'undemocratic', without obtaining either her prior approval, or presenting the document to the Cabinet and the Parliament before it was signed and announced; the relationship between the two executives soured thereafter. The President also argued that certain articles in the Agreement could impinge on national security concerns; she further criticised the prominent position of the Norwegian Facilitator and the ceasefire monitors – headed by Norway – as far surpassing her intentions of 1999. However, during a meeting in April with the Norwegian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vidar Helgesen, the President reiterated her support of the Peace Process, saying she was fully committed not only to the process but to a negotiated settlement.

In the debate on the CFA in the Sri Lanka Parliament on 4–5 March, PM Wickramasinghe said the Agreement was a vehicle

for moving forward and that it "should be seen as a reasonable and practical foundation on which a political solution [...] can be built upon and not as an end in itself".

At his first press conference in ten years, on 11 April, attracting unprecedented international attention, the LTTE leader Prabhakaran stated that the LTTE was sincerely and seriously committed to peace, paying tribute to the PM for agreeing on an indefinite ceasefire, declaring his commitment to finding a negotiated settlement and hinting that he might consider abandoning the fundamental demand of the LTTE – an independent Tamil state. Both Parties established peace secretariats to coordinate their respective participation in the process.

By the GOSL's de-proscribing of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation in September (initially for a month, later prolonged) the major obstacle against the first direct talks between the Parties since 1994/95 was removed; talks commenced in Thailand – with the expressed support of the President.

A separate Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Peace Process was signed between the LTTE and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) – which had a seat in government – on 3 September, agreeing that the latter should be part of the GOSL team at the upcoming talks, representing the country's Muslim community.

The first round of talks between the Parties, facilitated by the Norwegian government, was held at Sattahip naval base in Thailand (16–18 September). The talks centred on humanitarian issues and resettlements, with the LTTE expressing particular concern over the return of internally displaced persons (IDP's) in Jaffna to their homes in the High Security Zones (HSZ) established and controlled by the GOSL. The GOSL brought to the table complaints over extortion, kidnapping and child conscription allegedly conducted by the LTTE since the signing of the CFA. The Parties decided to establish two Joint Task Forces to handle a) the return of IDP's to Jaffna and the issue of HSZ's, and b) humanitarian and reconstruction issues in the North and the East.

The second round of talks, was held in Nakhon Pathom, Thailand (31 October–3 November) focussing on the modalities of setting up Joint Task Forces, eventually established as three sub-committees: the Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and East (SIHRN); the Sub-Committee on De-Escalation and Normalisation (SDN), including matters connected with the HSZ's and the IDP's; the Sub-Committee on Political Matters (SPM). The Parties also agreed to reconstitute the Local Monitoring Committees (LMC), appointing senior representatives from both sides as local members.

A major concern for the Parties, as well as the Facilitator, was that the momentum and viability of the Peace Process had to be underpinned by tangible and visible results on the ground, achieved not only by internal measures but also by external assistance – both fostering economic development and social improvements. To prepare for international financial backing, a Sri Lanka Support Conference was hosted by the Norwegian government in Oslo on 25 November – prior to the next round of direct talks.



PEACE PROCESS: The signing of the CFA represented a culmination of the Peace Process; the signing was, however, not entirely endorsed by the President of Sri Lanka, Chandrika Kumaratunga. With Norwegian facilitators, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vidar Helgesen (middle) and Special Envoy, Erik Solheim, April 2002.

The third round of talks was held in Oslo, Norway (2–5 December). Here, reports from the work of the SIHRN and SDN were presented, with much time devoted to the LTTE's concern regarding withdrawal of the SLA from the HSZ's, and the return of civilian property to the owners. Prior to the third round, the LTTE leader Prabhakaran, in his annual Heroes' Day speech had spoken of the aspiration of the Tamil people as that of living "in their own homeland under a system of self-rule", stating the LTTE's willingness to "consider favourably" a political framework offering substantial regional autonomy and self-government in the Tamil heartland. At the talks in Oslo, the Parties agreed to a statement in which they committed themselves to exploring a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination, "based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka".

The Parties agreed to set up a fourth sub-committee, the Sub-Committee on Gender Issues (SGI), to explore the inclusion of such issues in the Peace Process, and to establish peace committees at community level in order to facilitate the resolution of local problems, contributing to inter-ethnic communication and reconciliation, and to promote respect for human rights. Furthermore, the Parties emphasized in particular their commitment to accommodate the "needs and aspirations" of all three communities in the East: Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese – setting out specific measures to improve relations between the two former groups, including regular consultations between the LTTE leaders and Muslim political leaders.

Throughout the year, the Facilitator applied extensive effort in assisting the Parties and the process, meeting both Parties on numerous occasions, and preparing the three rounds of peace talks. Representatives of the Norwegian government, including Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vidar Helgesen and Special Envoy Erik Solheim met with the President and PM of Sri Lanka and senior LTTE leadership. In parallel, the SLMM conducted regular meetings with leaders of both Parties, centrally and locally, as well as regularly meeting with the Facilitator. Within the opposition, there was growing resentment against the prominent role of Norway, and – as formulated by Lakshman Kadirgamar of the People's Alliance (PA) and foreign policy advisor to the President – in connection with the third round of peace talks in Oslo, "the impending accommodation of the LTTE, on a level of parity with the Government of Sri Lanka".

OPERATION 2002

Operational attention

In 2002, the main focus of the Head of Mission (HOM) was to launch and carry out the operation according to the stipulations of the CFA, establish his Headquarters (HQ) in Colombo and field units in all six districts; i.e. the Liaison Office to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LO LTTE), District Offices (DO) and Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT).

Initial attention was concentrated on establishing the mission and developing operational modalities and procedures, enabling expeditious execution of prioritised activities, including tasks beyond the specific stipulations inscribed into the CFA:

Monitoring:

- Establish procedures and practises regarding monitoring the CFA, including routines for patrolling and enquiries into complaints, not least from civilians
- Establish Naval Monitoring Teams, monitoring the situation at sea, the sea territory not being explicitly covered by the CFA
- Participate in (and partly chairing) the sub-committees set up by the Parties following the peace talks towards the end of the year

Liaising:

- Establish contacts with the Parties on various levels as well as with other key stakeholders to the conflict, centrally in the capital and locally in the Area of Responsibility (AOR)
- Disseminate the provisions of the CFA, and explaining their implications locally, to the Parties and other interlocutors

Reporting:

- Establish procedures and routines for reporting on the operation from local level to the HQ and from HQ to the Facilitator and the Parties, to disseminate information on the CFA to the Sri Lankan public, and how to best deal with the media

Operational resources

To carry out the operation in 2002, the SLMM had at its disposal *human resources* constituted by 38 international monitors and 20 national staff (annual averages), and *financial resources* (current budget) amounting to NOK 18.2 million. *Logistical resources* were gradually acquired as part of the process of establishing the mission, including accommodation and offices, transportation and communication means.

For further details, see Part 03, 'Operational Resources'

At the commencement of the operation, Major General (R) Trond Furuhoide (NO) took on the position of HOM, Brigadier Hagrup Haukland (NO) that of Chief of Staff (COS). Tarmo Kaupilla (FI) became Chief of Operations (COO), succeeded by Jussi Antero-inen (FI) in September. The first Press and Information Officer (PIO), Teitur Torkelsson (IC), arrived in June.

OPERATIONAL EXECUTION

DIRECTING:

In 2002, the HOM devoted his attention to setting up the mission, establishing contacts and commencement of the operation, developing operational plans and administrative procedures.

A major initial preoccupation of the HOM was to analyse the CFA, in order to direct the operation according to the assignments and tasks inscribed in it as well as the intention behind it, prioritising limited resources to a number of demanding assignments. Several of these were given with specific timeframes (D-day +), others were of a more general and unlimited character. A main concern when interpreting the letter and spirit of the CFA was the key issue of balance of power – seen in relation to the status quo of 24 December 2001 defined by the Parties – which was considered an essential presupposition, including an acceptance of the right of both Parties to carry out military activities (training and exercises) and to maintain their respective existing military installations.

The HOM devoted considerable attention to setting up the mission, including the development of operational plans and administrative procedures. In 2002, the Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) was developed, with work on the Operation Order (OO) ('Hermes') commencing, to be issued in February 2003. Subsequent to the peace talks between the Parties, the SLMM was tasked to monitor the implementation of decisions made by the various sub-committees established, which given due priority by the HOM.

The HOM issued two Directives and one Guideline; 16 statements were issued, one special report prepared. The first Directive was on operational matters and the media, the second on procedures to be followed by DO's concerning cases on recruitment of the under-aged; the guideline regarded the interpretation of the CFA with respect to LTTE recruitment of children.

For full overview and document contents:
www.slmm.info

RUNNING:

In 2002, the SLMM devoted particular operational resources to establishing its structure, commencing monitoring and verifying the commitments made by the Parties through the CFA.

Upon arrival in Sri Lanka on 2 March, a week after the signing of the CFA on 22 February (the defined D-day of the SLMM operation), the HOM Major General (R) Trond Furuhoide set up his temporary HQ in Hotel Lanka Oberoi, Colombo, making the mission immediately operational. Within four weeks (by 8 April) all DO's and the LO LTTE were permanently deployed and operational, largely in preliminary locations and with rudimentary equipment in a war-affected environment. In the districts the SLMM was instrumental in reactivating six LMC's, which were in turn instrumental in attempting to resolve disputes at the lowest possible level and in assisting in evaluating complaints. The first complaint was received on 13 March: from the GOSL against the LTTE.

One of SLMM's immediate tasks was to monitor and verify specific activities drawn up in the CFA article 1 and 2: separation of forces; freedom of movement; measures to restore normalcy – several of which had a deadline. This called for an early development of monitoring modalities, in order to fulfill the assignments. The success of implementing these measures was considered important by the Parties, the Facilitator and the SLMM alike, in order to demonstrate the achievement of major – and visible – peace dividends.

For full text of the CFA, see Appendix 1, and
www.slmm.info/documents/cfa

Regarding the *separation of forces*, the SLMM monitored the FDL's established for the Parties' fighting formations to hold their ground positions and for maintaining a defined Zone of Separation (ZOS). The SLMM was also to assist the Parties in drawing up demarcation lines, at latest by D-day +30, facilitating several meetings in the field for the two sides to work out agreements. Whereas the Parties were allowed to keep their military capacities, they were not allowed to move munitions, explosives or military equipment into areas controlled by the other party;



MONITORING MOVEMENT: The CFA provided for an easing of restrictions regarding the movement of persons and goods between the North and the South, monitored by the SLMM. Waiting in line at Uliyankulam CP, Mannar area, 2002.

a commitment the SLMM continuously monitored. According to CFA, 1.8 Tamil military groups were to be disarmed by the GOSL by D-day +30. In March the SLMM monitored the first partial disarmament; the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP), the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and the Eelam People's Revolutionary Front (EPRLF) handing over weapons in Jaffna, Vavunya, Trincomalee and Batticaloa.

Regarding the *freedom of movement*, the SLMM monitored and verified, and to quite an extent facilitated the movement of (unarmed) troops between the areas controlled by the respective Party, as regulated in CFA 1.9–1.13; this proved to be a challenging and time-consuming endeavor. E.g., GOSL troops were, as of D-day +60, to be permitted unlimited passage through Jaffna and Vavunya, using the A9 highway – requiring modalities to be worked out by the Parties with the assistance of the SLMM. As of D-day, individual combatants were permitted to visit family and friends residing in areas under control of the opposing party. The SLMM orchestrated a number of high-level meetings between the Parties, often chaired by the HOM, assisting in negotiations to secure freedom of movement for civilians. E.g., the first meeting between the local Brigade Commanders of the SLA and the LTTE Southern Area Commanders in the ZOS at Omanthai was chaired by the HOM, crossing to improve technical arrangement at CP's for the enhancement of the capacity.

The stipulations of article 1.13 were of particular importance to the SLMM, playing an important role in securing the freedom of movement necessary for the LTTE to gradually establish an official political presence and carry out political work in areas in the North and East dominated by the GOSL. The CFA permitted 50 unarmed LTTE members to move into these areas as of D-day +30, additional 100 as of D-day +60, and an unlimited number as of D-day +90. This part of the CFA caused considerable upset, and the SLMM had to engage in countering negative attitudes which caused resentment and tension resulting from the agreement.

The SLMM assisted in working out the practicalities for crossings and behavior at CP's, dealing with a number of specific issues. One example was the need to develop new procedures in order to facilitate movements in light of the GOSL's non-acceptance of id-cards or vehicle license plates issued by the LTTE administration. Tamils from Vanni, in the majority, lacked other documentation. Another example was the need to develop specific routines in the face of the LTTE cadres moving into the GOSL-controlled areas carrying cyanide capsules – raising the question of these being a weapon or not. Furthermore, the concept of 'political work' had to be defined, including the consideration of cultural events with a political character, as well as political rallies, some of which were held in schools; the SLMM assisted in establishing guidelines.

Much of SLMM's strained resources were initially spent on working out the modalities for transporting and escorting troops through the opposing Party's area; this included the question of when to send notice in advance, how many cadres could participate in one movement, where to meet, how to define civilian clothing, etc. On 18–19 August, the SLMM successfully supervised and monitored the first sea movement of the LTTE troops, departing from Mullaithivu for a return journey to Vakarai, with one monitor on each of four Sea Tiger vessels. At the third round of peace talks, it was agreed that the SLMM should supervise future transportation of area commanders, ensured by the LTTE.

Regarding *the measures to restore normalcy*, the SLMM monitored a number of commitments towards confidence-building measures – for practical reasons, basically in its Area of Responsibility (AOR), although the measures were applicable to the whole of Sri Lanka, with the entire country constituting the SLMM's Area of Operation (AOO). Encompassing a wide range of aspects, from abstaining from hostile acts against the civilian population according to international law, to a number of other general as well as specific measures, this part of the CFA immediately became a major area of monitoring. I.e., the Parties should refrain from engaging in activities or propagating ideas that could offend cultural or religious sensitivities, and places of worship held by the forces of either of the Parties were to be vacated by D-day +30. Also, school buildings were to be vacated and returned to their intended use, completed by D-day +160 at the latest – actively monitored and verified by the SLMM in the North and the East. Both Parties made dedicated efforts to adhere to these regulations, whereas private building and public offices to a lesser extent were vacated by their military occupants – mostly due to lack of accommodation for the troops, also to be seen in connection with the balance of power, and the prohibition against constructing new military installations. As these issues were not clearly defined, they had to be solved locally, case by case – often with the active involvement of the SLMM. At the third round of peace talks, the Parties agreed to request

that the SDN propose a common approach to settling cases involving the disputed use of private property. Furthermore, the Parties were to review the security measures and the set-up of CP's – to be in place and verified by the SLMM from D-day +60.

Of great importance in the attempts to restore normalcy were economic activities, such as ensuring the unimpeded flow of non-military goods to and from LTTE-controlled areas (specifically regulated in the CFA), including the establishment of CP's and the opening of roads, specifically the Trincomalee–Habarana road (CFA 2.8) for passenger traffic with effect from D-day +10, and the A9 Kandy–Jaffna road (CFA 2.10) to non-military traffic of goods and passengers by D-day +30 at the latest. On 8 April, the HOM opened the remaining stretch of the A9 highway – from Kilinochchi to Jaffna – after 12 years of closure, resulting in a rapid increase in the flow of goods, and contributing to economic improvements in the North. The SLMM devoted resources to monitoring the restrictions on the flow of goods and therefore avoided developed procedures impeding the return to normalcy. Also important was the gradual easing of fishing restrictions, implemented D-day, and which by D-day +90 should be removed, with specified exceptions (CFA 2.11). The SLMM continuously monitored the easing of restrictions, particularly in Jaffna and Mannar, and the handing over of paddy fields to farmers. As commercial life revitalised, complaints from civilians regarding extortion, taxing, confiscations, etc – committed by both Parties as well as criminals – received considerable attention from the SLMM.

An ongoing task for the SLMM was to monitor that defined procedures at the CP's, connected to the movement of people and goods, were followed by the Parties, as far as possible ensuring a free flow according to the regulations laid down; this included that people should not be harassed nor property confiscated or stolen, or taxes unduly levied – all important elements in the attempted return to normalcy. Furthermore, the SLMM monitored the very existence of the CP's; a number being randomly set up – in contravention of the CFA.

Naval monitoring commenced as of beginning of June, with the first Naval Monitoring Team (NMT–Trincomalee) operational as of 30 May, and the first patrol carried out on board a Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) vessel from Trincomalee. Several serious incidents at sea revealed the need for agreed routines and SLMM monitoring of the sea movements of both Parties. The situation at sea turned out to be sensitive, and caused much consternation early on in the existence of the CFA and the SLMM, demanding considerable attention – through liaising on land and monitoring at sea, and with several serious incidents recorded during the year, including the exchange of fire between vessels. One major incident occurred in July, which also highlighted the security of the SLMM members: two monitors embarking a LTTE trawler – with the full approval of the LTTE political leadership – were refused return to the SNL boat they conducted their patrol from, in effect being taken hostage by the LTTE cadres, although later released unharmed on land. The incident was considered by the SLMM to be a serious violation of the CFA, with the HOM adding that it was also “a major blow to the trust of the SLMM in the LTTE”. The LTTE however denied having taken the monitors

“... the SLMM monitored a number of commitments towards confidence-building measures.

hostage, rather bringing them safely ashore, preventing them from jumping into a turbulent sea.

A major part of operational resources in 2002 was devoted to establishing contacts within the structures of the Parties, including other relevant parts of Sri Lankan society, establishing the greatest possible confidence in the mission and in the CFA. A corresponding endeavor, however not inscribed into the Agreement, was to provide information about the CFA (and the SLMM), creating CFA awareness in all districts from day one, with monitors delivering presentations to local government offices and civil society groups, including the media.

With the advent of the sub-committees established as a result of the peace talks, the SLMM was engaged in the practical facilitation of meetings towards the end of the year. The GOSL wanted the SLMM to partake in the peace committees established in the district capitals within the AOR, in which several LMC members participated, following the third round of talks in December; the HOM however, decided not to take part, in order not to compromise the mission's integrity.

Both Parties were sensitive to what was perceived as a lack of respect for political leaders and ranks of military personnel. However, the SLMM continued to monitor that the Parties did not misuse civilian premises for military (or political) activity, including the use of schools for propaganda purposes, in contravention of the basic idea of returning to a situation of civilian normalcy.

The SLMM observed that when the LTTE political offices were in place in a local community, complaints of child recruitment followed, adding to the mission's tasks. The SLMM checked the identity of young soldiers to determine their age, also following up single cases with the LTTE, often following complaints or requests by families.



PARENTS PROTESTING: Following the establishment of LTTE political offices in the East, the public was often mobilised for demonstrations, with the SLMM receiving complaints from parents regarding the unwanted mobilisation of their children during school hours.

The North

In the Northern region, the SLMM established a presence in Jaffna (DO1 and NMT-J), Mannar (DO2) and Vavuniya (DO3) as well as in Kilinochchi (LO LTTE), conducting monitoring on land and at sea. The first serious situation occurred when the SLN defined all the small islands in the Jaffna lagoon as HSZ's and denied the return IDP's and the establishment of LTTE political offices.

The East

In the Eastern region, the SLMM established a presence in Trincomalee (DO4 and NMT-T), Batticaloa (DO5) and Ampara (DO6), conducting monitoring on land and at sea.

ADAPTING:

Operationally

During 2002, the SLMM had to deal with the realities on the ground when establishing the mission whilst following the stipulations of the CFA. Following the incident when two monitors were held against their will on board a LTTE boat in June, new operating procedures for naval monitoring were introduced in July aimed at ensuring the safety of the monitors. As a general rule, monitors should remain on board the SLN vessel and not join the SLN inspection team when boarding an intercepted vessel. In December, the SLMM was instructed by the Facilitator to arrange meetings with the Parties regarding the SDN, consequent to the Facilitator having been tasked by the Parties to assist them in detailing the mandate and structure of the joint task forces initiated at the first round of talks in September.

Organisationally

Soon after the launch of the operation in early 2002, following the immediate establishment of HQ, all DO's and both NMT's were set up, to remain operational throughout the year, as did the LO LTTE.

Several Points of Contact (POC) were established, often connected to local tension: DO Ampara opening POC Akkaraipattu in June; DO Jaffna opening POC Valanai in July and POC Delft in October; DO Batticaloa opening POC Valaichenai in August; DO Trincomalee opening POC Muttur in September. NMT's, not originally part of the SLMM structure (reflecting the omission of sea territories in the CFA) were established in May-June, in Trincomalee and Jaffna; the first NMT becoming operational 30 May.

ACHIEVEMENTS 2002

Operational assessment

Assessing achieved results – seen in relation to the mandated assignments and the additional tasks and objectives – in 2002, it should be noted that the mission was established – and welcomed – by the Parties. Consequently, in the initial phase they cooperated closely with the SLMM as part of their efforts to live up to the letter and spirit of the CFA. Hence, the SLMM was in a better position to solve its complex assignment than at later stages of the operation, to quite an extent serving as a perceived guarantor of the ceasefire, although the Parties alone bore the responsibility to adhere to the commitments made.

A main function of the SLMM in this initial part of the operation was to assist – and thereby advise – the Parties as how to implement the CFA, as well as constituting a channel to the international community and a constructive seeker of solutions. The many tangible as well as intangible positive results seen in Sri Lankan society following the ceasefire should however not be ascribed to the monitoring mission alone, much more to the evolving spirit and reigning optimism, and the direct results of moving towards normalcy.

During 2002, the SLMM attained considerable attention and interest, and was truly considered a crucial part of the Peace Process as well as the CFA. The Parties at the end of the first round of peace talks in September, recognised that the CFA needed to be sustained, “with the continued assistance of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission”, which they commended for its “impartial conduct in the fulfilment of its important mandate”.

MONITORING:

Early in 2002, monitoring was established with defined modalities, continuously performed by the entire organisation, commencing with the establishment of the organisation and intensified with the deployment to the districts – with field monitoring carried out on land and sea.

Land monitoring commenced gradually with the deployment to the districts, the first DO's established on 26 March, completely deployed, including the LO LTTE, by 8 April – incidentally the same day as the HOM officially opened the A9 Kandy–Jaffna road. Naval monitoring was added as of April, with the first naval monitors going on a sea patrol on 11–12 April. In addition to the DO's and NMT's, the SLMM established POC's in four districts; in the opinion of the HOM a success with respect to the accessibility and presence of the SLMM. Monitoring included most of the main issues stipulated in the CFA, with verification of the fulfilment of D-day clauses. To assist the Parties in rectifying their breaches of the CFA, the HOM introduced ‘case rulings’ which attracted great attention and debate.

LIAISING:

During 2002, the SLMM established excellent relations with the leadership of both Parties, as well as an extensive network of contacts with other stakeholders – at central levels in Colombo and in the districts covered by the operation.

Arriving in Sri Lanka on 2 March, the HOM held an initial meeting, the same day, with the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, followed by an initial meeting with the LTTE Political Wing Leader four days later. Throughout the year, the HOM held infrequent consultations with the leadership of both Parties, including the President of Sri Lanka, and with the military commanders on both sides, working closely with the respective peace secretariats.

The HOM established a transparent media policy which played an active role in solving sensitive issues by explaining the intentions and effects of the CFA to key stakeholders.

REPORTING:

During 2002, the SLMM established itself as an independent and accountable source of information regarding the conflict situation, related to the CFA. In addition to briefings for visiting dignitaries and organisations, and information supplied to the media, the SLMM established a system of continuous reporting from all field units to HQ, and from the HOM to the Facilitator and the Parties. 17 statements were issued.

In the first written statement, the HOM in May commented on the Parties' compliance with the CFA, which he commended as “extremely well”, with none of the recorded violations jeopardising the Agreement. In a statement in July, the HOM conveyed a status of the CFA, noting that it has been necessary to accept some delays in the implementation of certain issues, noting differences in opinion especially concerning the question of the sea territories, and stressing the great importance of the balance of power, concluded that both Parties “look at war as a thing of the past”. In August, the HOM stated that “the LTTE has to do better” in adhering to the CFA, as the number of complaints had risen, and that the high number of abductions and underage recruitment not only constituted violations of the CFA, but also hindered the restoration of normalcy in the country. With a sharp decrease in the number of complaints in August, compared to July, the HOM noted a positive and friendly atmosphere, stating that “restoration of normalcy is underway” with both Parties showing “considerable restraint and a common responsibility for restoring peace”. In his final statement of the year, in late December, the HOM noted that “the value of life in Sri Lanka has increased”, and that the Parties as well as the people had started to experience the value of peace, pointing to the positive attitude demonstrated through the work of the SND through its district meetings, chaired and facilitated by the SLMM towards the end of the year.

Operational documentation

In 2002, the SLMM received 1786 complaints. The SLMM participated in 2198 general meetings at HQ and DO level combined, and chaired 157 LMC meetings. 124 sea patrols were conducted.

“During 2002, the SLMM established excellent relations with the leadership of both Parties.

Complaints registered by the SLMM, 2002

| DISTRICT | Jan | | Feb | | Mar | | Apr | | May | | Jun | | Jul | | Aug | | Sep | | Oct | | Nov | | Dec | | DO total |
|-------------------------|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|----------|
| DO1 Jaffna | | | | | 1 | | 0 | | 5 | | 26 | | 124 | | 90 | | 65 | | 123 | | 66 | | 42 | | 542 |
| DO2 Mannar | | | | | 0 | | 6 | | 18 | | 14 | | 21 | | 15 | | 23 | | 19 | | 14 | | 12 | | 142 |
| DO3 Vavuniya | | | | | 0 | | 13 | | 20 | | 5 | | 55 | | 23 | | 26 | | 11 | | 20 | | 21 | | 194 |
| DO4 Trincomalee | | | | | 3 | | 8 | | 11 | | 21 | | 47 | | 26 | | 15 | | 8 | | 15 | | 3 | | 157 |
| DO5 Batticaloa | | | | | 13 | | 66 | | 80 | | 62 | | 58 | | 42 | | 41 | | 195 | | 45 | | 70 | | 672 |
| DO6 Ampara | | | | | 0 | | 8 | | 2 | | 5 | | 6 | | 2 | | 16 | | 21 | | 5 | | 14 | | 79 |
| LO LTTE, Kilinochchi | | | | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 |
| HQ, Colombo | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0 |
| Month total/Grand total | | | | | 17 | | 101 | | 136 | | 133 | | 311 | | 198 | | 186 | | 377 | | 165 | | 162 | | 1786 |

General and liaising meetings with SLMM participation, 2002

| DISTRICT | Jan | | Feb | | Mar | | Apr | | May | | Jun | | Jul | | Aug | | Sep | | Oct | | Nov | | Dec | | DO total |
|-------------------------|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|----------|
| DO1 Jaffna | | | | | NA | | 25 | | 32 | | 45 | | 34 | | 34 | | 29 | | 52 | | 47 | | 47 | | 345 |
| DO2 Mannar | | | | | 3 | | 29 | | 32 | | 33 | | 32 | | 51 | | 39 | | 45 | | 43 | | 36 | | 343 |
| DO3 Vavuniya | | | | | NA | | 21 | | 36 | | 26 | | 34 | | 26 | | 30 | | 38 | | 24 | | 38 | | 273 |
| DO4 Trincomalee | | | | | 7 | | 17 | | 18 | | 29 | | 34 | | 35 | | 37 | | 40 | | 43 | | 32 | | 292 |
| DO5 Batticaloa | | | | | NA | | 12 | | 20 | | 26 | | 30 | | 21 | | 24 | | 36 | | 22 | | 42 | | 233 |
| DO6 Ampara | | | | | NA | | 10 | | 13 | | 17 | | 17 | | 19 | | 21 | | 36 | | 31 | | 39 | | 203 |
| NMT Jaffna | | | | | NA | | NA | | NA | | NA | | 6 | | 7 | | 5 | | 4 | | 7 | | 7 | | 36 |
| NMT Trincomalee | | | | | NA | | NA | | 1 | | 12 | | 5 | | 4 | | 5 | | 7 | | 7 | | 9 | | 50 |
| LO LTTE, Kilinochchi | | | | | NA | | 18 | | 29 | | 41 | | 49 | | 40 | | 67 | | 74 | | 54 | | 51 | | 423 |
| Month total/Grand total | 0 | | 0 | | 10 | | 132 | | 181 | | 229 | | 241 | | 237 | | 257 | | 332 | | 278 | | 301 | | 2198 |

LMC meetings chaired by the SLMM, 2002

| DISTRICT | Jan | | Feb | | Mar | | Apr | | May | | Jun | | Jul | | Aug | | Sep | | Oct | | Nov | | Dec | | DO total |
|-------------------------|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|-----|--|----------|
| DO1 Jaffna | | | | | 0 | | 2 | | 1 | | 2 | | 0 | | 0 | | 1 | | 2 | | 0 | | 2 | | 10 |
| DO2 Mannar | | | | | 0 | | 3 | | 4 | | 3 | | 4 | | 5 | | 3 | | 3 | | 4 | | 3 | | 32 |
| DO3 Vavuniya | | | | | 0 | | 3 | | 1 | | 2 | | 3 | | 2 | | 3 | | 2 | | 2 | | 3 | | 21 |
| DO4 Trincomalee | | | | | 1 | | 4 | | 3 | | 3 | | 4 | | 3 | | 3 | | 3 | | 4 | | 1 | | 29 |
| DO5 Batticaloa | | | | | 0 | | 4 | | 3 | | 3 | | 3 | | 3 | | 3 | | 7 | | 5 | | 5 | | 36 |
| DO6 Ampara | | | | | 0 | | 2 | | 4 | | 3 | | 2 | | 3 | | 3 | | 6 | | 4 | | 2 | | 29 |
| Month total/Grand total | 0 | | 0 | | 1 | | 18 | | 16 | | 16 | | 16 | | 16 | | 16 | | 23 | | 19 | | 16 | | 157 |

Sea Patrols conducted by SLMM NMT's, 2002

| | Jan | | Feb | | Mar | | Apr | | May | | Jun | | Jul | | Aug | | Sep | | Oct | | Nov | | Dec | | Total |
|-------------------------|-----|---|-----|---|-----|---|-----|---|-----|---|-----|---|-----|---|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|---|-------|
| Type | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | |
| FPC/FAC | | | | | | | 1 | | 2 | | 4 | 2 | 11 | 3 | 8 | 12 | 9 | 11 | 6 | 11 | 7 | 12 | 7 | | 106 |
| Troop Trsp. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | | 2 | | 2 | | 2 | | | 8 |
| FGB | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| SBS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| IPC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| LTTE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | | 1 | | 5 | | | | | | | 8 |
| Month total/Grand total | | | | | | | 1 | | 2 | | 4 | 2 | 11 | 5 | 8 | 15 | 9 | 18 | 6 | 13 | 8 | 15 | 7 | | 124 |

Operational Overview 2003

SUMMARY OF THE SLMM'S SETTING, OBJECTIVES, ACTIVITIES
AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN 2003

2003 was a year in which the SLMM – established in a positive political mood the previous year – faced several early challenges, as more confrontations between the Parties occurred, and the direct peace talks were halted. Additional to several major incidents at sea, the issue of sea territory was paramount in 2003, also for the SLMM, working on controversial modalities for the Parties' sea movements.

SETTING 2003

Operational mandate

Mandated through the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was to assist the Parties in adhering to their commitments as stipulated in the Agreement, by conducting international verification through on-site monitoring within six designated districts, and liaising with and between the Parties.

Operational environment

Militarily, 2003 saw a continuation of incidents at sea, confrontation between the Parties, and an increase in political violence in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)-held areas. However, at least early in the year, the positive atmosphere of cooperation and optimism from 2002 remained in place. The most serious incident since the signing of the CFA took place on 10 March, when a Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) vessel intercepted a LTTE ship, suspected of carrying 'warlike material', approaching the Mullaithivu coast; exchange of fire ensued and the merchant ship exploded, killing 11 cadres. The SLMM enquired into the incident, which caused the LTTE Chief Negotiator, Anton Balasingham to comment that "Though there is mutual trust and confidence at the conference table, the reality of the situation in the field is very different". In June, the SLN intercepted two ships off the East coast of Sri Lanka, firing warning shots. Following an explosion, the larger ship – by the LTTE said to be an oil tanker in their possession – sunk. Ethnic tension and political violence was on the increase during the year, including a number of assassinations of Tamil political leaders and alleged military informants, and clashes between Tamils and Muslims in the East.

Statements by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) Commander, Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle in early January, to the effect that a decommissioning of the LTTE's weapons was a precondition for internally displaced persons (IDP's) to be allowed to resettle in the High Security Zones (HSZ) was reputed by the LTTE as a 'non-nego-

tiabile' issue until a final solution was reached. Shortly thereafter, the Parties agreed on resettling IDP's in the HSZ's, some resettlement actually taking place in Jaffna in December. The Head of Mission (HOM) stated that dismantling the HSZ's for resettlement and cultivation would change the balance of power – a critical foundation of the entire CFA – between the Security Forces (SF) and the LTTE. Considerable controversy was aroused over the LTTE setting up a new military camp at Wan Ella in the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL)-controlled area in Trincomalee District, the LTTE repeatedly refusing to dismantle it. In June, President Chandrika Kumaratunga warned that the LTTE was preparing for war, and that the government forces were ill prepared to meet such a challenge. In his annual 'Heroes' Day' address in November, the LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran denied allegations that the LTTE was rearming for war, giving reassurance that the organisation would respect the CFA and not engage in hostilities unless provoked.

Politically, 2003 saw the willingness of the Parties to pursue a political process towards peace to a great extent prevailing, with continued cooperation on all levels and in several respects, and 'peace dividends becoming evident – particularly regarding the movement of people and goods between North and South of the island. On 23 January, representatives of the two Parties met in the capital Colombo for the first time in 12 years, briefing donor countries on immediate humanitarian needs. Opposition to the CFA and the Peace Process continued, with several rallies during the year. In April, the idea of a non-binding referendum on the ceasefire and the Peace Process was sounded by the GOSL but opposed by the LTTE, which pointed to the fact that approximately one million Tamils were in exile, others displaced internally.

Furthermore, the Peace Process – including the three rounds of talks in January–March (see below) – was a main feature of the political arena in the early part of the year, with the Parties discussing a federal solution with autonomy for Tamil-dominated areas. After pulling out of the peace talks in April, the LTTE on 31 October presented a provisional plan for the transfer of political power from Colombo to an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) for the North-East, proposing such an administration for

“ 2003 saw the willingness of the Parties to pursue a political process towards peace to a great extent prevailing.

a period of five years, after which elections should be held. The plan was the LTTE's reaction to proposals presented from the GOSL on an interim 'Provisional Administrative Structure'. Responding to the ISGA, President Kumaratunga and Sinhalese nationalists argued that such a model would undermine the unity of the country, whereas the GOSL, acknowledging the wide gap between the outlines, indicated willingness to enter into a dialogue with the LTTE on the issue.

On 4 November, declaring a state of emergency (lifted two days later), the President used her presidential powers to take charge of three ministries, all playing key roles in the Peace Process: defence, interior and mass communication, also proroguing the Parliament, arguing that PM Ranil Wickramasinghe made too many concessions to the LTTE – leading to a protracted political struggle between the two, largely jamming the Peace Process. However, on declaring the state of emergency, the President stated that the CFA would still be respected.

The Peace Process in 2003 proceeded with another three rounds of talks between the Parties, following up on the three initial rounds in late 2002:

The fourth round of talks was held in Nakhon Pathom, Thailand (6–9 January) focusing particularly on the need to ensure the implementation of urgent humanitarian priorities, including the resettling the hundreds of thousands of the IDP's – outside and within the HSZ's. It was strongly emphasized that the political breakthrough at the preceding session, at which basic principles for a political settlement were outlined, would have to be sustained through continued discussions on political matters. However, less progress was made on security issues, with the LTTE refusing to bend to pressure to disarm its cadres in advance of a political settlement. As a means to reinforce respect for the provision of the CFA, it was decided that monthly meetings between the GOSL, the LTTE and the SLMM were to be held, in order to discuss issues arising from the regular SLMM summary of recorded complaints and violations of the Agreement.



REFUGEES RETURNING: After the signing of the CFA, tens of thousands of Tamil refugees started to return from their exile, many from India; IDP's returned from their displacement within Sri Lanka. IDP's returning to Batticaloa, 2003.

The fifth round of talks was held in Berlin, Germany (7–8 February) focussing on several complex issues, "in a spirit of cooperation and conciliation", according to the press statement from the Facilitator, agreed upon by the Parties. Expressing their concern over the situation at sea, following a major incident on 7 February, involving a confrontation between the LTTE Sea Tigers and the SLN at the Delft islands, the Parties agreed that a meeting should be held soon between the GOSL, the LTTE and the SLMM, to establish effective safeguards. The Parties agreed to ask their international advisor on human rights, Ian Martin, to draw up a roadmap for human rights issues relating to the Peace Process.

The sixth round of talks was held in Hakone, Japan (18–20 March) amid growing concerns following recent incidents on land and at sea, the Parties leaving no doubt that top priority had to be given to improving the security situation. To prevent further incidents at sea that could threaten the stability of the ceasefire, the Parties agreed to convene senior naval and political representatives from both sides to work out arrangements for the operation of naval units in keeping with existing treaty obligations; the meeting was to be convened by the Facilitator and the HOM. Furthermore, and in the same context, the Parties agreed to strengthen the mandate and capacity of the SLMM to undertake preventive measures to avoid serious incidents at sea and on land. As a fundamental precondition for the SLMM to take on a stronger role, the Parties pledged to ensure full compliance with the rulings of the SLMM, guarantee the security of its personnel in all situations, and take disciplinary action against anyone endangering the lives of the SLMM personnel. The Parties also agreed to take steps to further strengthen the security situation on land, including the establishment of procedures, with the cooperation of the SLMM, for handling soldiers and cadres apprehended by the opposing party. In their political discussions, the Parties reiterated their commitment to develop a federal system based on internal self-determination within a united Sri Lanka.

At Hakone, the Parties agreed on three new rounds of talks, in April, June and July. However, with the LTTE suspending further talks on 21 April, the sixth round was to become the last, until the Parties met for renewed talks in Geneva in 2006. The LTTE's decision was explained by the fact that the organisation (listed as a terrorist organisation in the USA) had not been invited to a meeting in Washington in April preparing for the major donor conference in Tokyo in June, arguing that the GOSL had "opted to marginalise" the LTTE; other causes were the continued disagreements with the GOSL over the HSZ's in Jaffna, and lack of progress in the resettlement and rehabilitation.

The LTTE maintained that it was committed to a political settlement to the conflict, and in a letter to PM Wickramasinghe in June, the LTTE Chief Negotiator Anton Balasingham wrote that the organisation would be prepared to resume negotiations if the GOSL reconsidered its position on the ISGA proposed by the LTTE. The GOSL in July responded with a framework for establishing a provisional administrative arrangement aimed at enabling the LTTE to participate in decision-making and delivery related to the administration and rebuilding of the war-damaged infra-

structure and economy in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. With the Facilitator as intermediary, the Parties communicated through a series of letters.

With the political crisis following the declaration of a state of emergency on 4 November, Norway suspended its role as Facilitator, awaiting a clarification on who held the authority over the Peace Process and the CFA. After a number of meetings in Colombo and Kilinochchi, the Norwegian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vidar Helgesen (14 November) issued a statement in which he said that “the resumption of peace talks is seriously impeded by the political crisis in the south”, and that “If progress in the political negotiations is made impossible, the ceasefire will become increasingly fragile”. Until clarity regarding who holds political authority and responsibility on behalf of the GOSL was re-established, Helgesen stated, “there is no space for further efforts by the Norwegian government to assist the parties”.

To secure financial support to underpin the process, the Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka was held on 9–10 June with representatives from 51 countries and 22 international organisations participating, however without the LTTE. The participants pledged USD 4.5 billion in aid to Sri Lanka over four years, encouraging the Parties to “redouble their efforts to make further progress in the peace process”, regretting the absence of the LTTE, commending the Parties for their commitment to a lasting and negotiated peace based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka. The first contribution to the Sri Lanka North East Reconstruction Fund (NERF) was made by Norway in April, with a donation of USD 2.7 million. The NERF, administered by the World Bank, was established November 2002 to assist the work of the Sub-Committee for Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN) helping people in the North and East of the country to reap early and tangible benefits from the Peace Process. As another outcome of the conference, the Co-Chairs group was established.

The first meeting of the Sub-Committee on Gender Issues (SGI) was held with participation from both Parties in Kilinochchi in March. The Government of Norway appointed Dr. Astrid N. Heiberg as an advisor to the committee, facilitating the meetings.

After meeting PM Wickramasinghe in New York in September, the EU Ministerial Troika, led by the President of the EU Council, Frano Frattini, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, stated that the EU remained committed to play a role in the process, in partnership with the Co-Chairs and in particular with Norway as Facilitator. The EU Ministers encouraged the Parties to strictly adhere to the provisions of the CFA and to accept the rulings of the SLMM. In October, the US Administration decided to re-designate the LTTE as a terrorist organisation.

The Facilitator held a great number of meetings with the Parties during 2003. The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Petersen met with the LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran in Vanni in May, receiving the Political Wing (PW) Leader Suppayya Tamilselvan in Oslo in October. In April 2003, Hans Brattskar succeeded Jon Westborg as Norway's ambassador to Sri Lanka.

OPERATION 2003

Operational attention

In 2003, the main focus of the HOM was to conduct the operation in accordance with the intentions and assignments of the CFA, building on established procedures. Certain main tasks and objectives – beyond the stipulations inscribed into the CFA – were defined:

Monitoring:

- Consider and develop modalities for sea movements by the Parties, the issue not explicitly covered by the CFA

Liaising:

- Contribute to inter-communal contacts and to reduce tension between the Tamil and Muslim population in the East

Operational resources

To carry out the operation in 2003, the SLMM had at its disposal *human resources* constituted by 52 international monitors and 46 national staff (annual averages), and *financial resources* (current budget) amounting to NOK 12.1 million. The size of national staff increased considerably from approximately 40 in the first half of the year, to over 50 in the second half. *Logistical resources* were reinforced mainly by improved accommodation and operational equipment, and with new Points of Contact (POC) established in Pottuvil, Sampoor, Kalmunai and Kilinochchi.

For further details, see Part 03, ‘Operational Resources’

Major General (R) Tryggve Tellefsen (NO) took over as HOM as of 7 March, replacing Major General (R) Trond Furuhoed (NO); himself succeeded by the serving Chief of Staff (COS), Brigadier (R) Hagrup Haukland (NO) as of October. In March, Jussi Antero-inen (FI) took over as Chief Operations Officer (COO), succeeded by Erkki Poyhia (FI) in November.

Operational execution

DIRECTING:

In 2003 the HOM, in particular, devoted considerable operational attention to issues regarding activities at sea; extensive work on key operational plans and procedures were carried out.

Attempts were made to create technical arrangements for the LTTE Sea Tiger movements in order to avoid clashes with the SLN. The effort was based on the Parties' agreement at the sixth round of peace talks in March (see above), where they tasked the SLMM to “undertake preventive measures to avoid serious incidents at sea and on land”. This followed several serious incidents in 2002, particularly at sea, which continued in 2003.

The principal position adopted by the HOM, was that the LTTE Sea Tigers comprised a fighting formation at the time of the signing of the CFA, to be considered a de facto naval unit, although with “neither legal right nor any legitimate tasks of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka”. Retaining the balance of power being a foundation of the CFA, the HOM argued that both Parties, in order to maintain their respective forces' capabilities, should have the right to train and exercise in designated areas.



SEA SKIRMISHES: With naval confrontations coming to the forefront, the issue of the sea territory became a contentious issue, with the SLMM being tasked by the Parties to recommend modalities. HOM Trygve Tellefsen with Defense Secretary Austin Fernando and Naval Cdr Daya Sandagiri, 2003.

Based on an initial framework and feedback from the Parties, the SLMM (19 April) presented the “Proposed Measures for Preventing Clashes between the SLN and LTTE at Sea” to the Secretariat for Co-ordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) and the LTTE Peace Secretariat (PS), followed by an adjusted version (24 April). The establishment of Regional Maritime Committees (RMC) – in Jaffna and Trincomalee respectively – was one mechanism suggested by the HOM. The RMC’s were to serve as a tool to handle incidents and violations at sea, to be made up of two naval representatives from each Party, and headed by the SLMM. The concept was not favoured by the LTTE, which argued that any incident at sea should be handled in the same way as on land by the existing structures, whereas the GOSL proposed one Central Maritime Committee and two regional ones. The SLMM also suggested, for mutual trust and understanding and as a confidence-building measure, that the SLN and the LTTE Sea Tigers should permit observers from the other party – accompanied by the SLMM monitors – on board their vessels when conducting exercises in the Northern (Eastern/Western) waters.

Repeating that the role of the SLN is clearly stated in article 1.3 of the CFA, the HOM (25 April) pointed out that “From the SLMM point of view it is of the utmost importance that the mechanisms and arrangements specified in any final arrangements agreed upon must not interfere with the Sri Lanka Navy’s obligation and legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka”.

In May, the President of Sri Lanka criticised the Facilitator and the SLMM for, in her opinion, attempting to have the Sea Tigers recognised as a legitimate naval force. This, the President argued, was tantamount to asking Sri Lanka to forfeit its maritime sovereignty. The LTTE never recognised the HOM’s ruling confirming the GOSL jurisdiction over Sri Lanka’s entire sea territory, claiming rights to the sea directly outside of the LTTE-controlled land areas.

The main bone of contention was the SLMM’s acceptance of the LTTE Sea Tigers as a de facto naval force, and – in line with the LTTE demands – the suggested allocation of exercise and training areas at sea, as well as the confinement of the SLN training and exercises to specified areas.

During 2003, the Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) (Part 3 ‘Operations’) was revised with effect of March; the Operation Order (OO) (‘Hermes’) was issued for the first time, with three versions throughout the year.

The OO 1/2003 (February) established the standard for the plan, outlining the mission, with the HOM’s intent being formulated as to “reduce the tension between the Parties by providing an integrated, impartial, accessible and credible tool to enquire into any violations of the CFA,” and with a the stated purpose “to react rapidly on local level in order to prevent escalations regardless of the situation, and simultaneously advise and assist the Parties on a higher level with maintaining their balance of military power”. Minor adjustments were made in OO 2/2003 (June), tasking the two Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT), and in OO 3/2003 (July), the HOM stating that the SLMM should also “be accessible, react rapidly and solve the incidents on local level in order to prevent escalations”. The tasks of the Liaison Office (LO) to the LTTE now included liaising between the LTTE and Facilitator, as required.

The SOP was established with a new format, including definitions, on the CFA, the mandate and the Area of Responsibility (AOR). Accessibility and rapid reaction were added as principles of operations, stipulating that the SLMM should be accessible for the Parties as well as for ordinary people 24 hours day. Furthermore that the SLMM should react swiftly – centrally and locally – when incidents occur, “in order to appear on the scene and to intervene at the earliest time possible helping to settle disputes peacefully”. The concept of operation was reformulated, including the ‘two level dual approach’: “In a case of a serious incident or when the SLMM has been informed about a possible incident under development, the SLMM Headquarters (HQ) and District Offices (DO) intervene at local and central levels simultaneously to solve the problem and/or to avoid the incident before it occurs”.

The HOM issued one Directive and eight Fragmentary Orders (FragO); 13 statements were issued. During the year, 249 special reports were prepared. The HOM Directive no. 3 regarding hoisting of the LTTE flag in the GOSL-controlled areas was established.

For full overview and document contents:
www.slmm.info

RUNNING:

In 2003, the SLMM devoted particular operational resources to cooperate with and assist the Parties, and to monitor numerous incidents at sea and defuse growing ethnic tension.

The constructive atmosphere had a favourable impact on the smooth running of the operation. However, the SLMM faced

some operational restraints: In April, the freedom of movement was restricted in specific LTTE-controlled areas, and in May the SLN denied, in breach of the CFA, sea monitors the right to fly the SLMM flag onboard its vessels. The SLMM protested to the GOSL and temporarily suspended naval monitoring until the end of June, when it was again allowed to fly the flag.

With the political impasse between the President and Prime Minister in November, there was a growing fear that the situation could deteriorate, with the Parties – and the Police – largely remaining in their positions. As a consequence, the SLMM experienced an expectation to step up its operation – patrolling around the clock – to fill the void.

Violent confrontations between ethnic groups, fuelled by use of religious symbols and harassment, resulted in many hartals and curfews requiring extensive attention of SLMM monitors. Child recruitment and excessive taxation also became issues calling for increased attention, especially after the LTTE withdrew from the peace talks in April. Targeted assassinations of informants in Jaffna and Batticaloa as well as political killings in all districts put a lot of strain on SLMM recourses without resulting in tangible results.

On 16 October, the SLN activated a ‘special task operation’ towards a suspicious ship northeast of Mullaithivu, with the participation of the SLMM. However, the SLMM informed the LTTE too early in the operation, without conferring with the SLN, consequently blowing the navy’s cover. The episode resulted in strong protests from the SLN and the President, with the PM requiring an inquiry. As a consequence, following previous rulings and statements regarding sea incidents and the proposals regarding naval operations – the authority of the HOM was questioned. On 23 October, the President summoned the Ambassador of Norway to request Norway to replace the HOM, which eventually became the outcome of the controversy. The President informed the PM of Norway, Kjell Magne Bondevik, that she considered the HOM not impartial, and his action regarding the security of her country as unsatisfactory. Replying to the letter, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Petersen assured the President he would look into the matter, and consult with the other Nordic governments, adding that the SLMM would continue its operation whilst the incident was investigated. Subsequently, the HOM was recalled and substituted.

In mid-2003, SLMM naval monitors, as requested by the SLN, participated in a significantly increased number of troop transportations between Trincomalee and Jaffna naval bases.

In May, all DO’s conducted a comprehensive survey on the status of the GOSL vacating public buildings. This confidence-building measure to restore normalcy, according to CFA Article 2.4, was – starting in 2002 – the very first project in which the Parties cooperated. The survey was moderated by the SLMM and resulted in a renewed focus on the IDP’s still living outside the HSZ’s – not allowed to return to their (private) properties, which remained largely occupied. It furthermore focused on the high degree of military presence.

“ SLMM naval monitors participated in a significantly increased number of troop transportations.

The North

In the Northern region, the SLMM conducted monitoring on land and sea, liaising with the Parties and key stakeholders, and reporting on the fulfilment of the CFA throughout the year. The situation at sea remained tense, with a particularly serious incident south of Delft Island in Jaffna District on 7 February, involving two SLMM monitors. When the monitors inspected a LTTE fishing boat and discovered weapons and ammunition on board, they had no choice but to jump ship when the crew set the boat alight, committing suicide. The incident interrupted the ongoing peace talks in Berlin.

The East

In the Eastern region, the SLMM conducted its monitoring on land and sea, liaising with the Parties and key stakeholders, and reporting on the fulfilment of the CFA throughout the year. Considerable recourses were spent on attempting to defuse tension between the Muslims and the LTTE as the latter’s political offices initiated heavy taxing and confiscating of land. The SLMM was requested to facilitate meetings between the two groups, easing tension. In general, ethnic tension in the East was rising, involving all major communities and including an increase in political killings. Several serious incidents occurred off the coast, with exchange of fire between the Parties, also resulting in the sinking of vessels.

On 30 January, the HOM chaired the first of what was designated as a series of monthly meetings between the Tamil and Muslim communities in the East to reinforce respect for the CFA and reduce tensions, following a decision made by the Parties at the fourth round of peace talks in Thailand earlier in the month. The meeting discussed a formula on how to harmonise the interests of the communities, recommending to the upcoming talks in Berlin that separate meeting should be held between representatives of the LTTE and the Muslim community in Batticaloa District – subsequently agreed in Berlin.

The construction of the LTTE camp at Wan Ella south of Trincomalee Bay became a matter of tension in mid-2003. In June, the SLMM ruled the area to be controlled by the GOSL, implying the camp to constitute a violation of the CFA. When the LTTE refused to shut it down, the SLMM presented several proposals towards a solution. At the same time, restrictions on movements in the LTTE-controlled areas constituted a serious problem for the SLMM monitoring activities.

ADAPTING:

Operationally

During 2003, the operation was carried out based on the framework and procedures laid down in 2002, without any major operational adaptations, the organisation consolidating and finalising procedures.

Organisationally

During 2003, HQ and all six DO’s, including the two NMT’s and the LO LTTE, remained operational. Several new Points of Contact (POCs) were established in August to handle the growing

number of complaints from civilians returning to the area from abroad, including those from other regions; DO Mannar opened POC Silavatturai in December. Following the sea incidents in July, the number of sea monitors was increased.

ACHIEVEMENTS 2003

Operational assessment

Assessing achieved results – seen in relation to the mandated assignments and the additional tasks and objectives – in 2003, it should be noted that *the operational environment* was favourable. The SLMM succeeded well in conducting the operation according to concepts, plans and priorities. At the time, the SLMM did however not assess the *effects* of achieved results.

The *monitoring* activities were carried out according to established patterns, covering the AOR throughout the year. The *liaising* activities continued according to established modalities, the mission maintaining amicable relations with both Parties. The *reporting* activities were carried out according to established routines, internally and externally, focusing mainly on the situation on the ground, and incidents locally.

[More details on monitoring, liaising and reporting below](#)

In an update on the Peace Process in April, the Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister, Vidar Helgesen, said that “In implementing the agreement the parties have been effectively assisted by the independent Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)”.

MONITORING:

Throughout 2003, monitoring was performed by the entire organisation, with field monitoring carried out on land and sea. The presence of the SLMM was underwriting the positive atmosphere, following the appearance of visible peace dividends – a development in which parts of civil society considered the SLMM to be a guarantor of.

The recommencement of the train service between Batticaloa and Valachchenai on 12 April (cf. CFA 2.9), co-funded by the GOSL, the Norwegian government agency Norad and the EU was one of the tangible confidence-building measures and peace



SUICIDE SHIP: While inspecting a LTTE fishing boat, weapons were uncovered; minutes later the SLMM monitors had to jump ship to save their lives, before the LTTE cadres blew up the boat, committing suicide.

dividends – monitored by the SLMM – in 2003, contributing to economic development in the Eastern region.

SLMM's active monitoring on several occasions reduced tension.

LIAISING:

Throughout 2003, liaising was performed centrally and locally, the SLMM maintaining regular contact at the highest level with both Parties; directly with political and military leaders, additionally with respective peace secretariats. The liaising contributed to the increasingly ambient relationship between the Parties – meeting regularly at various levels and in different settings, often facilitated by and with the participation of international monitors.

With tension between Tamils and Muslims in the East on the rise since mid-2002, and increasing again in early 2003, the Parties tasked the SLMM with bringing representatives of the communities together, which was subsequently and successfully done through a series of meetings. The SLMM facilitated, chaired, and recorded the commencement of meetings between the LTTE and the Muslims; meetings that contributed to reduce tension – for some time, in some areas.

A lack of constructive relation to the SLN on central level developed in the first half of 2003, resulted in weaker communication also on the local level. Sea incidents, and the controversy regarding the SLMM proposals on how to avoid serious incidents at sea in April, cemented a negative attitude towards the CFA and the SLMM in some quarters. In November, the Secretary of Defence suspended the direct communication with the HOM and directed that all further contact with the SLMM should go through SCOPP.

In Kattaparichchan, Trincomalee District, commanders of the Security Forces (SF) and the LTTE met with the assistance of the SLMM in ‘no man’s land’ to bridge differences and to establish new lines of communication between the Parties.

REPORTING:

Throughout 2003, reporting was performed by the entire organisation, and the SLMM remained a major – independent and accountable – source of information in relation to the conflict situation, related to the CFA. In addition to the numerous briefings for visiting dignitaries and organisations, and information supplied to the media, the SLMM carried out extensive reporting from field units to HQ, and from the HOM to the Facilitator and to the Parties. 249 Special Reports were produced. Furthermore, 13 statements were issued.

Operational documentation

In 2003, the SLMM received 2804 complaints, a considerable increase of 57 percent compared to 2002 (in which the mission was operational for only ten months). The SLMM participated in 4968 general meetings at HQ and DO level combined, and chaired 176 Local Monitoring Committees (LMC) meetings. 434 sea patrols were conducted.

| DISTRICT | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | DO total |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|
| D01 Jaffna | 60 | 64 | 66 | 53 | 73 | 61 | 58 | 43 | 75 | 53 | 42 | 22 | 670 |
| D02 Mannar | 19 | 15 | 8 | 13 | 15 | 15 | 17 | 12 | 49 | 25 | 11 | 12 | 211 |
| D03 Vavuniya | 24 | 30 | 37 | 22 | 22 | 37 | 60 | 75 | 78 | 39 | 35 | 24 | 483 |
| D04 Trincomalee | 26 | 29 | 35 | 42 | 28 | 52 | 40 | 34 | 58 | 67 | 29 | 12 | 452 |
| D05 Batticaloa | 89 | 44 | 29 | 41 | 54 | 53 | 48 | 52 | 76 | 103 | 24 | 26 | 639 |
| D06 Ampara | 44 | 25 | 22 | 16 | 18 | 37 | 34 | 44 | 27 | 43 | 16 | 23 | 349 |
| LO LTTE, Kilinochchi | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| HQ, Colombo | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0 |
| Month total/Grand total | 262 | 207 | 197 | 187 | 210 | 255 | 257 | 260 | 363 | 330 | 157 | 119 | 2804 |

| DISTRICT | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | DO total |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|
| D01 Jaffna | 48 | 43 | 55 | 61 | 48 | 59 | 93 | 65 | 72 | 80 | 91 | 93 | 808 |
| D02 Mannar | 39 | 43 | 56 | 47 | 58 | 48 | 51 | 67 | 52 | 51 | 49 | 59 | 620 |
| D03 Vavuniya | 33 | 36 | 51 | 33 | 29 | 61 | 55 | 58 | 51 | 46 | 47 | 38 | 538 |
| D04 Trincomalee | 37 | 40 | 58 | 84 | 75 | 78 | 77 | 72 | 64 | 63 | 81 | 78 | 807 |
| D05 Batticaloa | 56 | 68 | 75 | 56 | 63 | 52 | 43 | 46 | 39 | 36 | 24 | 24 | 582 |
| D06 Ampara | 44 | 50 | 46 | 68 | 56 | 38 | 28 | 26 | 22 | 21 | 15 | 22 | 436 |
| NMT Jaffna | 21 | 24 | 17 | 27 | 46 | 32 | 55 | 28 | 27 | 21 | 24 | 19 | 341 |
| NMT Trincomalee | 15 | 14 | 18 | 19 | 19 | 17 | 19 | 15 | 18 | 6 | 9 | 6 | 175 |
| LO LTTE, Kilinochchi | 49 | 51 | 43 | 51 | 55 | 62 | 61 | 53 | 62 | 53 | 49 | 72 | 661 |
| Month total/Grand total | 342 | 369 | 419 | 446 | 449 | 447 | 482 | 430 | 407 | 377 | 389 | 411 | 4968 |

| DISTRICT | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | DO total |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|
| D01 Jaffna | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 12 |
| D02 Mannar | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 41 |
| D03 Vavuniya | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 37 |
| D04 Trincomalee | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 13 |
| D05 Batticaloa | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 32 |
| D06 Ampara | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 41 |
| Month total/Grand total | 16 | 12 | 9 | 12 | 14 | 16 | 17 | 15 | 17 | 17 | 16 | 15 | 176 |

| | Jan | | Feb | | Mar | | Apr | | May | | Jun | | Jul | | Aug | | Sep | | Oct | | Nov | | Dec | | Total |
|-------------------------|-----|---|-----|---|-----|---|-----|----|-----|---|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-------|
| Type | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | |
| FPC/FAC | 7 | 5 | 15 | 6 | 17 | 8 | 18 | 14 | 9 | 7 | 2 | 13 | 9 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 16 | 3 | 14 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 7 | 7 | 215 |
| Troop Trsp. | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | | 26 | | 31 | 2 | 34 | 2 | 32 | | 31 | | 34 | 196 |
| FGB | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 5 | | 3 | | 9 | | 7 | | 19 | | | | 46 |
| SBS | 1 | | 1 | | 3 | | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | 7 |
| IPC | | | | | | | | 2 | 1 | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 5 |
| LTTE | | | 2 | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 4 |
| Month total/Grand total | 10 | 5 | 19 | 6 | 21 | 9 | 19 | 16 | 10 | 9 | 3 | 20 | 11 | 31 | 7 | 40 | 18 | 44 | 16 | 60 | 10 | 41 | 7 | 41 | 473 |

Operational Overview 2004

SUMMARY OF THE SLMM'S SETTING, OBJECTIVES, ACTIVITIES
AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN 2004

In 2004, was a year in which the SLMM consolidated its operation, after the deployment in 2002 and implementation of its operational concept in 2003. The SLMM was challenged by growing violence – and violations of the CFA. Although opponents of the CFA won the parliamentary elections, the political climate was still inviting, with a revitalisation of the Peace Process.

SETTING 2004

Operational mandate

Mandated through the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was to assist the Parties in adhering to their commitments as stipulated in the agreement, by conducting international verification through on-site monitoring within six designated districts, and liaising with and between the Parties.

Operational environment

Militarily, 2004 saw more frequent – and more serious – violations of the letter and spirit of the CFA, indicating a shift in attitude and activities, the Parties moving from seeking a political solution to the conflict and towards renewed military confrontation. Both Parties engaged in activities challenging each other as well as the CFA and the SLMM on the ground; this included repeated attempts to move military positions such as check-points (CP) and armed personnel, also the establishment of new military camps; all in contravention of the agreed Forward Defence Localities (FDL). There was also considerable escalation of both Parties' activity at sea, resulting in numerous confrontations, observed and reported by the SLMM, whose naval monitoring was increased. The first suicide bomb attack in Colombo since the signing of the CFA, intended to hit Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) leader Douglas Devananda, was another early indication of a military situation undergoing a gradual but profound change for the worse.

The unfolding changes in the military landscape included the effects of the serious split within the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in March, when its senior commander in the East, Col Karuna Amman, established his own rival group, the Karuna faction. With apparent implicit support of the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL), Karuna challenged the LTTE militarily as well as politically, adding to the complexity of the military scene. The LTTE carried out attacks against the faction, by mid-year claiming to have evicted the armed elements from Karuna's base areas. Karuna began to establish military fortifications in the SLMM Area of Responsibility (AOR), mainly in the East, fuelling tension within the Tamil community and feeding the growing distance between the Parties, and contributing to a surge in violence wit-

nessed in 2004: The period following the LTTE split was marked by a number of assassinations and assassination attempts, summary executions, and other acts of violence among various armed elements (particularly in the Batticaloa area) and a marked increase in the LTTE child recruitment, noted by the SLMM in most of the AOR; child recruitment was also carried out by the Karuna faction. As a result of the increased violence in the East, the LTTE withdrew many of its political cadres from the GOSL-controlled areas there, and suspended meetings with the Security Forces (SF). This reduced the contact between the Parties and impeded the work of the SLMM, which voiced its concern to the Parties over the fact that this development, considered serious, was not addressed at the highest level.

Politically, 2004 was marked by the parliamentary election, and the split within the LTTE (see above); both with political as well as military consequences. In the 2 April elections, the ruling United National Party (UNP) of Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe was defeated by the opposition coalition, the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) – including the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) – which formed the new government. The electorate in the South voted overwhelmingly for the JVP and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), both opposed to the CFA, signalling strengthened support for Sinhalese-nationalist ideology. In the North and East, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) received the highest number of seats for a Tamil party since 1977. On 6 April, Mahinda Rajapakse was sworn in as Prime Minister (PM), bringing to an end a situation where – following the signing of the CFA by Wickramasinghe in 2002 – the relation between Sri Lanka's President and Prime Minister had become increasingly strained, a situation which had gradually impacted negatively on the Peace Process. In the 2004 election, the President and the PM were members of the same party.

The Peace Process in 2004 was pursued with, at times, hectic activity and critical moments – and some lulls. Following

“ 2004 was marked by the parliamentary election, and the split within the LTTE.

the election, President Chandrika Kumaratunga formally invited Norway to continue its role as Facilitator and to resume efforts to restart the talks with the LTTE. To explore ways of bringing the Peace Process forward, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Petersen, visited Sri Lanka 10–11 May, holding talks with both Parties, including the President and the PM, and the LTTE leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran. Following this contact, the Facilitator increased its efforts, establishing intensive consultation with the Parties, in an aim to arrange another round of peace talks. Representatives of the Norwegian government, including Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vidar Helgesen and the Special Envoy, Erik Solheim met the political leadership on both sides, conveying messages. Following the split within the LTTE, the issue of the Karuna faction became a new topic in the consultations, the LTTE arguing that the faction was an ‘armed group’, consequently to be disarmed according to the CFA before peace talks could be resumed. The GOSL rejected the LTTE claim that it was assisting and protecting the Karuna faction. At the same time, the SLMM – following inquiries – reported the presence of Karuna members in the GOSL-controlled areas.

The Co-Chairs, the EU and the USA issued separate statements during the year, urging the Parties to resume talks and adhere to the CFA. Following a meeting of the Co-Chairs in Washington in February, the group stated that it was pleased to note that “in cooperation with the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, the parties have largely upheld the ceasefire”, while at the same time calling for the earliest possible resumption of peace talks, repeating its message at the Brussels meeting in June.

In October, a high-level political delegation of the LTTE toured Europe, including Norway, promoting its proposed model for Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA). In December, due to a growing resentment toward the Peace Process and the Facilitator, and after receiving a suspicious letter containing Anthrax threats, the Norwegian Embassy took the decision to close down for three days for security reasons.

In May, Jayantha Dhanapala replaced Bernard Goonetilleke as Secretary-General of the Secretariat for Co-ordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP). The Sri Lankan consulate in Oslo was upgraded to Embassy.

On 26 December, the Indian Ocean tsunami hit the country, devastating vast stretches of the island’s coastline and killing more than 35,000 Sri Lankans, leaving over half a million displaced.

OPERATION 2004

Operational attention

In 2004, the main focus of the Head of Mission (HOM) was to conduct the operation in accordance with the intentions and assignments of the CFA, building on established procedures. Certain main tasks and objectives – beyond the stipulations inscribed into the CFA – were defined:



KEEPING CONTACT: The Norwegian government, as Facilitator to the Peace Process, kept up its activity, interacting with the Parties. The Ambassador of Norway, Hans Brattskar (with tie) meeting the head of the Sea Tigers, Col. Soosai, together with Tomas Stangeland of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Monitoring:

- Monitor the effects of the split within the LTTE and the activities of the Karuna faction
- Assist in the execution of the parliamentary election in LTTE-controlled areas

Liaising:

- Maintain and improve communication between the Parties through meetings at local levels due to the Parties unwillingness to meet on a national level
- Increase efforts to foster communication between the LTTE and Muslim community leaders in the East due to increased tension between Tamils and Muslims

Reporting:

- Develop and implement a media strategy to counter the largely counterproductive coverage of the SLMM in national media

Operational resources

To carry out the operation in 2004, the SLMM had at its disposal *human resources* constituted by 57 international monitors and 62 national staff (annual averages), and *financial resources* (current budget) amounting to NOK 10.2 million. *Logistical resources* were reinforced mainly by several new vehicles, and a new V-Sat satellite system installed in Kilinochchi.

For further details, see Part 03, ‘Operational Resources’

Major General (R) Trond Furuhoide (NO) took over as HOM as of 1 February, replacing Brigadier (R) Hagrup Haukland (NO), who resumed his duty as Chief of Staff (COS) until August, when replaced by Col Wagn Winkel (DK). In May, Erkki Poyhia (FI) was replaced by Kalle Liesinen (FI) as Chief Operations Officer (COO).

Operational execution

DIRECTING:

In 2004, the HOM, in particular, devoted his attention to the parliamentary elections and to the emerging political violence. Operational plans and procedures were revised.

Early in the year, the HOM focused on developing modalities to facilitate participation from the LTTE-controlled areas in the parliamentary elections, with the SLMM subsequently – following a request from the LTTE – being involved in the April elections.

In a statement of 10 May, the HOM expressed grave concern about political killings which he considered a trend, “thus representing a serious threat to the Ceasefire and to the Peace Process.” “Such killings,” he stated, “especially when they appear to be systematic, create oppression, spread fear and mistrust, and are also undermining the mutual trust between the Parties and the peoples of Sri Lanka.”

During 2004, the Standing Operational Procedures (SOP) (Part 3 ‘Operations’) and the Operation Order (OO) (‘Hermes’) were revised. The OO reiterated liaising and facilitation of meetings between the Parties as tasks for the Liaison Office (LO LTTE) and the District Offices (DO); between the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) and fishermen’s societies as a liaising task for the Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT). The OO also instructed cooperation with UNICEF and the ICRC connected to child recruitment. The SLMM Termination Order (‘Hera’) was developed.

The HOM issued five Directives (with others being revised), four Guidelines and ten Fragmentary Orders (FragO); five statements were issued. The HOM Directive no. 4 – on the handling of abduction cases – reflected the growing seriousness of such incidents; no. 5 – on the handling of deserters and defectors – reflected the prominence of such cases, not least following the strife within the LTTE; no. 6 – on safety and security measures – reinforced the focus on mission security.

For full overview and document contents:
www.slmm.info

RUNNING:

In 2004, the SLMM devoted particular operational resources to monitoring escalating violence and military build-up, with an increase in child recruitment, and continued ethnic tension.

The escalating violence proved challenging for the SLMM, in terms of the liaising function as well as field monitoring. The situation in the East continued to deteriorate; the SLMM concerns voiced to the Parties at higher levels did not achieve the desired effect. As most early violations were self-evident cases, the SLMM ruled accordingly. Once the character of violations changed, especially related to assassinations and disappearances, it became increasingly difficult for the SLMM to make enquiries and verifications – and rulings. The most serious cases, the political killings, could not be ruled upon due to lack of evidence and access to police investigations.

The emergence of the Karuna faction added to the complexity of



SERIOUS SPLIT: The split within the LTTE, creating the Karuna faction (Col. Karuna centre) resulted in increased violence and child recruitment especially in the East. SLMM confirmed Karuna camps being set up inside GOSL-controlled area in Welikanda.

fulfilling the mandate, not least because it was not a party to the CFA or the Peace Process. Consequently its acts did not formally constitute (possible) violations of the Agreement, and hence they could not be followed up in an ordinary fashion – nor ruled – by the SLMM. The mission considered its dealings with the group, choosing to meet with members locally. The SLMM observed a sharp increase in child recruitment and general recruitment in most areas in the North and in the East, following the LTTE split. In Batticaloa, monitors observed an increase in forced recruitment and a surge of re-recruitment of children who had previously been released.

In addition to the normal operational activities, the SLMM – and the HOM in particular – devoted considerable time and effort on issues related to the elections, facilitating to ease the participation of civilians in the LTTE-controlled areas. The HOM was also occupied with the release and exchange of personnel between the two sides, including members of the GOSL Home Guard.

The last days of 2004 were strongly influenced by the devastating tsunami, radically changing the attention and activities of the SLMM in the immediate perspective. The monitors aimed to establish an overview of the situation and to gather information on material destruction and relief needs, the SLMM becoming an important and immediate source of information on the unfolding disaster.

The North

In the Northern region, the SLMM conducted monitoring on land and sea, liaising with the Parties and key stakeholders, and reporting on the fulfilment of the CFA throughout the year. During the early part of the year, the SLMM observed the LTTE expanding measures of social control in Vavuniya and Mannar. In the latter part, monitors received reports saying that the

LTTE was taking on a more active role in policing the civilian population, due to what it perceived a lack of action by the police, whereas people increasingly reported cases to the LTTE offices. Meanwhile, monitors discovered that serious problems frequently arose between the Security Forces (SF) and the local population due to language barriers, police officers often not speaking Tamil.

The power of symbols, such as flag hoisting in public places and expansion of cultural propaganda programs in schools attracted a lot of attention by the Parties, and the SLMM devoted much time attempting to defuse tension arising from such acts, which often constituted violations of the CFA.

The SLMM was engaged with local political tension in Jaffna, which experienced political violence largely due to the relationship between the LTTE and members of the EPDP still being volatile. Monitors enquired into complaints from both sides concerning a power-struggle between students and EPDP members resulting in riots and unrest. The SLMM intensified local meetings, patrolling and monitoring in Mannar, where Muslim-Christian as well as Muslim-Hindu conflicts erupted. The power struggle between the LTTE and the drug mafia created much unrest in the area, and the SLMM received threats, taken as warnings not to interfere.

The SLMM registered cases of military build-up, and regularly patrolled and monitored both sides of the FDL of Nagarkovil, noting cases of fortifications near the FDL. In October the SLMM received a letter from the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) regarding an airstrip allegedly under construction near the old Kandy Road, southeast of Kilinochchi. Monitors tried for months to acquire access to the area but were not allowed to proceed by the LTTE.

The East

In the Eastern region, the SLMM conducted its monitoring on land and sea, liaising with the Parties and key stakeholders, and reporting on the fulfilment of the CFA throughout the year. Here, the operation was particularly affected by the split within the LTTE in March, causing internal strife that contributed to an upsurge in violence especially in the Batticaloa area; the SLMM registered 61 suspected political assassinations in the East during 2004. The LTTE claimed that the Karuna faction was assisted by the SLAF when attacking its members and suspended meetings with the SF. Consequently, the Parties found it increasingly difficult to seek out easy solutions to even practical problems.

The SLMM raised concerns over these developments undermining the CFA vis-à-vis both Parties, but the situation continued to deteriorate. In the absence of response from higher levels, the SLMM succeeded in conducting a meeting between local commanders of the SF and the LTTE military and political leaders after the split, aiming to get the escalating situation under control. Subsequently, the situation calmed down for a short period.

“... the ability of the SLMM to perform its assignments and tasks was challenged.

With its rift deepening, the LTTE sent reinforcements from Vanni, regaining most of the Eastern territories from the Karuna faction. The LTTE established a new camp in the Muttur-Sampoor area, and the SLMM monitored the situation and the vicinity. The movement of high-profile LTTE cadres crossing Exit/Entry (E/E)-points involved substantial negotiations and monitoring by the SLMM.

The SLMM increased patrolling in areas affected by growing tension between the LTTE and the Muslim community related especially to land disputes. Monitors worked continuously to address misgivings by the Muslim population, setting up meetings between Muslim leaders and the LTTE representatives to reduce tension, especially in and around the Muttur area in Trincomalee District.

The tsunami hit the East particularly hard, with monitors becoming heavily involved in relief work. The disaster affected SLMM directly as the premises of DO Batticaloa and DO Trincomalee were directly hit. The SLMM lost no member in the disaster; two monitors however narrowly escaped.

ADAPTING:

Operationally

During 2004, the operation was carried out based on the framework originally laid down in 2002 and the procedures developed in 2002–03, without any major adaptations. However, in 2004, the SLMM started to feel the repercussions of operating in a setting clearly different to the one prevailing at the time of the signing of the CFA.

Organisationaly

During 2003, Headquarters (HQ), all six DO's, the two NMT's and the LO LTTE remained operational. The Point of Contact (POC) Velanai (DO Jaffna) closed in early 2004, replaced by POC Point Pedro.

In March, there was a dialogue between the SLMM and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on the recruitment of monitors, including at a seminar in Colombo. Following up on the discussion, the HOM in writing underlined certain key considerations to be taken into account when selecting staff, receiving a positive response from the Special Envoy. The latter reaffirmed that the HOM and the COS would be chosen by the MFA, with an intention to open the position of COS to candidates from all contributing countries, the secondment to be based on merit, not nationality.

ACHIEVEMENTS 2004

Operational assessment

Assessing achieved results – seen in relation to the mandated assignments and the additional tasks and objectives – in 2004, it should be noted that *the operational environment* was becoming more complicated, and more violent. However, the SLMM succeeded in conducting the operation according to concepts, plans and priorities. At the time, the SLMM did however not assess the *effects* of achieved results.

The *monitoring* activities were largely carried out according to established patterns, covering the AOR throughout the year, although with suspension of naval monitoring as of May and with partial restrictions on patrolling on land. The *liaising* activities continued according to established modalities, the mission retaining good working relations with both Parties, however experiencing growing difficulties in gaining access – and an increasing strain in relations between the Parties. The *reporting* activities were carried out according to established routines, internally and externally, focusing mainly on the situation on the ground, and incidents locally.

More details on monitoring, liaising and reporting below

With the optimism that followed the signing of the CFA clearly subsiding, and pre-CFA violence returning, the ability of the SLMM to perform its assignments and tasks was challenged. A cooling of relations between the Parties, with no continuation of peace talks, made it the more difficult for the mission to exercise its assisting function. Yet, an example of the still positive effect of the SLMM assisting the Parties was given by the Co-Chairs in their joint press statement after the June meeting in Brussels, in which they welcomed the recent co-operation in the Batticaloa district, facilitated by the SLMM, “to improve the overall security situation”.

At a 12 March internal seminar hosted by the Ambassador of Norway, participants from the Norwegian MFA and the SLMM exchanged views on ‘SLMM after two years’. The Special Envoy, Erik Solheim praised the work of the SLMM and referred to statements from the Parties, to the extent that the SLMM “remained essential to maintaining the Ceasefire Agreement”. In a subsequent letter to the Nordic Foreign Ministries, Solheim reiterated that “without the work of the SLMM, the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government believe that the Ceasefire Agreement probably would have collapsed long ago.” In October, the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka stated in a press release that “At least part of the credit for the continuation of the ceasefire and the no-war situation should go to the Norwegian facilitators and the international monitors”.

The independent commission appointed by the Norwegian government to look into Norway’s handling of the tsunami disaster, in its 2005 report made several favourable references to the rapid response of the SLMM in alerting the MFA in Oslo, and supplying vital and accurate information from affected areas. Noting that a number of misleading news updates were spread by various sources, causing panic, the SLMM HQ – as described in the commission report – continuously checked the information, substituting rumours with facts, and distributing these to the sources of misinformation. “The SLMM,” the commission stated, “became an authoritative source for correct information in Sri Lanka”.

MONITORING:

Throughout 2004, monitoring was performed by the entire organisation, with field monitoring carried out on land and sea; naval monitoring, however, was briefly interrupted due to the controversy over the right of the SLMM flying its flag on SLN vessels.

Monitoring consequences of the split within the LTTE, the SLMM succeeded in contributing to impartial information, through increased patrolling, observing and reporting on the ensuing tension as well as on alleged collusion between the Karuna faction and the GOSL. The SLMM also succeeded in restarting the monitoring of troop movements by sea – as prescribed by the CFA but not conducted for more than a year – and assisted the transport of high-level LTTE members.

Assisting in election activities, the SLMM succeeded in contributing to ease the participation of voters in the LTTE-controlled areas, facilitating transport and crossings, movements of civilians and representatives of the Parties to and from polling stations; as well as setting up of the polling stations.

A major issue raised by several parties during 2004, was that of child recruitment, which the SLMM recorded – and reported – an increase of. In November, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a recommendation to the SLMM, that it should consistently monitor and report on child recruitment, raise the issue regularly with the LTTE, and establish a human rights unit.

LIAISING:

Throughout 2004, liaising was performed centrally and locally, the SLMM maintaining regular contact at all levels with both Parties; directly with political and military leaders, additionally with respective peace secretariats.

Maintaining and improving communication between the Parties, the SLMM – together with the Facilitator – contributed to an indirect exchange of positions. Locally, the SLMM succeeded in bringing the Parties together by initiating and chairing several high-level meetings, in which they agreed to re-establish contacts, pledged fresh dialogue and reaffirmed their allegiance to the CFA; and by doing so, defusing tension. Such meetings proved the more valuable as the Parties on a central, higher level proved less ready to continue its direct dialogue. However, with the LTTE suspending meetings due to claims that the SF cooperated with Karuna cadres, SLMM monitors found it increasingly difficult to cooperate with the LTTE local entities concerning violations of the CFA.

Increasing efforts to foster communication between the LTTE and the Muslim community in the East, the SLMM succeeded in reducing tension (following misgivings by the Muslim population, due to the Parties’ perceived reluctance to protect Muslim interests), by arranging meetings with the LTTE.

Although the Parties suspended bilateral high level meetings, the good relations between the HOM and respective senior leadership prevailed. The close high-level contact was illustrated by the HOM meeting the President in February and September, the PM in February and twice in March; the LTTE leadership on several occasions. However, the discontinuation of regular meetings between the GOSL and the LTTE proved a major setback for the CFA, as well as for the SLMM which was not given full access into various LTTE-controlled areas, particularly west of Batticaloa.



A9 ARTERY: The A9 highway remained open in 2004, still contributing to the flow of persons and goods between the GOSL-controlled South and the LTTE-controlled North of Sri Lanka – one of the main tangible peace dividends accruing from the signing of the CFA.

The SLMM chaired regular Local Monitoring Committee (LMC) meetings in all districts, contributing to keeping communications open and to reduce tension. As part of its monitoring and liaising activities, the SLMM also engaged in practical facilitation on behalf of the Parties, including facilitating meetings.

REPORTING:

Throughout 2004, reporting was performed by the entire organisation, and the SLMM remained a major – independent and accountable – source of information in relation to the conflict situation, related to the CFA. In addition to the numerous briefings for visiting dignitaries and organisations, and information supplied to the media, the SLMM carried out extensive reporting from field units to HQ, and from the HOM to the Facilitator and to the Parties. 118 Special Reports were produced. The mission held numerous briefings for visiting dignitaries and organisations, and supplied the media with information. Five statements were issued.

The mission implemented a media strategy aimed at rectifying misunderstanding and misconceptions regarding the SLMM as well as the Facilitator and the Peace Process, contributing to a somewhat more accurate representation of the mission and its role in the process.

Operational documentation

In 2004, the SLMM received 2095 complaints, a decrease of 25 percent compared to 2003. The SLMM participated in 4555 general meetings – a slight decrease from the previous year – and chaired 190 LMC meetings, an increase over 2003.

Complaints registered by the SLMM, 2004

| DISTRICT | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | D0 total |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|
| DO1 Jaffna | 37 | 45 | 36 | 23 | 32 | 65 | 67 | 34 | 43 | 28 | 47 | 41 | 498 |
| DO2 Mannar | 34 | 44 | 18 | 22 | 26 | 29 | 19 | 19 | 22 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 280 |
| DO3 Vavuniya | 31 | 31 | 27 | 28 | 54 | 35 | 24 | 29 | 30 | 30 | 51 | 35 | 405 |
| DO4 Trincomalee | 53 | 19 | 20 | 15 | 38 | 30 | 22 | 42 | 25 | 23 | 26 | 51 | 364 |
| DO5 Batticaloa | 22 | 28 | 27 | 12 | 32 | 41 | 35 | 62 | 44 | 48 | 45 | 31 | 427 |
| DO6 Ampara | 10 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 28 | 13 | 21 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 119 |
| LO LTTE, Kilinochchi | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| HQ, Colombo | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Month total/Grand total | 187 | 175 | 134 | 106 | 189 | 228 | 180 | 207 | 165 | 149 | 192 | 183 | 2095 |

General and liaising meetings with SLMM participation, 2004

| DISTRICT | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | D0 total |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|
| DO1 Jaffna | 87 | 69 | 58 | 66 | 81 | 65 | 70 | 68 | 101 | 69 | 80 | 101 | 915 |
| DO2 Mannar | 31 | 39 | 27 | 30 | 36 | 42 | 19 | 32 | 37 | 49 | 50 | 32 | 424 |
| DO3 Vavuniya | 56 | 62 | 36 | 35 | 32 | 26 | 17 | 19 | 9 | 11 | 22 | 26 | 351 |
| DO4 Trincomalee | 85 | 56 | 70 | 53 | 50 | 45 | 53 | 79 | 64 | 67 | 59 | 61 | 742 |
| DO5 Batticaloa | 33 | 24 | 32 | 18 | 11 | 10 | 24 | 35 | 23 | 23 | 28 | 18 | 279 |
| DO6 Ampara | 13 | 19 | 31 | 29 | 47 | 30 | 55 | 58 | 37 | 47 | 41 | 79 | 486 |
| NMT Jaffna | 23 | 36 | 38 | 19 | 19 | 9 | 20 | 13 | 6 | 17 | 23 | 21 | 244 |
| NMT Trincomalee | 30 | 24 | 27 | 31 | 23 | 22 | 21 | 19 | 26 | 16 | 29 | 31 | 299 |
| LO LTTE, Kilinochchi | 64 | 75 | 62 | 71 | 61 | 58 | 73 | 67 | 69 | 65 | 69 | 81 | 815 |
| Month total/Grand total | 422 | 404 | 381 | 352 | 360 | 307 | 352 | 390 | 372 | 364 | 401 | 450 | 4555 |

LMC meetings chaired by the SLMM, 2004

| DISTRICT | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | D0 total |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|
| DO1 Jaffna | 1 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 22 |
| DO2 Mannar | 2 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 40 |
| DO3 Vavuniya | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 31 |
| DO4 Trincomalee | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 15 |
| DO5 Batticaloa | 4 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 47 |
| DO6 Ampara | 2 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 35 |
| Month total/Grand total | 11 | 15 | 15 | 17 | 14 | 17 | 17 | 22 | 18 | 15 | 16 | 13 | 190 |

Sea Patrols conducted by SLMM NMT's, 2004

| | Jan | | Feb | | Mar | | Apr | | May | | Jun | | Jul | | Aug | | Sep | | Oct | | Nov | | Dec | | Total |
|-------------------------|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-------|
| Type | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | |
| FPC/FAC | 7 | 12 | 9 | 7 | 19 | 9 | 9 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 9 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 126 |
| Troop Trsp. | 0 | 33 | 0 | 38 | 0 | 34 | 15 | 36 | 2 | 36 | 0 | 25 | 15 | 4 | 42 | 2 | 30 | 6 | 32 | 0 | 16 | 24 | 7 | 32 | 429 |
| FGB | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 47 | 2 | 48 | 2 | 51 | 0 | 48 | 1 | 19 | 0 | 0 | 233 |
| SBS | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 11 |
| IPC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 35 |
| LTTE | | | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 |
| Month total/Grand total | 7 | 45 | 11 | 46 | 20 | 46 | 25 | 47 | 11 | 44 | 2 | 32 | 22 | 55 | 49 | 56 | 36 | 60 | 37 | 55 | 28 | 47 | 15 | 40 | 836 |

Operational Overview 2005

SUMMARY OF THE SLMM'S SETTING, OBJECTIVES, ACTIVITIES
AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN 2005

2005 was a year in which the SLMM was increasingly challenged by a military setting with repeated confrontations – and violations of the CFA. With growing mistrust between the Parties, the SLMM experienced a tendency of growing hostility. The Parties failed to resume the Peace Process, which was a major issue in the presidential election, where nationalists strengthened their position.

SETTING 2005

Operational mandate

Mandated through the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was to assist the Parties in adhering to their commitments as stipulated in the agreement, by conducting international verification through on-site monitoring within six designated districts, and liaising with and between the Parties.

Operational environment

Militarily, 2005 saw a further increase in military confrontation between several actors, evolving since 2004, and continuing to escalate – especially towards the end of the year. Visiting Sri Lanka as Special Representative of the Government of Norway, former Head of Mission (HOM), Trond Furuhoide expressed the opinion that the Parties were locked in a 'subversive war', calling on both sides to exercise restraint. With the conflict taking on a more distinctive military character, the SLMM – as well as the countries engaged in the Peace Process – gradually had to relate more to military aspects of the situation, in addition to the mainly political aspects, including that of escalating political violence.

The level of violence rose throughout the country and particularly in the North and East, with a higher number of political assassinations particularly in the East. In addition to politicians and political activists, media personnel were targeted more frequently. Assassinated together with four fellow Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) members in Batticaloa on 7 February, the LTTE Political Wing (PW) leader in the Eastern Province, Eliyathamby Kousalyan, was the highest-ranking Tiger leader to be killed since the CFA was entered into. Two notable killings that entailed statements of condemnation from the SLMM were the 12 August assassination of Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, the most senior Tamil cabinet member, and the 29 October killing of Lt. Col. T. Rizvi Meedin, a senior officer of the Military Intelligence Corps. The rivalry within the Tamil community added to violence and destabilisation, not least in the Batticaloa District. Shortly after the presidential elections in November, a series of attacks on the Security Forces (SF) occurred.

In July, the Co-Chairs stated that they were alarmed at the deteriorating security situation in Sri Lanka, calling for a cessation

of violence, urging the LTTE to stop its attacks and criticising the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) for failing to disarm Tamil paramilitaries colluding with the government forces. In an extraordinary meeting hosted by Norway in September, the Co-Chairs called on the LTTE to end political assassinations and underage recruitment, and on the GOSL to disarm or relocate paramilitary groups from the North-East. India voiced its concern over the LTTE representing a military threat.

Politically, 2005 saw a process of reaching an agreement on the joint administration of relief and reconstruction in the North and East after the tsunami becoming a key issue during the first half of the year, causing tension between the Parties and impeding the Peace Process, whereas the presidential election was the main issue in the latter part.

Establishing a joint mechanism – a Post-Tsunami Operation Management Structure (P-TOMS), in which the LTTE, along with Muslim representatives, were accorded influence over the allocation of international tsunami relief in the Northeast – became a measure of confidence, and a test of will to resume peace talks. A negotiated agreement in the way of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed by the two Parties on 24 June. The agreement created a political split within the government coalition, with the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) withdrawing in June, following the President's acceptance of the P-TOMS. The ultimate failure to implement the agreement influenced the relationship between the Parties negatively.

Also contributing to a widening non-cooperation between the Parties, was the political controversy over the security of the LTTE cadres moving through the GOSL-controlled areas, with the LTTE issuing an ultimatum to the GOSL, with potential for confrontation. Increased political violence caused the LTTE to close political offices in the GOSL-controlled areas, reducing the possibilities for direct dialogue, and for the SLMM to act as an interlocutor.

2005 saw a further increase in military confrontation.



TSUNAMI TOLL: SLMM monitors provided the international community with firsthand information about the effects of the devastating tsunami, taking its heavy toll on Sri Lanka in 2004, and assisted in facilitating the distribution of humanitarian aid in early 2005.

The murder of Foreign Minister Kadirgamar led President Chandrika Kumaratunga to declare a state of emergency on 13 August, providing the SF with broad powers.

The November presidential election was a major political issue with far-reaching consequences for the conflict and the Peace Process, and ultimately for the SLMM. PM Mahinda Rajapakse was elected by a narrow margin defeating Ranil Wickramasinghe, repeating the results of the 2004 parliamentary elections. In the North and East, the LTTE boycotted the presidential election. After the elections, the LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran accused the GOSL and the SLA of supporting armed elements working against the LTTE, and warned that measures would be taken if the new president did not disarm them.

The Peace Process in 2005 continued to face obstacles, and attempts at resuming peace talks between the Parties did not succeed. The February killing of the LTTE's PW leader in the Eastern Province made resumption of talks ominous; the August assassination of the Foreign Minister further contributed to a climate unfavourable to the Peace Process.

In September, at an extraordinary meeting of the Co-Chairs group aimed at strengthening respect for the CFA in an increasingly difficult security situation, the group said that the process faced its "most serious challenge" since the signing of the CFA, and called for talks between the Parties to review the implementation of the Agreement. With its September decision to proscribe delegations from the LTTE from visiting its member states, the EU called on the LTTE "to take immediate public steps to demonstrate their commitment to the peace process and their willingness to change". After consulting with the Parties over continuing violence and the failure to find common ground to discuss the implementation of the CFA, the former HOM, Trond

Furuhovde visiting Sri Lanka as Special Representative of the Norwegian government, in October called on both Parties to exercise restraint.

The Peace Process was an issue of the presidential election, with the Rajapakse camp being critical towards the CFA, his cabinet coalition partner, the JVP setting nullification of the P-TOMS agreement, a revision of the CFA and a review of Norway's role in the Peace Process as preconditions for its support. However, shortly after taking office, President Rajapakse explained his government's intention to observe the ceasefire, reiterating the invitation to the LTTE for renewed talks.

On 7 December, in a meeting with the Ambassador of Norway, Hans Brattskar, President Rajapakse voiced the government's opposition to Norway's dual role as Facilitator and head of the SLMM. However, he requested Norway to continue its role as Facilitator, at the same time pushing for the next HOM to be recruited from another country, eventually leading to the appointment of Major General (R) Ulf Henricsson of Sweden in April 2006. Rajapakse raised his concerns with the Special Envoy of Japan, Yasushi Akashi calling for more countries, particularly from Asia, to become involved with the SLMM. The option was duly considered, with approaches to some governments, however with no changes being made regarding the composition of the mission; such alterations would require an amendment of the CFA.

In mid-December, the Foreign Ministers of Sri Lanka and Norway, Mangala Samaraweera and Jonas Gahr Støre, met in Hong-kong. Samaraweera reiterated the President's commitment to the Peace Process; Støre underlined that the new Norwegian government was fully committed to engage as Facilitator. In late December, President Rajapakse visited New Delhi in an effort to persuade India to play a more direct role in the process. Attempts to have India join the Co-Chairs was resisted by the Indian government.

At the year's end, the Norwegian Special Envoy, and since October Norway's Minister for International Development, Erik Solheim expressed his deep concern over the escalating violence in Sri Lanka, emphasising the need for the Parties to come together to discuss their commitments to the CFA and bringing the Peace Process forward.

OPERATION 2005

Operational attention

In 2005, the main focus of the HOM was to conduct the operation in accordance with the intentions and assignments of the CFA, building on established procedures. Certain main tasks and objectives – beyond the stipulations inscribed into the CFA – were defined:

Monitoring:

- Monitor the situation following the tsunami, assisting the Parties in restoring normalcy
- Monitor preparations for the presidential election in the Area of Responsibility (AOR)
- Extend naval monitoring in the Northeast, due to increased Sea Tiger activity
- Assess and improve the SLMM's security in an increasingly violent environment

Liaising:

- Contribute to defuse tension and reduce mistrust between the Parties

Reporting:

- Contribute to establish updated information on the destructions caused by the tsunami

Operational resources

To carry out the operation in 2005, the SLMM had at its disposal *human resources* constituted by 59 international monitors and 72 national staff (annual averages), and *financial resources* (current budget) amounting to NOK 14.4 million. National staff increased by approximately ten man labour years from 2004. *Logistical resources* were reinforced mainly by new vehicles and generators.

For further details, see Part 03, 'Operational Resources'

Brigadier (R) Hagrup Haukland (NO) took over as HOM as of 1 February, replacing Major General (R) Trond Furuhoide (NO). Also in February, Leif Brunell (SE) replaced Kalle Liesinen (FI) as Chief of Operations (COO), himself replaced by Mika Sörensen (SE) in August. Also in August, Tommy Lekenmyr (SE) replaced Wagn Winkel (DK) as Chief of Staff (COS).

Operational execution

DIRECTING:

In 2005, the HOM in particular devoted his attention to the escalation of violence as well as consequences of the tsunami. Operational plans and procedures were revised.

On several occasions, the HOM pointed at a dangerous trend of escalating violence that could ultimately jeopardize the CFA and hinder the Peace Process, preventing renewed peace talks. Whereas the Parties' "pure willingness to act with restraint" was commended on the occasion of the third anniversary of the CFA in February, several subsequent statements condemned violent acts, and criticised the Parties. On 8 March, the HOM perceived recent killings as "a direct threat to the CFA and the Peace Process", a concern reiterated in a statement of 4 December, appealing to all community leaders and the Parties to do their utmost to "calm down the volatile situation before it escalates further". Underlining the grave concern, another statement was issued three days later, urging the Parties to do their utmost to re-open channels for direct dialogue at local level, at a time when "the escalating violence is jeopardizing the whole peace process at a time when there are signs that the GOSL and the LTTE are preparing for the resumption of peace talks". In a 29 December message, the HOM stated that the CFA and the Peace Process were in jeopardy.



VAVUNYA VIOLENCE: Violence escalated in 2005, also randomly targeting civilians. Victim found behind a camp outside of Vavunyia.

As a consequence of the growing violence, including animosity against and attacks on the SLMM, the HOM augmented the focus on operational security. Provisions included temporary suspension of patrols in some areas at the end of the year.

Immediately after the tsunami at the end of 2004, the HOM directed field monitors to help establish an overview of the situation, subsequently monitoring and facilitating the distribution of relief aid within its AOR in early 2005.

During 2005, the Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) (Part 3 'Operations') and Operation Order (OO) ('Hermes') were revised. The OO added to the mission task description, to "take immediate action on any complaint made by the Parties to the CFA", reiterating that the SLMM would "enquire into and assist in settling of any dispute in connection with such complaints". HOM's intention was reformulated to include the monitoring of the Parties' adherence to the CFA as well as to assisting them in implementing the Agreement; previous focus on reducing tension between the Parties was omitted. Also, the OO emphasised the focus of patrolling and monitoring – "with concentration of effort on populated areas and main roads in the NE". Liaising with the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) and the LTTE Sea Tigers in the AOR was added as task to the Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT), whereas the Liaison Office (LO LTTE) was tasked to liaise with "other organisations as appropriate". Regarding coordinating instructions, paragraphs included changes to Sri Lanka's security situation; regular assessments of the security situation in respective parts of the AOR by District Offices (DO) and NMT's; and retaining cooperation with other organisations to a minimum to safeguard the SLMM integrity. The concept of Mobile Units was introduced, to be run by DO's to increase their ease of access – as well as the establishing of temporary Points of Contact (POC). The 'two level dual approach' was omitted from the concept.

The HOM issued three Directives (with others being revised), one Guideline and three Fragmentary Orders (FragO); ten statements were issued. 64 special reports were prepared. HOM Directives (no. 9–11) regarding national meetings within the SLMM; ruling

on complaints about child recruitment and child abduction; and rapid procedures when dealing with complaints.

For full overview and document contents:
www.slmm.info

RUNNING:

In 2005, the SLMM devoted particular resources to monitoring escalating violence, which included sea incidents, ethnic tension, and child recruitment – and to handle mistrust between the Parties.

At the beginning of 2005, considerable SLMM attention and resources were dedicated to the situation following the preceding tsunami – from gathering information on the situation, assisting in the organising of the relief and rehabilitation efforts, to exercising its liaising capacity in connection with the establishment of the P-TOMS mechanism. The SLMM also dedicated considerable resources to the monitoring of a number of Temporary Accommodation Centres (TAC), established under the control of the Sri Lanka Army (SLA); the majority of which closed in February.

The SLMM observed a growing tension and mistrust developing between the Parties in 2005, resulting in difficulties arranging joint meetings with both Parties present, calling for the SLMM to act as an interlocutor. One issue that contributed to the mistrust, and in which the SLMM served in such a capacity, was regarding the security of the LTTE cadres travelling through the GOSL-controlled areas, and changing preconditions set by the GOSL.

Whereas the control of sea territory became a contested issue involving the SLMM in 2003, the question of control of the airspace was raised in 2005, with reports of the LTTE having acquired aircraft. Requested by the GOSL to look into the matter, the SLMM was effectively prevented by the LTTE from doing so, the organisation responding that any airstrip would be pre-CFA, and consequently no issue for the mission to look into. The HOM commented that the SLMM had not seen any LTTE aircraft, although he himself had observed an airfield.

As the conflict escalated, criminal activities also increased dramatically, with SLMM monitors noting that the police were seriously restricted in dealing with crime. In many areas, especially in Batticaloa, the SLA took over the majority of normal policing activities.

The North

In the Northern region, strict controls, curfews and heavy military presence contributed to the heightened tension; certain LTTE activities were perceived as warnings not to vote in the presidential election. As the election approached, the SLMM noticed further escalated violence and increased tension, with relations between the SLA and the Tamil population in Jaffna deteriorating after several incidents in the beginning of the year, and several extrajudicial killings reported. A high number of child recruitments were registered on the Jaffna Peninsula. The SLMM monitored preparations for the election, and conducted patrols on election day due to widespread intimidation at polling stations.

SLMM naval monitoring increased substantially during the last three months of the year, following intensified patrolling by the

SLN, who requested the presence of SLMM naval monitors on board. Several serious incidents at sea, including high LTTE Sea Tiger activity in general, culminated in confrontation between the SLN and the LTTE in Pesalai and outside Mannar Island. During the year, the Sea Tigers frequently conducted exercises off the coast of Mullaithivu, observed by the SLMM.

Towards the end of 2005, the use of claymore mines increased. On December 23, such a mine destroyed a SLN bus in Pesalai, killing 13 sailors. The HOM condemned the attack, calling it another “serious blow” to the Peace Process.

The East

In the Eastern region, the SLMM became increasingly more involved in the consequences of the tsunami. Through monitoring, and by its mere presence, the SLMM was able to defuse escalating tension caused by the fact that several camps were erected in disputed areas, and contributed to prevention of forced returns and child recruitment. The SLMM was also involved in negotiating solutions with regard to aid transport (including building materials) from international relief organisations into the affected areas, and escorted such transports.

The SLMM reported several incidents of political assassinations and escalating violence, with the LTTE repeatedly targeted. The LTTE repeatedly accused the SF of cooperating with the Karuna faction and facilitating attacks on the LTTE members, causing an escalation of violence observed by the SLMM, including direct military confrontation between the LTTE and the Karuna faction. The SLA admitted links to the faction when a Karuna camp was discovered in a SLA-controlled area near Welikanda; its existence was confirmed by the SLMM. The LTTE eventually closed down all its political offices and suspended its public political presence in the GOSL-controlled areas in the East – not to return.

The SLMM increased its attention to community violence in Trincomalee, devoting considerable resources to patrolling areas of surfacing hostility. Numerous incidents contributing to increased animosity between the different ethnic communities occurred, and heavy SLA and Sri Lanka Police Service (SLPS) presence in Trincomalee town had a negative effect on the restoration of normalcy.

ADAPTING:

Operationally

During 2005, the operation was carried out based on the framework and procedures originally laid down, without any major adaptations. However, due to a changing operational climate, including a tendency of increased hostility towards the SLMM and incidents of physical attacks as well as demonstrations against the mission, the operational execution, particularly in the East, was subject to reconsideration.

The operation was gradually directed towards the escalating political violence, which by late 2005 had altered much of the situation in the AOR, with the SLMM having to reinforce its attention on operational security. Following a review of the security situation, and enforcing more stringent measures, the

SLMM decided to temporarily suspend patrolling, including naval patrols, in areas of high tension.

Organisational

During 2005, HQ all six DO's as well as the two NMT's and the LO LTTE remained operational. DO Mannar opened POC Silavaturai in December. Reinforcement of the SLMM team in Batticaloa was necessary due to the many inquiries into killings in the East.

ACHIEVEMENTS 2005

Operational assessment

Assessing achieved results – seen in relation to the mandated assignments and the additional tasks and objectives – in 2005, it should be noted that the *operational environment* was changing for the worse, with increasing violence and decreasing trust between the Parties. The SLMM, in the main, succeeded in carrying out its operation according to concepts, plans and priorities.

The *monitoring* activities were carried out according to established patterns, covering the AOR throughout the year, although being more incident driven than before; patrolling had, on occasions, to be suspended due to rising violence towards the end of the year. The *liaising* activities continued according to established modalities, the mission maintaining good working relations with both Parties, although affected by growing mistrust between the Parties; contact with the LTTE, especially in the East, was impeded by the withdrawal of its political cadres from the GOSL-controlled areas. The *reporting* activities were carried out according to established routines, internally and externally, focusing mainly on the situation on the ground, and incidents locally.

[More details on monitoring, liaising and reporting below](#)

Reduced physical access to, and interaction with, the LTTE in the East (and generally decreased interaction with top leaders from both Parties) to some degree impeded the ability of the SLMM to fully perform its core activities – monitoring, liaising and reporting – particularly in the second half of 2005.

In the latter half of 2005, a study was carried out on the request of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) by the independent consultant, Liam Mahoney, with a report delivered in January 2006. Here, Mahoney pointed to the most positive feedback he received, involving the role of the SLMM in relation to its active local role in responding to localised situations and tensions at risk of escalation: “The SLMM’s willingness to create and facilitate local dialogue opportunities in situations of rising tensions between Tamil and Muslim communities in the Trinco and Battar regions was highly praised.” Mahoney concluded that “the SLMM is perceived to have a positive impact, and could have greater local impact if it were able to be deployed more widely, and be able to respond to and follow up on more of the local situations that arise”.

MONITORING:

Throughout 2005, monitoring was performed by the entire organisation, with field monitoring carried out on land and sea; naval monitoring in the Northeast was stepped up towards the end of



PUBLIC PROTESTS: With political tension rising, hartals became common – civic demonstrations often connected with strikes and the closure of schools, offices and workplaces. Hartal in Vakarai, 2005.

the year, whereas some patrolling on land was suspended due to the operational situation.

During the year, the SLMM became more incident driven – responding to the situation as it evolved (rather than by careful planning according to set objectives), gradually being lead by events, yet operating clearly in accordance with the mandate. By and large, the mere presence of – and active monitoring by – the SLMM on several occasions reduced tension, which was seen not least in connection with the tsunami. Discontent led to numerous demonstrations and hartals, at which the SLMM assisted the police in defusing the situation.

Monitoring the situation in the AOR following the tsunami in late 2004, the SLMM successfully carried out the additional tasks of mapping the destruction aiding the Parties in restoring normalcy and assisting aid organisations delivering relief supplies into the affected areas. The SLMM in 2004–05 contributed to establishing an overview of the situation after the tsunami, providing information, although monitoring was challenged by the denial of access to some LTTE areas. Monitoring of the TAC's was successfully carried out, easing tension between ethnic groups and contributing to serious outbreaks of unrest being avoided, as well as preventing forced recruitments.

Monitoring preparations for the November presidential election in the AOR, the SLMM carried out extensive patrolling in the run up to as well as during polling, helping to defuse tension.

Assessing and improving the security of the SLMM members in an operational environment which was becoming more vio-

“During the year, the SLMM became more incident driven – responding to the situation as it evolved.



MANNAR MEETING: The LMC's became all the more important in 2005, as the only venue remaining for meetings between the Parties locally. LMC meeting, chaired by the SLMM, in Mannar, April 2005.

lent, the SLMM also assessed the Sri Lankan security situation, regularly evaluating the situation in various parts of the AOR, at times suspending patrols due to security concerns.

LIAISING:

Throughout 2005, liaising was performed centrally and locally, the SLMM maintaining regular contact at all levels with both Parties; directly with political and military leaders, additionally with respective peace secretariats. Although it became more challenging with the escalating violence and growing mistrust between the Parties, liaising was extensive, and all the more important as the Parties became more reluctant to meet directly, the SLMM serving as an interlocutor.

With the LTTE closing down all of its political offices in the GOSL-controlled areas in the East, and pulling back to Vanni in September, the SLMM found it increasingly difficult to communicate with the LTTE representatives locally. This resulted in a situation of no direct contact between the Parties locally, greatly reducing the possibility of dealing with community issues. With the Parties not yet prepared to meet, the SLMM could no longer facilitate top-level meetings. An important task in 2005 was that of facilitating travel of the LTTE officials for meetings in Colombo and abroad.

The SLMM chaired regular Local Monitoring Committee (LMC) meetings in all districts, becoming all the more important during the year, as the only venue for the Parties to meet directly. The frequency of LMC meetings remained high, after a reduction at the start of the year, due to the upheavals caused by the tsunami.

Also, the SLMM – as an integral part of the Peace Process and a primary source of information in relation to the ground situation – was a much sought discussion partner for organisations

operating in or visiting Sri Lanka, including government authorities stationed in or visiting the country.

REPORTING:

Throughout 2005, reporting was performed by the entire organisation, and the SLMM remained a major – independent and accountable – source of information with regard to the conflict situation, information related to the CFA in general and prioritised parts of the mandate in particular, especially regarding military and normalcy aspects; other parts of the Agreement became increasingly less relevant. In the post-tsunami situation of early 2005, the SLMM played a particularly important role as an on-the-scene source of reliable information, helping the international community and aid organisation to assess the situation, and to plan their relief operations.

In addition to the numerous briefings for visiting dignitaries and organisations, and information supplied to the media, the SLMM carried out extensive reporting from field units to HQ, and from the HOM to the Facilitator and to the Parties. 64 Special Reports were produced. The mission held numerous briefings for visiting dignitaries and organisations, and supplied the media with information. Ten statements were issued.

With the SLA beginning to prevent international organisations from entering areas under its control, the relative importance of the SLMM increased; in certain areas as more or less the only independent body remaining and able to observe and report.

Operational documentation

In 2005, the SLMM received 2063 complaints, a slight decrease compared to 2004. The SLMM participated in 5803 general meetings at HQ and DO level combined, and chaired 163 LMC meetings.

Complaints registered by the SLMM, 2005

| DISTRICT | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | D0 total |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|
| DO1 Jaffna | 23 | 27 | 16 | 22 | 28 | 30 | 50 | 53 | 31 | 28 | 45 | 118 | 471 |
| DO2 Mannar | 15 | 18 | 7 | 7 | 1 | 7 | 18 | 18 | 8 | 4 | 4 | 19 | 126 |
| DO3 Vavuniya | 23 | 17 | 25 | 21 | 44 | 32 | 17 | 24 | 22 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 255 |
| DO4 Trincomalee | 18 | 10 | 9 | 29 | 24 | 55 | 66 | 43 | 15 | 75 | 46 | 42 | 432 |
| DO5 Batticaloa | 24 | 33 | 55 | 31 | 43 | 49 | 80 | 79 | 59 | 55 | 60 | 67 | 635 |
| DO6 Ampara | 2 | 7 | 13 | 6 | 14 | 13 | 10 | 19 | 6 | 17 | 4 | 15 | 126 |
| LO LTTE, Kilinochchi | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 10 |
| HQ, Colombo | | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 8 |
| Month total/Grand total | 105 | 112 | 125 | 117 | 154 | 186 | 242 | 239 | 143 | 193 | 172 | 275 | 2063 |

General and liaising meetings, 2005

| DISTRICT | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | D0 total |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|
| DO1 Jaffna | 122 | 93 | 113 | 63 | 70 | 77 | 73 | 87 | 80 | 48 | 79 | 73 | 978 |
| DO2 Mannar | 55 | 57 | 43 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 44 | 35 | 50 | 27 | 40 | 51 | 534 |
| DO3 Vavuniya | 39 | 45 | 51 | 46 | 62 | 50 | 46 | 36 | 48 | 26 | 35 | 42 | 526 |
| DO4 Trincomalee | 76 | 51 | 70 | 61 | 91 | 75 | 78 | 81 | 69 | 77 | 78 | 89 | 896 |
| DO5 Batticaloa | 50 | 36 | 51 | 48 | 73 | 61 | 55 | 57 | 65 | 56 | 52 | 37 | 641 |
| DO6 Ampara | 63 | 76 | 96 | 70 | 94 | 86 | 119 | 90 | 54 | 69 | 62 | 49 | 928 |
| NMT Jaffna | 32 | 21 | 34 | 15 | 24 | 31 | 11 | 23 | 25 | 21 | 26 | 26 | 289 |
| NMT Trincomalee | 14 | 9 | 15 | 13 | 20 | 12 | 14 | 23 | 14 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 157 |
| LO LTTE, Kilinochchi | 72 | 71 | 63 | 74 | 69 | 84 | 74 | 70 | 82 | 67 | 61 | 67 | 854 |
| Month total/Grand total | 523 | 459 | 536 | 433 | 547 | 521 | 514 | 502 | 487 | 398 | 440 | 443 | 5803 |

LMC meetings chaired by the SLMM, 2005

| DISTRICT | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | D0 total |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|
| DO1 Jaffna | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 21 |
| DO2 Mannar | 2 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 39 |
| DO3 Vavuniya | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 33 |
| DO4 Trincomalee | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 16 |
| DO5 Batticaloa | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 33 |
| DO6 Ampara | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 21 |
| Month total/Grand total | 9 | 11 | 18 | 11 | 11 | 13 | 16 | 17 | 15 | 16 | 15 | 11 | 163 |

Sea Patrols conducted by SLMM NMT's, 2005

| | Jan | | Feb | | Mar | | Apr | | May | | Jun | | Jul | | Aug | | Sep | | Oct | | Nov | | Dec | | Total |
|-------------------------|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|----|-------|
| Type | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | J | T | |
| FPC/FAC | 14 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 18 | 3 | 13 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 13 | 3 | 15 | 0 | 16 | 5 | 12 | 7 | 28 | 2 | 25 | 5 | 13 | 3 | 217 |
| Troop Trsp. | 2 | 41 | 0 | 42 | 0 | 53 | 8 | 60 | 0 | 46 | 0 | 55 | 0 | 47 | 0 | 54 | 0 | 48 | 0 | 53 | 0 | 54 | 0 | 42 | 605 |
| FGB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| SBS | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 43 |
| IPC | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 27 |
| Month total/Grand total | 19 | 44 | 10 | 44 | 26 | 59 | 26 | 62 | 15 | 50 | 16 | 59 | 19 | 48 | 18 | 64 | 16 | 58 | 32 | 58 | 29 | 60 | 15 | 46 | 895 |

Operational Overview 2006

SUMMARY OF THE SLMM'S SETTING, OBJECTIVES, ACTIVITIES
AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN 2006

2006 was a year in which the SLMM experienced a double challenge – of an increasingly demanding operational environment, with the military conflict developing into a war-like situation with consecutive violations of the CFA – and a radical reduction of the mission's strength. At the same time, the value of the SLMM was demonstrated by added monitoring tasks following the resumption of peace talks.

SETTING 2006

Operational mandate

Mandated through the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was to assist the Parties in adhering to their commitments as stipulated in the agreement, by conducting international verification through on-site monitoring within six designated districts, and liaising with and between the Parties.

Operational environment

Militarily, 2006 saw a marked increase in activities by both Parties, the conflict escalating to a new level of violence and military confrontation with regular offensive operations not seen since the signing of the CFA. Violence increased throughout the Area of Responsibility (AOR), leading to major military confrontations in the East as of late July – spreading to the North – and including high-level political assassinations. On 22 July, water supplies to the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL)-controlled Mavil Aru area south of Trincomalee Bay in the East were cut off, triggering a large-scale military offensive by government forces in the area of Sampoor – gaining control of an area for years held by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) – including the use of heavier arms, aerial bombings and artillery shelling, in addition to claymore mines. These attacks, alongside political assassinations and general violence claimed a substantial number of lives; many casualties were civilians. The situation further worsened, with military confrontations spreading to the Jaffna peninsula on 11 August, when the LTTE advanced over the Forward Defence Localities (FDL) near Muhamalai Exit/Entry point, exercising several attacks. With the LTTE repelled by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA), a new frontline was established with new FDL's on both sides. As a result, the A9 highway was permanently closed, reversing one of the main tangible achievements of the CFA. The fighting following 11 August in particular established a new level of the conflict, with continuous military confrontation. This intensification of hostilities caused the number of internally displaced persons (IDP's)

in the East to rise quickly, resulting in human suffering which the SLMM became involved in monitoring aspects of.

In the North, abductions and forced recruitment of children and adults occurred frequently. A particular incident that attracted international attention was the assassination of 17 local employees of the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Action Contre la Faim (ACF) in Muttur on 4 August.

Six major attacks in the capital – the assassinations of Major General Parami Kulatunga of the SLA in June, the Deputy Head of the Secretariat for Co-ordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP), Kethesh Loganathan in August, and MP Nadarajah Raviraj of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) in November; furthermore the failed attacks by a suicide bomber targeting the SLA Commander, Sarath Fonseka in April and the Defence Secretary, Gothabaya Rajapakse in December illustrated the grave situation, and that the conflict was not confined to the North and East alone.

In a response to the increasing violence, adding more frequent police and military Check Points (CP) and road closures in Colombo, the government re-authorised portions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), suspended since the signing of the CFA. A LTTE naval attack against the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) Dakshina-base in Galle in October illustrated that military activity had spread also to the South.

Politically, 2006 was marked by a hardened stance from the government side towards the LTTE, with Sinhalese nationalist sentiments expanding, following the presidential election late 2005, after which the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) became coalition partners of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) government. This development was reinforced by the 30 March local elections, in which the President's SLFP secured a landslide victory. The option for autonomy was publicly shelved by the LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran, again calling for an independent state for the Tamils. Meanwhile, the GOSL submitted preconditions unacceptable to the LTTE for the re-entry of their Political Wing (PW) cadres into areas under its control following the LTTE's wish to re-establish their political offices after their withdrawal September 2005.

“2006 saw a marked increase in activities by both Parties, the conflict escalating to a new level of violence and military confrontation.

Sri Lanka's Supreme Court in October ruled the 1987 merger between the North and East unconstitutional and invalid, and heard a petition from JVP and JHU, seeking the court to nullify the CFA, claiming it unconstitutional. The September GOSL freeze of the funds of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) caused a further deterioration in the relationship between the Parties. In his Independence Day address in February, President Mahinda Rajapakse avoided mentioning the upcoming Geneva peace talks, and promised "honourable peace" to the people of the Northeast.

The Peace Process in 2006 was pursued with new initiatives, most notably the two rounds of talks between the Parties, facilitated by the Royal Norwegian Government (RNG) at the request of the Parties, in February and October, held in Geneva. The talks, 22–23 February (Geneva I) were the first since the six rounds 2002–03. Against a background of escalating hostilities in 2005–06, a main ambition of the Geneva talks (I and II) was to get the Parties together on a high level, and thereby reiterate their commitments to the CFA – and reconfirm their commitment to the SLMM. The HOM participated at both rounds; at Geneva I, the SLMM was tasked with specifically monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the agreements reached between the Parties. The agreed purpose of the meeting was to discuss the implementation and the strengthening of the CFA, with the talks centering around two major issues; child recruitment, and the presence and activities of armed groups – as well as intimidation, acts of violence, abductions and killings by both sides. Ending the talks, the Parties issued a joint statement, committing themselves to "respecting and upholding" the CFA, reconfirming their commitment to "fully cooperate with and respect the rulings" of the SLMM. Both Parties committed themselves to taking "all necessary measures to ensure that there will be no intimidation, acts of violence, abductions or killings". The LTTE specifically committed itself to "taking all necessary measures to ensure that there will be no acts of violence against the security forces and police"; the GOSL to taking all necessary measures in accordance with the CFA "to ensure

that no armed group other than Government security forces will carry arms or conduct armed operations".

Despite the commitments in Geneva in February, the Co-Chairs meeting in Tokyo in May, expressed grave concern over the escalating violence, calling on the Parties to take "immediate steps to reverse the deteriorating situation and put the country back on the road to peace", reiterating their support for the SLMM "in an increasingly difficult situation", at the same time deeming it necessary to examine ways in which to strengthen the role of the SLMM.

Prior to the Geneva talks, the Peace Secretariat for Muslims (PSM) appealed for a separate Muslim delegation (rather than being included in the GOSL delegation) in the February meeting – as well as in future talks on resolving the conflict.

On 29 May, the Council of the European Union (EU) decided to include the LTTE in the list for application of specific measures to combat terrorism ('terrorism list'), following up on the travel ban on the LTTE from 2005. At the same time, the Council stressed that the listing would not diminish the EU's determination to play its role as one of the Co-Chairs, reconfirmed its commitment to assist Norway as Facilitator, and the Parties to the CFA; also expecting all parties "to respect the role and physical safety of the SLMM monitors". At the request of the EU in Sri Lanka, the HOM in a 18 April memo advised against listing the LTTE, in the present situation assessing such a move detrimental to the Peace Process.

Safety becoming a major concern, the Facilitator met with the Parties in Oslo in June, with the explicit aim of discussing the security and functions of the SLMM. However, the LTTE declined to meet with the GOSL delegation (which consisted of members of the SCOPP and no cabinet members) the LTTE perceiving that it was no longer to be treated as an equal partner. Consequently, the direct meeting between the Parties had to be cancelled.

At the same time, on 8 June, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), expressing its profound concern over the gravity of the situation on the ground in Sri Lanka, including the Parties' objection to collaborate with the SLMM as well as the lack of dialogue between the Parties, deemed it necessary to request both Parties, through letters to President Rajapakse and the LTTE leader Prabhakaran respectively, to respond in writing to five critical questions, the first regarding the CFA, the remaining dealing with the SLMM specifically:

- 1) Will the parties stand committed to the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) of 22 February 2002?
- 2) Do the parties want the continued existence and operation of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission as a mission coordinated, facilitated and led by the Royal Norwegian Government with diplomatic immunity to ensure its impartial operation?
- 3) Are the parties able to provide full security guarantees for all monitors, employees and physical assets of the SLMM in all situations, in accordance with CFA Article 3.9?



BANANA BREAK: HOM Ulf Henricsson escorted when picking bananas close to LTTE guesthouse, Tank View in Kilinochchi, 2006.

- 4) Will the parties accept amendments to CFA Article 3.5 in order to enable the continued functioning of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission at its current operational levels and with the necessary security guarantees?
- 5) In the event that amendments to Article 3.5 are made, will the parties provide full security guarantees for current SLMM personnel and assets during a six-month transition phase until an amended solution has been identified, decided and fully implemented?

The GOSL confirmed its commitment on all five questions; the LTTE confirmed its commitment regarding questions 1, 2 and 5, however repeating its demand that monitors from EU member states had to be withdrawn, as the neutrality of these countries had been compromised by the EU listing. With the LTTE proclaiming it could no longer guarantee the security of these monitors, Danish, Finnish and Swedish monitors were withdrawn in August, drastically reducing monitoring capacity.

In August, the Presidency of the EU, expressing its grave concern over the violence in Sri Lanka, reiterated EU's full support to the Peace Process and the Facilitator, stating that personnel of the SLMM "must be supported and their security guaranteed at all times". In September, the PM of India, Manmohan Singh, in a message to President Rajapakse reiterated India's strong backing of Norway's role as Facilitator.

At Geneva II, held against a situation of escalated violence and increased military confrontation, discussions focused in particular on military de-escalation, including the disarming of paramilitary groups in the North and East, and the humanitarian situation, as well as provisions related to ending child recruitment, with the reopening of the A9 highway as a particularly sensitive, concrete issue over which the Parties failed to reach an agreement. However, the Parties also failed to agree on measures that could halt the spiralling violence and lead up to a political settlement of the conflict.



TALKING TIME: The SLMM was tasked at Geneva I to report on proceedings, and were present at the Geneva II talks, with a delegation led by HOM Lars J. Sølberg, accompanied by PIO Thorfinn Omarsen (left) and PA Paul Erik Bjerke – meeting with the SG of the LTTE PS, Sevaratnam Puleedevan, October 2006.

“... the growing repugnance towards the SLMM threatened the very relevance of the mission as an instrument in the Peace Process.

Prior to Geneva II, the SLMM released its second report regarding the implementation of agreements reached at Geneva I, with the HOM stating that both Parties failed to comply with their commitments, and that “The violence has increased significantly during the reporting period and serious violations of the CFA have been committed”. Although formally still in existence, questions regarding the validity of the CFA continued to surface. In his 27 November Hero's Day speech, Prabakharan called it “defunct”, further stating that there was no option left but an independent state for the Tamil people.

In March, the RNG appointed Jon Hanssen-Bauer as its new Special Envoy to Sri Lanka, succeeding Erik Solheim, who joined the cabinet as Minister of International Development in October 2005. On the Sri Lankan side, Dr. Palitha Kohona succeeded Dr. John Gooneratne as Secretary-General of SCOPP in May 2006. The chief negotiator of the LTTE, Anton Balasingham, passed away in London in December. In May, the first HOM, Major General (R) and Norwegian Special Representative Trond Furuhoide, passed away in Norway.

As 2006 proceeded the growing repugnance towards the SLMM – from the Parties and areas of Sri Lanka society – threatened the very relevance of the mission as an instrument in the Peace Process, assisting the Parties; requiring a thorough analysis of the situation and reorientation of the operation.

OPERATION 2006

Operational attention

In 2006, the main focus of the HOM was to conduct the operation in accordance with the intentions and assignments of the CFA, building on established procedures. Certain main tasks and objectives – beyond the stipulations inscribed into the CFA – were defined:

Monitoring:

- Monitor and report on the adherence of the Parties to the commitments made at the Geneva I talks
- Monitor armed elements connected to the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Palikal (TMVP), still militarily active in the East
- Monitor the humanitarian situation including the movement of goods, to ease a precarious situation
- Maintain the operation following the withdrawal of monitors from Denmark, Finland and Sweden, in effect halving the number of international monitors
- Reconsider the organisational structure and operational strategy of the SLMM following the dual challenge of reduced capacity and increased hostility
- Increase focus on security, implementing measures to maintain the safety of all SLMM members and the security of the mission

Liaising:

- Retain a working relationship with both Parties in a situation of gradually growing distance to the SLMM

Reporting:

- Improve SLMM registration and reporting (data) systems to cope with the escalating numbers of CFA violations, and improve reporting
- Prepare reports on the implementation of the agreements reached between the Parties' at the Geneva talks in February specifically
- Develop and exercise new media strategy, reporting in public through an active presence in the national media; subsequently redirected

Operational resources

To carry out the operation in 2006, the SLMM had at its disposal *human resources* constituted by 56 international monitors in the first half of the year, declining in the second, supported by 76 national staff (annual averages), and *financial resources* (current budget) amounting to NOK 15.8 million. *Logistical resources* were reinforced with ten vehicles; the IT systems and equipment were upgraded, including the new Incident Management System (IMS).

The withdrawal of monitors from Denmark, Finland and Sweden as of September, only partially offset by more people dispatched from Iceland and Norway, nearly halved monitoring staff, from a monthly average of 58 in January–August to 33 in September–December (with 19 at the lowest), profoundly influencing the organisation and operation.

For further details, see Part 03, 'Operational Resources'

In 2006, there were two exchanges in the HOM position: In March, Major General (R) Ulf Henricsson (SE) succeeded Brigadier (R) Hårup Haukland (NO), to be replaced by Major General (R) Lars J. Sølberg (NO) as of 1 September. In September, Jon Oskar Solnes (IS) replaced Tommy Lekenmyr (SE) as Chief of Staff (COS). In October, Sverre Iversen (NO) succeeded Mika Sørensen (SE) as Chief Operations Officer (COO), himself replaced by Jimmy Søland (NO) in December.

Operational execution

DIRECTING:

In 2006, the HOM in particular devoted his attention to the Geneva talks, to operational security, and the consequences of radical staff reductions. Operational plans and procedures were revised.

Leading up to the Geneva I talks in February, the HOM tasked the organisation to prepare input to the Facilitator, identifying problems related to the implementation of the CFA. The work commenced in October 2005, the report being handed over prior to the February 2006 meeting. Following Geneva I, the HOM directed the additional reporting tasks accorded the SLMM (see Reporting below).

Subsequent to the Geneva I talks, the HOM instructed the SLMM – as of “utmost importance” – to show presence by flying the flag extensively, with maximum patrolling and immediate intervention if/when incidents occurred. Further, the SLMM was to maintain focus on child recruitment and abduction cases,



MILITARY MOVEMENT: The closing of the water supplies to the GOSL-controlled area of Mavil Aru marked the start of a new phase in the conflict, with heavier military response – and a large number of civilians being caught in the middle. Mavil Aru, July 2006.

despite the LTTE stance that it had no authority to deal with child recruitment. Another key issue included a request to disarm armed elements outside the Parties to the CFA. The HOM assessed that this would compromise monitors' security, as well as considering it to be the responsibility of the Security Forces (SF) and the Sri Lanka Police Service (SLPS).

Responding to the evolving situation, the HOM directed monitoring and patrolling throughout the AOR to be concentrated more on 'potential tension areas'. In May, he suspended naval monitoring due to security considerations, following an incident in which a SLMM monitor came under direct fire north of Chalais while on board a SLN vessel. The possible resumption of naval monitoring was subject to reconsideration during mid-2006, including the possible acquiring and running of the mission's own patrol vessels; an option that was put on hold.

At a meeting with representatives from the Nordic contributing countries in Oslo in May, the HOM outlined future operational possibilities, as part of his chief objective on safeguarding the CFA, in which case 15 + 25 more monitors would be required. Such operational options included monitoring of fishing and harvesting, establishing contact with the Sea Tigers, and monitoring re-settlement of the High Security Zone (HSZ) and CP's.

An extensive process was carried out in mid-year, preparing for the eventuality of monitors from EU member states being withdrawn, coupled with an Operational Continuity & Downsizing Plan, including the distribution of remaining monitors to DO's according to operational priority. Various options were considered, including the withdrawal of the SLMM.

At the Nordic meeting in Reykjavik in November, held against a radically altered setting, the new HOM presented various scenarios, including the option of de facto termination the operation. He recommended a continuation of the field operation, albeit with

reduced activity in order to reduce risks; remaining ready for partial retreat. At the same time, other options should be planned.

Following the departure of monitors from EU member states in August, the HOM considered it compelling to restructure the organisation with respect to its monitoring capacity. Based on an analysis of the prevailing situation, and having considered an eventual withdrawal of the mission, he found the need for a thorough reorientation, organisationally as well as operationally, under the prevailing circumstances, in order to renew the mission's relevance. This approach included a renewed analysis of the mandate, and a clarification of the objectives and tasks in view of the current setting. The need for adaptation was later confirmed by a comprehensive internal survey among the remaining monitors and national staff, instigated as part of the analysing activities.

In the latter half of the year, the HOM deliberately altered the media strategy, from a high to a moderate profile. The purpose was to improve the SLMM relation and interaction with the Parties, as well as to ensure the safety of the SLMM personnel.

With effect 1 January, a new Security Plan/General Instructions was in place, cautioning that in spite of the ceasefire “there is an unpredictable security situation”. Due to the worsening security environment, a ‘Weekly Threat Assessment’ was established, distributed to all the SLMM units, the Facilitator and the contributing countries. In August, it became necessary to implement the first phase of the Security Plan, restricting movements and preparing for a possible evacuation. Stating (FragO 31/2006) that “it is now evident that Parties are disregarding the CFA and are not able to live up to its security guarantees towards the SLMM”, the HOM decided to temporarily withdraw all DO's and the LO LTTE to Colombo, in accordance with the plan, though only Phase 1 was actually executed. Monitors from non-EU states remained in Jaffna, Vavuniya and Ampara as well as in Kilinochchi. Monitors withdrew temporarily from Trincomalee to Dambulla. In response to a further deteriorating security situation towards the end of the year, the HOM initiated a process for improving security, especially at the DO's. On 21 November, the HOM imposed (FragO 32) restrictions on SLMM movements in certain areas due to security concerns. In December, he re-initiated a process with aimed to improve the safety of SLMM personnel through possible acquisition of armoured vehicles, alternatively or additionally by enforcing existing vehicles with Kevlar lining, carried on into 2007.

In late 2006, the HOM acted on critical security-related information from a variety of sources. He was informed of plans to by force take out named members of the mission. Various measures were taken to handle the situation, including discretely relocating the monitors in question out of the Area of Operation (AOO). Parallel to this, a growing anti-SLMM sentiment appeared in the media, as well as from a few influential government officials, perceptibly undermining the SLMM authority and public

confidence in the mission and the Peace Process. Adding to this, the mission obtained information about imminent large-scale military offensives in the North and attacks in Colombo.

Against this backdrop, the HOM on December 25 ordered a temporary withdrawal of all international monitors to the Taj Airport Hotel in Seeduwa, north of Colombo. A minimum support staff contingent to handle essential logistical links was maintained in the Colombo HQ. The temporary withdrawal offered the opportunity of a consolidation workshop for the mission to reconsider its *modus operandi*.

During 2006, revisions to the Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) (Part 3 ‘Operations’) and Operation Order (OO) (‘Hermes’) were drafted. The OO was restructured and adjusted to an altered operational reality, taking into account the departure of monitors from Denmark, Finland and Sweden. The HOM's intention was reformulated, omitting the opening phrase of “to reduce the tension between the Parties” by employing the SLMM, but rather emphasising the monitoring role, including monitoring the *situation* and the *developments* in the AOR, in addition to assisting the Parties. A previous point, “advise and assist in the de-escalation and normalisation process” was omitted from the mission outline, and a listed task was narrowed into enquiring into ‘significant’ complaints and incidents, reflecting the new realities on the ground and the reduced capacity of the SLMM. The Coordinating Instruction, ‘Changes in Sri Lanka's political situation’ was supplemented with ‘Changes in Sri Lanka's security situation’. In order to safeguard the SLMM integrity, cooperation with other organisations was to be limited, focusing on such interaction being ‘conducive to the fulfilment of the CFA’.

The concept of a Forward Mobile Command Post for the HOM was introduced in order to improve the ability to maintain continuous contacts in the field, but not implemented due to the reduced capacity – and omitted in the December version of the SOP. Similarly, the ability of HQ to deploy a forward cell in the AOO, stated in a new paragraph on Command and Control, was taken out. ‘Flexibility’ was added as an operational principle; operational preparedness was introduced as part of the Operational Concept, emphasising the ambition of a high degree of flexibility.

The HOM issued eight Fragmentary Orders (FragO), including the temporary termination of Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT) in June, the temporary withdrawal of the SLMM from the field in August, the restrictions on patrolling in November, and the consolidation workshop in December; 23 statements were issued. 139 special reports were prepared.

For overview and document contents:
www.slmm.info

RUNNING:

In 2006, the SLMM devoted particular operational resources to monitoring increasing violence and military presence and confrontations, as well as agreements following the Geneva peace talks.

In addition to pursuing the established monitoring, liaising and reporting routines, the SLMM was accorded additional tasks

“... the HOM was informed of plans to by force take out named members of the mission.

after the Geneva talks in February. Specifically requested to monitor and report on the agreements reached between the Parties, the mission had to focus particularly on child recruitment and the presence of armed groups, as well as on the overall conflict and humanitarian situation.

Prior to Geneva I, the HOM prepared a document for the Facilitator, in which some key problems related to the implementation of the CFA were identified: mainly insufficient commitments by the Parties to the CFA as well as specific problems related to geographical areas. Some general concerns were also raised, including the lack of direct dialogue, the lack of confidence, and incorrect and negative statements to the media. Regarding the lack of dialogue, a proposal of the HOM was to establish a 'Joint Implementation Commission (JIC)' at a central as well as local level (in each district of the AOR) to ensure the Parties compliance with the CFA and SLMM's determinations. Meetings of the JIC would also serve as a confidence-building measure, helping to alleviate the prevailing lack of confidence. Other confidence-building measures proposed included exchange of liaison officers at central level; (PS, SCOPP); notification of all military activity; cooperation between the Parties in investigations of killings and other criminal cases; actions to reconstruct the Mannar–Puttalam road and open it for normal traffic; ease heavy-handedness at CP's; provide immediate information of missing and/or detained persons.

The SLMM issued its first report regarding the implementation of the commitments reached at Geneva I (covering the period 24 February–16 April), in June. Here, it was noted that intimidation, harassment and violence, including assassinations and attacks on high-profile targets resumed in April, and that a significant increase in child recruitment and child abductions took place during March and April. This led the HOM to conclude that "The violence has not decreased during the reporting period and serious violations of the CFA have been committed", noting that the CFA was put under heavy pressure, and "the Parties' lack of commitment" was considered "highly critical". Regarding the Karuna group, the HOM stated that there were clear indications of the GOSL, despite its denial, actively supporting it, thereby infringing the Agreement.

In its second report, released in September (covering the period 29 May–31 August), the HOM criticised the Parties on the issue of child recruitment. Here, the HOM concluded that "Neither side has complied with this so far, as in addition to the regular child recruitment continuing on the LTTE side, additional abductions and recruitment are now being carried out by the Karuna faction on the East coast, without the GOSL making any attempts to curb this development". On the overall situation, the HOM stated that both Parties failed to comply with their commitments, and that they had developed a "strong resentment" of the SLMM rulings, furthermore making themselves "extremely difficult" to contact. Concluding, the HOM remarked that "The violence has increased severely during the reporting period and serious violations of the CFA have been committed".

Full text of the Geneva reports:
www.slmm.info

Connected to the Geneva talks, the SLMM facilitated transport of local LTTE commanders between the North and the East, a prerequisite set by the LTTE in order to participate.

The fact that the SLMM was to report on the implementation of the commitments before the second round of talks resulted in a significant increase of complaints received in March–May, straining the monitoring resources of the mission. The lower number registered from June was partly ascribed to the escalating tension, making it more difficult to lodge and receive complaints. A considerable share of the complaints received should have been directed to the Sri Lankan judicial authorities, but the civilian population's confidence in this withering, cases were increasingly presented to the SLMM.

On the humanitarian site, the SLMM observed emerging crisis in areas both in the North and the East, with limited supplies brought into Jaffna and the LTTE-controlled areas. A growth in the number of IDP's was noticed, and the SLMM played an important role in gaining access for provision of humanitarian aid to affected areas and IDP camps.

Not only did the operational environment continue the deteriorating trend from 2005, with a marked change in mid-2006, when the overall situation was assessed as "tense and unpredictable". Military activity at sea increased, and naval monitoring was stepped up, particularly in March and April, despite difficulties in gaining access to the LTTE Sea Tigers and Military Wing leaders. In the GOSL-controlled areas, the SLMM found the Security Forces (SF) restrictive in allowing monitors access to enquire into alleged activities by armed groups, particularly in Vavunya. The SLMM did not establish formalised contacts with the Karuna faction, as it was not a party to the CFA. During the course of monitoring, however, the SLMM was in frequent contact with Karuna supporters and members of TMVP, and encountered armed personnel in the GOSL-controlled areas claiming to belong to the group.

The security situation for the SLMM deteriorated substantially. The personal security of members of the mission was jeopardized during military operations carried out by both Parties, despite knowledge of the presence of SLMM personnel. After an attack against the SLMM office in Batticaloa in January, the Nordic countries issued a joint, strong condemnation, expecting the Parties to ensure the security of the mission.

Following several incidents of fire being directed at SLMM members, restrictions on patrolling and conduct of inquiries in specified areas were implemented in November, temporarily ceasing patrolling and enquiring in defined areas in the North as well as the East. These incidents included indirect fire aimed at the area in which the HOM and entourage were known to be present in Mavil Aru in July, targeted fire against the area where the HOM and party was present in Poonaryn in November, as well as and other incidents jeopardizing the security of SLMM personnel. Naval monitoring was suspended in May, also due to security concerns.

The North

In the Northern region, the SLMM observed a continuing increase in the level of fighting in the Jaffna district during the first three months, in the way of air assaults, navy battles and ground skirmishes – with a further escalation taking place from August. Major incidents included 64 people killed by a roadside bomb targeting a bus full of civilians near Kebithigowella in June, and more than a hundred SLN personnel killed when a convoy was targeted by a suicide bomber near Habarana in October.

Large-scale military confrontation spread to the Jaffna peninsula on 11 August, following a LTTE offensive advancing over the FDL at Muhamalai. Fighting grounded flights to and from Palali air base and closed the A9 highway, cutting Jaffna off to civilians and leaving SLMM personnel stranded in the GOSL-controlled areas, as well as in Kilinochchi. Both sides exercised a strong reluctance to assist the SLMM moving monitors out, further aggravating the relation between the mission and the Parties.

With northern parts of the country being effectively isolated, contributing to humanitarian hardship, the SLMM assisted the United Nations (UN) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in their efforts to deliver supplies into affected areas. The situation was aggravated by the closure of three entry points west of A9 in August; the SLMM engaged itself in attempts to reopen access. International staff of various organisations evacuated Jaffna, leaving the SLMM, as the last remaining organisation from the international community with permanent presence.

In May, an embargo on the transportation of cement and steel to the North was imposed in contravention of CFA provisions – an important part of the Agreement monitored by the SLMM. Another example of a provision reintroduced, moving towards a pre-CFA situation, was the partial introduction in October, of a system where passes had to be obtained for all vehicles leaving the districts of Mannar and Vavuniya for the rest of the country.

In mid-August, the SLMM intensified presence on the islands of Kayts for a longer period, with the situation calming down, after several killings of civilians, and an attempted amphibious



BATTI BOMB: Facing growing animosity, nurtured not least by negative media coverage in the South, the SLMM was also exposed to attacks, and vehicles in its garage in Batticaloa were hit by an explosive. Later in the year, death threats directed at named monitors became known.

“...the drastic down-sizing of the mission called for a thorough reconsideration of the operation and the organisation.

landing on 12 August by the LTTE. The attempt was repulsed, forcing many civilians to seek refuge in churches.

The East

In Eastern region, the SLMM was increasingly involved in monitoring the presence of armed elements, notably the Karuna faction, following the Geneva talks in February. Especially in the East, the SLMM received a large number of complaints relating to assassinations, harassments, extortions, assaults or abductions where an armed group was the main suspect, noting that the only identified such group was the Karuna faction, which – contrary to the commitment of the GOSL – became even more visible in government-controlled areas in the East. The SLMM verified several attacks on the LTTE camps perpetrated by armed personnel coming from or fleeing to the GOSL-controlled areas; the LTTE claiming the attackers belonged to the Karuna faction.

In the Vakkarai area, the humanitarian situation deteriorated as mid-2006, with the SLMM exercising an important role facilitating the entry of aid to IDP's.

In Trincomalee, the killing of a prominent Tamil Peoples' Forum (TPF) politician, Vanniasingham Vigneswaran, in April sparked off another spiral of violence. Aerial attacks, direct exchange of fire resulted in the highest number of casualties since the signing of the CFA. In May alone, the SLMM registered 337 killings, many due to fighting between the Karuna faction and the LTTE.

Due to shelling, the SLMM office in Batticaloa was closed for several days in late August/early September, whereas the office in Trincomalee closed for a few days in April due to unrest following i.a. extensive shelling from the Eastern Navy Base. In August, monitors in Trincomalee temporarily withdrew to Dambulla due to the security situation when shells landed near their accommodation.

The SLMM was involved in an enquiry after the massacre of 17 aid workers from the ACF in Muttur on 6 August, resulting in a controversial ruling against the SLA which caused international attention.

ADAPTING:

Operationally

During the first half of 2006, the operation was largely carried out as in preceding years, with the notable exception of naval monitoring, which was suspended on 11 May, and not resumed. Monitoring on land had to some extent, at times and in certain areas, to be reduced, partly due to restricted freedom of movement imposed by the Parties, partly self-imposed due to security concerns. The patrolling patterns had to be adapted both to the situation on the ground and the reduced monitoring staff from September.

Organisationally

In mid-2006, the drastic downsizing of the mission called for a thorough reconsidering of the operation and organisation. Vari-

ous approaches to accommodate the changes were considered, including the recruitment of monitors from other non-EU nations. In the end, it was decided that the number of monitors, for a number of practical as well as political reasons, would remain at about 30 only. Iceland and Norway agreed to re-enforce their contributions to fill critical vacancies.

Due to the reduced number of monitors available, also considering the security situation, SLMM's field deployment was adjusted with effect of 1 September. Still aiming to carry out a fully fledged operation in accordance with the CFA, the DO structure was redesigned, with DO Mannar merging with DO Vavuniya and DO Ampara merging with DO Batticaloa. All DO's remained operational on a continuous basis; DO Mannar and DO Ampara manned permanently by national staff, partly by visiting monitors.

For review of and maps depicting deployment, see 'Adapting' article, pages 70–74

ACHIEVEMENTS 2006

Operational assessment

Assessing achieved results – seen in relation to the mandated assignments and the additional tasks and objectives – in 2006, it should be noted that *the human resources* were radically reduced as of September, and that *the operational environment* radically changed for the worse towards the end of the year. Still, the operation was conducted largely in accordance to established concepts, plans and priorities, somewhat adapted to the emerging ground realities towards the end of the year.

The *monitoring* activity proceeded according to established patterns, covering the designated AOR throughout the year, intensified in the first half of the year due to the task accorded the SLMM at the Geneva talks as well as the serious humanitarian situation; with reduced capacity and intensifying in the latter half. The *liaising* activity continued according to established modalities, maintaining good but less frequent relations with both Parties, however turning somewhat strained due to the unfolding events. The *reporting* was carried out according to established routines, with two major reports regarding the Parties' adherence to the agreements reached at Geneva in addition.

More details on monitoring, liaising and reporting below

With the conflict escalating in clear violation of the letter as well as spirit of the CFA, and a growing reluctance from the Parties, not least the GOSL, to cooperate with the SLMM experienced during the first half of the year, the mission was less able to perform its basic function – of assisting the Parties – than before. Still, both Parties confirmed their commitment to the CFA, and to collaborate with the SLMM, indicating the value of upholding the mission as a mechanism. Although the LTTE insisted it could not guarantee the security of monitors from EU member states, and thereby in effect impairing the capacity and capability of the SLMM, the existence of the mission was not questioned.

With the Parties gradually moving to military confrontations, the ability of the SLMM to reduce tension was also limited. Yet, on a number of occasions locally, the mission still managed to exercise such a positive impact. It seems fair to assume that the mere presence of SLMM – as an external and neutral body – had an inherent value observing and reporting, although the potential restraining effect diminished as the conflict gradually turned into low-intensity warfare.

The significance ascribed to the SLMM by the Facilitator, the Co-Chairs, as well as expressed by the Parties, was noted on several occasions during the year, illustrated by the unprecedented request to the Parties by the former to reconfirm their commitment to cooperate with the mission, and the specially organised meeting over the situation of the SLMM in Oslo in June.

During 2006, the SLMM faced a major challenge in finding itself struggling with decreased credibility and confidence from the Parties – reaching an all-time low; strained media relations; and negative sentiments from the public in the South. Many field monitors found themselves in relations of distrust with local representatives of the Parties, and toiled with improving these relationships.

MONITORING:

Throughout 2006, monitoring was performed by the entire organisation, with field monitoring carried out on land and sea, until naval monitoring was suspended in May, not to be recommenced. All DO's remained open, despite downsizing and reorganisation in September.

The increasingly non-cooperative stance of the Parties, including restriction from both sides on access for SLMM monitors to areas of conflict and scenes of reported incidents, especially from July, made the mission's task the more challenging.

Despite the decidedly worsening operational conditions, the SLMM managed in principle to conduct its monitoring, with much resources devoted to receiving and following-up on a record high number of complaints received, particularly in April and May, and specifically monitoring agreements reached by the Parties at the Geneva talks in February. On a practical, yet critical, level, the SLMM played an instrumental role in making the Geneva talks a reality by escorting the LTTE delegation members to and from the conferences.

Increasing focus on security, the SLMM implemented measures to maintain the safety of all SLMM members and the security of the mission, based on an updated plan effective from the beginning of the year, implementing the first phase, restricting movements and preparing for evacuation in August, and withdrawing all monitors from the districts in late December due to a grave security situation.

Criticism of the SLMM regarding the recurrent issue of monitoring the human rights situation, which was not inscribed specifically in its mandate and consequently not carried out as such, was addressed by Amnesty International (AI) in its February report "A Climate of Fear in the East", noting that SLMM "[...] has been unable to effectively address the worsening human

“...the mere presence of the SLMM had an inherent value, observing and reporting.”

rights situation in eastern Sri Lanka. The SLMM is mandated to receive and enquire into complaints about breaches of the CFA, including killings and abductions, with parties to the CFA. However it does not have a mandate to independently investigate these breaches and can therefore do little more than raise the complaint with the allegedly responsible party.”

The International Crisis Group (ICG), in its November report “Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process”, criticised the Facilitator as well as the GOSL for ‘deliberately overlooking’ “many of the LTTE political killings and suppression of alternative Tamil political groups”, adding that “[...] certainly SLMM offices were frequently able to intervene when complaints were made against the LTTE. But many people were afraid to complain, knowing that the SLMM would not be able to defend them”.

LIAISING:

Throughout 2006, liaising was performed centrally and locally, although with reduced access to the Parties and less frequent meetings than in previous years. The SLMM was – for several reasons, not least the changing nature of the conflict and growing distrust between the Parties – less successful than in the initial years to maintain a cordial and constructive relationship. Still, fairly regular contact with both Parties was maintained on a central level, primarily through the respective peace secretariats. Also, the SLMM still met with institutions and leaders locally, although on a lower level. The access to key persons on both sides proved increasingly difficult, also because of the LTTE closure of its political offices in GOSL-controlled areas since 2005.

Local Monitoring Committee (LMC) meetings continued throughout 2006, subsiding at the end of the year. For most of 2006, the SLMM participated in a high number of general meetings, although fewer than the previous year, reflecting the less favourable attitude towards the mission from the Parties.

The SLMM engaged frequently with representatives of international non-governmental organisations (INGO's) and the international community. Due to the situation – and having on the ground information – it regularly briefed the latter in Colombo.

REPORTING:

Throughout 2006, reporting was performed by the entire organisation, and the SLMM remained a major – independent and accountable – source of information about the conflict situation, related to the CFA and prioritised parts of the mandate, especially regarding military and normalcy aspects. Towards the end of the year, at a time when several specific parts of the CFA had become practically irrelevant with regards to monitoring and reporting, the focus gradually turned towards looking into tendencies, in addition to incidents.

During the year, the SLMM regularly reported to the Facilitator and to the Parties, and produced numerous Special Reports. As of October, Weekly Situation Reports were issued, also published on the SLMM web site. Ten statements were issued.

One indication of the value and validity of the SLMM information

is the fact that the UN Secretary-General, in his report to the Security Council on children and armed conflict in Sri Lanka, systematically referred to the SLMM as a source on incidents of killing and maiming, as a result of the interaction with UNICEF locally – carried out in the spirit rather than the letter of the CFA. The key role of the mission was also illustrated by the terms of reference for the Special Advisor to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Allan Rock, on his field trip to Sri Lanka in November: to engage with the SLMM.

As an example of the credibility of the impartial role and reporting of the SLMM, the EU – in its statement on listing the LTTE as a terrorist organisation – said it “stands by all of the findings in the reports of the SLMM”.

Improving SLMM registration and reporting systems, the SLMM developed and established a tailored data system – the Incident Management System (IMS) – to cope with the escalating numbers of CFA violations, and advance reporting.

Reporting on the implementation of the agreements reached at the Geneva talks in February, the SLMM – based on targeted and intensified monitoring – presented two specifically compiled reports, one in June and one in September, leading up to the Geneva II talks.

Developing and exercise new media strategy, the HOM in the early part of the year exercised a policy of reporting in the public through an active presence in the national media, obtaining extensive coverage; a strategy that was redirected to a low-key media presence in the latter part of the year, following a worsening security situation and a reconsideration of the operational direction.

Operational documentation

In 2006, the SLMM received 3411 complaints, an increase of 65 percent compared to 2005. The SLMM participated in 3893 general (external) meetings at central (HQ) and local (LO, DO) level, and chaired 128 LMC meetings.

Complaints registered by the SLMM, 2006

| DISTRICT | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | D0 total |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|
| DO1 Jaffna | 88 | 39 | 50 | 92 | 146 | 80 | 83 | 26 | 49 | 72 | 76 | 46 | 847 |
| DO2 Mannar | 15 | 6 | 7 | 31 | 13 | 33 | 7 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 5 | 124 |
| DO3 Vavuniya | 19 | 17 | 22 | 47 | 47 | 35 | 31 | 21 | 44 | 35 | 50 | 21 | 389 |
| DO4 Trincomalee | 78 | 24 | 147 | 135 | 95 | 21 | 51 | 8 | 12 | 9 | 22 | 24 | 626 |
| DO5 Batticaloa | 50 | 38 | 75 | 90 | 135 | 119 | 95 | 141 | 102 | 122 | 126 | 72 | 1165 |
| DO6 Ampara | 11 | 8 | 19 | 13 | 10 | 10 | 36 | 29 | 8 | 48 | 29 | 8 | 229 |
| LO LTTE, Kilinochchi | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| HQ, Colombo | | | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 26 |
| Month total/Grand total | 261 | 132 | 324 | 411 | 449 | 299 | 305 | 231 | 220 | 294 | 308 | 177 | 3411 |

General and liaising meetings, 2006

| DISTRICT | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | D0 total |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|
| DO1 Jaffna | 63 | 48 | 54 | 43 | 43 | 29 | 44 | 39 | 35 | 34 | 17 | 23 | 472 |
| DO2 Mannar | 30 | 19 | 22 | 22 | 30 | 31 | 18 | 23 | 4 | 15 | 9 | 5 | 228 |
| DO3 Vavuniya | 46 | 34 | 31 | 30 | 26 | 21 | 17 | 46 | 24 | 35 | 35 | 18 | 363 |
| DO4 Trincomalee | 74 | 51 | 69 | 65 | 78 | 61 | 66 | 41 | 55 | 62 | 44 | 31 | 697 |
| DO5 Batticaloa | 54 | 35 | 31 | 60 | 69 | 56 | 33 | 26 | 30 | 23 | 27 | 21 | 465 |
| DO6 Ampara | 46 | 33 | 17 | 30 | 40 | 42 | 46 | 22 | 21 | 13 | 14 | 8 | 332 |
| NMT Jaffna | 34 | 21 | 35 | 25 | 39 | 22 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 176 |
| NMT Trincomalee | 18 | 18 | 11 | 15 | 9 | 6 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 77 |
| LO LTTE, Kilinochchi | 64 | 54 | 66 | 76 | 79 | 78 | 80 | 86 | 111 | 178 | 122 | 89 | 1083 |
| Month total/Grand total | 429 | 313 | 336 | 366 | 413 | 346 | 304 | 283 | 280 | 360 | 268 | 195 | 3893 |

LMC meetings chaired by the SLMM, 2006

| DISTRICT | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | D0 total |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|
| DO1 Jaffna | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 17 |
| DO2 Mannar | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 32 |
| DO3 Vavuniya | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 25 |
| DO4 Trincomalee | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| DO5 Batticaloa | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 35 |
| DO6 Ampara | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 18 |
| Month total/Grand total | 13 | 14 | 15 | 14 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 8 | 8 | 11 | 8 | 1 | 128 |

Sea Patrols conducted by SLMM NMT's, 2006

| | Jan | | Feb | | Mar | | Apr | | May | | Total |
|-------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Type | NMTJ | NMTT | NMTJ | NMTT | NMTJ | NMTT | NMTJ | NMTT | NMTJ | NMTT | |
| FPC/FAC | 8 | 0 | 15 | 2 | 18 | 1 | 28 | 4 | 9 | 1 | 86 |
| Troop Transport | 0 | 35 | 2 | 35 | 14 | 37 | 8 | 45 | 0 | 14 | 190 |
| FGB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| SBS | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 13 |
| IPC | 6 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 8 | 9 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 1 | 50 |
| Month total/Grand total | 17 | 38 | 26 | 40 | 44 | 47 | 42 | 55 | 14 | 16 | 339 |

Operational Overview 2007

SUMMARY OF THE SLMM'S SETTING, OBJECTIVES, ACTIVITIES
AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN 2007

2007 was an exceptional year in which the SLMM, in the face of a radically escalating conflict and a seriously worsening security situation was forced to make major alterations in its mode of operation. With the Parties increasingly engaging in armed confrontations, the SLMM saw the need to monitor the broad developments, still enquiring into incidents, but halting its rulings altogether.

SETTING 2007

Operational mandate

Mandated through the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was to assist the Parties in adhering to their commitments as stipulated in the agreement, by conducting international verification through on-site monitoring within six designated districts, and liaising with and between the Parties.

Operational environment

Militarily, 2007 saw a sharp of military activities by both Parties, escalating to low intensity war scenarios in the Eastern Province, and some areas in the Northern Province. Both provinces experienced extensive air operations by the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF), including a substantial increase in air-to-ground targeting. The South, Colombo included, was subject to a number of insurgency style bombings. Intense fighting occurred in the East during the first six months of the year, resulting in major civilian displacements and casualties. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ceased its overt military activities in the East in June. As new groups grappled for power, civilians continued to be victimised. Abductions, harassment, and politically motivated violence became increasingly widespread. Meanwhile, the military conflict moved to the North, causing increasing numbers of casualties and displacements, as in the East.

The government forces captured new ground, starting with the capture of Vakarai in January, following the seizure of Sampoor in August 2006, constituting a strategic shift as it was the first time in years that the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) had gained control of the coastline from Trincomalee to Batticaloa and the vital supply routes on land, denying the LTTE access to the eastern theatre from sea. Several Check Points (CP) stipulated in the CFA were rendered obsolete and previous demarcation of areas controlled by either Party became null and void. Several major incidents took place during the year, including bus bombs killing civilians, and the LTTE carrying out three operations with light

aircraft, in the North and in the South. Due to the escalating conflict, the SLMM lost access to great stretches of the Area of Operation (AOR) in both provinces.

Politically, 2007 was marked by an increasingly uncompromising stance exercised by both Parties, steadily moving towards fully fledged war, with the Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse quoted as saying "There is no ceasefire agreement". President Mahinda Rajapakse strengthened his position with the defection of 20 members of the opposition in Parliament crossing the floor to join the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) in January, ensuring his majority. The political rhetoric became increasingly harsh, and a growing concern and criticism voiced in the international community was refuted in the public, increasingly holding international presence at bay. In May, the United National Party (UNP) ruled out forming a national government with the SLFP administration of President Rajapakse, repeating its stance of a negotiated political solution to the conflict. A rift opened up within the Tamil Makkal Viduthala Pulikal (TMVP), with armed confrontation between factions loyal to the two senior leaders, Vinayagamorthy Muralitharan (Col Karuna Amman) and Sivanethurai Chandrakanthan (Pillayan), respectively, in May–June; the latter replaced Colonel Karuna as the party leader in April. In November, Karuna was arrested in the United Kingdom. The President in 2007 established the International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP), mandated to observe investigations and enquiries conducted by the National Commission of Inquiry, and to advise the latter. In June, it was reported that 376 Tamils were expelled by the authorities from Colombo, and taken to Vavuniya.

The Peace Process in 2007 was for all practical purposes defunct, following the October 2006 Geneva talks which failed to establish a new platform for bringing the Parties together. However, the Government of Norway retained its position as Facilitator, and remained in touch with the Parties, although with less frequency than before, the Special Envoy largely unable to visit Sri Lanka. Despite the extensive use of military means, the Parties hesitated to renounce the CFA. However, during the year they both openly demonstrated through official statements as well as practical actions, that the Agreement was perceived to be of diminishing relevance to the conflict.

“ 2007 was marked by both Parties steadily moving towards a fully fledged war.

On the occasion of the five years since the signing of the CFA (on 22 February) the former Special Envoy, now Minister for International Development of Norway, Erik Solheim commented that the establishment of the Agreement was a tremendous positive development for Sri Lanka, noting that his government remained in regular contact with the GOSL and the LTTE, Norway being willing to “go the extra mile to assist their peace endeavours at their request”. At a seminar hosted by the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka (NPC), the Norwegian Ambassador, Hans Brattskar in his speech noted that the CFA made political dialogue between the Parties possible, which “will have to be resumed, in order for a peaceful solution to the conflict to be found”. In a statement from the SLMM, the mission expressed its commitment to the Parties “as a neutral part, seeking continuously to develop a deep understanding of the conflict situation, with the sincere aim of finding ways to continue its contribution according to the mandate”. Also commenting on the anniversary, Senior Fellow of the Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies (IPCS) in New Delhi, N. Manoharan opined that “Presently the CFA is alive, but only on paper”, noting that the prevailing situation could best be described as ‘undeclared war’.

In June, Erik Solheim and his successor as Special Envoy, Jon Hanssen-Bauer, met with the President of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapakse in Geneva. The President indicated that an imminent visit by the Special Envoy to the country was not considered desirable due to the military situation. Shortly afterwards, on June 26, the Co-Chairs group met in Oslo deliberating on how it could continue to play a constructive role in the current situation. Ahead of the meeting, the LTTE Political Wing (PW) leader and senior negotiator, Suppayya Tamilselvan, stated that only the CFA could save the island from disaster; 2 November he was killed in an airstrike by the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) in Vanni.

With both Parties demonstrating that the CFA was perceived to be of little relevance (attempts to solve the conflict, suppressed by acts of war), an already widespread uncertainty, inside and outside the SLMM, about the purpose and meaningfulness of the mission emerged. Despite the fact that the Parties had set the CFA aside, and the SLMM was not in a position to fulfil its original mandate, there was no request for the SLMM to be pulled out; neither did the mission itself call for a withdrawal – although the option was planned for, and presented to the Nordic co-sponsors.

The formal tools of the peace process such as the CFA, the Facilitator, the SLMM and the Parties’ commitment to pursue peace through political processes, greatly contrasted with the reality on the ground and the growing public opinion in opposition to the Peace Process. For the SLMM, this complicated the operational setting, demanding the mission manoeuvre extremely cautiously.

OPERATION 2007

Operational attention

In 2007, the main focus of the Head of Mission (HOM) was to continue the operation, as far as possible, in accordance with the intentions and assignments of the CFA, building on but adjusting established procedures.

As the Parties turned to military means and the Peace Process came to a complete halt, a main objective of the SLMM became to adapt the operation – and consequently the organisation – into an instrument that again would be capable of contributing positively to a possible continuation of the Process and be relevant to the Parties, according to the intentions of the CFA.

On the *organisational side*, several challenges were identified that needed thorough attention, specifically:

- Assess the current external and internal situation, and adapt the SLMM organisation to be relevant in the present situation, with escalating conflict.
- Adjust the SLMM personnel body to the evolving organisational and operational challenges, with regards to individual proficiency and capability.
- Pursue the idea of developing a mechanism within the SLMM to cover the lack of ability to perform strategic assessments.
- Reconceptualise the three major modalities: monitoring, liaising, and reporting.

On the *operating side*, certain main tasks and objectives – beyond the stipulations inscribed into the CFA – were additionally defined:

Monitoring:

- Maintain presence and conduct continuous field monitoring in all designated districts despite partial withdrawal of international monitors and aggravated security situation.
- Reconceptualise the SLMM monitoring according to the spirit of the CFA documenting the key trends and issues in the conflict, addressing the elements influencing the motivation and behaviour of the Parties, using a threefold approach; field, policy and information monitoring.

Liaising:

- Re-establish SLMM’s credibility vis-à-vis the Parties, especially at the national level towards the peace secretariats; furthermore re-identify key stakeholders in order to reinforce relationships between the mission and key actors.
- Reconceptualise the SLMM liaising by confidence building activities, and identify unintentional conflict triggers.
- Re-establish SLMM practical dialogue with the Parties – with the aim of re-establishing the mission’s credibility and the Parties’ confidence in the mission.

Reporting:

- Reconceptualise the SLMM reporting, to inform the Parties and the Facilitator on issues feeding the conflict increase and decrease.
- Provide concrete information from the ground situation useful in preparation for potential dialogue, and producing the kind of information available solely through a professional, impartial and international actor.

Operational resources

To carry out the operation in 2007, the SLMM had at its disposal *human resources* constituted by 32 international monitors and 62 national staff (annual averages), and *financial resources* amount-

“Dawn in the East”



POLITICAL PROPAGANDA: The stepping up of GOSL military activities in the East during 2006–2007, was part of a larger campaign launched by President Rajapakse – the ‘Dawn in the East’, seeing the ‘sun rise’ again – aiming to recover control of LTTE-held areas, ‘liberating’ them from LTTE. Facsimile from local press, 2007.

ing to NOK 18.3 million. The size of national staff was reduced from approximately 70 in January–May, to 57 for the rest of the year. Early in the year, it became evident that the mission needed to recruit a variety of additional capabilities, strengthening its analytical and writing capability. *Logistical resources* were reinforced mainly by new vehicles and improved ICT systems. A feasibility and cost study for bullet-proofing vehicles was carried out in early 2007, although not implemented due to the substantial cost. Kevlar-based bulletproof vests were acquired to enhance personal security. Also, a new visual identity profile was introduced and implemented, including larger – and more easily visible – logos on vehicles, improving security. For operational reasons, a greater part of the SLMM international personnel body was relocated to Negombo in January–June.

For further details, see Part 03, ‘Operational Resources’

Major General (R) Lars J. Sølberg (NO) remained HOM throughout the year. In March, Jimmy Sølund (NO) replaced Jon Oskar Solnes (IS) as Chief of Staff (COS) in the new capacity of Mission Manager (MM), succeeded by Jonas Allanson (IS) in June.

Operational execution

DIRECTING:

In 2007, the HOM devoted extensive attention to adapting the SLMM to another ground reality, including a grave security situation, and to improve its relations with the Parties.

Based on the strategic processes initiated in 2006, the HOM decided on implementing major organisational and operational changes: a major strategic re-orientation of the SLMM. *Internally*, this included measures to enhance safety and security; *externally*, efforts were made to improve the working relationship with the Parties, not least by the re-appointment of a dedicated liai-

son officer to the GOSL/Secretariat for Co-ordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP).

In view of the prevailing situation at the beginning of the year, coupled with the worsening military situation and the halt of the Peace Process, the SLMM needed a careful re-consideration of the mandate and of the purpose of the mission, an issue which, however, was picked up by neither the Parties nor the Facilitator. The SLMM chose to examine the pertinent issue, developing adjusted modalities and mechanisms: what to monitor, what to report, and how to, relate to and communicate with the stakeholders.

Faced with operational objectives growing irrelevant, a lack of coherent policies and strategies, insufficient human resources, and an organisational structure no longer suited for the current situation, the HOM decided to reassess the direction and restructure the organisation. A two-fold plan was conceived; to handle current affairs, and adjust to the situation, seeking parallel long-term solutions through a strategy revision. Implementing the plan, a wide-ranging adaptation was carried out, described below.

Due to the generally declining security situation, with assassination plans against named SLMM monitors brought to his attention at the end of 2006, as well as the reduction of the mission size, the HOM (according to Frago 33/2006) – ordered a withdrawal of international monitors from the districts to Negombo, for a consolidation workshop of an undefined period. National staff members were offered leave from the districts; only those from the most vulnerable DO in Vavuniya accepted.

Monitoring activities were adjusted to fit the real situation, refocused on major trends and incidents in three monitoring arenas – by *field monitoring*, *policy monitoring*, and *information monitoring*.

The HOM initiated a fresh process aimed at enhancing personnel safety and operational security. One element was the option of reinforcing SLMM vehicles, acquiring armoured vehicles or protecting existing ones with Kevlar lining; an issue assessed on several occasions, and looked into again after December 2006. However, the question was put on hold due to various considerations. A new position of Security Manager was established.

In 2007, the Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) (Part 3 'Operations') and the Operation Order (OO) ('Hermes') were revised, however, not finalised. The SLMM Security Plan was continuously revised, published and distributed as Security Manual in December. Eight statements were issued by the SLMM; in addition 12 joint SLMM and SCOPP Press Releases were issued, following a new policy taking effect in June; 17 special reports were prepared.

For full overview and document contents:
www.slmm.info

In late 2007, the HOM declined requests for information from the Presidential Commission of Inquiry to Investigate and Inquire into Alleged Serious Violations of Human Rights, with reference to the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) and the imperative to uphold SLMM's integrity, as the information was considered sensitive. During the year, the HOM met several times with members of the IIGEP.

RUNNING:

In 2007, the SLMM devoted particular operational resources to monitoring an escalating military situation – adjusting modalities and methods, together with a restructuring of the organisation.

Following the withdrawal of international monitors from the districts at the start of the year, new operational concepts were introduced: *Presence in District (PID)* operations involved monitors staying in the District Offices (DO) for 2–5 days at a time, in addition to monitoring the situation in the respective DO from Negombo through a variety of means of communication. In this period, the additional concept of *Rapid Response Team (RRT)* operations was developed and practiced, responding to major CFA-related incidents – in the North and East as well as in the South of Sri Lanka – requiring immediate SLMM attention.

A new Security Manual, reflecting a focus on an all-inclusive security approach was developed, with a range of situation-specific security arrangements to be implemented locally, under the guidance of the Headquarters (HQ) management. Security measures were an integral – and extremely important – part of the restructuring process, including equipment as well as awareness, and with an intensified and continuous assessment of the evolving situation, at all levels, coordinated by the Security Manager.

After six months of refocusing and subsequent reorganisation of the SLMM, no further substantial organisational alterations were

implemented in the second part of 2007. Due to the regained positive working relationship with the SCOPP, representing the GOS side, it was again judged safe to re-man offices in the North and East on a permanent basis, reactivate the Colombo HQ premises, as well as re-install permanent Liaison Offices to the Parties in Kilinochchi and Colombo.

See 'Adapting' for organisational changes

Throughout the year, also during the temporary pullout, the SLMM enquired, registered, reported on cases and complaints; and also, on occasion, interceded in situations. Information gathered was put to the attention of local commanders, the SCOPP, and the LTTE Peace Secretariat (PS) for discussions.

The North

In the Northern Region, the SLMM focused on the escalating military conflict and its consequences for civilians. With the extension of the opening of the Omanthai CP, as part of the efforts to ease the humanitarian situation, the flow of goods to Vanni increased, and the SLMM monitored the pricing of essential items.

The East

In the Eastern Region, the SLMM focused on the increasing numbers of abductions and incidents of political violence. Furthermore, in the South, the SLMM continued to operate RRT's at locations of major, presumably CFA related incident.

ADAPTING:

Operationally

During 2007, the operation had to change profoundly in order to adapt to the radically changed situation on the ground, including centralisation of management. In March a new – intermediate – HQ/Operation Centre in Temple Road, Negombo was put to use, while the HQ/Support Centre continued to operate from Ward Place, Colombo. The Ops Centre was established to balance security concerns with the ambition of continuously staying operational. Continuously assessing the security situation, the HOM in June asserted the situation to be sufficiently safe to relocate also the Ops Centre to Colombo.

The mission chose to focus on major developments in two main regions rather than six districts. The regions were made up by the same districts, which were consequently still monitored through SLMM presence, as designated by the CFA.

The monitoring activities were reconceptualised to fit with the changed situation, focusing on major trends and incidents through field monitoring, policy monitoring, and information monitoring. The number and character of violations had already rendered traditional field monitoring less feasible. Moreover, the effect of traditional field monitoring was dwindling as the Parties for all practical purposes disregarded the SLMM rulings and statements. Hence, the HOM decided to implement a broader monitoring perspective and utilise the knowledge gained through monitoring in a more focused dialogue with the Parties.

The liaising activities (with a strong focus on dialogue) became a crucial part of the operational concept and were operationalised

“During 2007, the operation had to change profoundly in order to adapt to the radically changed situation on the ground.

through several initiatives, aimed at improving relations between the SLMM and the Parties. As local commanders and authorities, to a great extent, were governed by national leaders, the SLMM strengthened its dialogue capacity, targeting dialogue activities towards national level, mainly through the peace secretariats. Another important initiative was to appoint a designated LO to the GOSL. In May and June, the HOM formally informed the Parties about the intended changes through presentations in Colombo and Kilinochi, respectively, with positive responses from both.

The reporting activities were also adapted to the changed situation, with a revised communication and information strategy based on a low media profile, the suspension of SLMM rulings and complaints statistics, and a major refocus on the SLMM Weekly Monitoring Reports (WMR), which were further developed in cooperation with the peace secretariats. In August, the SLMM added an issue of the WMR especially adapted to the Parties, in addition to the two WMR issues for public and internal use, respectively. Through the production process for the WMR, the SLMM implicitly opened a forum for discussing incidents, trends, and the general development in the North and East. This was done by inviting the Parties to comment on the report before the public version was published on the SLMM web site. With the WMR becoming the main SLMM product, the mission focused much of the daily routines around it: In the regions and districts, Daily Situation Report (DSR) and Weekly Assessments (WA) described incidents, enquiries, and trends.

Organisationally

In terms of structuring and deployment, the AOR was divided into two regions, each comprising of three districts. This reflected the distinctively different development – and consequently, the operational situation (in the East and the North) which evolved in early 2007. Henceforth, in April monitors were redeployed to Trincomalee, the DO there constituting the *Regional Office (RO)* of the SLMM Eastern Region responsible for Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara Districts. In June, monitors were redeployed to Vavuniya, the DO there constituting the RO of the SLMM Northern Region, responsible for Jaffna, Mannar and Vavuniya Districts. Throughout the first half of 2007, with the exception of Mannar and Ampara, all district offices remained continually manned, though the former were visited on a regular basis. The issue of naval monitoring being resumed was brought up by SCOPP in a meeting with SLMM 12 October 2007. The HOM responded that naval monitoring was suspended, but that SLMM would on a continuous basis evaluate its monitoring methods (ref SLMM and SCOPP press release dated the same day).

At HQ level, several major adaptations were carried out, including a new concept for the Operation Centre, implying a division into three cells; one each for Field Monitoring, Information Monitoring, and Policy Monitoring. The position of Chief of Staff (COS) was split into a) a Deputy Head of Mission and b) a Mission Manager, the latter with extensive responsibilities related to internal executive activities. A number of other new positions were added, i.e. Policy Advisor, Information Manager, Information Analyst and Field Operations Analyst. Personnel with an academic background were recruited, specifically, to facilitate

the focus on analysing trends rather than focusing on single incidents. A designated Security Manager was recruited to embody the increased focus on security matters, on a parallel level to that of the Operations Manager. A designated Liaison Officer for interaction with the GOSL was re-instated to facilitate the renewed focus on the assisting role of the SLMM. Additionally, a Dialogue Team was established for the same purpose.

ACHIEVEMENTS 2007

Operational assessment

Assessing achieved results – seen in relation to the mandated assignments and the additional tasks and objectives – in 2007, it should be noted that the *human resources* remained radically reduced compared to pre-September 2006, and that the *operational environment* kept worsening during the year, to a state of low intensity warfare. Although continuing the operation – maintaining presence in all designated districts, monitoring and reporting as prescribed by the CFA – the SLMM was in effect prevented from carrying out much of its traditional operational field activities.

As the situation developed from bad in 2006 to worse in 2007 – regarding the operational setting with a deteriorating security situation and the operative role with a decreasing opportunity to assist the Parties and influence the course of events – the mere fact that the SLMM, by adapting to the situation, managed to exist and operate, without casualties, and managed to regain some of its severed position vis-à-vis the Parties was a major feat in 2007.

With the Parties steadily moving away from a peace process to renewed warfare, in effect ignoring the CFA and having largely disavowed the SLMM during 2006, the mission found itself in a faint position to assist the same Parties in adhering to their commitments to cease fire and return Sri Lankan society to normalcy. Still, the SLMM managed to re-establish good working relations with both Parties, avoiding to be perceived as partial and to attract undue counteraction.

Structure-wise, the SLMM managed to adapt the organisation to the escalating conflict situation – both in the districts and at HQ level, also re-enforcing recruitment of monitors. The new organisation structure was consolidated, with a few shortcomings due to lack of human resources and various practicalities. Still, the reorganisation of the mission and the reorientation of the operation were tangible results of the strategic adaption process. Thereby, credibility and confidence vis-à-vis the Parties was re-established, and the SLMM regained a potential relevance.

In a March statement, the Sri Lanka Democracy Forum (SLDF) considered the ceasefire “virtually non-functional” due to the Parties’ display of “total disregard” of the provisions of the CFA, rendering the role of the SLMM “totally inoperative” in a situation of an “all out war”.

MONITORING:

Throughout 2007, monitoring was performed by the entire organisation, field monitoring carried out on land only. All DO’s remained open, despite downsizing in 2006 and temporary pull-

out in early 2007. Field monitoring was restricted due to the security situation and impaired freedom of movement.

A reconceptualising of the monitoring modality, with the three-pronged monitoring concept – of combined field, policy, and information monitoring – was largely implemented. The latter part was however not fully executed due to lack of human resources. The revised modality enabled the SLMM to better understand and respond to the underlying causes of the conflict and thus enter into a more modest role in the actual stage of the conflict.

LIAISING:

During 2007, the SLMM largely managed to maintain and strengthen its liaising function, particularly at the central level, through the Parties' peace secretariats. The liaising and dialogue activities were intensified, improving relations between the mission and the Parties, contributing to restored confidence and credibility vis-à-vis the peace secretariats. Keeping communications open with the LTTE was perceived essential, and throughout the year, the HOM met with LTTE leaders in Kilinochchi on several occasions. As part of the renewed focus on dialogue, a designated LO GOSL was re-appointed in June (after being discontinued in 2003), and a Dialogue Team was established in Colombo. Weekly meetings with the SCOPP were initiated, focusing on recent developments in the AOR. During the year, the relations between the SLMM and the SCOPP improved.

Especially in the second half of the year, the Parties – through their respective peace secretariats – again engaged actively with the SLMM, exchanging views and positions on the current situation. Thereby, the space in which the SLMM could influence on the secretariats' common understanding of the situation and the respective commitments to the CFA was to a great extent restored. A highly tangible result of the improved relation with the GOSL was the decision by the SLMM and the SCOPP to issue joint press releases after regular meetings. On announcing the new practise in June, the Secretary General of SCOPP, Dr. Rajiva Wijesinha called such dissemination of accurate information a contribution to promote confidence in the Peace Process, also noting the need to ensure confidence in the mission of



CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS: Due to the drastically changed operational environment – and mission capacity – in 2006/2007, the HOM called for a reconceptualisation of SLMM monitoring, redirecting the operation, restructuring the organisation, and partially redeploying the staff.

“... the Parties again engaged actively with the SLMM, exchanging views and positions.”

the SLMM. The SCOPP and the SLMM agreed that the weekly meetings resulted in expanded understanding, by both sides, of issues relating to the CFA and the Peace Process.

REPORTING:

Throughout 2007, reporting was performed by the entire organisation, and the SLMM remained a major – independent and accountable – source of information about the conflict situation, related to the CFA and prioritised parts of the mandate.

The SLMM reconceptualised its reporting, issuing a credible weekly public reports and exercising a lower media profile. By the end of 2007, the public bashing of the SLMM had subsided substantially – an indication of the success of the largely low-key public information strategy, combined with intensified communications directly with the Parties.

Referring to child abductions and forced recruitment by the Karuna faction, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) in its January 2007 report 'Complicit in Crime', noted that "The only two organizations publicly keeping track are the Norwegian-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) and UNICEF", referring to SLMM information regarding the Karuna faction as well as the LTTE. In this report (repeated in the August 'Return to War' report), the HRW recommended to the LTTE and the Karuna group, respectively to allow UNICEF, SLMM, as well as domestic and international agencies access to all their camps – military and otherwise – to assess the age of recruits, and to identify children for demobilisation.

Operational documentation

In 2007, the SLMM received 864 complaints, a radical reduction compared to 2006 and previous years, as a consequence of reduced presence in the districts for large parts of the year, thereby also hampering the accessibility to civilian complainants. Additionally, as the ruling system was abandoned by the HOM, the Parties did not have the same incentive to launch complaints, further decreasing the number.

The SLMM participated in 1704 meetings at HQ and DO level combined, and chaired 44 Local Monitoring Committee (LMC) meetings. The lower number of general meetings – compared to 3893 the previous year and a record of the 5803 in 2005 – was again due to less presence in the districts as well as the reduced number of monitors. The number of LMC meetings was reduced to about a third compared to 2007, mainly due to the reasons noted above and the fact that HOM abandoned the ruling system. Fewer complaints and consequently fewer meetings for inquiry purposes also contributed to the decrease in meetings. Also, the conflict situation made such meetings less feasible, mainly because the periodical absence of monitors in the districts, partly due to difficulties for committee members to attend meetings and travel between GOSL- and LTTE-controlled areas.

Complaints registered by the SLMM, 2007

| DISTRICT | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | D0 total |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|
| D01 Jaffna | 39 | 17 | 29 | 10 | 1 | 6 | 27 | 19 | 21 | 19 | 3 | 0 | 191 |
| D02 Mannar | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| D03 Vavuniya | 10 | 1 | 10 | 9 | 3 | 9 | 31 | 8 | 11 | 15 | 14 | 25 | 146 |
| D04 Trincomalee | 4 | 7 | 16 | 9 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 11 | 17 | 17 | 11 | 111 |
| D05 Batticaloa | 58 | 31 | 34 | 26 | 17 | 23 | 11 | 4 | 17 | 15 | 14 | 26 | 276 |
| D06 Ampara | 17 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 15 | 102 |
| LO LTTE, Kilinochchi | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| HQ, Colombo | 3 | 3 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 31 |
| Month total/Grand total | 131 | 68 | 98 | 68 | 38 | 53 | 84 | 40 | 69 | 82 | 55 | 78 | 864 |

General and liaising meetings, 2007

| DISTRICT | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | D0 total |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|
| D01 Jaffna | 9 | 20 | 7 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 13 | 23 | 21 | 23 | 128 |
| D02 Mannar | 3 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 8 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 40 |
| D03 Vavuniya | 9 | 8 | 12 | 1 | 2 | 12 | 15 | 16 | 10 | 16 | 20 | 20 | 141 |
| D04 Trincomalee | 16 | 21 | 28 | 17 | 9 | 8 | 1 | 42 | 20 | 29 | 16 | 18 | 225 |
| D05 Batticaloa | 9 | 7 | 9 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 14 | 24 | 13 | 94 |
| D06 Ampara | 4 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 9 | 43 |
| LO LTTE, Kilinochchi | 108 | 111 | 119 | 123 | 120 | 112 | 38 | 84 | 78 | 66 | 41 | 33 | 1033 |
| Month total/Grand total | 158 | 170 | 183 | 153 | 144 | 134 | 58 | 160 | 140 | 154 | 131 | 119 | 1704 |

LMC meetings chaired by the SLMM, 2007

| DISTRICT | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | D0 total |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|
| D01 Jaffna | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 9 |
| D02 Mannar | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 11 |
| D03 Vavuniya | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 14 |
| D04 Trincomalee | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| D05 Batticaloa | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| D06 Ampara | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Month total/Grand total | 2 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 44 |



MONTHLY REVIEWS, 2002–2007

The SLMM executed its operation throughout the year and in all districts, according to the set priorities and core activities, until terminating in early 2008.

The Monthly Reviews are designed to present a condensed picture of SLMM activities, major incidents and key statistics for each month; covering the period March 2002 until December 2007 – the last full month of field monitoring operation (January 2008 being covered in the Overview, 2008-article).

These brief outlines do not constitute a comprehensive account, neither of the setting nor the operation; rather they are aimed at presenting a basic record of the SLMM operation. It should be noted that the space available does not allow for a complete review; nor does a complete and accurate record for each and every month exist.

One main element of SLMM's operation was to record and report major events relevant to the CFA (reported on a daily basis from the LO's, DO's and NMT's) and edited into various reports at HQ. These reviews are based on scrutiny of more than 70 000 files held in SLMM's own records, reports and correspondence.

The main section of each review is comprised of the following elements: Structure, Attention, Monitoring, Liaising and Reporting. Structure covers personnel and premises; including some major investments in terms of procurements. Attention describes the main operational focus of that month (not always as a direct result of forward planning, more often as a result of events taking place). Monitoring describes SLMM activities in the field and major events that took place, relevant to the operation. Liaising records major high-level meetings; in the main with the participation of HOM or his deputy. Reporting covers the ongoing reporting, internally and externally, including press statements.

In each review, significant statistical records add to the understanding of the utilisation of SLMM resources: the number of international monitors and national staff per month, the number of complaints received, the number of naval monitoring patrols carried out, the number of general meetings held through-

out the SLMM AOO and also the number of LMC meetings held. The figures derive from overall data presented by each respective Annual Review and cover the entire organisation. Comprehensive data on personnel is found in the Part 03; 'Operational Resources'. An explanation of the statistics is found in the separate introductory text to this section.

ACRONYMS

For the sake of brevity, a number of acronyms are used, some of which are not included in the overall acronyms list see pages 4–5:

| | |
|---------------|---|
| Cdr(s) | Commander(s) |
| CP | Check Point |
| DIG | Deputy Inspector General |
| DSR | Daily Situation Report |
| E/E | Exit/Entry (point) |
| EPDP | Eelam People's Democratic Party |
| EPRLF | Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front |
| FDL | Forward Defence Locality |
| FPC | Fast Patrol Craft |
| GA | Government Agent |
| HSZ | High Security Zone |
| IDP | Internally displaced person |
| KKS | Kankasanturai |
| MFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| MOD | Ministry of Defence |
| MSR | Monthly Situation Report |
| MW | Military Wing |
| PID | Presence in District |
| PLOTE | People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam |
| PM | Prime Minister |
| POW | Prisoner of War |
| PS | Permanent Secretary |
| PW | Political Wing |
| RRT | Rapid Response Team |
| SF | Security Forces |
| SG | Secretary General |
| SLA | Sri Lanka Army |
| SLAF | Sri Lanka Air Force |
| SLFP | Sri Lanka Freedom Party |
| SLN | Sri Lanka Navy |
| SLP | Sri Lanka Police |
| SLPS | Sri Lanka Police Service |
| STF | Special Task Force |
| TELO | Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation |
| TMVP | Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal |
| TNA | Tamil National Alliance |
| TRO | Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation |
| UAV | Unmanned Aerial Vehicle |
| UNP | United National Party |
| WSR | Weekly Situation Report |
| ZOS | Zone of Separation |

March 2002

| | |
|--------------------------------|-----------|
| International monitors: | 21 |
| National staff: | 2 |

Structure: HOM, Maj. Gen. (R) T. Furuhovde (NO); DHOM/COS, Brig (R) H. Haukland (NO); COO, Mr. T. Kaupilla (FI); LO GOSL, Mr. N.L. Lundin (SE) and LO LTTE, Mr. P. Hartikainen (FI). DO's Trincomalee, Mannar and Vavuniya permanently established. LO LTTE temporarily deployed. HQ established in Hotel Lanka Oberoi. First Toyota Hilux 4x4 vehicle received. HQ employs the two first national staff employed by HQ.

Attention: Operational attention on establishing the mission, meeting the Parties and writing operational and administrative procedures.

Monitoring: Emphasis, firmly, on establishing the mission in accordance with the CFA. First complaint received in HQ from GOSL, 13 March. Two monitors went to Batticaloa same day for very first field visit, to make inquiries. Monitors to all districts for reconnaissance purpose, 16–17 March. Three districts fully deployed by end of month; LO LTTE initially deployed on a temporary basis. Monitors observed the part disarmament of paramilitary group PLOTE in Jaffna and Vavuniya (21 March) and official weapons handover by paramilitary EPDP in Jaffna, Trincomalee and Batticaloa two days later. Monitors patrolled districts to gain knowledge of respective AOR's and started immediately establishing contacts with local representatives of the Parties, including inquiring into complaints received.

Liaising: HOM, arriving in Sri Lanka 2 March, met with the PM, Mr. R. Wickramasinghe, the Minister of Economic Reform, Mr. M. Moragoda and SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke same day. First meeting with LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan, 6 March in Malavi; followed by a meeting with LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran and LTTE PW Leader in Kilinochchi next day. Mr. T. Stangeland from the Norwegian MFA attended the meetings. HOM subsequently met LTTE Chief Negotiator, Mr. A. Balasingham and LTTE PW Leader in Puthukudiruppu. DO Trincomalee held its first introductory LMC meeting. In addition, HOM met with the Ambassador of Norway, Mr. J. Westborg.

Reporting: Monthly report produced by HOM sent to Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|-----------------------------|-----------|
| Complaints received: | 17 |
| Naval patrols: | 0 |
| General meetings: | 10 |
| LMC meetings: | 1 |

April 2002

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 20 |
| National staff: | 13 |

Structure: DO's Jaffna, Batticaloa and Ampara, including LO LTTE, permanently established early in the month. DO Mannar opened new office adjacent to accommodation house/temporary office. National staff employed at DO's.

Attention: Operational attention remained on establishing the mission, as well as implementing operational procedures, becoming acquainted with the districts and building contact nets with the Parties and other stakeholders.

Monitoring: The first HOM Directive (operational matters and media guidelines) issued. Activity in the districts, all deployed and operative by 8 March, continued with patrols of respective AOR's for familiarisation and inquiries into complaints. Monitors, having established a contact base, worked hard at gaining confidence with the Parties and other stakeholders such as local community leaders, co-operative societies, etc. First sea patrol took place with a monitor from Trincomalee joining SLN on a 12 hour patrol. HOM officially opened the A9 for traffic, 8 April; an event that gathered around fifty thousand people at Muhammalai E/E point, somewhat less at Omanthai. First serious incident occurred when six SLN vessels intercepted three LTTE vessels southeast of Trincomalee; incident settled peacefully with intervention from a monitor. LTTE opened political offices in the districts outside areas controlled by itself. LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabhakaran held a press conference for the first time in ten years, witnessed by SLMM.

Liaising: HOM had meetings twice with the Defence Secr. Mr. A. Fernando and his Service Cdrs. and SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke, with Minister of Economic Reform, Mr. M. Moragoda present in one. He met SG SCOPP separately once, with LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamil-selvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S Puleedevan in Kilinochchi. LMC meetings held in all districts. The first HOM conference was held. In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced by HOM sent to Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 101 |
| Naval patrols: | 1 |
| General meetings: | 132 |
| LMC meetings: | 18 |

May 2002

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 32 |
| National staff: | 14 |

Structure: NMT Trincomalee (NMT-T) deployed and operational.

Attention: Operational attention remained on familiarisation of the districts and building of contact nets with the Parties and other stakeholders. Focus on incidents at sea.

Monitoring: Familiarisation with respective districts and establishing contacts still very much driving the monitors. Patrolling and complaints inquiries continued. Another two serious incidents at sea highlighted the need for dedicated naval monitors resulting in a NMT becoming operational, 30 May. The first sea incident took place, 1 May, when SLN confronted and sank two trawlers alleged to be LTTE vessels off the Vakara coast. It was later found that the vessels belonged to Muslims. In the second incident, direct fire was opened from a fishing boat against a SLN vessel; SLN retaliation resulting in the boat exploding and sinking. An unofficial LTTE sea movement took place, causing a protest from GOSL. Though SLMM was informed by the LTTE, information was not divulged to the other party. GOSL demanded approved arrangements for such movements in the future. LTTE formally complained about UAV flights in the skies above Mullaithivu.

Liaising: HOM had a meeting with the Defence Secr., Mr. A. Fernando and his Service Cdrs. and SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke and Minister of Economic Reform, Mr. M. Moragoda; meeting SG SCOPP and the Northern Naval Cdr. in Jaffna. On 10 May HOM chaired the first meeting between local SLA Cdrs. and LTTE MW Cdrs. in ZOS Omanthai E/E point; also meeting local Service Cdrs. and local LTTE PW and MW leaders in Ampara, Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts. LMC meetings held in all districts. In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced by HOM sent to Facilitator and contributing countries. One press statement issued stating that the Parties' compliance with CFA was going extremely well.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 136 |
| Naval patrols: | 2 |
| General meetings: | 181 |
| LMC meetings: | 16 |

June 2002

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 42 |
| National staff: | 21 |

Structure: Mr. T. Torkelsson (IS) first PIO. Mr. P.E. Bjerke (NO) replaced Mr. P. Hartikainen (FI) as Head of LO LTTE. HQ moved into premises at 399 Galle Road, Colombo 3. DO Vavuniya moved into a second accommodation house. DO Ampara established POC Akkaraipattu.

Attention: Operational attention on handling of incidents at sea, efforts in building relationships between the Parties and return to normalcy.

Monitoring: Emphasis on establishing contacts, patrolling, receiving complaints and inquiring into incidents. Tension between EPDP and LTTE escalated on Velanai, both groups trying to gain political control. One LTTE member allegedly attacked by EPDP cadres assisted by a group of SLN soldiers. In the East, tensions rose between Muslims and Tamils, with people reportedly killed and shops set on fire. Curfew subsequently imposed in Valaichenai in Batticaloa district and Muttur south of Trincomalee Bay. Hartals observed in Trincomalee town, SLMM monitors witnessing riots; LTTE officially requesting people stay calm. HQ Ops busy working out procedures for LTTE sea movements, discussing the issue at length with both Parties.

Liaising: HOM had a meeting with the Defence Secr., Mr. A. Fernando and his Service Cdrs. and meeting SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke; twice meeting LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamil-selvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi. Additionally, he met separately with Sea Tiger Leader, Col. Soosai and SG LTTE PS. In Jaffna, HOM chaired a meeting between local Service Cdrs. and local LTTE PW leader plus other PW representatives, attended also by SG LTTE PS. LMC meetings held in all districts. In addition, HOM briefed the Norwegian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. V. Helgesen, and held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced by HOM sent to Facilitator and contributing countries. Two press statements issued; one concerning access for LTTE members to Jaffna islands and the eastern sea route; the second re SLMM request for an independent special commission on the Velanai incident.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 133 |
| Naval patrols: | 4 |
| General meetings: | 229 |
| LMC meetings: | 16 |

July 2002

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 42 |
| National staff: | 28 |

Structure: NMT Jaffna (NMT-J) established. Mr. H.J. Hestvang (DK) replaced Mr. P.E. Bjerke (NO) as Head of LO LTTE. A third building (second accommodation) acquired in Vavunya; a second accommodation house acquired in Jaffna. DO Jaffna established POC Velanai.

Attention: Operational attention on handling of incidents at sea and dealings with increased number of complaints.

Monitoring: Significant increase in complaints (close to threefold), in Jaffna in particular (almost fivefold), with inquiries requiring substantial monitoring resources. Patrolling remained a priority. *In the North*, a serious incident at sea occurred when two naval monitors from Jaffna, while on patrol with SLN, were required to inspect a suspected LTTE trawler near Iranathivu Island. Monitors hindered by LTTE crew from rejoining the SLN vessel and taken hostage; released unharmed a few hours later. Both Parties issued statements blaming the other. GOSL accused LTTE of establishing a new camp at Rufus Kulam; SLMM findings did not support the complaint. At Muhamalai FDL a SLA soldier crossed the ZOS and opened fire on LTTE cadres injuring two; shot dead in return. Previous tension and incident on Velanai Island, factors in the establishment of DO Jaffna's POC there.

Liaising: HOM had a meeting with the Defence Sec., Mr. A. Fernando and his Service Cdrs. and SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke. In Batticaloa, HOM chaired a meeting between SG SCOPP and local Service Cdrs. and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan, chairing a second meeting between SG SCOPP, SG LTTE PS and local LTTE PW and MW leaders; similar meetings in Muttur and Sampoor. Additionally, he joined a meeting between SG SCOPP and local LMC members in Muttur, meeting LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS in Kilinochchi; separately meeting Sea Tiger Leader, Col. Soosai and SG LTTE PS in Mullaithivu. In Mannar, HOM met with the GA. LMC meetings held in all districts apart from Jaffna. *In addition*, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced by HOM sent to Facilitator and contributing countries. Six press statements issued.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 311 |
| Naval patrols: | 13 |
| General meetings: | 241 |
| LMC meetings: | 16 |

August 2002

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 42 |
| National staff: | 33 |

Structure: DO Mannar moved into a second accommodation house; DO Batticaloa established POC Valaichchenai.

Attention: Operational attention on LTTE sea movements and dealing with complaints.

Monitoring: Technical arrangements re LTTE sea movements agreed with the Parties, 12 August, with first such movement taking place a week later from Mullaithivu to Vakara and the second a day later returning to Mullaithivu. Four LTTE vessels took part, a monitor on each, including on escorting SLN vessels. Though deemed a success, certain safety and communication arrangements were not satisfactory, LTTE convoy also sailing too close to the coastline. SLMM monitoring SLA vacating school buildings in the districts, only 13 not vacated whereof one in Jaffna. On Velanai Island an incident took place when SLN soldiers attacked and robbed a toddy bar following a SLN Buddha shrine having been vandalised. Monitors in all districts continued inquiries into the many complaints, though the number reported was down somewhat on the previous month. Normal but extensive patrolling in all districts.

Liaising: HOM had a meeting with the Defence Sec. Mr. A. Fernando and his Service Cdrs. and SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke; also meeting once LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi; separately meeting PW Leader and Sea Tiger Leader, Col. Soosai. In Ampara, HOM met with local LTTE PW and MW leaders, followed by a separate meeting with SG SCOPP and Senior STF Officers. LMC meetings held in all districts apart from Jaffna.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced by HOM sent to Facilitator and contributing countries. Two press statements issued, one re complaints and CFA violations as of 31 July; the second re the first successful LTTE sea movement with SLMM inspection and monitoring.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 198 |
| Naval patrols: | 13 |
| General meetings: | 237 |
| LMC meetings: | 16 |

September 2002

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 46 |
| National staff: | 33 |

Structure: Mr. J. Anteroine (FI) replaced Mr. T. Kaupilla (FI) as COO. DO Trincomalee established POC Muttur.

Attention: Operational attention on keeping the channels open between the Parties and dealing with complaints.

Monitoring: Complaints, although a high number received, drastically reduced since July; monitors in all districts spending substantial resources on inquiries. At Muhamalai, SLMM planned and facilitated installation of a direct telephone line between SLA and LTTE. At Hartley College and the Catholic Girls College in Point Pedro/Jaffna, both inside the SLA HSZ, students were not allowed to decorate the school with LTTE propaganda; students and civilians attacked the HSZ, with LTTE believed to be behind; SLMM monitored the unrest. First meeting between the Parties in Trincomalee facilitated and chaired by SLMM. HOM issued second directive, dealing with SLMM handling of child recruitment. Monitors escorted and monitored LTTE transport by road from Batticaloa to Vanni. LTTE captured seven SLA soldiers claimed to have entered their area. POW exchange at Omanthai ZOS without SLMM involvement. One successful LTTE sea movement planned and monitored by SLMM.

Liaising: HOM had a meeting with the Defence Sec., Mr. A. Fernando and his Service Cdrs. and SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke; separately meeting with SG SCOPP; meeting once with LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi. HOM chaired a meeting in ZOS Muhamalai between Jaffna SF Cdr. and LTTE Northern Flank Cdr., a meeting also attended by SG LTTE PS. Separate meetings with SF Cdr. and Deputy Navy Cdr. in Jaffna, also meeting with GA in Vavuniya. LMC meetings held in all districts.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced by HOM sent to Facilitator and contributing countries. One press statement issued, stating that ceasefire complaints against GOSL and LTTE were down by 40%.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 186 |
| Naval patrols: | 34 |
| General meetings: | 257 |
| LMC meetings: | 16 |

October 2002

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 46 |
| National staff: | 33 |

Structure: DO Jaffna established POC Delft.

Attention: Operational attention on handling complaints, on civilian unrest and LTTE sea movements.

Monitoring: Highest number of complaints to date, inquiries straining resources in the districts; also maintaining a significant number of patrols. Many of the complaints, especially in Jaffna indicated a large LTTE recruitment drive. Tension escalated out of control on Delft Island in Jaffna district, prompted by opening of EPDP office, which was attacked by a mob of angry civilians. SLMM successful in calming the situation, EPDP cadres eventually left the island. SLMM subsequently opened a POC there. In Kanchankuda in Ampara district 500–600 civilians stormed a STF camp; seven civilians died, another 14 injured. Civilian unrest in East and North, allegedly fueled by LTTE, caused great concern and had negative effect on the desire for return to normalcy. Two return and one single LTTE sea movement required substantial resources from the NMT's; maintaining normal patrol pattern.

Liaising: HOM and the Ambassador of Norway, Mr. J. Westborg, met twice with PM R. Wickramasinghe, Minister of Economical Reform, Mr. M. Moragoda and SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke. He had a meeting with the Defence Sec., Mr. A. Fernando and his Service Cdrs. and SG SCOPP; with additional meeting with SG SCOPP. HOM met with LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabhakaran, LTTE Chief Negotiator, Mr. A. Balasingham and LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan in Kilinochchi, separately meeting LTTE PW Leader and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan; also meeting separately with local Service Cdrs. and LTTE PW and MW leaders in Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara districts. LMC meetings held in all districts with increased frequency. *In addition*, HOM met the Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. V. Helgesen and the Special Envoy, Mr. E. Solheim, and held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced by HOM sent to Facilitator and contributing countries. Two press statements issued, one re loss of life and injuries when a crowd forcefully entered a STF camp in Ampara district, the second with a statement from HOM on 'A Time for patience, justice and courage'.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 377 |
| Naval patrols: | 24 |
| General meetings: | 332 |
| LMC meetings: | 23 |

November 2002

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 45 |
| National staff: | 33 |

Structure: Monitors in Ampara District moved to another accommodation house.

Attention: Operational attention on the establishment of Sub-committee on De-escalation and Normalisation (SDN) meetings and the prevailing tension on Delft Island.

Monitoring: Monitors in all districts continued inquiries into complaints, with normal patrol pattern both on land and at sea carried out in all districts. Considerable effort on establishment of the SDN meetings held in Vavuniya, Trincomalee and Ampara districts. In Trincomalee harbour, SLN arrested a LTTE dinghy with six cadres in possession of 34 mines and radio equipment. LTTE carried out a sea movement without prior notification and as such with no involvement from SLMM. Civilians on Delft Island in Jaffna district started rotational hunger strike in opposition to the presence of EPDP. Another 40 EPDP cadres returned to the island in a SLN landing craft, causing protests and riots with civilian and LTTE participation. SLMM maintained a daily presence for almost one month, having a positive effect and greatly contributing to maintaining situation control.

Liaising: HOM had a meeting with the Defence Sec., Mr. A. Fernando and his Service Cdrs. and SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke; also meeting SG SCOPP separately; meeting once LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi. Additionally, HOM participated in first SDN meeting held in ZOS Omanthai. The Defence Sec. and the Ambassador of Norway, Mr. J. Westborg attended the meeting along with Military Cdrs. from GOSL and MW leaders from LTTE. LMC meetings held in all districts apart from Jaffna. *In addition*, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone; also meeting the Japanese Special Envoy, Mr. Y. Akashi and the Ambassador of Japan.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced by HOM sent to Facilitator and contributing countries. One press statement issued re a correction to SLMM PIO being wrongly quoted in Daily Mirror.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 165 |
| Naval patrols: | 20 |
| General meetings: | 278 |
| LMC meetings: | 19 |

December 2002

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 46 |
| National staff: | 33 |

Structure: No significant changes.

Attention: Operational attention on dealing with demarcation lines between the Parties.

Monitoring: Monitors in all districts carried out normal duties without any major changes in terms of patrol pattern, meetings or inquiries. HOM, HQ and DO's worked hard on establishing procedures for SLMM to enquire into complaints raised by GOSL against the LTTE concerning demarcation lines. Two operation orders were issued, both for Mannar district; none executed, mainly due to non-cooperation from LTTE. Jaffna SF Cdr. proposed de-escalation with regards to HSZ, agreeing to removal of Jaffna HSZ under condition of LTTE disarmament, prompting HOM to issue a letter re balance of power. Tension on Delft Island subsided due to significant contribution from SLMM monitors.

Liaising: HOM had a meeting with the Defence Sec., Mr. A. Fernando and his Service Cdrs. and SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke; also meeting SG SCOPP separately; meeting once with LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi. HOM chaired a SDN meeting in ZOS Muhammadalai between the Northern Naval Cdr. and Sea Tiger Leader, Col. Soosai. LMC meetings held in all districts.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone; meeting the British High Commissioner in Colombo.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced by HOM sent to Facilitator and contributing countries. One press statement issued, from HOM, on security, normalisation and the gradual change towards a new Sri Lanka.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 162 |
| Naval patrols: | 22 |
| General meetings: | 301 |
| LMC meetings: | 16 |

January 2003

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 46 |
| National staff: | 36 |

Structure: Mr. H. Liljeström (SE) replaced Mr. H. J. Hestvang (DK) as Head of LO LTTE.

Attention: Operational attention was on patrolling and surveying SF occupied property outside HSZ in Jaffna.

Monitoring: Emphasis in the districts was mainly on patrolling the respective AOR's, and inquiring into an increased number of complaints compared to the two previous months. The atmosphere was generally good with high expectations from both Parties with regards to the peace talks. LTTE female cadres wearing waist belts caused some tension with SLA formally prohibiting the practice, claiming it was part of their uniform. In Jaffna, monitors coordinated a survey of buildings outside the HSZ still occupied by SF. SLA, carrying out the survey, allowed for LTTE to be present as observers and the process was executed in an amicable way. Sea patrols continued with normal frequency no significant incidents taking place.

Liaising: HOM held a meeting with the Defence Secr., Mr. A. Fernando and his Service Cdrs.; regular meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke and a meeting with LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi. He chaired a meeting in Vavunathivu between the Defence Secr. and his Service Cdrs. and a LTTE delegation lead by their Eastern MW Leader, Col. Karuna. Additionally he met the Army Cdr., Lt. Gen. Kottegoda in Colombo and local SF Cdrs. in Jaffna. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in the districts.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met with the Ambassador of Italy.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. monthly report produced by HOM sent to the Facilitator and the contributing countries. Two press statements issued; one re complaints and violations of the CFA in December 2002; the second re the Muslim factor, provocative actions and child recruitment discussed in the East.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 262 |
| Naval patrols: | 15 |
| General meetings: | 342 |
| LMC meetings: | 16 |

February 2003

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 45 |
| National staff: | 37 |

Structure: LO LTTE moved from LTTE Guest House and established office/accommodation in alternative house just off the A9 road Kilinochchi. POC Akkaraipattu moved to new location.

Attention: Operational attention maintained on patrolling on land and at sea, incl. focus on unrest in Jaffna after the Manipay and Delft incidents.

Monitoring: Situation remained reasonably calm, with enthusiasm for peace talks. Continued high monitoring activity incl. increased sea patrolling activities, with the first LTTE sea movement in four months. Three serious incidents; the first involving two Jaffna-based SLMM naval monitors on SLN patrol south of Delft Island; during inspection of a suspicious fishing vessel and the discovery of a 23mm gun, the crew set fire to the vessel, resulting in the monitors having to jump overboard; they were picked up by a SLN Dvora and learned that the crew had committed suicide. The second involved eight female cadres (wearing belts) assaulted by SLA near Maipay/Jaffna; the third in Kuchaveli, when seven armed LTTE cadres were surrounded by SLN. Mediation by monitors and direct intervention by HOM resulted in release the same day. A group of civilians, representing 13 local organizations, blamed SLMM for the two first incidents and demonstrated outside DO Jaffna. Ethnic tension on the rise in the East; both Parties agreed that SLMM should facilitate and arrange meetings between Tamils and Muslims.

Liaising: HOM held a meeting with the Defence Secr., Mr. A. Fernando and his Service Cdrs.; regular meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke; chairing a meeting in Vavunathivu between the Defence Secr. and his Service Cdrs. and a LTTE delegation lead by Eastern MW Leader, Col. Karuna. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in the districts apart from in Batticaloa.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met the Japanese Special Envoy, Mr. Y. Akashi and the Ambassador of Japan; a delegation from Non Violent Peace Force (NVPF) and the Head of UNICEF in Sri Lanka.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. monthly report produced by HOM sent to the Facilitator and the contributing countries. Three press statements issued.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 207 |
| Naval patrols: | 25 |
| General meetings: | 369 |
| LMC meetings: | 12 |

March 2003

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 54 |
| National staff: | 40 |

Structure: Maj. Gen. (R) T. Tellefsen (NO) replaced Maj. Gen. (R) T. Furuhovde (NO) as HOM. Mr. T. Ekdahl (FI) replaced Mr. J. Anteroinen (FI) as COO.

Attention: Operational attention remained on patrolling on land and at sea and monitoring the rising tension between Muslims and Tamils in the East, with particular focus on incidents at sea.

Monitoring: Several serious incidents occurred at sea; the rise of ethnic tension in the East continued. A SLN vessel intercepted a LTTE vessel (suspected of carrying war like materials) approaching the Mullaithivu coastline; SLN fired towards the ship which exploded and sank. Eleven cadres reportedly killed and four SLN sailors injured causing HOM to call it the most serious incident since the CFA. In the 'Chinese trawler incident' LTTE was blamed for killing the crew and sinking the trawler off the Mullaithivu coast; LTTE accused the trawler of spying on direction from GOSL. SLN-hired merchant vessel carrying ca 1700 troops reportedly came under fire in waters off Trincomalee; SLN return fire resulted in one sinking. One SLMM-approved and facilitated LTTE sea movement, the last for approx. one year. Monitors increased patrolling and meetings in Tamil and Muslim areas south of Trincomalee Bay attempting to avoid further escalation of tension. Patrolling and complaints inquiries demanded majority of resources. Large numbers of armed LTTE cadres crossing GOSL controlled area by foot between the North and the East was reported.

Liaising: HOM/HOM designate met with the Defence Secr., Mr. A. Fernando and his Service Cdrs.; regular meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke; meeting with LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran, LTTE Chief Negotiator, Mr. A. Balasingham and LTTE PW Leader Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan in Kilinochchi. A second meeting with the latter two and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan a few days later. HOM met local SF Cdrs. from Trincomalee in Colombo. LMC meetings held with normal frequency apart from Batticaloa and Jaffna.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. monthly report produced by HOM sent to the Facilitator and the contributing countries. Two press statements issued.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 197 |
| Naval patrols: | 30 |
| General meetings: | 419 |
| LMC meetings: | 9 |

April 2003

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 42 |
| National staff: | 42 |

Structure: DO Ampara established POC Pottuvil; DO Trincomalee established POC Sampoor. Two Toyota Hilux Double cabs ordered.

Attention: Operational attention on avoidance of serious incidents at sea and dealing with ethnic tension.

Monitoring: Due to four serious incidents at sea the previous three months and the agreement reached at the last peace talks in Hakone, where SLMM was requested to undertake preventative measures to avoid such incidents, the mission forwarded a framework dealing strictly with technical issues and modalities to the Parties early in the month. SLMM HQ and NMT's worked extensively on the proposal.

There was an increase of ethnic tension between Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims, particularly in Muttur area, leading to increased patrolling in areas of high tension; measures implemented, to a degree, proving successful. April was also characterized by several killings of Tamil political leaders and alleged military informants not affiliated with LTTE. Monitors attended many incident areas to carry out inquiries.

Liaising: HOM held both regular and ad-hoc meetings with the Defence Secr. Mr. A. Fernando and SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke; meeting the Cdr. Northern Naval Command, Rear Admiral N. Thuduwwatta at KKS Naval HQ, also meeting LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and MW Leaders Col. Soosai and Col. Theepan in Kilinochchi. LMC meetings were held in all districts apart from Trincomalee and Batticaloa. *In addition*, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, also meeting the ambassadors from the Netherlands and Switzerland, the British High Commissioner and the ICRC Head of Delegation.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries. Two statements issued, one re violent incidents at sea and prevention of future incidents; one re clarifications of proposals on security at sea.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 187 |
| Naval patrols: | 35 |
| General meetings: | 446 |
| LMC meetings: | 12 |

May 2003

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 44 |
| National staff: | 43 |

Structure: Ms. A. Bragadottir (IS) replaced Mr. T. Torkelsson (IS) as PIO. DO Ampara established POC Kalmunai. The first version of the SLMM website published internally on HQ Intranet.

Attention: Operational attention remained on issues at sea, ethnic tension, killings of Tamil political leaders and alleged military informants.

Monitoring: Proposal re a mechanism to undertake preventative measures against incidents at sea suspended due to internal considerations, Parties agreeing to delay finalisation of the draft proposal put forward by SLMM until feasible to consider pursuing the issue constructively. Naval monitors experienced change in policy when onboard SLN vessels when refused to hoist SLMM flag (in breach of the SOMA) causing mission to temporarily suspend monitoring at sea. Ethnic tension continued until end of month when SLMM facilitated meeting between LTTE, SF and community leaders; achieving mutual understanding and resulting in easing of tension. Monitors applied extensive resources to dealing with the problem in terms of patrols and meetings. Systematic assassination of Tamil political leaders and alleged military informants continued in the North and the South, claiming much of the monitors' time. On request from LTTE, SLMM carried out surveys in the East and North towards end of month pertaining to alleged lack of withdrawal of GOSL forces from public and private buildings. Survey carried out with participation from both Parties.

Liaising: HOM held regular and ad-hoc meetings with the Defence Secr., Mr. A. Fernando and SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke; meeting LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan in Kilinochchi. *In addition*, HOM participated in a meeting with LTTE leader, Mr. A. Balasingham, the Norwegian Special Envoy, Mr. E. Solheim and the Norwegian Ambassador, Mr. H. Brattskar; holding a separate meeting with the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr. J. Petersen. HOM also met with the Japanese Special Envoy, Mr. Y. Akashi. HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, also meeting the ambassadors from Italy and the European Commission.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries. Statement issued re killings of members of political parties and GOSL forces personnel becoming a threat to the CFA.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 210 |
| Naval patrols: | 19 |
| General meetings: | 449 |
| LMC meetings: | 14 |

June 2003

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 53 |
| National staff: | 44 |

Structure: Mr. N.L. Lundin (SE) replaced Mr. H. Liljeström (SE) as Head of LO LTTE. The LO GOSL role not filled when Mr. Lundin departed for Kilinochchi.

Attention: Operational attention remained on patrolling areas with prevailing ethnic tension, on sea monitoring and inquiries into killing of political members and alleged military informants.

Monitoring: Surveys carried out in late May established that GOSL forces continued to occupy a large number of public and private buildings. Further SLMM action was pending GOSL final assessment. No survey was conducted in LTTE-controlled areas. Serious incident at sea between SLN and a LTTE merchant vessel off the East coast. SLMM monitors not present; a thorough inquiry conducted by naval monitors resulted in a report to the Parties. SLN agreed to SLMM being allowed to hoist its flag when onboard its vessels; recommencement of naval monitoring. Extensive patrolling continued throughout AOR especially in areas with prevailing ethnic tension; a high level meeting in May proved successful and tension decreased. Monitors faced problems with restrictions of movement in both GOSL- and LTTE-controlled areas; LTTE stating that the privilege only applied to areas where it could guarantee monitors security and safety. SLMM viewed the issue as a deliberate attempt to obstruct its concept of operations. Killings of political members and alleged military informants continued to take its toll on SLMM resources. The killing of a Police Inspector in Colombo caused SCOPP to formally request SLMM to enquire into the incident, the request later withdrawn.

Liaising: HOM held both regular and ad-hoc meetings with the Defence Secr., Mr. A. Fernando and SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke; meeting LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan in Kilinochchi. LMC meetings held in all districts. *In addition*, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries. Press statement issued re the 14 June incident at sea.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 255 |
| Naval patrols: | 23 |
| General meetings: | 447 |
| LMC meetings: | 16 |

July 2003

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 49 |
| National staff: | 45 |

Structure: No significant changes.

Attention: Operational attention mainly on construction of LTTE camp in Wan Ella south of Trincomalee Bay and increased sea monitoring on SLN troop transport while maintaining focus on political violence and killings.

Monitoring: SLMM ruled that a LTTE camp erected in Wan Ella south of Trincomalee Bay was in GOSL-controlled area and as such a violation of the CFA; LTTE refusing to dismantle the camp, creating a serious point of contention between the Parties and SLMM. Monitors from Trincomalee patrolled the area and visited the camp in question on several occasions. The Parties previously submitted maps marked with areas claimed to be under respective control. The initial decision to postpone the process of demarcation was made by the Parties in deliberations with SLMM. As requested by SLN, naval monitors took Part 01n a significantly increased number of troop transportations between Trincomalee and Jaffna naval bases. Political violence and killings continued to be a problem, straining SLMM resources, with Jaffna and Batticaloa being the most troublesome areas. Several attacks against members of EPDP, TELO and PLOTE. Restrictions of movement continued to be an issue, particularly in LTTE-controlled areas. SLMM noted an increase in complaints regarding LTTE child recruitments, incl. an increase in attacks against less specific targets, appearing to be aimed at intimidation of the civilian population.

Liaising: HOM held regular and ad-hoc meetings with the Defence Sec., Mr. A. Fernando and SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke; meeting LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan in Kilinochchi, holding several meetings with LTTE PW and MW leaders in the Northern and Eastern districts. LMC meetings held in all districts apart from Jaffna.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries. Statement issued re Acting HOM being wrongly quoted in the media.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 257 |
| Naval patrols: | 42 |
| General meetings: | 482 |
| LMC meetings: | 17 |

August 2003

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 52 |
| National staff: | 51 |

Structure: DO Vavuniya established POC in Kilinochchi. Two Toyota Hilux Double Cabs ordered.

Attention: Operational attention remained on Wan Ella camp and the need to establish demarcation lines. Political killings a continuous matter of concern; troop transport remained a focus for naval monitors.

Monitoring: LTTE Wan Ella camp continued to be main issue; SLMM presenting several proposals for solution, monitors spending considerable time in the area. Due to lack of cooperation from LTTE, the issue of establishing demarcation lines made the task impossible to carry through, making it more difficult for SLMM to decrease tension and avoid disputes between the Parties. Freedom of movement in LTTE-controlled areas remained a problem, prompting SLMM to forward a formal protest to the organisation. Monitors from Mannar district worked extensively with SLA in the opening up a new crossing point in Madhu area, proving successful in creating limited access for civilians to pass and finally free and permanent crossing. Political violence and killings continued, GOSL arguing that these were police matters and that SLMM should not get involved. Flag hoisting in GOSL-controlled areas a problem, impacting on SLMM activities and resources, particularly in Vavuniya district. SLMM ruled this as a violation of the CFA. Various proposals to ease the continuous tension worked on by naval monitors continued with extensive SLN troop transport monitoring.

Liaising: HOM held regular and ad-hoc meetings with Defence Sec., Mr. A. Fernando and the SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke; extensive meetings with Army Cdrs. in Trincomalee; meeting LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan in Kilinochchi, holding meetings with LTTE PW leaders in Batticaloa and MW Commander Col. Ramesh. LMC meetings held in all districts.

In addition, HOM met the Norwegian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. V. Helgesen and the Special Envoy, Mr. E. Solheim in Oslo; participated in weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, also meeting Ms. T. Michelsen of the Danish MFA, the Ambassador of Italy and civil society groups.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 260 |
| Naval patrols: | 47 |
| General meetings: | 430 |
| LMC meetings: | 15 |

September 2003

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 62 |
| National staff: | 53 |

Structure: Mr. N. Nikolaisen (DK) replaced Mr. N.L. Lundin (SE) as Head of LO LTTE. One Toyota Hilux Double cab written off due to accident; replacement ordered.

Attention: Operational attention remained on Wan Ella camp and its implications and on restoration of normalcy.

Monitoring: LTTE camp in Wan Ella remained high on the agenda for monitors in Trincomalee, with extensive patrolling continuing. The issue further complicated by growing discontent among Muslims in the area, with issues on access to farming land/paddy fields surfacing. Restrictions on movement in LTTE-controlled areas continued to be a serious problem for SLMM, especially as it appeared that INGO's/NGOs and civilians enjoyed free access to roads in question. On a positive note, the crossing point near Madhu in Mannar district was fully opened making life much easier for civilians. The opening resulted from SLMM persistence and good cooperation between GOSL and the Norwegian Embassy (partially funding the project) and was seen as positive by all parties involved. Flag hoisting continued regardless of SLMM rulings, the practice considered provocative. Generally, SLMM carried out its normal routines with extensive patrolling throughout the AOR. An increase in received complaints, with subsequent inquiries and follow ups, strained resources. Naval monitoring stayed at a level similar to previous month, with troop transport claiming major resources from NMT-T in particular.

Liaising: HOM held regular and ad-hoc meetings with the Defence Sec., Mr. A. Fernando and SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke; meeting LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan in Kilinochchi, PW leaders from all districts with LTTE LMC members present. LMC meetings held in all districts.

In addition, HOM participated in weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries. Statement issued re HOM being wrongly quoted in the media.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 363 |
| Naval patrols: | 62 |
| General meetings: | 407 |
| LMC meetings: | 17 |

October 2003

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 54 |
| National staff: | 53 |

Structure: Maj. Gen. (R) T. Tellefsen (NO) departed; Brig (R) H. Haukland (NO) appointed Acting HOM.

Attention: Operational attention on maintaining an extensive patrol pattern on land and at sea; presence at trouble spots and assisting Parties in defusing tension as and where it occurred, aiming to restore normalcy.

Monitoring: Due to several traffic accidents in Jaffna involving SF, tension rose significantly, with SLMM, on request, dispatching additional monitors as reinforcement. Extensive patrolling appeared to have a calming effect and outbreak of violence was halted. In Alankerny village south of Trincomalee ethnic tension was on the rise, erupting from a longstanding land dispute, causing severe riots and hartals and resulting in an SF-imposed curfew. Monitors from Trincomalee spent considerable time and resources in area; following inter-religious meetings (initiated and organised by SLMM and with participation of the Parties); tension eased towards end of month. A SLN naval operation, attempting to intercept a LTTE vessel off the coast of Mullaithivu, had severe ramifications for SLMM: The President claimed SLMM had endangered national security (allegedly warning LTTE of the operation) and forwarded a demand for the removal of Maj. Gen. Tellefsen as HOM, who subsequently departed for consultations with the Norwegian MFA. Naval monitoring continued unhindered with continued intensity. Activities in the districts continued at same level, with a large number of complaints requiring inquiries and follow up.

Liaising: HOM held regular and ad-hoc meetings with the Defence Sec., Mr. A. Fernando and SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke, holding a joint meeting with the Service Cdrs.; meeting SF Cdr Jaffna at his premises; meeting LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan in Kilinochchi and separately with PW leader Jaffna. LMC meetings held in all districts. *In addition*, HOM held in weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, also meeting representatives of the Finnish MFA and Ministry of the Interior, the Canadian High Commissioner and Head of Delegation to the EU.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 330 |
| Naval patrols: | 76 |
| General meetings: | 337 |
| LMC meetings: | 17 |

November 2003

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 58 |
| National staff: | 53 |

Structure: Mr. E. Poyhia (FI) replaced Mr. T. Ekdahl (FI) as COO. Two generators installed in offices at DO's Jaffna and Batticaloa.

Attention: Operational attention concentrated on proactively minimising potential problems during LTTE's Hero's week celebrations, on ethnic tension in Trincomalee South and maintaining normal activities.

Monitoring: Ethnic tension escalated in Alankerny area south of Trincomalee, SLMM monitors applying their resources extensively to finding solutions and bring the Parties together, instrumental in forming a local peace and reconciliation committee. Despite this, the tension remained very high with fear of further violence between Tamil and Muslim communities. All SLMM DO's extensively involved in coordinating and facilitating meetings between the Parties, carrying out a significant number of patrols in the run up to and during LTTE's Hero's week. The arrangements went without any major incidents. The number of complaints received, especially against LTTE declined dramatically. The number of sea patrols declined somewhat, partly explained by the start of the Northeast Monsoon and heavy seas affecting SLN activity, although troop transport between the North and the East remained at its normal high.

Liaising: HOM held his first meeting with the new Defence Sec., Mr. C. Herath (stating that all future communication between SLMM and GOSL should go via SCOPP). Also holding a separate meeting with the Chief of Defence Staff, Gen Balagalle and regular meetings with SG SCOPP; meeting SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Colombo. LMC meetings held in all districts apart from Jaffna. *In addition*, HOM met with the Norwegian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. V. Helgesen and Special Envoy, Mr. E. Solheim held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, also meeting representatives of the EU, as well as with the ambassadors of Sweden and the USA, and the Defence attaché of France.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 157 |
| Naval patrols: | 51 |
| General meetings: | 389 |
| LMC meetings: | 16 |

December 2003

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 62 |
| National staff: | 54 |

Structure: No significant changes.

Attention: Operational attention on maintaining regular activities; keeping channels of communication open to and between the Parties and visibility in the areas south of Trincomalee Bay.

Monitoring: Monitors in the East maintained a high number of patrols in the area south of Trincomalee in order to show flag amongst the Tamil and Muslim population. The efforts the preceding month had a positive effect with tension appearing to be receding. Some instances of flag hoisting took place in most districts on the anniversary of the death of LTTE's Col. Kittu. A LTTE machine gun position, newly established on the A5 road near their Perriyapullumalai CP, was removed following SLMM ruling deeming it a CFA violation. SLMM patrolling and observations revealed that LTTE was constructing new CP's and posts in other areas in the East, in particular the Muttur area. Naval patrols continued with normal frequency. Complaints filed in December were the lowest since March 2002, allowing monitors to catch up with their inquiries.

Liaising: HOM had regular meetings with the Defence Sec., Mr. C. Herath and his Service Cdrs.; regular meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke, meeting LTTE PW leader, Mr. S.P.; Tamilselvan and LTTE PS SG, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts. *In addition*, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, also meeting the Ambassador of Germany, as well as with the High Commissioner of Australia.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 119 |
| Naval patrols: | 48 |
| General meetings: | 411 |
| LMC meetings: | 15 |

January 2004

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 58 |
| National staff: | 55 |

Structure: New generator installed in DO Ampara; new V-Sat satellite system installed in LO LTTE Kilinochchi.

Attention: Operational attention on maintaining regular activities; keeping channels of communication open to and between the Parties.

Monitoring: Number of complaints against LTTE continued to be reduced for the third consecutive month. Monitors both in the North and East continued to enquire into received complaints about LTTE child recruitment, particularly in Jaffna and Trincomalee. *In the North*, several complaints regarding harassment of civilians by SF were dealt with by monitors in Jaffna; monitors in Mannar and Vavuniya spent significant time on incidents and complaints regarding symbolic acts such as erection of LTTE monuments, flag hoisting, etc. *In the East*, Batticaloa and Ampara remained reasonably calm: SLMM liaised regularly with the Parties. Extensive, normal patrol activity conducted throughout the AOR. Two monitors held at gunpoint by LTTE cadres near Norway Point, south of Trincomalee, taken to the LTTE office in Sampoor, released after two hours; the most serious incident related to SLMM in January.

Liaising: HOM held regular and ad-hoc meetings with the Defence Sec., Mr. C. Herathh and his Service Cdrs.; SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Colombo. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in the districts. Notable high level of general meetings.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met a Parliamentary group from Sweden, the Ambassador of Italy and the Deputy of the Embassy of Germany.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 187 |
| Naval patrols: | 52 |
| General meetings: | 422 |
| LMC meetings: | 11 |

February 2004

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 61 |
| National staff: | 57 |

Structure: Maj. Gen. (R) T. Furuhoide (NO) assumed duty as HOM 1 February, replacing Brig (R) H. Haukland (NO), resuming his position as COS. DO Jaffna closed down POC Velanai.

Attention: Operational attention on maintaining regular activities; keeping the channels of communication open to and between the Parties; defining a role in upcoming elections, developing modalities enabling people in conflict zones and disputed areas to vote.

Monitoring: No serious incidents reported. *In the North*, conflict between Jaffna fishermen and Indian trawlers conducting illegal fishing impacted on normalisation process. Monitors facilitated meetings between fishing communities and SF, with mixed results. In Vavuniya, monitoring intensified around the Omanthai E/E points due to unrest. LTTE cadres, carrying cyanide capsules, on entering GOSL-controlled areas caused confrontation, requiring increased SLMM patrolling. Monitors in Vavuniya and Mannar initiated and facilitated meetings to defuse tension resulting from protests re access to Madhu Church and LTTE-controlled areas. SLMM faced problems accessing local LTTE PW leaders. *In the East*, tension between Tamils and Muslims, increased as Muslims were denied access into LTTE-controlled areas. Monitors from Trincomalee heavily involved in facilitating meetings, achieving desired calming effect. Batticaloa and Ampara remained calm; abduction of an EPDP member caused SLMM to increase monitoring related to elections.

Liaising: HOM held separate meetings with the President, Mrs. C. Kumaratunga and the PM, Mr. R. Wickramasinghe; routine weekly meetings with the Defence Sec., Mr. C. Herathh and Service Cdrs.; routine weekly meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke; meetings with LTTE PW leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan in Kilinochchi; SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Colombo; also meeting former Defence Sec., Mr. A. Fernando. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in the districts.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met an EU election assessment team and the Chargé d'affaires of Sweden. Frequent media appearances.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 175 |
| Naval patrols: | 57 |
| General meetings: | 404 |
| LMC meetings: | 15 |

March 2004

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 60 |
| National staff: | 58 |

Structure: DO Jaffna established POC Point Pedro.

Attention: Operational attention on maintaining regular activities with special attention on the Parties' compliance with the CFA relating to the upcoming national and provincial elections and LTTE split.

Monitoring: *In the North*, monitors in Jaffna enquired into clashes between LTTE and EPDP supporters; killings of candidates for election called for extensive SLMM follow-up. The large number of LTTE cadres passing crossing points in Vavuniya and Mannar districts caused concern to the SF resulting in significant SLMM monitoring. *In the East*, all DO's paid particular attention, spending much time monitoring LTTE split; restricting patrolling in Karuna-dominated areas, especially Batticaloa and Ampara districts. SLMM recorded an increase in violence in which high-ranking officials from TNA, UNP and SLFP were attacked. SLMM reported several thousand Jaffna Tamils in the East fleeing, following orders of the Karuna faction, with subsequent return closely monitored by SLMM. Many meetings initiated, aiming to dissolve the heightened tension. Notably, number of child abductions subsided in several districts and many conscripted children released by LTTE. Apart from the self-imposed restrictions on patrolling in Karuna-dominated areas, normal patrol activities carried out.

Liaising: HOM held two meetings with the PM of Sri Lanka, Mr. R. Wickramasinghe; routine weekly meetings with the Defence Sec., Mr. C. Herathh and his Service Cdrs.; regular weekly meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke; meeting with LTTE PW leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan in Kilinochchi, SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Colombo and meeting district LTTE PW leader in Trincomalee. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in the districts.

In addition, HOM met with the Norwegian Special Envoy, Mr. E. Solheim and his delegation; held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met a member of the European Parliament and representatives of election monitoring mechanisms; representatives from the embassies of Denmark, Finland and Sweden; UNICEF and other UN agencies and various NGO's. Frequent media appearances.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 134 |
| Naval patrols: | 66 |
| General meetings: | 381 |
| LMC meetings: | 15 |

April 2004

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 58 |
| National staff: | 59 |

Structure: DO and NMT Trincomalee moved accommodation from Hotel Club Oceanic to Hotel Lotus Park.

Attention: Operational attention on maintaining regular activities; continued focus on national and provincial elections and ensuing increased violence as well as uncertainties caused by LTTE split.

Monitoring: Significant part of time and resources spent on monitoring the set-up of polling stations, transportation of people, implementation of the election franchise and not least the crossings of people between GOSL- and LTTE-controlled areas for voting. *In the North*, no major incidents recorded; positive cooperation between the Parties observed particularly in Mannar district. LTTE propaganda activity in Vavuniya resulted in increased monitoring and follow-up. *In the East*, the LTTE split caused escalation in armed confrontation between factions; LTTE starting a process of reorganising political offices and military operational command. SLMM involved in preparing and monitoring increased transport of cadres to and from Vanni. SLP and SF strengthened their security as violent incidents increased in the East; many registered as complaints with resulting strain on SLMM resources.

Liaising: HOM held routine meetings with the Defence Sec., Mr. C. Herathh and his Service Cdrs.; routine weekly meetings with SCOPP; meeting local Service Cdrs. in Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara; with new LTTE Military Cdrs. in the East; participated in a significant meeting between the Parties in Batticaloa, the first since LTTE split. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in the districts. *In addition*, HOM met with the Norwegian Special Envoy, Mr. E. Solheim and his delegation, held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met the Inspector General of UNHCR, Mr. McNamara. Frequent media appearances.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 106 |
| Naval patrols: | 67 |
| General meetings: | 352 |
| LMC meetings: | 17 |

May 2004

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 60 |
| National staff: | 61 |

Structure: Mr. K. Liesinen (FI) replaced Mr. E. Poyhia (FI) as COO; Ms. H. Finnbogadottir (IS) replaced Ms. A. Bragadottir (IS) as PIO.

Attention: Operational attention on issues surrounding LTTE split and ensuing tension in the East.

Monitoring: *In the North*, SLMM witnessed increase in LTTE child recruitment, particularly Jaffna, with inquiries straining monitoring activity. In Jaffna, SLMM accomplished organising the first high-level meeting between SF and LTTE PW in some time. LTTE attempted to enforce social control on Tamil population in GOSL-controlled areas, resulting in added tension and requiring increased monitoring of propaganda events. *In the East*, SLMM activity concentrated on the aftermath of LTTE split. Meeting between local SF and LTTE Cdrs. organised by HOM diffused tensions to some extent. Monitoring transport of cadres and LTTE VIP's between Vanni and the East connected to LTTE reorganisation continued to strain resources. The first LTTE sea movement, between Mullaithivu and the Eastern Region, in a year carried out with involvement of naval monitors. Tighter control experienced when patrolling AOR and freedom of movement in GOSL- and LTTE-controlled areas, to a certain degree, compromised. However, patrolling continued at normal level in all districts. Notable increase in complaints compared to previous month.

Liaising: HOM held routine meetings with the Defence Sec., Mr. C. Herath and Service Cdrs.; routine weekly meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. B. Goonetilleke; two meetings with SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Colombo; participated in meeting between local Batticaloa and Ampara Cdrs from both Parties in Vavunathivu. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts. *In addition*, HOM met with Norway's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. J. Petersen; twice with the Norwegian Special Envoy, Mr. E. Solheim and his delegation; held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met the British High Commissioner and the Chargé d'affaires of Sweden.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries. Press statement issued re killings of members of LTTE and GOSL forces.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 189 |
| Naval patrols: | 53 |
| General meetings: | 360 |
| LMC meetings: | 14 |

June 2004

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 62 |
| National staff: | 63 |

Structure: Mr. K. Gundersen (NO) replaced Mr. N. Nikolaisen (DK) as Head of LO LTTE.

Attention: Operational attention remained on issues surrounding LTTE split and ensuing tension in the East, as well as popular frustration due to stalls in the Peace Process.

Monitoring: *In the North*, increased number of complaints in most CFA categories received in Jaffna; substantial child recruitment reported in Vavuniya. Problems persuading the Parties to meet, mainly in Vavuniya, made it more difficult for SLMM to prevent misunderstandings and minor issues turning into incidents. Normal and extensive patrolling carried out in all three districts. *In the East*, LTTE postponed further meetings with SF due to new Army Cdr. admitting connection with Karuna faction resulting in further tension, intensifying SLMM patrolling and monitoring. In Batticaloa killings decreased. LTTE opened several new offices calling for increased patrolling in Trincomalee and Ampara districts in particular. Meeting facilitated by SLMM between influential Muslims and LTTE in Muttur minimised tension while some increased tension observed in mixed faith/ethnic areas in and around Trincomalee, increasing SLMM presence there. Further increase in complaints recorded.

Liaising: HOM held routine meetings with the Defence Sec., Mr. C. Herathh and Service Cdrs.; routine weekly meetings with SCOPP; meeting LTTE PW leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan in Kilinochchi and district LTTE PW leader in Jaffna. DHOM participated in meeting between the Army Cdr., Lt. Gen. Kottegoda and local Batticaloa and Ampara cdrs from both Parties in Vavunathivu. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in the districts. *In addition*, HOM met with the Norwegian Special Envoy, Mr. E. Solheim and held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met separately with the ambassadors of Italy and the USA, the deputy from the Embassy of France, representatives of the Embassy of the Netherlands and a representative of the Finnish MFA.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries. Two press statements issued, one re GOSL and LTTE agreeing on security measures, one re discussions between the Parties.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 228 |
| Naval patrols: | 34 |
| General meetings: | 307 |
| LMC meetings: | 17 |

July 2004

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 57 |
| National staff: | 62 |

Structure: Two Toyota Hilux vehicles purchased, deployed to DO Ampara.

Attention: Operational attention remained on issues surrounding LTTE split and ensuing violence in the East.

Monitoring: *In the North*, growing tension between Christians and Hindus in Mannar called for occasional SLMM intervention, influencing on the patrol pattern. *In the East*, although the month was generally calm, particularly in Batticaloa, violence continued with several killings incl. a local LTTE PW leader. SLMM enquired into the cases. GOSL filed complaints re establishment of new LTTE camp south of Trincomalee Bay, requiring increased SLMM patrolling, with significant time spent in Mutur and Sampoor areas. SLA also complained that LTTE established social control in GOSL-controlled areas. Flag hoisting in public places in the North and the East called for SLMM to intervene in an attempt to avoid confrontation between the Parties. Extensive patrolling continued throughout the AOR. First suicide bomber since signing of CFA intended to target EPDP leader Douglas Devananda in Colombo.

Liaising: HOM held weekly routine meetings with the Defence Secrs., Mr. C. Herath and Service Cdrs.; routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Dhanapala; meeting LTTE PW leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan in Kilinochchi. With killings on the increase in Vavuniya, SLMM arranged a meeting between the Parties, both agreeing to attempt prevention of an escalation of violence. SLMM hosted meetings between the Parties in all districts except Batticaloa and Ampara, where mistrust and concerns surrounding the Karuna faction and armed elements was evident. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in the districts. Notable increase in number of general meetings.

In addition, HOM met with Norway's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. V. Helgesen and held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met senior representatives of UNDP, ICRC, and with the Chargé d'affaires of Sweden.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 180 |
| Naval patrols: | 77 |
| General meetings: | 532 |
| LMC meetings: | 17 |

August 2004

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 57 |
| National staff: | 62 |

Structure: Mr. J. O. Solnes (IS) replaced Ms. H. Finnbogadottir (IS) as PIO. HQ staff moved accommodation from C-house to leased flats.

Attention: Operational attention still centered on LTTE split, violence in the East and establishment of new LTTE camps south of Trincomalee Bay.

Monitoring: *In the North*, monitors from DO Jaffna spent significant amount of time checking newly established or improved fortifications along the FDL. At sea, some tension was observed by naval monitors around a suspected LTTE vessel anchored near Chalai; the incident highlighted the issue of the sea as highly volatile. *In the East*, monitors from DO Trincomalee, with assistance from NMT-T, continued extensive patrolling as well as meetings with the Parties and community leaders, checking on LTTE camps causing great concerns to GOSL. The level of killings in the East remained high, particularly in Batticaloa area, heavily influencing SLMM activities. The absence of evidence, hampering police investigations, affected SLMM inquiries. SLMM, shuttling between separate meetings in Ampara and Batticaloa, able to mediate between the Parties who remained reluctant to meet; LTTE threatening to cease all political work there. Deterioration in the security environment affected civilian population; also reflected in complaints received. Increased SLA security measures including checks caused further tension.

Liaising: HOM held routine meetings with the Defence Secrs., Mr. C. Herath and Service Cdrs.; routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Dhanapala. Special meeting with the Defence Secrs. and SG SCOPP held following meeting in Kilinochchi. Also, HOM met SLA Divisional Cdrs. in Batticaloa; meeting LTTE PW leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan in Kilinochchi and local LTTE PW and MW leaders in Batticaloa. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in the districts.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also twice met the Deputy of the Indian High Commission as well as Head of the European Commission.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries. Press statement issued re discussions between GOSL and LTTE in Ampara.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 207 |
| Naval patrols: | 105 |
| General meetings: | 390 |
| LMC meetings: | 22 |

September 2004

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 60 |
| National staff: | 64 |

Structure: Mr. L. Kjerland (NO) replaced Mr. K. Gundersen (NO) as Head LO LTTE. New generator installed at DO Mannar.

Attention: Operational attention remained on violence in the East, where killings continued at high level, aiming to get the Parties to agree on measures to avoid escalation of hostilities.

Monitoring: Significant monitoring resources dedicated to inquiring into killings, remaining at a high level in the East, on the increase in other districts. *In the North*, DO Jaffna in particular and DO Vavuniya stepped up monitoring along the FDL's; longer patrols necessary. SLMM proposal to widen gap between opposing forces in Nagarkovil area, designed to ease tension and avoid clashes, not accepted by GOSL; LTTE not responding. Another proposal, re cadre transport between the East and the North, accepted by LTTE, rejected by GOSL. *In the East*, the Parties agreed to meet again at low level, following insistence from the SLMM, considered a step in the right direction, despite non-participation from LTTE MW. Unrest among Sinhalese communities in Trincomalee area impacted negatively on DO Trincomalee patrolling. Land disputes between Muslims and Tamils in Ampara area resulted in significant involvement by monitors attempting to avoid escalation of violence. Naval monitoring increased with SLN requesting SLMM escort and participate in troop transport between Trincomalee and the Jaffna peninsula.

Liaising: HOM met with the President of Sri Lanka, Mrs. C. Kumaratunga; with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. L. Kadirgamar and the Acting Defence Minister. Routine weekly meetings with the Defence Secrs., Mr. C. Herath and Service Cdrs.; three routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Dhanapala. HOM chaired meeting between local SF and LTTE PW in Batticaloa; meeting LTTE PW leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in the districts.

In addition, HOM met with the Norwegian Special Envoy, Mr. E. Solheim; held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also twice met the ambassador of the USA, also meeting the Ambassadors of France and Italy; furthermore with ICRC Head of Delegation.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 165 |
| Naval patrols: | 96 |
| General meetings: | 372 |
| LMC meetings: | 18 |

October 2004

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 57 |
| National staff: | 65 |

Structure: No significant changes.

Attention: Operational attention on the tension in Trincomalee, in particular pertaining to detained home guards.

Monitoring: Despite general calm, killings continued throughout the AOR. *In the North*, and Jaffna in particular, clashes between LTTE, EPDP and PLOTE. SLMM maintained a normal patrol pattern on land, with naval monitoring remaining high. *In the East*, tension in and around Trincomalee, with Sinhalese unrest and demonstrations, continuing until detained Home Guards released mid month, stated as a goodwill gesture by LTTE to SLMM. Although SLMM activity hampered due to security concerns, normal patrol pattern re-established as tension gradually abated following the release. GOSL released ten LTTE prisoners, with SLMM extensively involved in the issue re the release. A Youth Peace Convention in Batticaloa, with Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim participants from 16 regions was monitored.

Liaising: HOM held routine weekly meetings with the Defence Secr., Mr. C. Herath and Service Cdrs.; weekly routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Dhanapala. HOM chaired a meeting between local SF and the Batticaloa LTTE PW in Vavunathivu. Direct meetings with LTTE leadership at low level due to absence of PW leader and others. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in the districts.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met the Japanese Special Envoy, Mr. Y. Akashi, a member of US House of Representatives, Mr. McCormick, the British High Commissioner, the Minister Counselor of the Indian High Commission and a representative of the Icelandic MFA, Mr. A. Sigurjonsson.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries. Press statement issued re stance on the issue of LTTE detained Home Guards in Trincomalee.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 149 |
| Naval patrols: | 92 |
| General meetings: | 364 |
| LMC meetings: | 15 |

November 2004

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 61 |
| National staff: | 65 |

Structure: Mr. W. Winkel (DK) replaced Brig. (R) H. Haukland (NO) as COS. One Toyota Land Cruiser ordered for HOM; one Toyota Hilux ordered for DO Ampara.

Attention: Operational attention on LTTE Hero's week; political killings still dictating much of activities.

Monitoring: Activities in all districts still influenced by killings continuing at high level. LTTE celebrations of Hero's week the main event, with SLMM stating prior to the celebrations, flag hoisting would be considered a CFA violation and provocation; resulted in some hostility from Tamil population and in Mannar, monitors stopped patrolling for one day due to security concerns. Flag hoisting caused some tension, especially in the North, SLMM presence often defusing the situation and violence avoided. Clashes did occasionally take place between LTTE supporters and SF, notably in Mannar and Vavuniya. All districts carried out extensive patrolling, monitoring the preparations before and during the events. *In the North*, monitors from DO Jaffna and DO Trincomalee faced problems accessing LTTE camps and FDL's. GOSL requested SLMM look into alleged construction of a LTTE airstrip southeast of Kilinochchi. *In the East*, new LTTE camps south of Trincomalee bay remained an issue with the SF; DO Trincomalee intensified patrolling and presence in the area.

Liaising: HOM held routine weekly meetings with the Defence Secr., Mr. C. Herath and Service Cdrs.; routine weekly meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Dhanapala. HOM chaired a meeting in Vavuniya between local SLA Cdrs. and local LTTE PW leader. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in the districts. *In addition*, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 192 |
| Naval patrols: | 75 |
| General meetings: | 401 |
| LMC meetings: | 16 |

December 2004

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 61 |
| National staff: | 68 |

Structure: Ms. H. Olafsdottir (IS) replaced Mr. J.O. Solnes (IS) as PIO. One new lease contract for HQ staff apartment for HQ signed. Seven Toyota Hilux vehicles ordered; five vehicles damaged due to tsunami. New computers ordered.

Attention: Operational attention focused on maintaining stability; increasing dialogue between the Parties and attempts to prevent killings and violence spiraling out of control. Consequences of tsunami changed focus substantially at end of month.

Monitoring: Violence and killings continued at a high level; violence spread in all districts. *In the North*, monitors registered increase in LTTE child recruitment, particularly in Jaffna. *In the East*, tension prevailed in Trincomalee, with SLA enforcing increased security in the town areas. SLMM carried out normal but extensive patrolling on land and at sea. Efforts made in all districts and through HQ in persuading the Parties to meet more often and at all levels, with aim of changing the negative, violent trend of preceding months.

Tsunami changed focus and activities drastically for all districts excluding Mannar and Vavuniya, with main task, as directed by HOM, for monitors to establish overview of the situation and gather information about destruction and emergency needs. The latter days of the month saw heavily intensified patrol schedules within and to the affected areas. Tsunami also had a deep impact on SLMM members – international monitors and national staff. SG SCOPP initiated round trip visit to all SLMM DO's to check if mission was implementing tasks accorded in CFA.

Liaising: HOM held routine weekly meetings with the Defence Secr., Maj. Gen. A. Jayawardene and Service Cdrs.; weekly routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Dhanapala; meeting SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan twice in Colombo. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in the districts. Exceptional high level of general meetings.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met a member of the US Senate, Mr. Riesler and the Ambassador of the USA; meeting with the ICRC Head of Delegation.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 183 |
| Naval patrols: | 55 |
| General meetings: | 450 |
| LMC meetings: | 13 |

January 2005

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 60 |
| National staff: | 67 |

Structure: HQ staff all located in three apartment buildings upon termination of lease contract at 5th lane.

Attention: Operational attention on reinforcing preparedness in aftermath of tsunami, also assisting the Parties in dealing with challenges resulting from the disaster.

Monitoring: Following tsunami at end of 2004, SLMM attention concentrated on relief efforts incl. monitoring relief transport from GOSL to LTTE-controlled areas and the situation in the many Temporary Accommodation Camps (TAC) set up in both North and East, avoiding a serious outbreak of unrest. LTTE were discontent with presidential order that SLA/STF should manage TAC's. *In the East*, SLMM chaired talks between the Parties in Ampara, resulting in the SLA/STF staying outside the camps with LTTE and TRO allowed to assist in aid work. Mapping the destruction from tsunami and its impact on the Parties resulted in extensive patrolling in the East involving DO Jaffna and DO Vavuniya also. SLMM statistics did not confirm increased child recruitment as indicated by UNHCR and UNICEF.

Liaising: Reduced activity due to tsunami. HOM met with the Defence Secr., Maj. Gen. A. Jayawardene and Service Cdrs.; weekly routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Dhanapala; meeting SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Colombo; SLA Trincomalee District Mil. Cmdr.; LTTE Trincomalee PW and MW leaders. LMC meetings in all districts, slightly lower frequency due to tsunami.

In addition, HOM met with the Norwegian Special Envoy, Mr. E. Solheim and delegation; held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 105 |
| Naval patrols: | 63 |
| General meetings: | 523 |
| LMC meetings: | 9 |

February 2005

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 64 |
| National staff: | 67 |

Structure: Brig (R) H. Haukland (NO) replaced Maj. Gen. (R) T. Furuhoide (NO) as HOM; Mr. L. Brunell (SE) replaced Mr. K. Liesinen (FI) as COO. HOM took delivery of Toyota Landcruiser.

Attention: Operational attention remained on dealings with aftermath of tsunami.

Monitoring: Monitoring concentrated on flow of aid and relief materials and on TAC's, many closing down during the month as people were moved into Transitory Camps (TC). Several petitions received raised concerns on what various Tamil organisations perceived as an increased targeting of Tamils and an unjust distribution of relief aid to Tamil areas. Hartals resulting from these perceived notions were monitored, SLMM monitors often playing an important role in defusing the situation. Great effort devoted to monitoring transport of LTTE cadres through GOSL-controlled areas. A more normal patrol pattern and POC visits re-established towards end of month. The effect on the community resulting from the destruction of tsunami strained SLMM resources considerably.

Liaising: HOM held two routine meetings with the Defence Secr., Maj. Gen. A. Jayawardene and Service Cdrs., with new HOM paying additional courtesy visit to the former Defence Secr.; routine weekly meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Dhanapala; meeting SG LTTE PS SG, Mr. S. Puleedevan Colombo; COMEAST in Trincomalee. LMC meetings back to normal frequency in all districts.

In addition, HOM met with the Norwegian Special Envoy, Mr. E. Solheim and Japanese Special Envoy, Mr. Y. Akashi and resp delegations, and held regular weekly meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met the independent Norwegian Tsunami Investigation Commission.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries. Two press statements issued, one re appointment of new HOM, one re 3rd anniversary of the CFA.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 112 |
| Naval patrols: | 54 |
| General meetings: | 459 |
| LMC meetings: | 11 |

March 2005

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 62 |
| National staff: | 70 |

Structure: DO Vavuniya moved to new accommodation closer to office upon termination of old lease contract. Delivery of seven Toyota Hilux Double Cabs; generator purchased for DO Batticaloa accommodation.

Attention: Operational attention remained on assisting in restoring normalcy after tsunami; monitoring distribution of relief aid.

Monitoring: SLMM back to a normal patrolling pattern throughout AOR; intensified patrolling in Batticaloa due to killings mentioned below. *In the North*, with situation mainly calm and quiet, normal patrol patterns and meeting schedules continued, inquiries conducted. Two serious traffic accidents and alleged rape by SF in Jaffna caused riots; SLMM played important Part 01n monitoring situation, defusing tension. The issue of LTTE Airstrip at Iranamadu and possible LTTE light aircraft was discussed between SLMM and SCOPP; SLMM attempted to gain access to area to monitor. *In the East*, particularly from DO Batticaloa, much time spent on attending incident areas, dealing with reprisal killings, allegedly and mostly between LTTE and Karuna faction. Protests in the AOR over slow distribution of relief aid continued, mainly in the East, also in the North. On several occasions' monitors at the spot helped defuse situations in which all three main communities (Tamil, Sinhalese and Muslim) protested. Karuna faction camp discovered in Thivuchchenai near Welikanda in GOSL-controlled area.

Liaising: HOM held routine weekly meetings with Defence Secr., Maj. Gen. A. Jayawardene and Service Cdrs.; routine weekly meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Dhanapala; LTTE leadership abroad most of the month, HOM maintaining contact by phone and through LTTE PS. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts.

In addition, HOM held regular weekly meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met a delegation from the Hong Kong Immigration Authorities and representatives of the Asia Foundation.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries. One statement issued regarding killings threatening the ceasefire.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 125 |
| Naval patrols: | 85 |
| General meetings: | 536 |
| LMC meetings: | 18 |

April 2005

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 61 |
| National staff: | 71 |

Structure: No significant changes.

Attention: Operational attention remained on aftermath of Tsunami and popular frustrations; focus also on high number of political and reprisal killings continuing mainly in DO Batticaloa, and increasingly in two other Eastern districts.

Monitoring: Normal patrolling activities, POC visits and meeting schedules maintained throughout the month in all districts. SLMM still not granted access by LTTE to patrol areas of the Iranamadu Airstrip. Several anti-Norway protests, particularly in Colombo, incl. demonstrations outside SLMM HQ. *In the East*, ban on transporting building materials into LTTE-controlled area caused demonstrations in Muttur and Sampoor; SLMM monitoring the tension, helping to defuse situation. Shootings from both sides reported. Monitoring of LTTE cadres escorted by SLA through GOSL-controlled area strained SLMM resources. A high number of complaints concerning child recruitment and harassment filed in all districts with much time being spent inquiring into these.

Liaising: HOM held one routine meeting with the Defence Sec., Maj. Gen. A. Jayawardene and Service Cdrs.; routine weekly meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Dhanapala; meeting local LTTE leaders in Batticaloa, Ampara and Vavuniya. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts.

In addition, HOM met with the Norwegian Special Envoy, Mr. E. Solheim and his delegation; held regular weekly meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met the Head of ICRC in Sri Lanka and representative of Sida.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries Press statement issued re shooting incident in Trincomalee.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 117 |
| Naval patrols: | 88 |
| General meetings: | 433 |
| LMC meetings: | 11 |

May 2005

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 62 |
| National staff: | 70 |

Structure: Five Toyota vehicles sold locally.

Attention: Operational attention mainly on continuing political and reprisal killings in the East, also on tense situation throughout the AOR, caused by the raising of a statue of Buddha in Trincomalee. Negotiations for a joint mechanism re aid relief funds also an issue.

Monitoring: SLMM easing into a more normal and pre-tsunami patrol pattern. *In the North*, one monitor and one national staff member physically attacked by LTTE at Omanthai E/E, Vavuniya District. *In the East*, killings decreased in Batticaloa District; increased in Trincomalee and Ampara Districts', requiring increased effort in monitoring, patrolling and incident inquiry. Small-arms fire following demonstration against a SLA CP in Batticaloa, with one killed and many villagers injured, lead to serious unrest with demonstration and hartals in several districts; SLMM monitoring the situation closely. Buddha statue erected in Trincomalee city caused increased tension in all Tamil-dominated areas in AOR.

Liaising: HOM held two routine meetings with Defence Sec., Maj. Gen. A. Jayawardene and Service Cdrs.; routine weekly meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Dhanapala; meeting local LTTE leaders in Mannar; leaders of Tamil parties EPRLF, PLOTE and EPDP in Batticaloa. Continued high number of general meetings. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts.

In addition, HOM held regular weekly meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone, and acting head of ICRC.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 154 |
| Naval patrols: | 65 |
| General meetings: | 547 |
| LMC meetings: | 11 |

June 2005

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 66 |
| National staff: | 72 |

Structure: No significant changes.

Attention: Operational attention on rising violence and frequency and scale of CFA violations being reported.

Monitoring: SLMM continued normal pattern of patrolling, inquiries and meetings. *In the East*, political and reprisal killings continued, requiring SLMM attention. Antipathy between the Parties on a rise with violence increased over past few months. Roadside bomb exploded near Welikanda as SLA escorted; SLMM monitored bus transporting cadres, causing minor injuries to one cadre, prompting a security guarantee ultimatum from LTTE and threats of moving cadres through GOSL-controlled area armed, as prior to CFA. Differences of opinion re the Joint Mechanism caused disturbances throughout the month. SLMM car with two monitors onboard attacked in Trincomalee District, by mob of JVP supporters, resulting in evacuation guarded by police and SLA, causing all districts through HQ to re-evaluate security. Tension following attacks against several LTTE offices in GOSL-controlled area.

Liaising: HOM held two routine meetings with the Defence Sec., Maj. Gen. A. Jayawardene and Service Cdrs.; routine weekly meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Dhanapala; two meetings with LTTE PW leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts.

In addition, HOM met with the Norway's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. V. Helgesen; held regular weekly meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met representatives of contributing countries in Iceland; meeting Head of ICRC in Sri Lanka and Advocacy Director of HRW in Colombo.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 186 |
| Naval patrols: | 75 |
| General meetings: | 521 |
| LMC meetings: | 13 |

July 2005

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 59 |
| National staff: | 72 |

Structure: Two new lease contracts for apartments in Colombo signed.

Attention: Operational attention on increased level of killings in the East, escalation of violence and increased mistrust between the Parties.

Monitoring: SLMM, particularly in the East, became more and more incident-driven, required to deal with the increased level of violence. SLMM continued to mediate, trying to agree a solution re transport of cadres through GOSL-controlled areas (following roadside bomb in June). Failing to reach an agreement increased the heightening level of mistrust between the Parties. *In the North*, situation remained relatively calm, although killings took place; SLMM carrying out patrols, inquiries and meetings as normal. Representatives from both Parties expressed worry about violence in the East spilling over to the North. *In the East*, level of killings caused by armed elements continued to increase in all three districts, resulting in insecurity and mistrust between the Parties, SLMM describing it a low attrition conflict. Attacks on LTTE PW offices continued, resulting in closing down of several of its Eastern political offices in GOSL-controlled areas and Mannar. Several hand grenade attacks and shootings in the East served to further increase the mistrust.

Liaising: HOM held three routine meetings with the Defence Sec., Maj. Gen. A. Jayawardene and Service Cdrs.; routine weekly meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Dhanapala; meeting LTTE PW leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi once. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts. *In addition*, HOM held regular weekly meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met the Ambassador of the USA, Head of Indian High Commission and Acting Head of Canadian High Commission; visited the Norwegian MFA in Oslo.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 242 |
| Naval patrols: | 67 |
| General meetings: | 514 |
| LMC meetings: | 16 |

August 2005

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 63 |
| National staff: | 74 |

Structure: Mr. T. Lekenmyr (SE) replaced Mr. W. Winkel (DK) as COS; Mr. M. Sørensen (SE) replaced Mr. L. Brunell (SE) as COO. DO Mannar moved into new accommodation; new generator purchased for DO Vavuniya office.

Attention: Operational attention remained on violence in the East, also increase in the North.

Monitoring: SLMM continued patrolling, conducting normal activities and attempting to defuse tension between the Parties at local level. Meetings between the Parties at district level came to a halt. Violence remained high in the East, spreading to Northern districts apart from Mannar. SF and LTTE PW offices targets as well as individual civilians: LTTE warned GOSL that country could slip back into war if GOSL continued to back armed groups and paramilitaries. *In the North*, a senior police officer killed in Jaffna following riots based on what appeared to be a SLA unintentional shooting of a civilian. *In Colombo*, the assassination of the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister and the subsequent declaration of State of Emergency increased tension further throughout the country, with SLMM observing growing mistrust between the Parties.

Liaising: HOM held routine weekly meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Dhanapala; meeting local Cdrs. and GOSL representatives in Ampara, Batticaloa, Mannar and Vavuniya as well as local LTTE leaders in these districts; meeting with LTTE PW leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts.

In addition, HOM met Norway's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. V. Helgesen; held regular weekly meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met the Indian High Commissioner, Chairman of the Foundation for Co-Existence Sri Lanka and Acting Representative of UNHCR Sri Lanka.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries. Press statement issued with condemnation of assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign Minister.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 239 |
| Naval patrols: | 84 |
| General meetings: | 502 |
| LMC meetings: | 17 |

September 2005

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 64 |
| National staff: | 76 |

Structure: No significant changes.

Attention: Operational attention remained on high level of killings and escalating violence.

Monitoring: Targeted killings of SF personnel and Tamils opposed to the LTTE continued at high level in Ampara, Trincomalee, Vavuniya and Jaffna. *In the East*, DO Batticaloa reinforced with four monitors from other districts for two weeks due to high level of violence. Emphasis on SLMM visibility, incl. increased patrolling along main axis and E/E points. Decrease in violence in Batticaloa observed. Tension and mistrust between the Parties escalated; LTTE decided to vacate all political offices in GOSL-controlled area for security reasons. Direct contact between the Parties had already stopped.

Liaising: HOM held one routine meeting with Defence Sec., Maj. Gen. A. Jayawardene and Service Cdrs.; three routine weekly meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Dhanapala; meeting LTTE PW leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi; meeting local Cdrs. and GOSL representatives in Jaffna, Mannar and Batticaloa, as well as local LTTE PW leaders in those districts. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in the districts.

In addition, HOM held regular weekly meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met the UN SG Special Representative, Ambassador Brahimi, representative of Danish MFA, Mr. N. E. Nielsen and Ambassador of France; meeting EU representatives in Brussels and representatives from Swedish Police.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 143 |
| Naval patrols: | 74 |
| General meetings: | 487 |
| LMC meetings: | 15 |

October 2005

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 59 |
| National staff: | 78 |

Structure: DO Jaffna terminated contract for Grey House; land monitors moving into MSF House. Fire damaged new DO Mannar accommodation; monitors moving temporarily to old premises.

Attention: Operational attention remained on high level of violence and on upcoming election.

Monitoring: Targeted killings of SLPS and SF personnel as well as civilian continued, particularly in the East; also notably in Jaffna – where SF accused LTTE of extrajudicial killings in an attempt to disturb the upcoming election; LTTE blaming SF and EPDP for deteriorating situation. *In the East*, LTTE convoys and patrols increased in frequency. Paramilitaries backed by SF being blamed, while SF said they were carried out by Karuna faction alone. Sea Tiger activity outside Mullaithivu lead to SLMM intervention; SLN requested naval monitors be present on patrols on continuous basis; request almost hundred percent fulfilled through cooperation between the NMT's. Time at sea increased significantly as a result.

Liaising: HOM held one routine meeting with the Defence Sec., Maj. Gen. A. Jayawardene and Service Cdrs.; routine weekly meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Dhanapala; meeting LTTE PW leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts. *In addition*, HOM held regular weekly meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met Human Rights Advisor to the Norwegian Government, Mr. I. Martin; special representative of the Norwegian Government, Mr. T. Furuhovalde, Head of ICRC Sri Lanka and representatives of the EU Election committee and the EU South Asia desk.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 193 |
| Naval patrols: | 90 |
| General meetings: | 398 |
| LMC meetings: | 16 |

November 2005

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 62 |
| National staff: | 78 |

Structure: Mr. C. Jenssen (DK) replaced Mr. L. Kjerland (NO) as Head of LO LTTE. DO Mannar monitors in new accommodation following repairs after fire; new generators ordered for DO Vavuniya accommodation; new high-speed dedicated internet line installed in HQ.

Attention: Operational attention mainly concentrated on election, maintaining efforts connected to violence in the East and extended naval monitoring on Northeast coast.

Monitoring: Extensive patrolling in the whole AOR in run up to and during election on 17th, continuing during Hero's week. In the North, demonstrations were organised to scare off potential voters particularly in Jaffna; in the East, some violence disturbed elections in Batticaloa. SLMM monitors observed increase in uniformed and armed LTTE cadres patrolling their areas; LTTE also intensifying military type training of civilians – highlighted by a number of complaints and observed by SLMM patrols. *In the North*, situation deteriorated with violence between LTTE and pro-government Tamils as well as numerous attacks against SF. Naval monitoring on the Northeastern coast remained high throughout the month. *In the East*, violence continued, developing into ethnic violence between Muslims and Tamils. Tension grew further with grenade attack against Mosque in Akkaraipattu, killing five persons – sparking large protests and demonstrations in the whole Eastern AOR; SLMM actively trying to diffuse tension.

Liaising: HOM held two routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Dhanapala.; meeting SF Cdr. Jaffna and Jaffna LTTE PW leader. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts. *In addition*, HOM held regular weekly meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met the US State Department Desk Officer for Sri Lanka, Head of EU election monitors, Assistant Police Commissioner from Sweden, Head of ICRC Sri Lanka, UNICEF Country Representative in Sri Lanka, and UN Special Representative on extrajudicial killings.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries. Press statement issued with condemnation of killing of SLA Lt. Col. Meedin.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 172 |
| Naval patrols: | 89 |
| General meetings: | 440 |
| LMC meetings: | 15 |

December 2005

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 64 |
| National staff: | 75 |

Structure: DO Mannar established POC Silavaturai. Six Toyota vehicles ordered.

Attention: Operational attention wholly on a drastically worsening situation throughout the AOR, with security for monitors becoming an issue for attention.

Monitoring: SLMM became very event-driven as result of multiple incidents taking place in all districts, imposing restrictions on patrolling, as attacks, at times, took place regardless of SLMM presence. Besides a marked increase in small scale attacks on SF and targeted killings of civilians; larger attacks against SF with claymore mines; Sea Tigers attacked SLN vessel. *In the North*, patrolling in Jaffna was halted altogether towards end of the month, sea patrols cancelled as monitors were unable to travel to the KKS Naval Base. *In the East*, violence between Muslims and Tamils having spread throughout November ended, except in Muttur area where tension and violence continued until mid month when an agreement was reached between the communities – following SLMM mediation.

Liaising: HOM held four routine meetings with the Defence Sec., Maj. Gen. A. Jayawardene together with PS MOD, Mr. G. Rajapakse, two with Service Cdrs.; routine weekly meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Gooneratne; meeting several GOSL representatives as well as district LTTE PW leaders while traveling the districts. HOM met with the LTTE PW leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan in Kilinochchi. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts. *In addition*, HOM held regular weekly meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met the Japanese Special Envoy, Mr. Y. Akashi, representatives of the Swedish National Police, Minister of the Indian High Commission, representatives of Amnesty International, SG of the Foundation for Co-Existence, Dr. K. Rupasinghe and representative of Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries. Four press statements issued.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 275 |
| Naval patrols: | 61 |
| General meetings: | 443 |
| LMC meetings: | 11 |

January 2006

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 55 |
| National staff: | 73 |

Structure: Installation of new computer server in HQ; new IT equipment installed in DO's Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara and delivered to others; one Toyota Hilux Double cab and one Toyota Landcruiser ordered; shatter proofing of all offices and accommodation ongoing.

Attention: Operational attention on escalation and severity of hostilities between the Parties.

Monitoring: Violent campaign directed against the SF continued with increased intensity; repeated use of claymore mines. *In the East*, tension and violence continued to increase. SLN Dvora FPC claimed to be sunk outside Trincomalee Bay killing 15 sailors. Nine soldiers travelling on a bus killed, many injured near Cheddikulam. Increased tension and violent attacks affected SLMM operational activities; limited patrolling in some districts, temporary suspension of operations in Trincomalee and naval night monitoring temporarily suspended. Monitoring in all districts stretched due to attending reported incidents and subsequent enquires. SLMM office in Batticaloa, 13 January, attacked with explosive device, destroying one SLMM vehicle and damaging three in car park. Situation changed for the better following 25 January decision for high level discussions in Geneva.

Liaising: HOM held five regular meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Gooneratne; meeting LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts; notable high level of general meetings. *In addition*, HOM met with the Norwegian Special Envoy, Mr. E. Solheim and held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met Lord Naseby from the House of Lords, UK, the Australian Deputy High Commissioner and the Canadian High Commissioner. HOM also met with representatives of INGO's. Additionally, he attended the Christian Council and Bishops Conference.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries. Four statements issued.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 261 |
| Naval patrols: | 55 |
| General meetings: | 429 |
| LMC meetings: | 13 |

February 2006

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 56 |
| National staff: | 75 |

Structure: Installation of new IT equipment completed in all districts. New e-mail system operational, switching from mfa.no to slmm.lk. accounts.

Attention: Operational attention on preparations for and participation in Geneva meeting.

Monitoring: SLMM monitors back to a normal or increased patrol pattern both on land and at sea due to significantly improved security situation. Significant time spent in all districts catching up with inquiries and following up on incidents. Preparations for Geneva talks incl. gathering of information as to the Parties' knowledge and expectations at local level. Marked decrease of violence in all districts with number of incidents reduced to a level not seen since early 2005; no major incident in any part of AOR. Reduction of SF personnel in the streets observed as activities seemed to have eased. *In the North*, SLMM monitored the transport of four released sea tigers travelling to Vavuniya. At Omanthai, SLMM informed both Parties that construction of new bunkers at FDL violated CFA; construction subsequently stopped. *In the East*, tension observed around Karuna faction in DO Batticaloa; some killings and a few lesser incidents. SLMM observed increased presence of TMVP in Batticaloa; also noting renewed optimism among Tamil population particularly. In Ampara, SLMM facilitated meetings between Muslims and Tamils re paddy harvesting.

Liaising: HOM participated in the CFA implementation talks in Geneva 22–23 February. In Colombo, three routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. J. Gooneratne; telephone conferences with LTTE PW leadership in Kilinochchi prior to Geneva talks; meeting with LTTE PW and MW leaders of Batticaloa and Ampara, Mr. Dayamohan and Col. Banu. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts. *In addition*, HOM held two telephone conferences with Norwegian MFA before Geneva talks, and held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway. He also twice met Mr. S. Marelius, Mr. J. Westerlund and Mr. A. Wallberg from the Swedish MFA and the Chargé d'affaires of the Embassy of Sweden, the Indian High Commissioner. AHOM held a separate meeting with the Swedish delegation.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 132 |
| Naval patrols: | 66 |
| General meetings: | 313 |
| LMC meetings: | 14 |

March 2006

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 63 |
| National staff: | 76 |

Structure: Mr. M. Vainionpaa (FI) replaced Mr. C. Jenssen (DK) as Head of LO LTTE.

Attention: Operational attention on increased Karuna activities in the East and the Parties' adherence to Geneva agreements.

Monitoring: Situation throughout AOR remained calm, with monitors from all districts continuing normal but extensive patrol activity on land and at sea. SLMM received approx. twice as many complaints as normal, placing a major strain on resources in terms of inquiries and follow-ups. *In the North*, unrest observed among students in Jaffna in particular, where monitors had to mediate on several occasions, successfully diffusing the tension as SLA arrived. Attack against a SLN Dvora fast patrol craft off western coast killed eight sailors. SLN, witnessed by naval monitors, intensified checking of Indian trawlers poaching in Sri Lankan waters. *In the East*, SLMM noticed strengthened TMVP presence and targeted killings in Batticaloa and Ampara; abductions continued unabated. Skirmishes between SLN and LTTE in waters east of Sampoor. Further fishing restrictions imposed led to many meetings between naval monitors and fishing communities in Trincomalee and as Jaffna.

Liaising: HOM and HOM designate met with the Defence Sec., Mr. G. Rajapakse. Regular and routine weekly meetings with SCOPP SG, Dr. B. Gooneratne; meeting with LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi. HOM designate toured all districts and met with Local Service Cdrs., local LTTE PW leaders and other local leaders and dignitaries. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts. *In addition*, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, incl. introduction meeting with HOM designate, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. Outgoing HOM had several meetings with local and international media.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries. Three statements issued; the first condemning attack on LTTE CP in Vavunathivu; the second condemning attack on SLN also warning both Parties on current escalation of violence; the third re appointment of new HOM.

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| Complaints received: | 324 |
| Naval patrols: | 91 |
| General meetings: | 336 |
| LMC meetings: | 15 |

April 2006

International monitors: 59
National staff: 75

Structure: Maj. Gen. (R) U. Henricsson (SE) replaced Brig (R) H. Haukland (NO) as HOM on 1 April.

Attention: Operational attention firmly on re-escalation of violent attacks and serious incidents after two months of relative calm.

Monitoring: Upsurge in violence in the North and the East. Suicide attack within Army HQ in Colombo killed nine persons, resulting in extensive shelling of LTTE-controlled areas in Sampoor and Ilakkantai. *In the North*, attacks with claymore mines targeting LTTE commenced inside Vanni. A new pattern evolved where many Tamil men, allegedly LTTE supporters were shot and killed. SLMM registered 191 killings during the month; SF and civilians bore the brunt of attacks. *In the East*, killing of Tamil political leader in Trincomalee appeared to trigger widespread violence and tension between ethnic groups; SLMM attempting to improve contact between the communities and with Sinhalese and Muslim religious leaders. From mid month, claymore mines again directed at SF and SLP. Karuna group continued to increase activities, becoming more visible. SLMM received reports of direct clashes between Karuna faction and LTTE. Number of complaints remained very high, with many serious incidents straining SLMM in all districts. SLMM made several attempts to facilitate transport of local LTTE commanders to Kilinochchi, a prerequisite set by LTTE in order to participate in Geneva II meeting.

Liaising: HOM had two regular meetings with SCOPP, being introduced to the new SG, Dr. P. Kohona by outgoing SG, Dr. B. Gooneratne; meeting with LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi. HOM visited the Jaffna and Trincomalee districts, meeting local Service Cdrs. as well as LTTE PW leader in Trincomalee. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts.

In addition, HOM met with the Norwegian Special Envoy, Mr. J. Hanssen-Bauer, and held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. MSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries. Five statements issued. High media profile of new HOM.

Complaints received: 411
Naval patrols: 95
General meetings: 366
LMC meetings: 14

May 2006

International monitors: 59
National staff: 76

Structure: Delivery of six Toyota Hilux Double cabs.

Attention: Operational attention on spiraling violence and serious major breaches of the CFA.

Monitoring: Tension heightened and violence escalated with increased number of serious incidents, the HOM characterising conflict as a low intensity war. *In the North*, LTTE inside Vanni targeted for second month running, incl. killing of eight civilians in Allaipiddy on Kayts Island, causing civilians to seek shelter in public buildings. *In the East*, naval monitors observed increased Sea Tiger activity, particularly outside Mullaithivu. Tension at sea increased and culminated with a Sea Tiger attack on 11 May with one SLMM monitor coming under direct fire. 17 SLN sailors and one SLA communications soldier killed when suicide craft rammed Dvora FPC, after which SLMM temporarily suspended all sea monitoring activities.

SLMM monitoring resources stretched; number of complaints reaching its highest level to date. Highest number of casualties recorded since signing of CFA; 337 people killed. 33 attacks with claymore mines registered. LTTE conveyed three written warnings to SLMM that it could no longer guarantee the security of monitors on board SLN vessels. Perceived as threats, they were not given into. Freedom of movement severely restricted in many areas. SLMM efforts in attempting to arrange secure transport of LTTE commanders travelling to Kilinochchi resumed but failed again.

Liaising: HOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. P. Kohona, meeting local Service Cdrs. and local LTTE PW leaders in Ampara and Mannar, meeting LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi; separately with LTTE Head of Police, Mr. B. Nadesan and LTTE Head of Judicial, Mr. R. Pararajasingham. In Mullaithivu, HOM met LTTE Sea Tiger Leader, Col. Soosai and LTTE Deputy Northern Flank Cdr., Lt. Col. Lawrence, as well as representatives of the Mullaithivu Fishermen Coop Society. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts. *In addition*, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. Three statements issued.

Complaints received: 449
Naval patrols: 30
General meetings: 413
LMC meetings: 11

June 2006

International monitors: 63
National staff: 78

Structure: Mr. T. Omarsson (IS) replaced Ms. H. Olafsdottir (IS) as PIO.

Attention: Operational attention still concentrated on serious escalation of the conflict.

Monitoring: Continuous high number of incidents and serious violations of CFA by both Parties. Attacks with claymore mines against SF personnel continued throughout AOR, triggering aerial attacks in Vanni and artillery fire from Trincomalee into Sampoor area. Claymore mine attack north of Colombo represented new development; SLA Deputy COS killed in a suicide attack outside capital. *In the North*, attacks with claymore mines inside Vanni continued. SLMM involved in several meetings in order to defuse tension and support civilians. SLMM blamed by both Parties for being unable to stop violence. *In the East*, child recruitment on increase. Direct fighting between Parties continued with open confrontations.

The many incidents, the continued high number of complaints and unease among civilians and tension between the Parties claimed most of SLMM's resources. Following the EU listing of LTTE as a terrorist organisation in May, LTTE withdrew its security guarantees for SLMM monitors from EU member states.

Liaising: HOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. P. Kohona, meeting LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi; also meeting Father Karunaratnam, Head of the North East Secretariat of Human Rights, and President of TRO, Mr. Sivanadiyar. HOM visited Jaffna, Vavuniya, Trincomalee and Batticaloa meeting local Service Cdrs. in the districts as well as local LTTE PW leaders and local leaders. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts. *In addition*, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. HOM participated in the meeting of contributing countries in Oslo, also meeting Norway's Minister of International Cooperation, Mr. E. Solheim and the Norwegian Special Envoy, Mr. J. Hanssen-Bauer, as well as the GOSL and LTTE delegations.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. one statement issued, condemning attack against a bus near Kebitigollewa. SLMM issued report re the Parties' adherence to agreements reached in Geneva.

Complaints received: 299
Naval patrols: 0
General meetings: 346
LMC meetings: 14

July 2006

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|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 58 |
| National staff: | 81 |

Structure: HQ moved from premises in 399 Galle Road, Colombo 3 into 76 Ward Place, Colombo 7. Remaining naval monitors merged with Jaffna and Trincomalee DO's.

Attention: Operational attention on tension and mistrust between the Parties; escalation of conflict during second half of month. Urgent attention on organisational and operational consequences of withdrawal of monitors from EU member states following LTTE relinquishing its security guarantees.

Monitoring: General situation relatively and comparatively calm in beginning of month; tension between Parties continued at high level; situation unpredictable. In second half, major incidents took centre stage with direct small arms and mortar fire between the Parties; direct clashes increasing. *In the East*, severe clashes between LTTE and TMVP, mainly in Batticaloa and Ampara area continued – including suicide attacks. LTTE closing of Mavil Aru sluice gates caused great concern, despite intense involvement by SLMM and HOM to resolve the situation; GOSL forces responded with heavy military retaliation using artillery and carrying out aerial attacks in general area of Sampoor. Future of SLMM uncertain with LTTE maintaining stance on monitors from EU member states despite diplomatic efforts. SLMM continued all normal activities with many resources devoted to inquiries and follow-up of complaints which although decreasing compared with previous three months, remain very high. Naval monitoring remained suspended.

Liaising: HOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. P. Kohona, one meeting chaired by Deputy SG, Mr. K. Loganathan. HOM visited the local Service Cdrs. in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts, as well as local LTTE PW leaders and other local leaders. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts; decreasing number of general meetings. *In addition*, HOM met with the Norwegian Special Envoy, Mr. J. Hanssen-Bauer and held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met the Ambassador at Large of Sweden, Mr. A. Oljelund.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. WSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

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|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 305 |
| Naval patrols: | 0 |
| General meetings: | 304 |
| LMC meetings: | 11 |

August 2006

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 54 |
| National staff: | 79 |

Structure: Mr. R. Nystad (NO) replaced (temp) Mr. M. Vainionpaa (FI) as Head of LO LTTE. Monitors from Denmark, Finland and Sweden left mission late month. DO Mannar merged with DO Vavuniya; DO Ampara with DO Batticaloa.

Attention: Operational attention remained on escalation of conflict, with large-scale military confrontations. Attention on organisational and operational restructuring, preparing for reduced strength as of September, following withdrawal of monitors from EU member states.

Monitoring: Situation deteriorated further, with Jaffna peninsula closed to civilians; Deputy SG SCOPP assassinated in Colombo. *In the North*, 11 August, direct confrontations spread to Jaffna; LTTE advancing across FDL at Muhammalai. Heavy LTTE artillery from Poonaryn peninsula targeted Palali SF HQ and SLN base; heavy SLA artillery towards Muhammadalai area and Poonaryn; several air attacks targeting LTTE artillery positions. 52 girls died in air attack near PTK in Vanni. *In the East*, fighting in area south of Trincomalee Bay continued. HOM and entourage, together with Trincomalee LTTE PW Leader, on way to open Mavil Aru sluice gates close to artillery fire, escaped unhurt. Heavy artillery into Sampoor area and aerial attacks. SLA took full control over Muttur area. 17 Tamils working for Action Contre La Faim (ACF) killed. SLMM movement severely restricted, ceased patrols; considerable number of complaints still received. HOM decided to implement first phase of the Security Plan. Monitors from the East relocated temporarily to Habarana due to security concerns.

Liaising: HOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. P. Kohona; with HOM designate, introduced on 24 August; HOM and HOM designate meeting with LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi, meeting local Service Cdrs., local LTTE PW leaders and other local leaders in Vavuniya and Trincomalee districts. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts. *In addition*, HOM met Norwegian Special Envoy, Mr. J. Hanssen-Bauer and held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. WSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 231 |
| Naval patrols: | 0 |
| General meetings: | 283 |
| LMC meetings: | 8 |

September 2006

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 36 |
| National staff: | 73 |

Structure: Maj. Gen. (R) L.J. Sølberg (NO) replaced Maj. Gen. (R) U. Henricsson (SE) as HOM on 1 September; Mr. J.O. Solnes (IS) replaced Mr. T. Lekenmyr (SE) as COS; Mr. S. Iversen (NO) replaced Mr. M. Sørensen (SE) as COO; Mr. L. Bleymann (NO) replaced Mr. R. Nystad (NO) as Head of LO LTTE. Number of monitors drastically reduced. DO Trincomalee moved accommodation from Hotel Lotus Park back to Hotel Club Oceanic.

Attention: Operational attention on military conflict. Attention on organisational situation and operational manning following halving of monitor staff size.

Monitoring: Open military conflict continued in the East as well as the North. Abductions and killings of Tamils continued – and increased – in all districts, particularly in Vavuniya. *In the North*, violence remained at high level in Jaffna. *In the East*, GOSL forces gained control over Sampoor, clearly overstepping FDL's established in CFA, resulting in mass displacements of civilians. The number of open confrontations subsided somewhat, daily shelling still taking place both directions at FDL's at Muhammalai, Poonaryn, South of Trincomalee Bay and Batticaloa area – with fighting between LTTE, GOSL and TMVP. SLMM activities severely hampered due to security restrictions put in place by the Parties, with minimal patrolling, although all DO's maintained reasonable level of meetings. Apart from receiving complaints, SLMM's main activity was centered on attempting to gain overview over emerging situation, having to rely mainly on information from the Parties. However, both Parties paid markedly less attention to SLMM concerns and attempted constructive input. Naval monitoring remained suspended.

Liaising: HOM and AHOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. P. Kohona; meeting LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi; also meeting the Army Cdr., Lt. Gen. S. Fonseka in Colombo. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts. *In addition*, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. WSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries.

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|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 220 |
| Naval patrols: | 0 |
| General meetings: | 280 |
| LMC meetings: | 8 |

October 2006

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 28 |
| National staff: | 73 |

Structure: No significant changes; number of international monitors at all-time low.

Attention: Operational attention remained on military conflict and preparations for Geneva II talks. Reconsideration of operational approach in view of reduced manning and deteriorating security situation.

Monitoring: Situation remained the same at FDL's, with open confrontations and shelling taking place daily in same areas as previous month. Major offensive by SLA, 11 October, repulsed by LTTE. *In the North*, SLMM witnessed display and handover to ICRC of 79 SLA slain bodies in Kilinochchi. Suicide attack carried out against convoy of buses carrying SLN sailors at parking/resting place near Habarana claimed the lives of 104 SLN personnel; SLMM attending the scene and carrying out inquiries. *In the East*, Ralkuli in Trincomalee district was taken by SLA; TMVP opened office in Trincomalee. SLMM activities restricted; mainly centered on incidents in the districts, away from open war, with limited patrolling, meetings and inquiring. SLMM influence on the Parties remained low. SLMM remained involved with Parties preparing for Geneva II talks. Naval monitoring remained suspended.

Liaising: HOM, with delegation, participated as observers at the Geneva II meeting. HOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. P. Kohona. PIO met with Minister of Disaster Management and Human Rights, Mr. M. Samarasinghe. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts; increase in general meetings.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. WSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries; WSR's were published on the web.

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|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 294 |
| Naval patrols: | 0 |
| General meetings: | 360 |
| LMC meetings: | 11 |

November 2006

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 33 |
| National staff: | 75 |

Structure: No significant changes; slight increase in number of monitors after the all-time low in October.

Attention: Operational attention remained on military conflict. Continued attention on organisational structure and operational strategy of SLMM following radically changed setting re situation on the ground, incl. human resources available.

Monitoring: Situation in districts remained largely unchanged, with high tension prevailing, despite the Parties meeting in Geneva, which ended without agreements. Prominent TNA parliamentarian shot dead in Colombo. *In the North*, situation at FDL's remained largely unchanged, but with daily shelling and heavy artillery in use. Many aerial attacks in Vanni, with civilian casualties; bombing of what turned out to be civilian target close to Kilinochchi hospital. *In the East*, IDP situation became a matter of concern with thousands of civilians displaced to Vakarai area, on occasions subject to shelling resulting in casualties. SLMM assisted ICRC and UN in bringing in supplies to the affected.

HOM and party came under direct artillery fire by SLA while on site visit to Poonaryn, with LTTE, evaluating the possibility to open land route to the Jaffna Peninsula across the narrow part of Jaffna lagoon (A32). Due to security concerns, HOM imposed restrictions on movements in certain areas affecting all DO's. Monitors continued limited patrolling, with exception of Vavuniya district where monitors continued attending to and inquiring into the many killings and incidents taking place. Naval monitoring remained suspended.

Liaising: HOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. P. Kohona; meeting with SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi. LMC meetings held with normal frequency in all districts. *In addition*, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. WSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries; WSR's published on the web.

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|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 308 |
| Naval patrols: | 0 |
| General meetings: | 268 |
| LMC meetings: | 8 |

December 2006

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 34 |
| National staff: | 75 |

Structure: Mr. J. Sølund (NO) replaced Mr. S. Iversen (NO) as COO. DO Batticaloa moved accommodation in same road. All international staff temporarily withdrawn from districts, gathering at Taj Airport Garden Hotel, Negombo 28 December.

Attention: Operational attention remained on military conflict; reconsidering of organisational structure and operational strategy, incl. increased focus on security of field monitors.

Monitoring: Situation similar to previous month in all districts, with assassinations and various types of attacks throughout AOR; suicide attack against Defence Sec. in Colombo unsuccessful. *In the North*, shelling, mainly from Jaffna, took place on daily basis. *In the East*, LTTE fired artillery into GOSL-controlled areas in Kallar, hitting a school, resulting in intensified retaliation attacks and heavy artillery barrages from SF. SLMM was able to inspect scene following the attack. Number of civilians displacing continued to rise. In Batticaloa area violent attacks between LTTE and TMVP on the increase.

SLMM monitors involved in normal activities – in environment of restricted movements. The ground and security situation developed to the point that, at end of month HOM deemed it necessary to withdraw all monitors temporarily from districts to Negombo, with intention to carry out review and restructuring of SLMM with input from monitors on how the organisation best could serve the Parties in the future. Naval monitoring remained suspended.

Liaising: HOM held routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. P. Kohona, also meeting with Secretary to the President, Mr. L. Wiretunga and attended by the SCOPP SG. LMC meetings subsided; decrease also in general meetings. *In addition*, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DSR's and WSR's made in all DO's. WSR produced in HQ for Facilitator and contributing countries; WSR's published on the web. One statement issued, expressing serious concerns re suicide attack against Defense Sec.

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|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 177 |
| Naval patrols: | 0 |
| General meetings: | 195 |
| LMC meetings: | 1 |

January 2007

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|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 35 |
| National staff: | 71 |

Structure: HOM, HQ operations and all monitors located in Taj Airport Garden Hotel near Negombo engaged in SLMM workshop. LO LTTE redeployed to Kilinochchi during first week. HQ support staff remained fully operational in HQ Colombo.

Attention: Operational attention on workshop while maintaining presence in districts and conducting inquiries into major incidents.

Monitoring: Field monitoring changed significantly as a result of the withdrawal of monitors to workshop. National staff remained in districts and reported daily to their resp. teams. HOM executed the Presence In Districts (PID) and Rapid Response Team (RRT) concepts. PID sent twice to Batticaloa/Ampara, Trincomalee and Vavuniya districts; once to Jaffna. RRT dispatched four times; to Illupai kadaval inside Vanni after the SLAF killed 15 civilians and injured more than 50; to scenes of civilian bus bomb explosions, in Nittmabuva and Godagama/Hikkaduwa in the South, which killed a total of 17 and injured 85; the last attempting to reach Vakaraï after it fell to GOSL forces, access not obtained.

Tense situation in all districts, with shelling into and out of areas in Vakaraï, Verugal and Kallar, across Northern Vanni FDL and to and from Poonaryn. Vakaraï fell to SLA 19 January. In Jaffna and Vavuniya abductions and killings of civilians increased; several claymore mine attacks targeting and killing SF. Abductions and killings also notable in Batticaloa district. TMVP very active, opened new offices in Batticaloa and Trincomalee. Clashes between Muslims and TMVP reported in Kathankudy.

Liaising: HOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. P. Kohona. Only two LMC meetings held, in Batticaloa and Jaffna, due to shortage of time.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DR's issued by the DO's; WSR's produced by HOM/HQ Ops for Facilitator, contributing countries and Parties; public version posted on SLMM website. Five statements issued; one re the air strike in Illupai kadaval; one re each of the two bus bombings; one update on SLMM Workshop; one re the claymore mine attacks in Vavuniya.

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|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 131 |
| General meetings: | 158 |
| LMC meetings: | 2 |

February 2007

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 35 |
| National staff: | 71 |

Structure: LO LTTE unmanned for five days; Vavuniya national staff located to Negombo towards end of month due to security situation.

Attention: Operational attention remained on workshop in Negombo while maintaining presence in districts and incident inquiries.

Monitoring: Two PID's to each district executed, one to Vavuniya at end of month; time spent mainly on meeting stakeholders and national staff; limited patrolling. Two RRT dispatched; one to enquire into claymore mine attack in Vantharumoolai in Batticaloa district which killed 11 SLA soldiers and injured 15; the second to same district to follow up on incident involving a group of ambassadors and VIP's subject to LTTE mortar attack. Shelling, at times heavy, continued both in North – at Northern and Southern FDL's – and East with shelling to and from LTTE-controlled area west of Batticaloa increased. Several air strikes carried out inside Vanni, near the FDL's and deep inside LTTE-controlled area; also in Kokadichcholai west of Batticaloa. LTTE shelled police station in Eravur north of Batticaloa and attacked STF camp in Vavunathivu. LTTE also shelled SLA 53 Division HQ north of Muhammalai. Reports of heavy military build up in the North received from the opposing Parties. LTTE cadres reportedly made their way from the East to the North. Killings and abductions continued at high level in Vavuniya, Jaffna and Batticaloa in particular. Offensive SLA operations North of Trincomalee. Claymore mine attacks both in GOSL- and LTTE-controlled northern areas; also directly targeting SF in Batticaloa district. Increased LTTE presence noted in the Vavuniya suburbs; numerous SLA cordon and search operations caused tension and fear among civilians. Such operations also increased in Trincomalee. TMVP operated more freely in the East; the IDP situation was reported as difficult.

Liaising: HOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. P. Kohona. One LMC meeting in Mannar.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DR's issued by the DO's; WSR's produced by HOM/HQ Ops for Facilitator, contributing countries and Parties; public version posted on SLMM website. One statement issued in relation to the five year anniversary of the CFA.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 68 |
| General meetings: | 170 |
| LMC meetings: | 1 |

March 2007

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 35 |
| National staff: | 70 |

Structure: Mr. J. Sølrand (NO) replaced Mr. J.O. Solnes (IS) as COS (in capacity of Mission Manager). Monitors moved back to Trincomalee on permanent basis towards end of month. Vavuniya national staff returned to the district after approx. a week in Negombo early in month. Process of establishing a forward Operations Centre in Temple Road, Negombo commenced.

Attention: Operational attention remained on workshop in Negombo while maintaining presence in districts and incident inquiries.

Monitoring: PID teams dispatched to all districts; once to Jaffna, thrice to Vavuniya incl. visit to Mannar, once to Trincomalee (manned on a permanent basis towards end of month) and twice to Batticaloa and Ampara. Pattern of meetings and patrolling as previous two months. No RRT teams dispatched as PID teams also enquired into incidents. PID teams visiting IDP camps, liaising with UN organisations and INGO's. Level of violence and open confrontations as per previous months with numerous killings and abductions, particularly in Vavuniya. Shelling, at times heavy, along both Vanni FDL's and Batticaloa West. SLA offensives moved towards Thoppigala area northwest of Batticaloa. Frequent air strikes in Thoppigala area and in Vanni; 10 registered in the last week. GOSL military movement north of Trincomalee towards southeastern Vanni FDL confirmed. Mannar remained reasonably calm; shelling from Mannar towards southwestern Vanni caused tension among civilians. Claymore mines targeting SF exploded in Vavuniya, Batticaloa, Ampara and inside Vanni; one exploding on A9, eight kms south of Kilinochchi. LTTE attacked six SLA camps in the East and ambushed SLA patrol in Wilpattu National Park. Major incident occurred, 26 March, when LTTE attacked Katunayake Air base, dropping bombs from two light aircraft. Despite several requests, SLMM not granted access to the scene for inquiry.

Liaising: HOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. P. Kohona; meeting the DIG Police in Trincomalee district; further meeting with SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi. Number of LMC meetings increased slightly.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DR's issued by the DO's; WSR's produced by HOM/HQ Ops for Facilitator, contributing countries and Parties; public version posted on SLMM website.

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|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 98 |
| General meetings: | 183 |
| LMC meetings: | 5 |

April 2007

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|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 26 |
| National staff: | 70 |

Structure: The new forward Operations Centre in Temple Road, Negombo operational first week. Workshop in Negombo concluded with reorganisation of SLMM.

Attention: Operational attention remained on workshop while maintaining and increasing presence in the districts.

Monitoring: PID teams to all districts on an almost weekly basis; Jaffna visited twice. Monitors carrying out normal activities incl. meetings, patrols and incident inquiries. RRT's dispatched twice; one to enquire into bus bombing near Ampara which killed 16 civilians, injured 23; one to Mannar district when a claymore mine targeted bus carrying both civilians and GOSL military personnel, killing eight, injuring 23. Military confrontations in the North escalated; SLA infiltrations into – and fighting inside – LTTE-controlled areas in Mannar and Madhu proximity, also west of Ommanthai. Shelling, at times heavy, continued along the Northern and Southern FDL's with numerous air strikes in Vanni. Shelling in the East subsided somewhat, directed from Valachchenai area towards Thoppigala where SLA claimed to have boxed LTTE in. Still, LTTE attacks against SF continued throughout Batticaloa/Ampara district. SLA gained control over the entire A5 road between Badulla and Chenkaladdy for first time in 14 years. Kokadichcholai fell to SLA. LTTE air wing carried out two attacks; the first directed at two oil and gas installations close to Colombo, the second against targets at Palaly military base in Jaffna. Killings and abductions continued at high level, mainly in Jaffna, Vavuniya and Batticaloa. Trincomalee reasonably calm though some individual fighting between TMVP and the LTTE cadres claimed lives.

Liaising: HOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. P. Kohona. One LMC meeting held in Jaffna district.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DR's issued by the DO's; WSR's produced by HOM/HQ Ops for Facilitator, contributing countries and Parties; public version posted on SLMM website.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 68 |
| General meetings: | 153 |
| LMC meetings: | 1 |

May 2007

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 31 |
| National staff: | 70 |

Structure: Newly adapted organisational structure developed and implemented, with an Eastern Regional Office (RO) based in Trincomalee, a Northern RO operating out of Negombo. HOM invited all national staff to conference successfully held in Habarana. Mr. K Gudmundsson (IS) replaced Mr. L. Bleymann (NO) as head of LO LTTE.

Attention: Operational attention on implementing new organisational structure and developing an improved reporting concept, internally and externally, while maximising presence in districts.

Monitoring: Dispatching of PID teams continued, carrying out normal meeting schedules, patrolling and incident inquiries in Batticaloa/Ampara, Jaffna and Vavuniya/Mannar districts. A RRT attended incident in Colombo where a claymore mine exploded targeting a SLA bus, killing one soldier, injuring three people. The situation did not change dramatically, with several air strikes in Vanni, decreasing somewhat towards end of month. Fighting between Parties, heavy on several occasions, in Mannar, Madhu and west of Ommanthai. Shelling continued along the Northern and Southern Vanni FDL. Ommanthai E/E point closed for several days due to shelling and fighting. Killings and abductions continued, particularly in the North, subsiding marginally in the East. *In the East*, shelling from Valachchenai directed towards Thoppigala area with SLA reportedly closing in on the remaining LTTE cadres. Reports of major sea battle north of Trincomalee. LTTE attacked a SLN base on Delft Island, resulting in fatalities on both sides as reported by the Parties. In Batticaloa, a STF camp was attacked by LTTE. A senior member, S. Chandrakanthan (Pillayan) broke away from Karuna faction/TMVP; Karuna and Pillayan later publicly denounced split, Pillayan rejoining.

Liaising: HOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. P. Kohona; meeting SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi – presenting new SLMM organisation to the Parties. LMC meetings held in Mannar and Batticaloa districts.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DR's issued by the DO's; WSR's produced by HOM/HQ Ops for Facilitator, contributing countries and Parties; public version posted on SLMM website.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 38 |
| General meetings: | 144 |
| LMC meetings: | 3 |

June 2007

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 32 |
| National staff: | 57 |

Structure: Mr. J. Allansson (IS) replaced Mr. J. Sjøland (NO) as Mission Manager. Mrs. A. Sender (NO) appointed Operations Manager. Northern Region operating out of Vavuniya; Eastern Region operating out of Ops Centre in Negombo from 8 June and remainder of month.

Attention: Operational attention on implementation of the organisational structure and presence in the districts.

Monitoring: Patrolling throughout the AOR, extensive incident inquiries and follow up of complaints. Presence in Eastern Region minimal due to resources available. Situation in both regions followed trends of previous months with shelling, at times very heavy. Bombardment of Madhu area caused civilians to move further into LTTE-controlled areas. Air raids in Vanni continued; sea clashes reported at Point Pedro and seas off Nilavelli north of Trincomalee. *In the North*, abductions and killings mainly in Jaffna and Vavuniya. Tension high in Cheddikulam area; among civilians in Vavuniya as Ommanthai CP operated with limited openings – people complaining about SLA harassment. SLMM met with both Parties in Vavuniya, suggesting a low level meeting to assess problems at Ommanthai; suggestion not accepted. *In the East*, Shelling into Thoppigala area continued with fighting taking place. Child abductions in Batticaloa and Ampara districts continued. In Trincomalee, the Pillayan faction of TMVP operated visibly. Reports of clashes between the two TMVP factions in Batticaloa and Ampara districts. LTTE continued attacks on SF camps in the area, including SLA camp near Mannar. Eviction of approx. 400 Tamils from Colombo caused tension. SLMM patrolled Sampoor for first time since it fell to GOSL forces.

Liaising: HOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Mr. P. Kohona and was introduced to the incoming SG, Prof. R. Wijesinha. No LMC meetings held.

In addition, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DR's issued by the DO's; WSR's produced by HOM/HQ Ops for Facilitator, contributing countries and Parties; public version posted on SLMM website. The SG SCOPP, Prof. Wijesinha and HOM agreed to issue joint press statements after each regular meeting; the first issued 19 June.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 53 |
| General meetings: | 134 |
| LMC meetings: | 0 |

July 2007

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 29 |
| National staff: | 57 |

Structure: Mr. K. Hestad (NO) replaced Mrs. A. Sender (NO) as Operations Manager; Mrs. Sender appointed Head of LO GOSL.

Attention: Operational attention on carrying out monitoring in all districts.

Monitoring: Shelling continued at same levels along FDL west of Omanthai; in the North along the whole FDL and Poonaryn; in the East into Thoppigala from Valachchenai and from three newly established SLA camps along A5 road. LTTE customs office north of Omanthai and Hospital in Puliyanakulam, on A9, damaged by SLA artillery. Air strikes continued in Vanni and Thoppigala area. On 11 July SLA claimed to have taken Thoppigala and cleared the East of LTTE; LTTE confirmed having vacated area shortly afterwards. Major SLA offensive into LTTE-controlled area, in general area of Madhu, reported repulsed by LTTE. SLMM continued patrolling AOR, both in North and East, with self-imposed security measures traveling A30 and A14 Vavuniya–Mannar due to military operations. Large percentage resources devoted to inquiries. Claymore mines detonated in Vavuniya and Jaffna districts, also Vanni; one claiming 13 lives. One mine detonated north of Mankulam on A9, killing five civilians and injuring one. Killing and abductions, having become the norm, continued mainly in Jaffna, Vavuniya and Batticaloa. Clashes between TMVP and EPDP members in Batticaloa reported. Tension in Batticaloa decreased somewhat after the fall of Thoppigala, though LTTE attacks on SF and clashes between LTTE and TMVP continued. The Eastern Province Chief Secretary assassinated in Batticaloa. SF forces in Vavuniya entered the TELO office, one TELO member shot.

Liaising: HOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Prof. R. Wijesinha; meeting with LTTE PW Leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan in Kilinochchi, presenting new SLMM organisation. LMC meetings held in all Northern districts. *In addition*, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DR's issued by the DO's; WSR's produced by HOM/HQ Ops for Facilitator, contributing countries and Parties; public version posted on SLMM website. SCOPP and SLMM issued two joint press releases following regular meetings.

| | |
|----------------------|----|
| Complaints received: | 84 |
| General meetings: | 58 |
| LMC meetings: | 4 |

August 2007

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 30 |
| National staff: | 57 |

Structure: Mr. S. Sveinsson (IS) replaced Mr. T. Omarsson (IS) as PIO. DO Jaffna manned with one monitor on permanent basis.

Attention: Operational attention remained on manning the districts, attending and inquiring into incidents.

Monitoring: Abductions and killings continued unabated, particularly in Jaffna, Vavuniya, Batticaloa and Trincomalee district. *In the North*, shelling, at times very heavy, along the two Vanni FDL's continued. Increased shelling noted from Mannar area into LTTE-controlled area. LTTE carried out mortar attacks; approx. 80 shells landing in Tallady SLA camp near Mannar, reportedly killing three soldiers. Air strikes continued into locations in Vanni. Fighting erupted between SLA and LTTE in Silvatturai, south of A14 near Mannar, causing approx. 5,000 civilians to flee. The ICRC re-opened for five days at Omanthai CP; SLMM noted a better flow of goods in and out of Vanni. *In the East*, fighting at sea between SLN and Sea Tigers in waters north of Trincomalee. Clashes between SLA and LTTE in Ampara district. Normal skirmishes between TMVP and LTTE continued in Batticaloa and Ampara districts. On patrol to Vakara, the SLMM verified desecration of LTTE cemetery. In Ampara district the SLA captured eight underage, armed LTTE cadres. Monitors in both regions carried out extensive patrolling, attending and inquiring into numerous incidents and continuing its event driven activities.

Liaising: HOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Prof. R. Wijesinha; meeting SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi. LMC meetings held in Vavuniya and Mannar districts. *In addition*, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DR's issued by the DO's; WSR's produced by HOM/HQ Ops for Facilitator, contributing countries and Parties; public version posted on SLMM website. SCOPP and SLMM issued four joint press releases following regular meetings.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 40 |
| General meetings: | 160 |
| LMC meetings: | 4 |

September 2007

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| International monitors: | 34 |
| National staff: | 57 |

Structure: Mr. P. A. Clark (NO) replaced Mr. K. Gudmundsson (IS) as Head of LO LTTE.

Attention: Operational attention on occurring events; increased patrolling in the East.

Monitoring: Shelling, now the norm, continued with increased intensity particularly in Mannar area; civilians in Mantai West area displaced further into LTTE-controlled area. Increased shelling noted by SLMM along the northern FDL and towards Poonaryn. Several claymore mines detonated in both regions. *In the North*, SLAF increased air strikes in Vanni. Uliyanakulam crossing point near Mannar closed due to shelling and fighting. Fighting in Silvatturai area south of Mannar continued with more civilians displaced. Overall, an increase in military operations and strengthening of GOSL military efforts in the North appeared. The pattern of killings and abductions continued in Jaffna and increased further in the East; many minors taken away. *In the East*, 12 huts belonging to a Muslim community burned down in Ampara district. SLMM patrolled extensively, showing flag, maintaining high visibility in towns and villages, which to some degree had a calming effect on the people. SLMM gathered information on political development as the preparations started for elections. SLMM also raised issues with DIG re allegation they allowed TMVP to carry out armed activities.

Monitors noted more goods on the shelves in Kilinochchi stores, the extended opening of Omanthai having a positive effect. IDP's moving back into Vakara faced difficulties as many areas remained mined. SLMM monitored the IDP situation. Families and individuals followed up based on complaints. SLN reported to have sunk three LTTE ships in the waters southeast of the island claiming these were loaded with military hardware.

Liaising: HOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Prof. R. Wijesinha; meeting Mr. R. Hakeem of the Muslim Congress. LMC meetings in all districts apart from Trincomalee. *In addition*, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. He also met with UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Mr. M. Novak.

Reporting: DR's issued by the DO's; WSR's produced by HOM/HQ Ops for Facilitator, contributing countries and Parties; public version posted on SLMM website. SCOPP and SLMM issued four joint press releases following.

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Complaints received: | 69 |
| General meetings: | 140 |
| LMC meetings: | 6 |

October 2007

International monitors: 35
National staff: 57

Structure: Ms. P.E. Hansson (IS) replaced Mr. S. Sveinsson (IS) as PIO.

Attention: Operational attention remained on inquiries and following up on abductions, particularly in the East; maintaining visibility and keeping track of military developments, particularly in the North.

Monitoring: *In the North*, military operations increased further with intensified fighting in Mannar area. Shelling along the northern Vanni FDL towards Poonaryn remained at high level, intensified along southern Vanni FDL. Rate of air strikes remained high in Vanni. Uliyankulam CP remained closed. On 22 October, LTTE carried out its largest single suicide attack to date when reportedly 21 Black Tigers attacked Anuradhapura Air Base in coordination with two light LTTE aircraft. A number of planes, helicopters and UAV's reportedly destroyed and damaged; SLMM unable to verify as permission to enter the base was not granted. SLMM attempted to assess situation for people in Jaffna seeking protective custody from GOSL. *In the East*, the number of killings and abductions remained high; further increase registered in Batticaloa in particular. Police reluctant to intervene. Armed TMVP members with abductees reportedly allowed unhindered passage past SLA CP's. In one case, SLMM witnessed armed civilians being allowed through a SLA CP. Monitors noted two desecrated LTTE cemeteries west of Batticaloa. Monitors witnessed IDP's returning to previously closed areas in Muttur East. SLMM activities somewhat hampered by new security measures.

Liaising: HOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Prof. R. Wijesinha; meeting Defence Sec., Mr. G. Rajapakse. LMC meetings in all districts apart from Trincomalee and Ampara. *In addition*, HOM held weekly regular meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone. AHOM met with UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms. L. Arbour.

Reporting: DR's issued by the DO's; WSR's produced by HOM/HQ Ops for Facilitator, contributing countries and Parties; public version posted on SLMM website. SCOPP and SLMM issued one joint press release following a regular meeting. SLMM issued a statement re visit of Mr. B. Vestmann of Iceland to Sri Lanka.

Complaints received: 82
General meetings: 154
LMC meetings: 6

November 2007

International monitors: 34
National staff: 57

Structure: Mr. L. Svare (NO) replaced Mr. P.A. Clark (NO) as Head of LO LTTE.

Attention: Operational attention remained on inquiries and following up on the many abductions and killings in all districts, maintaining visibility in Eastern towns and villages; keeping track of military developments in the North.

Monitoring: Abductions and killings remained at very high level in the East, increased in the North, particularly in Jaffna and Vavuniya. Explosions in Colombo caused fear. *In the North*, situation deteriorated even further following air strike in Kilinochchi, killing LTTE PW leader S.P. Tamilselvan, five other PW members and two civilians. Intensified SLA ground offensives in Mannar area continued. Military confrontations at Northern FDL. Numerous air strikes inside Vanni with considerable increase towards end of month; one strike killing ten civilians and injuring 17. SLMM continued to monitor situation for several hundred civilians held in protective custody in Jaffna. *In the East*, SLMM verified increased infighting within the TMVP. Killing of two PLOTE members in Vavuniya caused concern; Muslims in Kathankudy, south of Batticaloa, arranged hartals due to the killings. Political parties avoided campaigning for provincial elections; SLMM followed up on the preparation. Growing fear in several communities, in particular Kanniya, Eachilampattu and Valaichchenai, due to extensive killings – a trend noted by monitors on patrols. SLMM denied freedom of movement by being stopped at Omanthai CP, refused crossing without clearance by MOD. Continued extensive patrolling to monitor IDP situation and political activities.

Liaising: HOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Prof. R. Wijesinha; meeting new LTTE PW Leader, Mr. B. Nadesan and SG LTTE PS, Mr. S. Puleedevan in Kilinochchi. LMC meetings in the Northern districts. *In addition*, HOM held regular weekly meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone.

Reporting: DR's issued by the DO's; WSR's produced by HOM/HQ Ops for Facilitator, contributing countries and Parties; public version posted on SLMM website. Two statements issued; one following air strike killing LTTE PW leader, Mr. S.P. Tamilselvan and seven others; the second expressing alarm re escalating number of civilian casualties.

Complaints received: 55
General meetings: 131
LMC meetings: 6

December 2007

International monitors: 40
National staff: 57

Structure: Mr. P.A. Clark (NO) replaced Ms. A. Sender (NO) as LO GOSL.

Attention: Operational attention remained on inquiries and following up on abductions and killings in all districts, particularly in Jaffna and Batticaloa; maintaining visibility in Eastern towns and villages; keeping track of military developments in the North.

Monitoring: Activities in line with previous month. In Batticaloa district SLMM experienced increased difficulties interacting with civilians, monitors on several occasions asked to leave as people were openly worried about drawing attention. Inquiries into killings and abductions used most of the resources in Jaffna and Batticaloa districts. *In the North*, military activity, with heavy shelling and several air strikes, continued, with heavy clashes reported along Northern and Southern FDL's; particularly heavy in Mantai West area in Mannar district. Increased military activity reported in the Weli Oya sector, south of Mullaithivu. Claymore mine attacks against SF and police in Vavuniya district, against a civilian bus in Kebithigollewa, the most significant with 16 reportedly killed and 21 injured. A further claymore mine attack killed three EPDP members and two civilians in Vavuniya. 84 civilians were arrested in Mannar following the killing of a policeman at the local bazaar; monitors increased Mannar patrols. *In the East*, following the arrest of Col. Karuna in London, monitors witnessed an increase in hostilities and open confrontation, between the Piliayan and Karuna factions of the TMVP. SLMM noted increase in forced recruitment.

Liaising: HOM had routine meetings with SG SCOPP, Prof. R. Wijesinha. LMC meetings in all districts apart from Trincomalee and Batticaloa. *In addition*, HOM held regular weekly meetings with the Ambassador of Norway, communicating with the Facilitator in Oslo by telephone, and meeting the Facilitator in Oslo. AHOM met with Mr. R. Templer and Mr. A. Keenan of the International Crisis Group.

Reporting: DR's issued by the DO's; WSR's produced by HOM/HQ Ops for Facilitator, contributing countries and Parties; public version posted on SLMM website.

Complaints received: 78
General meetings: 119
LMC meetings: 6



EPY/SCANPIX



REUTERS/SCANPIX



The SLMM operation on Sri Lanka terminated in January 2008, the termination of the organisation continued in the Nordic countries.



TERMINATION REVIEW, 2008

The SLMM terminated its operation in January 2008, following the abrogation of the CFA, subsequently terminating the organisation in December.

Overview 2008

SUMMARY OF THE TERMINATION
OF THE SLMM IN 2008

2008 was the final year of the existence of the SLMM, with the operation ending on 16 January and the organisation terminated on 31 December 2008. The termination was executed first in Sri Lanka, to be completed in the Nordic countries, including filing, auditing and reporting.

SETTING 2008

Abrogation of the CFA

The mandate accorded the *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)* by the Parties through the *Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)* was effectively removed with the unilateral notification of the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) to the Norwegian government on 2 January that it would withdraw from the CFA, and by consequence: terminate the operation of the SLMM with effect from 16 January, according to the stipulations of the Agreement.

For notification and message of abrogation, see Appendix 3

The abrogation was unanimously sanctioned by the Sri Lankan cabinet; acting upon a request made by Prime Minister Rathnasiri Wickramanayake, and was presented with the intention of finding a more inclusive political solution to the conflict. On 3 January a letter to the Royal Norwegian Government (RNG) was handed to the Ambassador of Norway, Tore Hattrem by Sri Lanka's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rohitha Bogollagama. The notification was in accordance with paragraph 4.4 in the CFA, reading: "This Agreement shall remain in force until notice of termination is given by either Party to the RNG. Such notice shall be given fourteen (14) days in advance of the effective date of termination."

International concern was voiced, with expressions of fear that the abrogation would lead to a further escalation of the conflict, reducing the possibility of a political solution. In a statement issued on 4 January, the foreign ministers of the five Nordic countries, expressed worry that the violence and human suffering would escalate, noting that the withdrawal of the SLMM "will mean the end of an important mechanism that protected civilians and gave a voice to the victims and their families", and that the termination of the CFA "will only make it more difficult to find a way back to the negotiating table". On the SLMM, the ministers said that "The Nordic countries are both grateful for and proud of the efforts and contributions made by the international and local monitors and staff of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission under very demanding circumstances".

Speaking on the CFA in Washington DC in late January, the Ambassador of Sri Lanka, the first Secretary-General of the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) and a promi-

nent participant in the Peace Process, Dr. Bernard Goonetilleke said that "the demand of a return to the CFA is like requesting a return to the make-believe world in which Sri Lankans lived since 2002," squarely placing the blame for the failure of the agreement on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), saying: "[...] the violations listed by Nordic monitors clearly establish that the Tigers never *ceased firing*. What remained of the CFA, until its recent abrogation, was an *agreement on paper*, rendered defunct by the Tigers, from day one".

Following the abrogation, the HOM met with the LTTE Political Leader, Balasingham Nadesan in Kilinochchi for a last round of talks. Expressing 'shock' and 'disappointment' over the decision of the GOSL, Nadesan said the LTTE desisted from withdrawing from the CFA and remained ready to stand by its clauses, requesting Norway to continue with its facilitation role. In a statement, the LTTE said the GOSL "failed to implement the CFA clauses within the timeframes indicated in the CFA and bring normalcy to the life of the Tamil people".

Hosting a farewell luncheon for the HOM and monitors on 16 January, the Secretary General (SG) of the SCOPP, Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha, praised the SLMM for doing a good job on the whole in monitoring adherence to the CFA "under difficult conditions", saying that despite many ups and downs in the monitoring, "the SLMM in general carried out its task well", adding that members of the mission did an exemplary job. Responding, the HOM proclaimed his intention to prepare a report on the SLMM experience after the termination of the operation. Secretary to the Foreign Ministry and former SG SCOPP, Dr. Palitha Kohona and the Ambassador of Norway, Mr. Tore Hattrem also attended the luncheon.

At a farewell reception given the same evening by the Ambassador of Norway, Tore Hattrem, SG Wijesinha said he looked forward to receiving the report mentioned above, building on gained experience to develop mechanisms for restoring confidence between all communities in advancing the peace process, reiterating Sri Lanka's gratitude to the monitors who at times had been under much pressure. The SG also said that the SLMM under its current HOM had done much to restore confidence and SCOPP appreciated his cooperation over the preceding year.



EXIT EXERCISE: With the abrogation of the CFA, the SLMM terminated its operation, immediately preparing for withdrawal, in accordance with its prepared plan for evacuation/termination, 'Hera'. Packing up at HQ, Colombo, 2008.

Operational environment

Militarily, January 2008 saw no significant changes in the military situation during the latter days of the CFA. The Sri Lanka Army (SLA) continued offensives into the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)-controlled areas west of Vavuniya and in the Mantai West area in Mannar. Shelling, at times heavy, took place along the southern Forward Defence Localities (FDL) including the Weli Oya sector, as well as in the North, particularly towards the Poonaryn peninsula.

Several serious incidents took place during the first half of January. The Tamil United National Party (UNP) MP, Thiyagarajah Maheswaran was assassinated in Colombo 1 January. Four days later, the LTTE Military Intelligence leader, Col. Charles was killed by a claymore mine inside the LTTE-controlled territory near Palamaduru, allegedly by a SLA Deep Penetration Unit (SLA DPU). On 8 January, the Minister for Nation Building, Mr. D.M. Dissanayake plus his driver and a security guard were killed when a claymore mine exploded just north of Colombo. On the very last days of the ceasefire a claymore mine targeting a civilian bus in the Monaragala area killed 27 civilians and wounded 63 others.

The SLMM did not attend to any of the incidents, instead concentrating on closing down the mission. The HOM had his farewell meeting with the LTTE Political Wing (PW) leader, Balasingam Nadesan and the SG LTTE-Peace Secretariat (PS), Sevaratnam Puleedevan on 10 January. The HOM gave his final press conference (late afternoon) 16 January at the Trans Asia Hotel.

Politically, January 2008 saw the conflict deepening as a consequence of the unilateral abrogation of the CFA by the GOSL, which

also effectively halted the peace process, in effect largely defunct since 2006. Regretting the decision, the Norwegian Minister of the Environment and International Development, the former Special Envoy, Erik Solheim stated that "This comes on top of the increasingly frequent and brutal acts of violence perpetrated by both parties, and I am deeply concerned that the violence and hostilities will now escalate even further." Several governments issued statements of regret, including the USA, which called on both Parties to avoid escalation. Another member of the Co-Chairs group, Japan, expressed deep concern that the decision taken by the GOSL "may lead to the escalation of the conflict by way of increased level of violence and greater civilian casualties, and leave the peace process at a standstill", further noting that the "Conflict in Sri Lanka cannot be solved by military means," calling on the Parties to reach a solution through negotiation. At the same time, the regional power India ruled out any military solution to the Sri Lankan problem, stressing that the solution "had to be found through dialogue and discussion". The Secretary General of the UN expressed deep worry that the withdrawal from the CFA came amidst "intensifying fighting in the North and increasing violence across the country, including Colombo".

Following statements from its individual members, the Co-Chairs group on 12 January expressed deep concerns about the termination of the CFA, and expressed continued support to a continued Norwegian role as facilitator. The Co-Chairs urged the GOSL to "finalise a politically sustainable devolution plan", and all parties to "comply with their obligations under international law to protect civilians and allow access by humanitarian aid agencies to populations in need".



HÅNØN MØNSVOLD LARSEN/SCANPIX

COOL KEEPING: The SLMM files are deposited for safekeeping in the cooled underground vaults of the National Archives of Norway, deep inside the rocky hills of the Oslo forest.

The Colombo-based group, National Peace Council (NPC) noted that the abrogation would result in the removal of the SLMM monitors, which would reduce the flow of credible information to the outside world.

OPERATION 2008

Operational execution

The SLMM ceased normal operation immediately on being notified about the Government's decision to abrogate the CFA. Movement was limited to, to and from and in between offices and accommodation. Additionally, monitors in Vavuniya travelled to Mannar town and held a Local Monitoring Committee (LMC) meeting on 2 January. Monitors in all districts arranged and carried out farewell meetings with their various contacts. Reporting also ceased immediately. Generally, and for obvious reasons, activity turned from monitoring, reporting and liaising to termination and close down.

A total of 78 general meetings were held. LMC meetings were held in both Mannar and Vavuniya. A total of three complaints were received, one in Batticaloa and two in Vavuniya, before the SLMM closed its complaints database for further entries.

TERMINATION 2008

Execution, Sri Lanka

Resources: Entering January, the SLMM had 40 international monitors and 57 national staff members. There were six offices and six accommodation premises in the districts plus the location in Kilinochchi serving as both office and accommodation. District Office (DO) Trincomalee monitors were housed in a hotel. In Colombo, the SLMM premises comprised of the Headquarters (HQ) and 19 apartments. The organisation possessed 32 vehicles.

2008 saw the conflict deepening as a consequence of the unilateral abrogation of the CFA.

Operation: The termination plan was executed as of 4 January, though monitors in the districts as well as in the HQ started packing up their files on 3 January. The Communication Manager and his assistant, 4–11 January, travelled to all districts and the Liaison Office (LO) in Kilinochchi disassembling all communication and satellite equipment, which was brought to Colombo. Some communication masts were sold to international non-governmental organisations (INGO's) in the respective districts. The Logistics Manager commenced the process of terminating leasing contracts for buildings and premises including the lease of the various Points of Contact (POC) offices. With the limited time available most of the SLMM's property in terms of furniture and household items were given away as charity to organisations such as local schools, orphanages, hospitals, INGO's etc. To a limited extent, some items were sold to INGO's. Larger items such as generators were given away, mainly to the landlords where they were located, although some were sold to INGO's. The large generator in Kilinochchi was given to the District Medical Officer for use in a government hospital in Vanni. AC units were largely left in the district buildings and given to the respective landlords. This huge task was completed in all districts in the period 4 to 11 January, with the exception of Jaffna which was completed by 13 January. All files, vehicles and computer equipment were brought to Colombo, apart from the vehicles in Jaffna that were left behind in the custody of the NGO Forut due to the fact there was no access by road out of the district.

It quickly became clear that the SLMM required more than the 14 days the CFA stipulated time to close down the mission. Although the operations officially terminated 16 January, the organisation was given until 20 February for administrative closedown in Colombo. The period 16 January–20 February, in which a limited



FRIENDLY FAREWELL: On completion of its operation in Sri Lanka, the SLMM bid farewell to its key stakeholders, first and foremost the Parties. The SG of SCOPP, Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha (centre, right), hosting a farewell luncheon for the HOM, Maj Gen (R) Lars J. Sølberg (centre, left), praised the SLMM for the way it carried out its tasks – “despite ups and downs”; facsimile from the ‘SCOPP Quarterly’.

number of monitors and the HOM stayed behind, was used to pack all files for transport to Norway. Likewise, all communication equipment was thoroughly packed for transportation. During this period, all vehicle-based communication equipment was dismantled from the cars and packed. All computer hard disks were de-installed. Additionally, security equipment such as bullet proof vests and helmets were packed. Necessary approvals from the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence (MOD) and from customs were obtained for transport by a ship-borne container with the extensive help and assistance of the Norwegian Embassy. The container was escorted to Colombo harbour by a representative of the embassy on 18 February. Leasing contracts for apartments were terminated. Household items and furniture was collected from the apartments and stored in the HQ premises for an auction to be held at a later date. This was carried out in April by a Colombo based auctioneer with the assistance of the Norwegian Embassy. Likewise, the SLMM fleet of 32 vehicles was auctioned at a later date.

Organisation: National staff members were given their termination letters shortly after the CFA was announced abrogated. They were all given an additional six month's salary. The monitors were given their termination letters by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs respectively. All monitors were out of their districts by 11 January with the exception of one monitor in Jaffna arriving in Colombo 14 January. With the exception of the HOM, the Mission Manager and nine monitors, all other monitors had left the country by early morning 17 January. The remaining eleven, plus ten HQ-based national staff carried out the work described above before the HOM and the Finance Manager were the last to leave the country on 20 February.

Two monitors travelled to Trincomalee to meet the then former national staff towards the end of January, with the purpose of helping with whatever concerns they had. From Trincomalee the monitors linked up with the Personnel Manager for a similar visit to Vavuniya. The exercise was repeated in the second week of February when a trip to Batticaloa was carried out. Unlike the initial trip, the MOD insisted on an escort by a SCOPP representative. This trip also included an informal meeting with LMC member Father Miller in Batticaloa.

Execution, Norway

The completion of the termination process was carried out in the Nordic contributing countries, from a temporary base in Oslo, during 2008. For this purpose, the SLMM continued to exist as an organisation, despite the closure of the field operation on January 16, until it was formally disbanded by 31 December 2008, as agreed by the Nordic governments. The purpose of retaining the organisation was to complete the complex termination, designed as a termination project consisting of three main components:

1) Accounting and Auditing:

The remaining financial accounting for 2008 was completed, and the accounts covering the years 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 were prepared and presented for external audit; audited by the international company KPMG. Also, a complete report of resource utilisation for the entire operational period was compiled, incorporated into this document.





CARTOON COMMENT: The Colombo-based weekly, the 'Bottom Line' raised the key question at the critical time of the burial of the CFA – with the SLMM waving farewell in the background. Sri Lanka, January 2008.

the SLMM itself for the future, considered of value not least for researchers, evaluators, politicians, and others. The report also constitutes a part of the historical web-site on the SLMM established as part of this termination component.

Resources: The termination process carried out in the Nordic countries was lead by the last HOM, retaining his position on request from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), until the closure of the organisation, and directed from rented, temporary office premises in Oslo, manned by a minimal termination team of former monitors supported by external expertise on short-term contracts. The production of the reports with the accompanying historical web, was completed by 2009/2010.

Organisation: The termination process included all five Nordic governments and involved former monitors, supporting the core termination team with information. The ministries of foreign affairs were visited by members of the termination team in mid-2008, and all former monitors invited to participate in an electronic survey, carried out in August 2008. Additionally, a number of persons holding key positions connected to the establishment

and directing of the SLMM as well as the Peace Process were interviewed in persona. Furthermore, 27 key persons from all Nordic countries – former HOMs and other monitors, as well as representatives of the respective MFA's and recruitment agencies, including the Special Envoy of the Norwegian government – participated in a workshop in Helsinki, hosted by the Finnish MFA in September 2008, debating experiences made by the SLMM.

The NRC, which throughout the operation had played an instrumental administrative role seconding monitors from Norway, on 4 March hosted an End of Mission Ceremony in cooperation with the Norwegian MFA at the Oslo Grand Hotel.

The ambassadors to Norway, of Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden, gathered, at the invitation of the Norwegian Minister for foreign affairs Jonas Gahr Støre, in Oslo on 12 December to sign a protocol between the governments of the five countries that had contributed towards the running of the SLMM, concerning the archives of the mission. In order to safeguard the archives and ensure their secure handling, a depository agreement was concluded between the Norwegian MFA, acting on behalf of the SLMM, and the National Archives of Norway. The archives remain inviolable, and any requests for access to information and documents contained there, has to be jointly considered and decided upon by the parties to the protocol.

“The completion of the termination process was carried out in the Nordic contributing countries.

03: OPERATIONAL RESOURCES

Human Resources
Logistical Resources
Financial Resources

The SLMM carried out a complex operation with limited resources under increasing pressure.

Acting independently, the mission was financed and manned by the five Nordic co-sponsors, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, acquiring logistical support locally. In 2006, the capacity was considerably hampered by a sharp reduction in international monitors.



The SLMM was manned by international monitors from the Nordic countries and national staff from Sri Lanka.

Human Resources

THE SLMM WAS MADE UP OF INTERNATIONAL MONITORS
AND NATIONAL STAFF MEMBERS

The SLMM was designed as a civilian organisation, composed of personnel from the five Nordic countries. Without any organisational entity of this nature available, individuals with varied backgrounds were recruited for the purpose, briefly prepared and deployed to the mission.

The *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)* was created by the Parties to the conflict, as a part of the *Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)* itself. The CFA constitutes the major part of the framework for the SLMM, outlining its mandate and tasks. However, upon requesting the Royal Norwegian Government (RNG) to establish the mission, the Parties largely left it to the Facilitator to design the organisational structure, as well as the manning model. The prerequisites given to this effect were that the SLMM was to be 'civilian', that it was to be composed of personnel from the five Nordic countries and that the MFA was to appoint the *Head of Mission (HOM)*. Implicitly, it was understood that the mission was to be Norwegian-led. There was, however, no provision for any institutionalised governance of the SLMM.

The five Nordic countries took upon themselves the recruitment of the international monitors for deployment to Sri Lanka to man the SLMM. Altogether, during the entire operational period, 2002–08 there were 319 individuals serving as SLMM monitors, the mission's strength varying from approx. 20 to 60. The SLMM itself hired a number of national staff locally to support the monitors; in all 123 national staff members were recruited during the course of the operation. Consequently, some 442 individuals were employed with the SLMM, 2002–2008.

It should be noted that there are slight uncertainties pertaining some of the statistics regarding human resources, as a number of personnel files were inadequately kept.

ORGANISATIONAL CONCEPT

The organisational structure of the SLMM was designed in parallel with finalising the CFA, with the definite design executed immediately after the signing of the Agreement and as the operation commenced. The organisation was in principle modelled on a conventional UN (military) peace-keeping structure, with a headquarters (HQ) and decentralised presence throughout positions in the operational area.

See also the "Structure" article, pages 47–52

Although the design of the mission started in advance of the deployment, there was no clear idea of the exact structure or size of the SLMM before the operation commenced; the final structure was developed based on the operational framework

drawn up through the CFA and an assessment of the situation in the country at the time. Initially, at the MFA, there was the idea that the SLMM should be kept relatively small; approx. 16 monitors were to be deployed, mainly to maintain a distributed presence as prescribed by the CFA.

However, at the time of actual deployment the monitors numbered 20 plus, with the chosen structure requiring approx. 45; this increased to 60 at maximum strength in 2005. In September 2006 it was more than halved, following the withdrawal of the monitors from member states of the European Union (EU), a consequence of the EU's listing of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation.

The initial size of the SLMM was a question of defining a politically acceptable volume of the mission, more than a functional consideration of the tasks at hand and the scope of the operation as such; one of the preconditions agreed upon in the CFA process, was for the monitoring mission to be kept small. With the defined tasks within a wide Area of Responsibility (AOR), the personnel resources were at all times stretched and the number of monitors became a matter of concern to the HOM. Already in March 2002, the HOM in his Monthly Report to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), took note of 'unacceptable limitations' as regards the 'capacity and endurance' of the Mission. The expectations expressed by the Parties, as well as the population, were at the time very high and HOM reported that the mission was unable to execute all mandated tasks due to an inadequate personnel force.

A system of *Senior National Representatives (SNR)* was introduced in 2002 and remained in place throughout the operation. The SNR was appointed by the respective Nordic secondment institutions to serve as a link between the SLMM and the contributing nations regarding national administrative and legal matters related to the monitors. For practical reasons, the SNR's

“The initial size of the SLMM was a question of defining a politically acceptable volume of the mission, more than a functional consideration of the tasks at hand and the scope of the operation.

were appointed among personnel based at HQ. Internally the SNR's also exercised leadership, when necessary, with regard to minor individual disciplinary challenges.

MANNING CONCEPT

The SLMM was established on short notice and there was little precedence to draw directly on when designing and deploying the mission. There had been no mission of the kind (a civilian monitoring mission composed of members from five Nordic countries) prior to the SLMM. Whereas all the Nordic governments (with the exception of Iceland) had considerable experience from military peacekeeping and monitoring, there was only scattered experience with civilian monitoring of military conflicts. Consequently, there was neither any institutional expertise nor structure in place from where to deploy the SLMM.

The governments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden were invited by the Norwegian MFA to provide personnel for the venture as well as to contribute to mission running costs. All countries accepted the invitation. The contributing countries chose different mechanisms and methods in recruiting and training personnel, as described below.

The human resources of the SLMM consisted of three categories:

– International monitors:

Individuals from the five Nordic countries were recruited to serve as monitors in Sri Lanka for contract periods of six months duration. All personnel seconded to the SLMM were designated monitors irrespective of their functions.

– National staff:

Individuals from Sri Lanka were hired by the SLMM (at HQ or DO level) to assist the mission and the monitors in specific tasks, particularly serving in the capacity of field assistants, interpreters and drivers. Other main functions were as administrative assistants and within housekeeping.

– External expertise:

Specialised companies were engaged to perform specific tasks in situations where the SLMM itself lacked sufficient expertise; this included software development/adaptation, security assessment, organizational development and communication strategy (incl. visual profiling and web development).

The chosen HQ set-up, reflecting a lean organisation, also required the SLMM to draw extensively on resources in local civil society to provide supplies and services. This kept mission specific logistical staff to a minimum.

HEAD OF MISSION (HOM)

Albeit a civilian mission, the Parties decided that the organisation and the operation should be led by a military general officer, who at the time was not in active service within his/her respective Armed Forces. The Norwegian MFA was requested to recruit the HOM; it was not decreed that they should be a Norwegian. Five individuals served as the HOM over the years; one of them serving twice: Major General Trond Furuhoide, the first HOM, 2002–03, served again, 2004–05. The last HOM, Major General Lars J. Sølberg, served until the final

termination of the SLMM organisation by December 31, 2008, even though the operation was terminated in January 2008.

SLMM Heads of Mission (HOM)

| PERIOD | PERSON | NATIONALITY |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|
| Mar 2002–Mar 2003 | Major General (R) Trond Furuhoide | Norway |
| Mar 2003–Oct 2003 | Major General (R) Trygve Tellefsen | Norway |
| Oct 2003–Mar 2004 | Brigadier (R) Hagrup Haukland* | Norway |
| Mar 2004–Feb 2005 | Major General (R) Trond Furuhoide | Norway |
| Feb 2005–Mar 2006 | Brigadier (R) Hagrup Haukland | Norway |
| Apr 2006–Aug 2006 | Major General (R) Ulf Henricsson | Sweden |
| Sep 2006–Dec 2008 | Major General (R) Lars J. Sølberg** | Norway |

* Serving as acting HOM

** In charge of the termination throughout 2008

An extensive list of key persons is found in Appendix 5

Whereas all other monitors were contracted by and seconded through the respective national recruitment agencies (see below) the HOM – here a Norwegian – was selected and seconded by the Norwegian MFA. The HOM was not formally instructed by the MFA, neither did he report to the Ministry in any capacity as a civil servant. He did however, as stipulated by the CFA, report to the Facilitator of the Peace Process (i.e. the RNG represented by the MFA) through the Facilitator's Special Envoy to Sri Lanka

Although neither instructed nor described, the HOM in effect held a dual position; that of heading the monitoring mission as an organisation 'force commander' and that of embodying a designated function of the peace process, especially with regards to his role as the supreme CFA interpretation authority. Additionally, the HOM played an assigned role as an intermediary between the Parties and at times between the Parties and the Facilitator; liaising at the highest available level (which changed over time) without constituting any political figure.

INTERNATIONAL MONITORS


The international monitors were recruited from the five Nordic countries, all contributing personnel from the onset of the operation until mid-2006, when monitors from EU member states were withdrawn, leaving the SLMM with monitors from Iceland and Norway only. The other Nordic governments continued to support the mission politically and economically.

Mission Strength

Altogether 319 international monitors were deployed to the SLMM, 2002–08, several of them serving more than one contract period (normally six months). During the operational period, the total number of secondments (contract periods) were 563. In total, the SLMM had approximately 280 man-years at its disposal; approx. 47 on the average per year.


Differences in manning strength from one year to another occurred due to changes in recruitment, secondment and deployment practices. At times delays in acquiring visas to Sri Lanka hampered the manning procedures. The sharp decline in 2006/2007 was caused by the decision to withdraw monitors from Denmark, Finland and Sweden following the EU's list-

Graph 1: Monitors per nationality (deployments), 2002–2008¹




¹ Please note that SLMM monitors rotated continuously, and not every six months as the graph might indicate. The figures are thus based on the main periods of deployment for each monitor; for example – a monitor deployed from February 2003 to August 2003, is placed in the category “2003 January–June”. The first half in 2002 was marked by continuous adding of monitors, most of which came in late spring. These monitors were seconded mainly in the second half of 2002, and are thus placed in the category “2002 July–December”.


Graph 2: Nordic contribution of monitors, 2002–2008




Graph 3: Number of contract periods in SLMM, 2002–2008



Graph 4: Age distribution of monitors, 2002–2008




Graph 5: Professional background of monitors, 2002–2008¹




¹ Please note that many monitors had multiple backgrounds; especially those with military and NGO/UN background

Graph 6: Education level of monitors, 2002–2008




Graph 7: Function within the in SLMM, 2002–2008




The chart indicates the initial function of SLMM monitors.

Graph 8: Stationed within the in SLMM, 2002–2008




The chart indicates the number of monitors initially stationed in the DO's or at the HQ.


Graph 9: Function and nationality, 2002–2008




Graph 10: National employees and Ethnicity, 2002–2008




Graph 11: Function in SLMM



Graph 12: National employees and gender, 2002–2008



Graph 13: National employees and Age, 2002–2008



ing of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation and after which the LTTE declared it could no longer guarantee the safety of monitors from EU countries. This left the afore mentioned countries with no other option than to recall their monitors, thereby substantially reducing the capacity and capability of the mission. Consequently, in September 2006, the numbers of monitors were reduced by about 50 percent; capacity never to be fully restored: The Facilitator wishing to convey signals to the Parties regarding the development in the Peace Process decided, in principle, not to compensate for the reduction. However, a few more monitors from Iceland and Norway were deployed as reinforcement to critical positions, reaching a total strength of about 35 monitors in 2007. Late 2006, the option of introducing monitors from nations other than the Nordic was discussed, but for a number of reasons never further pursued. (Graph 1)

The number of monitors with the SLMM year-on-year is only indicative as regards the actual capacity: Within contract period of six months the monitors would normally be entitled to 36 days of leave (six days per month). Consequently, only $\frac{3}{4}$ of the monitors would, on average, be available for active duty; the remainder absent on leave. Considering the utilization of the monitors, it should be taken into account that they would require time to adapt to the setting and acquaint themselves with their appointment prior to being not only operative, but effective.

Mission Composition

Of the total number of 319 monitors, Norway contributed the largest share with 109 persons, seconding the largest number of individuals throughout the operation; followed by Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. The majority of monitors worked for the SLMM for more than one period (six months). Whereas the total number of monitors deployed to the mission was 319, the total number of deployments was approximately 570. (Graph 2)

There was no fixed distribution of key positions between the Nordic countries. The HOM – with one exception – remained Norwegian; all nations except Finland held the position of Chief of Staff (COS). For practical reasons, some key positions were informally linked to specific countries: Chief Personnel and Administration Officers (CPAO) from Denmark, Chief Finance Officers (CFO) from Norway, Chief Logistics Officers (CLO) from Sweden and Chief Operation Officers (COO) from Finland – until 2005/2006, when monitors for EU member states were withdrawn. Iceland provided the Press and Information Officer (PIO) throughout the operation; Finland the Legal Advisor (LA) until pulling out in 2006. Other key positions, i.e. Heads of Districts (HOD) were assigned on the basis of merit, rather than nationality.

The majority of monitors were male (235 individuals; 74 per cent); approx. $\frac{1}{4}$ were female (84 individuals; 26 percent). The age span was considerable, ranging from mid 20's to mid 60's. There were a number of military and police service retirees. The

age distribution varied between contributing countries, reflecting different recruitment policies and models: Norway deployed the highest number of monitors born during the period 1970–1980; Denmark deployed the highest number of monitors born during the period 1940–50. (Graph 3) (Graph 4)

Mission Competency

Being a civilian mission, the SLMM monitors were of mixed professional background. However, approx. 26 per cent had a military career and approx. 10 per cent were police officers. Other professions included administration, finance, media, logistics, research and IT/telecom. 61 per cent of the monitors came from public sector, 39 per cent from private sector. (Graph 5)

The majority of monitors had wide professional experience, including from international operations or organisations. Almost one half had a background working with NGO's or the UN prior to their secondment to the SLMM. Approx. 55 percent of the monitors had a vocational background and 45 percent an academic background. The educational level was high, with almost $\frac{2}{3}$ holding bachelor or master degrees. (Graph 6)

Mission Structure

All international staff were designated monitors, although the actual field monitoring was carried out by the personnel seconded to the DO's, NMT's and the LO's. At HQ level, monitors were divided into two categories: *management* and *support* staff. The HQ structure was altered at several stages, including both functions and denominations, although keeping the division between the main functions fairly constant. On average, for the entire period, approx. 56 percent of the monitors carried out field monitoring with the DO's, NMT's, or served with the LO's; 26 percent were found in management; 18 percent in support. In total, almost $\frac{1}{3}$ of all monitors served with HQ, the rest with DO's, NMT's and LO's. (The chart below indicates the initial function of SLMM monitors; the function often changed during the course of their secondment. It should be noted that some of the monitors served both at HQ and DO level during their tenures and some held multiple functions.) (Graph 7) (Graph 8)

Functions were fairly equably distributed between contributing countries. (Graph 9)

All countries provided personnel to HQ, DO's and NMT's, with the exception of Denmark, who did not provide naval monitors.

Recruitment Model

Monitors were recruited individually from the respective Nordic countries, with each country applying their own recruitment model and preparatory practise. Recruitment and preparation was not coordinated between nations from the onset of the mission and scarcely during the operation. As a result, the monitors did not arrive in mission area with common, basic preparation or training. However, everyone was provided a thorough introduction briefing at the SLMM HQ before taking up respective positions. The HOM had listed a certain set of qualifications as a prerequisite for serving with the SLMM (see below).

“... in September 2006, the numbers of monitors were reduced by about 50 percent; capacity never to be fully restored.

All five countries drew upon existing systems of voluntary secondment for international operations based on general rosters/databases. No SLMM – specific recruitment concept was developed in any of the countries during the operation period. Typically, personnel on the rosters had volunteered for international service in general; neither for ceasefire monitoring as an operational mode, nor Sri Lanka as a defined location. Personnel were not normally recruited for specific positions within the SLMM; with the exception of a few specialists, i.e. accountants, IT experts and similar. Each individual signed a contract which expressed his/her assignment as ‘monitor’ and the specific deployment position was allocated upon arrival.

The respective recruitment agency/office in each of the five countries were themselves contracted by their governments to recruit and second monitors. Hence, all matters pertaining to salary, insurance, travel and other ‘national expenses’ were a matter between the recruiters and the recruited (not the responsibility of the SLMM, as was the case with pre-deployment preparations). The responsibility for final de-briefing and further follow-up of monitors, after their tour of duty ended, rested with the respective agencies.

In 2002, a Guidelines document was issued by the SLMM, including stipulations on qualifications required. These, together with job descriptions for all positions in the mission, created an overall framework for recruitment. After an assessment of issues relating to personnel and recruitment made by the MFA and the SLMM, including a seminar with the SLMM in Colombo in March 2004, the MFA forwarded a letter to the other Nordic ministries regarding ‘Recommendations on SLMM recruitment and personnel’. The proposals from the MFA, which were congruent with considerations raised by the HOM, in the main, covered key staff positions and stated that ‘The position will be filled on the basis of merit, not nationality’. Responding to an explicit recommendation from the HOM, the MFA proposed that additional political advisors to the DO’s be excluded, arguing that “We believe that the insertion of political officers at district level would change the nature of SLMM in a manner that would not accord with its mandate to serve as a monitoring, rather than a political, mission.”

In the same letter, the MFA requested contributing nations to take note of additionally required qualifications for SLMM personnel in their recruitment of monitors. In a memo on requirements, the HOM noted that “SLMM monitors have to be prepared for additional tasks *not covered by job descriptions*, as and when required”. In particular, the HOM emphasised the desirability of staff having previous experience from longer stays abroad, living in the field and previous and similar missions abroad. A special note was made, that “Experience as an election observer is not a sufficient qualification for joining the SLMM”. In order to improve the staff competency level, the HOM recommended that each of the Nordic countries send recruitment representatives to Sri Lanka once or twice a year, to familiarize themselves with the requirements of being a SLMM monitor.

Naval *monitors* were recruited directly, rather than through the Nordic personnel rosters.

DENMARK

In *Denmark*, monitors were recruited from a database of 360 persons with mixed skills and different profiles, hosted by the Danish MFA. Most of the database members were retirees. A basic requirement for everyone enrolled in the roster was to have previous mission experience, therefore ensuring members were fit for an international operation. Prior to deployment, all monitors attended a 2.5 day basic training course and a 4.5 day course on security and communication issues. In addition, they received a briefing, in Copenhagen, and in Sri Lanka. Follow-up of the Danish monitors during deployment went mostly through the SNR, the Danish Chief Personnel and Administration Officer (CPAO).

The *Danish monitors*, in the majority, had 6 to 12 months contracts.

FINLAND

In *Finland*, recruitment was initially conducted by the MFA, later being passed to a unit within the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in March 2003. Later, the unit developed into a Crises Management Centre outwith the ministry. The monitors were recruited from a database, with no specific requirements for enrolment. The majority of Finnish monitors seconded had a military background. In the Finnish model, no mission specific training was provided, apart from former monitors passing on information to outgoing monitors and handouts of information and books. The monitors were not subject to any tests. Follow-up of deployed monitors was conducted through the SNR. All monitors were debriefed upon return and some provided written reports.

The *Finnish monitors* had six month contracts as a standard, with the possibility of extending up to a maximum 12 months.

ICELAND

In *Iceland*, the recruitment of monitors was conducted by the Iceland Crisis Response Unit (ICRU), a division of the Directorate of International and Security Affairs of the Icelandic MFA. Personnel deployed by the ICRU had a wide variety of professional background and experience. The ICRU roster enclosed close to 200 individuals. The majority of personnel seconded to the SLMM had background from the police and coast guard. In addition, the Icelandic monitors recruited to handle SLMM’s press and information had a background in media. Most of the personnel deployed to the SLMM received basic pre-deployment training in mine-awareness, field security and gender issues. On occasion new recruits were also given an introduction to the mission and to political and cultural issues by former SLMM personnel. Occasional field visits were made to Sri Lanka by ICRU representatives. The office maintained contact with the SNR and other Icelandic mission members during their deployment. The *Icelandic monitors* had six month contracts as standard, with the possibility of extending up to a maximum 18 months.

NORWAY

In *Norway*, the recruitment was undertaken by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), tasked to do so by the MFA. Monitors were mostly recruited from NRC’s emergency standby roster (NORSTAFF) whereas naval monitors were recruited outwith this database. Enrolment in NORSTAFF required interview but no

tests were conducted. All monitors received a three day course on cultural understanding, gender and human rights issues. There was no mission specific training regarding Sri Lanka or the SLMM, though handouts and books were provided. In addition, outgoing personnel were briefed by former monitors and occasionally by the MFA. Monitors were to write monthly reports to the NRC, though this policy was not enforced. In addition, the NRC visited the SLMM once or twice a year and was in regular contact with the Norwegians seconded.

The *Norwegian monitors* had contracts for six months initially, with the possibility of extending up to a maximum 18 months.

SWEDEN

In *Sweden*, the recruitment of monitors was undertaken by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), a government agency under the MFA. SIDA had a database consisting of 150 individuals for secondment, from which monitors were recruited. To be part of the database, members were subject to physical and psychological tests. Prior to deployment, Swedish monitors attended a three day course on security, communication, cultural differences, first-aid, crisis management and Sri Lanka specific as well as SLMM specific issues. Books and articles regarding Sri Lanka were provided by SIDA. Knowledge of the conflict was seen as essential, and language tests, psychological tests, health tests and interviews were carried out for monitors recruited to the SLMM. SIDA visited the SLMM at least once a year, for follow-ups of seconded and of the mission. In case of a crisis, SIDA had a network of crisis consultants ready to provide assistance. Upon return, SIDA arranged a two to three day debrief meeting, with individual and group follow-ups. All monitors submitted an end of contract report.

The *Swedish monitors* had contracts for six months initially, though Sida preferred one-year contracts.

Upon completion of their contracts each monitor was subject to an out-processing procedure within the SLMM, including completing an end of tour report form and the SLMM producing an evaluation of the performance of the monitor.

Competency Requirements

The SLMM did not issue any specified competency criteria for functions but developed a set of general requirements for the monitors to the mission; initially outlined in the 2002 Guidelines document distributed to the contributing governments, the following qualifications were considered essential:

- experience from multinational/international service
- experience from living in the field
- actual driving experience
- proficiency in map reading
- ability to speak, read and write English
- basic knowledge of radio communication
- knowledge of the phonetic alphabet
- knowledge of digital cameras and mobile phones
- basic computer knowledge (Microsoft software)
- physical fitness

In general, previous international information (preferably related to peacekeeping operations) was considered a valuable experience; particularly from the start of the operation.

Job descriptions were issued for land monitors and naval monitors, furthermore for the specialised functions at HQ, stipulating mandatory or desired background, as well as required experience.

NATIONAL STAFF

Staff recruited locally, *national staff* (initially denominated 'locally employed staff', LES) made up a crucial part of the SLMM human resources throughout the entire operation. Altogether, 124 national staff members were employed by the SLMM. These individuals were hired both at HQ and DO level to perform valuable support functions within the mission, not least that of translation. Consequently, the main requirement for national staff was knowledge of Sinhalese, Tamil and English. National staff was recruited irrespective of ethnicity; however, a majority were bi-lingual Tamils. (*Graph 10*)

National Staff, 2002–2008 (man labour years)

| DISTRICT | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | Total |
|----------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| DO1 Jaffna | 5.2 | 10.3 | 13.4 | 12.8 | 10.8 | 9.0 | 0.8 | 62.3 |
| DO2 Mannar | 2.0 | 4.8 | 5.4 | 6.6 | 6.8 | 0.4 | 0 | 26.0 |
| DO3 Vavuniya | 1.8 | 4.7 | 7.3 | 7.4 | 7.6 | 8.4 | 0.7 | 37.9 |
| DO4 Trincomalee | 2.6 | 5.4 | 7.4 | 6.9 | 6.8 | 6.0 | 0.5 | 35.6 |
| DO5 Batticaloa | 5.0 | 9.00 | 10.1 | 13.2 | 13.6 | 9.7 | 0.7 | 61.3 |
| DO6 Ampara | 0 | 1.6 | 4.8 | 7.5 | 9.4 | 6.7 | 0.4 | 30.4 |
| LO LTTE Killinochchi | 0 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 0.3 | 11.2 |
| HQ Colombo | 3.8 | 8.8 | 11.2 | 16.2 | 18.3 | 19.4 | 1.5 | 79.2 |
| Year total/Grand | 20.4 | 46.0 | 61.6 | 72.6 | 75.8 | 62.6 | 4.9 | 343.9 |

Of the 124 national staff, 112 worked at the DO's. However, some also spent periods of their employment at the HQ.

The functions filled by national staff were that of field assistants (23), administration assistants (20), interpreters (26), drivers (25), finance and logistics assistants (6) and house maids/housekeepers (45). The majority (82 persons, 66 per cent) were male; a substantial number of females were also employed (42 persons, 34 percent). (*Graph 11*) (*Graph 12*)

The majority of the national staff stayed with the SLMM for more than one year; 26 were employed for one year, 39 were employed for two years and 57 were employed for more than two years. The national staff was of a somewhat younger average than the international monitors; over one third of national staff were born between 1970–1980 and only eight born between 1940–1950 (in comparison, 89 SLMM monitors were born in the 1940's). (*Graph 13*)

Whereas the international monitors were contracted by national agencies, the national staff members were hired by the SLMM as an independent international organisation which held employer

“... made up a crucial part of the SLMM human resources throughout the entire operation.

responsibility in accordance with Sri Lankan laws and regulations (normally with fixed contracts pending a probation period of the first three months of service). The terms and conditions regulated various aspects of working with the SLMM; terms included insurances against personal accident and life insurance paid for by the SLMM. With the termination of the operation in January 2008, all contracts had to be terminated according to agreed terms and conditions. The individuals employed as SLMM national staff at the time of termination received severance payment of six months.

Although without any formal responsibility to SLMM national staff members (or contracts) after the termination of the operation, the Nordic governments, in 2008, responded favourably to a number of applications for refugee status from Sri Lankan citizens who had served with the SLMM.

EXTERNAL EXPERTISE

— The SLMM was designed as a lean organisation, constructed with focus on field monitoring capacity, with limited in-house support capabilities. For additional support, external service providers were to be utilised; on ad hoc basis. Thus, the mission relied on hired suppliers and experts for a wide variety of contributions in both the logistical and operational areas.

This included areas such as development of computer tools, the SLMM Incident Management System (IMS), (crucial to registration of complaints and storing of vital operational information), including the design and running of the Internet web site and a dedicated SLMM intranet. Another example was the creation of a visual identity profile, implemented primarily to enhance vehicle and personnel security.

Notably the mission did not comprise any inherent medical capacity, implying that all forms of medical services had to be contracted externally, which transpired to be a considerable undertaking over the years.

Following the radical reduction of international manning in 2006, parallel to the deteriorating security situation and rapid escalation of the armed conflict, the HOM initiated a mission relevance assessment. The process was enhanced with external expertise for mission strategy revision, as well as for relevant organisational adaptations. These preparations led to implementation of major alterations of mission operational concept and organisational arrangement in 2007; supported by external expertise.

In the same period, consultant proficiency was hired to perform security assessments; both in the districts and in Colombo, for subsequent improvement of personnel security by relevant measures.

The SLMM also received valuable external assistance from The Norwegian Church Abroad (their mobile pastoral services in South Asia covering Sri Lanka) who offered to visit the SLMM offices and members for talks and sermons, normally 3–5 times a year.

Following the tsunami disaster late 2004, the Trauma Team of the Norwegian Armed Forces supported the mission with adequate relief efforts for the SLMM staff.

PRIVILEGES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

— Formalities regarding the status of the SLMM were regulated through the *Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA)*, entered into between the governments of Norway and Sri Lanka. Here, the status, privileges and immunities of the SLMM and its members were defined and set out; the LTTE, in writing, declaring its willingness to fully implement all parts of the SOMA. The contributing countries issued Diplomatic Service passports to monitors according to respective national policies. The SLMM issued each member with a dedicated mission identity card.

The SOMA states that “The Mission and its members shall have such status, privileges and immunities as are conferred on them by this SOMA and any other applicable instrument of international law.” Article 3 of the document contains provisions regarding individual members of the mission. “The same immunities and privileges as are accorded to diplomatic agents under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961.” This did include immunity from personal arrest or detention, from legal process in respect of acts performed in the course of duty, freedom of movement for the performance of monitoring tasks and inviolability for all papers and documents.

In Article 4 of the SOMA (on laws and regulations) it is instilled that “Privileges and immunities are accorded to the SLMM and its members in the interests of efficient and independent fulfilment of the Mission’s tasks and not for the personal benefit of the individuals concerned. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, the Mission and its members will take all appropriate steps to ensure respect for and compliance with the laws and regulations of Sri Lanka.”

Full texts of the CFA and the SOMA are found in appendixes 1 and 2

CONDUCT AND COMPLIANCE

— The SLMM developed its own rules and regulations regarding the conduct of staff members, including the operational principles entrenched in the *Standing Operating Procedures* (SOP, Part 3: Operations). Among these principles, it is stated that the SLMM (and consequently its members) “must be seen to be credible and impartial in all work”; implying that SLMM staff should refrain from any action that might cast doubt on their ability to act impartially. In the Guidelines document it was further stated that impartiality required that monitors could have neither family nor other close ties with individuals or organisations in Sri Lanka.

The SLMM was designed as a non-family mission; meaning that dependants could not accompany international personnel during their tour of duty except for vacation visits limited to four weeks duration.

The behavioural conduct of SLMM staff was detailed in the SOP

Part 4: Personnel, which states that notwithstanding the privileges and immunities accorded through the SOMA, “Mission Members must respect local laws, regulations, customs and traditions” and that Sri Lanka authorities should be informed about any misconduct by a SLMM member and if deemed appropriate, waive immunity.

From the first year of the operation a SLMM Code of Conduct (COC) was formulated as part of the SOP, and a system for disciplinary action in case of non-compliance and misconduct was introduced; including a Disciplinary Board (DB) concept, to be appointed and activated by the HOM when deemed necessary by himself. The COC stated that “Mission Members shall at all times conduct themselves according to the highest personal and professional standards, both on and off duty, in relation to the Parties, the local population and to other Mission members”. Furthermore, “Mission members must at all times comply with the principles, norms and commitments of SLMM, as well as with the applicable provisions of international law”.

Mission members were expected to adhere strictly to the orders, rules and regulations outlined in the CFA and SOMA, including the SLMM’s own documents (particularly the SOP with its COC) and to local and state laws and regulations. Minor breaches of rules were to be dealt with by the SNR’s; serious incidents of disciplinary misconduct by the DB. The means of disciplinary actions available consisted of counselling or verbal warning, written warning and potential dismissal from the SLMM (repatriation).

The SOP further instigated (on loyalty) that “the work and conduct of the Monitors shall be in conformity with the interests of the SLMM” and that “the responsibilities of serving in an international environment require discretion and tact”.

On discipline and conduct, the SOP also covered issues such as impartiality and loyalty, confidentiality and discretion. All monitors signed declarations of confidentiality with their respective governments; all national staff signed a similar declaration with the SLMM.

An alcohol policy was issued through the SOP, i.e. noting that “it is not acceptable having alcohol consumption affecting the readiness of each district office and HQ Branch to be able to carry out work related tasks on a short notice, 24 hours a day”.

In the case of misconduct the HOM had the right to discharge monitors. However, there were few disciplinary cases during the operation, either among international monitors or national staff. Four cases of repatriation of Nordic monitors and a minor number of discharges of nationals occurred throughout the operation period.

PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT

As indicated above, the SLMM did not comprise any inherent medical capacity, but relied on local institutions and national Nordic systems in the contributing countries (the above mentioned also covering the field of psychological support). There was no continuous system of professional assistance during the operation, with the exception of the end of tour debrief. During the latter part of the operation, one very competent individual serving with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in Colombo contributed such professional assistance to the SLMM. In the SOP it was stipulated that mission members who were involved in serious incidents, including life threatening situations, should be debriefed as soon as possible and by professionals if deemed necessary (facilitated by the SNR’s). Furthermore, collegial support was encouraged. After the tsunami in 2004, the SLMM received trauma assistance from the Norwegian Armed Forces, dispatching a specialist team to Sri Lanka.

Returning to their respective countries after serving with the SLMM, there were national systems of debriefing and follow-ups (see above). In Denmark and Finland monitors were offered psychiatric consultation as part of their debriefing; medical check-ups were performed in Finland and Norway.

[More on the medical system, pages 182–183](#)

“... there were few disciplinary cases during the operation, either among international monitors or national staff.

Logistical Resources

THE SLMM WAS A DECENTRALISED FIELD OPERATION
REQUIRING FUNCTIONAL LOGISTICS

The SLMM was designed with a distributed presence throughout a wide area of operation, with an anticipated short operational period. This implied major challenges on the logistical side, including increasing security concerns and requirements.

Organised with limited resources to carry out a comprehensive mission, the *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)* chose to have a lean structure with regards logistical resources – without a dedicated logistics unit. The chosen support concept was to purchase goods and contract services locally, with a Chief Logistics Officer (CLO) in charge of planning, budgeting, purchasing and distributing all equipment on behalf of the Head of Mission (HOM) – with the exception of communications equipment, which was the responsibility of the Chief Communications Officer (COO).

Equipment acquired by the SLMM was formally regarded as the property of the Royal Norwegian Government (RNG), in accordance with the *Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA)* entered into between RNG and the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) following the signing of the *Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)*. Consequently, upon termination of the operation, equipment listed in the SLMM termination plan was recovered and handed over to the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Colombo.

TRANSPORTATION

With on-site field monitoring constituting the major part of the operation, the SLMM depended heavily on ground transportation means for patrolling, accessing scenes of incidents and the ability to enquire into complaints. Field monitoring was concentrated on land and sea; hence air monitoring was deemed unnecessary.

For administrative transportation by air (predominantly of personnel between Colombo, the North and the East of Sri Lanka) the GOSL provided Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) fixed wing and helicopter transport. This was efficiently handled by the SLAF liaison at the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP), upon request from the SLMM HQ throughout the entire period of the SLMM operation.

Monitoring at sea was carried out by SLMM naval monitors; on board vessels belonging to the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) during patrols and also on board LTTE Sea Tiger vessels during scheduled and authorized movements of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The question of acquiring own means of sea

transportation was addressed in 2002 but was not pursued due to the high costs and the personnel resources such a solution would require. The issue was raised again following a serious incident at sea in May 2006, when it became obvious that SLMM monitors could no longer travel safely with the SLN because of the surfacing threat of direct conflict with the Sea Tigers. Again, the idea of SLMM vessels was discussed but dismissed, mainly due to resource considerations but also with regard to likely judicial implications related to the CFA – which does not include specific accords for the situation at sea.

As for operational vehicles, road conditions in the districts called for 4WD utility cars. Diesel engines were decided on, due to fuel prices and the availability of diesel fuel in the districts. Furthermore, it was considered desirable to have a one-manufacturer fleet for ease of administration. The SLMM took delivery of its first vehicle 22 March 2002, a second-hand Toyota Landcruiser. By the end of 2005 the SLMM had purchased 43 vehicles, all Toyota 4WD Diesels, whereof 41 were Toyota Hilux Double Cab pickup trucks and two were Toyota Landcruiser custom cab station wagons. Initially, vehicles were bought inclusive of value added tax (VAT), later this was changed to duty free purchases. During 2005, the SLMM began selling and replacing vehicles with current issues of the same two models. 21 vehicles were sold during 2005–07; seven in 2005, six in 2006 and eight in 2007. 19 of these were replaced during 2006 and 2007: 11 Toyota Hilux Double cab pickup trucks, seven Toyota Landcruisers and 1 Toyota Hilux single cab pickup truck.

During its period of operation the SLMM purchased 62 vehicles; 27 were sold during the period, three were written off and 32 vehicles remained upon termination of operations (16 January 2008). With the assistance of the Norwegian Embassy in Colombo, the remaining vehicles were disposed of by October 2008.

Organised with limited resources to carry out a comprehensive mission, the SLMM chose to have a lean structure with regards logistical resources – without a dedicated logistics unit.

All SLMM vehicles displayed the SLMM logo; along the sides, across the bonnet, the roof and the rear. A renewed SLMM logo, with significantly larger letters, was introduced in the spring of 2007. Based on experiences during 2006, the concept was to make indirect fire observers (artillery and mortars) as well as long-range snipers using optical target acquisition means, explicitly aware of the vehicle identity at a range of two km and below. The renewed logo, for the same reason, contained an easily recognizable bright orange colour element – in addition to larger and more distinctive letters. All vehicles were of white base colour and in compliance with civil humanitarian vehicle standards, fitted with flagpoles and orange flashing emergency beacons. The SLMM vehicles were all additionally fitted with emergency first aid kits, fire extinguishers and special lighting. For inner city security reasons, logos and flagpoles were removed from the Colombo vehicles during the latter stages of 2007. (Communication Equipment is covered under Communications, below).

During its near six years in Sri Lanka, the SLMM vehicles covered a total distance of approx. 5.100.000 kilometres, consuming roughly 410.000 litres of diesel.

IT AND COMMUNICATIONS

Initially, it was decided that IT equipment needed to be light and portable due to an expected high degree of travelling between HQ and districts. With lack of telecommunication infrastructure, GSM in particular, satellite communication equipment was required.

IT

Equipment

Purchasing of IT (and Communications) equipment started as early as the second week after the signing of the CFA and prior to arrival in Sri Lanka.

Ten laptop computers including eight Immarsat sets for data (and voice) communication were acquired in Norway and brought to Sri Lanka. Initially, one laptop computer was deployed to each DO/LO. The purchase of additional desktop computers commenced during the summer of 2002. Local Area Networks (LAN) were established at DO's and HQ, though not initially with dedicated file servers: one computer in each location was set up with a common disk and as an Internet gateway. Dedicated file servers were implemented early 2005.

Internet access was established in all DO's and LO's immediately on deployment, initially via Immarsat, followed closely by dial-up connection through Sri Lanka Telecom for the DO's. The change was mainly due to cost reasons. The Immarsat link was retained, serving as a back-up facility. *Systems*

Fixed data lines and the implementation of data communication via leased lines and Virtual Private Network (VPN) started in earnest in 2004 and by March that year two of the DO's had direct links with HQ. Implementation continued throughout 2004 and all were established by the end of the year. The landline telephone network to the LO LTTE was initially based on a VHF

link to Jaffna. However, this was very unreliable and not suitable for data communication. Later, the LO received an established landline through Sri Lanka Telecom, which also proved problematic and unreliable with regards to data communication. Subsequently, the LO LTTE established a data link via satellite set up, operational towards the end of 2005. During 2007, the Northern Region Office in Vavuniya and the Eastern Region Office in Trincomalee also had this facility, increasing both reliability and speed.

In some of the districts, LAN's linked to the offices were also established in the SLMM living accommodation, thus enabling Internet access from these premises. All the SLMM apartments in Colombo were installed with ADSL Internet connections during 2007 (though some of them had dial-ups prior to this). More computers, desktops as well as laptops, were purchased from early 2006 onwards. By the end of the SLMM operation in Sri Lanka all monitors were equipped with individual laptop computers.

Database

A large number of CFA complaints were received early on and it became obvious that a system capable of keeping a systematic register and overview was essential. A database tool was the solution. The initial access-based Complaints Databases (one per DO) were developed from scratch by the current Chief Communications Officer (CCO) and were operative around September 2002, with complaints received prior to this entered. These databases were in use until July 2006 when the new Incident Management System (IMS), developed specifically for the SLMM by the Colombo-based company Mazarin, was implemented. In addition to covering complaints, the system was developed for better handling of incidents. Additionally, it included more search and report functions than the old database systems. Personnel, Finance, Logistics and Intranet modules were developed within this system, though never fully implemented prior to termination of the operation. The SLMM also implemented a new and more sophisticated off the shelf finance system in 2006.

Website

The SLMM established its own website by mid-2003, using it to inform the public about the mission as well as to publish statements and reports. With the termination of the operation in January 2008, this web (www.slmm.lk) was closed and replaced by a restructured site (www.slmm.info), informing on the termination process. As part of the termination process, a final, permanent version of the latter SLMM website has been constructed to provide historical documentation of the operation.

See: www.slmm.info

Communications

Equipment

Purchase of some essential communication equipment (in addition to Immarsat) commenced prior to deployment to Sri Lanka. Stationary Immarsat satellite phones for office use and portable for Naval Monitoring Teams (NMT) were acquired in Norway. Stationary HF Transceivers were installed in all DO's almost immediately, with the policy that all vehicles were to be equipped with CODAN HF sets prior to deployment to the districts.

The portable Immarsat satellite phones proved too difficult to use, certainly in emergencies. The Asia Cellular Satellite (ACeS) phones followed, also proving to be inadequate. In June 2003 the Thuraya 2 Satellites were launched, giving coverage to parts of Asia; soon all field monitors had their own sets. DO's, HQ Operations and key personnel were also issued with the sets. During this time the SLMM had around 50 Thuraya phone sets operational. In the eastern areas of Sri Lanka this system proved to have limited coverage, but proved to work very well for naval monitors. Thuraya docking stations were installed at LO LTTE premises in 2003 and in all offices and vehicles by 2005.

The GSM mobile phone (cellular telephone) network was developed reasonably quickly in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka because of the new ceasefire situation and presumed progress of the peace process. Within a short time, all SLMM personnel were issued mobile/cell phones. After military activity intensified mid-2006, the GSM network as well as the standard land-based telephone network were often disabled by the Security Forces (SF). Consequently, the need to use the much more expensive satellite phone network increased both within the districts and between the districts and HQ. In Kilinochchi, the LTTE LO personnel – throughout the operation – had to rely entirely on satellite phones as back up to the landline; the GSM network did not extend into Vanni.

With regards to radio communication, the HF system proved unreliable, difficult to use and to maintain. Plans for establishing a VHF system covering almost the entire Area of Responsibility (AOR) were developed quite early but for various reasons, not least restrictions by the GOSL, implementation took a long time. Licenses for channel usage were required and erecting masts for repeaters needed authorisation. Installation in offices and vehicles commenced in earnest in the latter part of 2007, and the system was almost complete and operational by the time of the SLMM departure in 2008. As the CODAN did not work well in Sri Lanka, these HF systems were de-installed and taken down early 2006, i.e. long before the VHF system was in place.

Other Equipment

HQ and DO's were all established with additional equipment such as fax machines, printers, scanners and copying machines. To document incidents and for verification during enquiries, digital cameras and GPS handsets were issued to the DO's; all naval monitors were provided both as part of their personal patrol kit.

SECURITY

Initially, the need for security equipment was not deemed a priority by the SLMM management as the situation was relatively calm in the early stage of the operation. As hostilities escalated, from late 2005 onwards, the lack of such equipment became apparent and very much a concern for the HOM and management; this included the quality and functionality of communication equipment, which is the main security tool in a civilian field operation of this kind (see description above).

System Equipment

A feasibility and cost study for bullet-proofing some of the vehicles was carried out late 2006, but due to the huge investments required, this was not yet implemented by the time of withdrawal, though it remained a continuous assessment issue until the operation was terminated. The SLMM also took delivery of several GPS handsets, but without any map facilities, these were able to give positions only. The Thuraya handsets also had GPS positioning functions.

By late 2005 and early 2006, all windows in SLMM premises and vehicles were installed with shatterproof film. By mid-2006, the HOM ordered all field offices to have bunkers/foxholes constructed at or near the SLMM premises.

Personal Equipment

During the spring 2006, the first bulletproof vests and helmets were ordered and subsequently issued to the DO's. The vests were not to required standard and size; by mid 2007 the SLMM took delivery of 44 Kevlar-based standard UN issue flak jackets through the Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence (MOD). All field monitors were issued with these and it became a procedure to have them available in vehicles, at all times, when moving around in the districts during patrols and transport. Extra jackets were issued to the DO's/RO's for national staff accompanying the monitors on patrols. Naval monitors were issued with personal Satellite Emergency GPS Beacons.

In addition to the systems established and equipment acquired, there were a number of security measures implemented so as to, when required, improve the security of personnel. In the districts as well as at HQ, the presence of security guards became the norm: Professional security companies were employed to guard SLMM premises, although local police covered some. Apart from system software standard firewalls and anti-virus programmes and the fact that the HQ server was stored in a locked room, no special system was in place to further increase IT security.

Health and Safety

Adequate medical facilities were essential from the start; local risks (including rabies and poisonous snakes) were considered and precautions taken. As hostilities escalated, accidents (and possible injuries) as result of operating at or near incident areas and in the proximity of military operations, also became a matter of growing concern.

All DO's had agreements with local doctors in their districts, mainly for emergency reasons but also for day-to-day and ad hoc requirements. HQ had arrangements with the well-acknowledged Apollo Hospital in Colombo; a facility available also for field monitors if more serious conditions required medical attention. Medical evacuation (Medevac) from the districts to Colombo could be arranged with the assistance of the SLAF.

All monitors were issued with basic personal first aid kits and all offices and vehicles were equipped with proper first aid bags and basic medicines in case of emergency. After seri-

ous incidents, qualified professionals offered monitor's professional debriefing(s). No fixed debriefing team was in place but the SLMM had the opportunity to use professional personnel, from the likes of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and other organisations, as and when required. Early in 2006, a stress trauma team from the Norwegian Armed Forces visited the SLMM. All monitors were given the opportunity to have a private consultation with the team, which visited all districts. Furthermore, Rev. Stein Vangen, the Norwegian Chaplain Abroad (responsible for Asia) visited the SLMM and all DO's a number of times from 2003 and until the end of the operation. All monitors were insured through their national recruitment authorities, all national staff members by the SLMM.

OFFICES AND ACCOMMODATION

The SLMM was deployed in six districts, as designated by the CFA, as well as with an HQ in Colombo and a Liaison Office (LO) to the LTTE in the Vanni (Kilinochchi). This distributed deployment required a number of premises: accommodation and offices.

Premises

All premises whether offices or living accommodation in the districts, or the capital, were rented locally. At the most, the SLMM rented one office (HQ) and 18 apartments in Colombo, a total of six offices (DO's) and nine houses/living accommodation in the districts, including a combined office/living accommodation in Kilinochchi (LO LTTE). Accommodation in Trincomalee was provided in a hotel and at the most, 11 monitors were based there simultaneously. The Parties took it upon themselves to assist the SLMM in finding appropriate offices and accommodation. All buildings and apartments rented by the SLMM were of a medium/high standard related to local comparison.

After withdrawal from the districts late December 2006, the majority of monitors were lodged at the Taj Airport Hotel near Negombo, north of Colombo. A building was hired nearby, functioning as a temporary HQ/Operations Centre, until the monitors were redeployed to their districts by mid 2007, and HQ staff returned to Colombo.

The SLMM purchased almost all furniture and household effects for their offices and living accommodation, ranging from expensive items such as cookers, fridges, freezers, washing machines, dish washers and furniture – to bed linen, kitchen equipment and utensils. All offices and living accommodation in the districts were installed with SLMM-purchased air conditioning units (ACU) for living areas and bedrooms. During its operational period, in the region of 215 ACU's were acquired; many eventually replaced due to wear and tear.

In addition to the real estate listed above, a number of smaller premises were rented as Point of Contact (POC) locations in the different districts.

“Initially, the need for security equipment was not deemed a priority by the SLMM management as the situation was relatively calm.

Electrical Power

Unreliable power supply in certain districts (at times totally lacking) meant that the SLMM, in order to remain operational, had to invest in alternative electricity supply. Consequently, all offices and living accommodation were equipped with SLMM-purchased generators. E.g., in Kilinochchi the SLMM office was disconnected from the national electricity grid after August 2006, with the generator running 24 hours a day for long periods, consuming some 100 litres of diesel per day. In addition, the Kilinochchi office/living accommodation was provided with a sun cell electricity system, providing limited power generation capacity.

WELFARE

Contributing to the welfare of its personnel, all the SLMM living accommodation was issued with television sets, satellite TV and music systems. Training equipment such as rowing machines and exercise bikes, including bicycles, were purchased for the districts. Funds were made available for welfare purposes and it was the place of individual districts to decide on priorities.

IDENTITY

A major operational concern for the SLMM monitors was to be readily identifiable and recognised; both with respect to fulfilling their duties and for enhancing security.

All members of the SLMM were issued with mission identity cards. In addition, respective countries providing monitors issued diplomatic/service passports according to national policy. A policy of the SLMM was to exclude nationality from the ID cards.

There were signs bearing the SLMM logo at all offices and field accommodation. All monitors were issued with beige/light brown shirts and t-shirts. Initially, armbands with SLMM inscriptions were also issued; later the SLMM insignia was printed on the shirts and t-shirts. Baseball caps and sun protecting hats with the SLMM logo were also issued. All vehicles were marked with the mission name in English, Sinhalese and Tamil along the sides, across the bonnet, roof and rear. Flagpoles carrying the SLMM flag were installed on all vehicles. Naval monitors were issued with SLMM flags to be hoisted whenever at sea. For inner city security reasons, logos and flagpoles were removed from Colombo vehicles during the latter stages of 2007.

The SLMM changed its logo early 2007, incorporating a visual profile to be used also on stationary, reports, the web, etc. An important aspect of the profile development was to make the logo more prominent and easily identifiable, contributing to security (see details above).

MAINTENANCE

In all SLMM premises, a national staff member was responsible for the maintenance and the running of rented real estate. For comprehensive tasks, contractors and professional craftsmen were hired locally. Cleaners were hired and employed as SLMM national staff individuals.

Financial Resources

THE SLMM WAS FINANCED BY THE NORDIC COUNTRIES,
WITH ONTRIBUTION FROM THE EU

The SLMM was funded by the five Nordic countries, contributing mission monitors as well as budget support. The total cost of the SLMM, 2002–2008, amounted to an estimated NOK 350 million, with approximately NOK 55 million per year in operational costs during the period 2002–07.

The *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)* was created by the signatories of the *Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)* of 2002, who requested that the Facilitator to the Peace Process, the Royal Norwegian Government (RNG), establish the mission. The Parties decided the SLMM should be composed of monitors from the Nordic countries. The RNG approached the governments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden requesting each of the countries to contribute to the mission; each one in turn agreed.

Table 1 shows the accounted (estimated) total cost of the SLMM for the duration of the six years of operation, 2002–2007, amounting to NOK 313.2 million. This accounts for the total cost of establishing and running the SLMM, from inception in February 2002, through to the end of the operational year 2007. The operation terminated in January 2008, with a subsequent final termination of the organisation in December 2008. Including the operational and termination costs of 2008 (plus the cost of the HOM and estimated annual costs accrued directly by the SLMM; an average of NOK 1 million per contributing country per year) the estimation of the *grand total cost* of the SLMM, 2002–2008, stands at approx. NOK 350 million.

To some extent, figures included in table 1 are also estimates, as it has been necessary to estimate certain cost elements. Otherwise, the individual governments' annual expenses connected to the operation are identified, as shown in table 2.

FINANCING MODEL

The SLMM was established in parallel with the finalisation of the CFA; albeit without a predefined timeframe or known number of personnel required. There was, however, an outline of the composition of the mission and slight knowledge of the complexity of the operation. Shortly after the commencement of the operation, a preliminary budget was developed later to be completed and formalised. For each one of the following years, an annual budget was presented to the RNG and the Nordic co-sponsors for approval.

The expenses of the SLMM were covered by funding through two channels of contributions:

– Cost of monitors:

Each country covered the total expenditure connected with their respective monitors seconded to the SLMM, including recruitment and preparation, salaries and insurance.

TABLE 1: Operational costs, SLMM 2002–2007 (NOK)

| | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | Total |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Running costs and investments | 18 161 481 | 12 060 373 | 10 222 625 | 14 385 698 | 13 928 324 | 18 936 984 | 87 695 486 |
| Monitor costs | 25 838 108 | 37 576 173 | 45 442 962 | 50 048 538 | 43 956 016 | 22 671 157 | 225 532 953 |
| Grand total | 43 999 589 | 49 636 546 | 55 665 587 | 64 434 236 | 57 884 340 | 41 608 142 | 313 228 439 |

TABLE 2: Operational costs, SLMM 2002–2007; monitors (indiv.), monitor costs and contributions (NOK)

| | 2002 | | | | 2003 | | | | 2004 | | | |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-------------------|------------------|-----------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Monitors | | Costs | Contributions | Monitors | | Costs | Contributions | Monitors | | Costs | Contributions |
| | Jan-Jun | Jul-Dec | | | Jan-Jun | Jul-Dec | | | Jan-Jun | Jul-Dec | | |
| Denmark | 0 | 8 | 2 208 073 | 887 804 | 8 | 12 | 7 397 016 | 1 025 234 | 12 | 13 | 8 974 374 | 2 228 469 |
| Finland | 6 | 11 | 7 029 877 | 1 942 932 | 11 | 11 | 8 775 615 | 1 228 749 | 11 | 11 | 11 935 017 | 1 947 811 |
| Iceland | 0 | 2 | 521 739 | 224 921 | 2 | 2 | 1 834 862 | 223 409 | 3 | 4 | 3 698 484 | 634 806 |
| Norway | 11 | 18 | 12 016 604 | 10 385 526 | 18 | 19 | 13 766 087 | 3 286 763 | 18 | 18 | 13 871 976 | 3 368 775 |
| Sweden | 6 | 8 | 4 061 815 | 1 610 006 | 8 | 12 | 5 802 593 | 2 043 580 | 12 | 12 | 6 963 111 | 2 124 885 |
| Total | 23 | 47 | 25 838 108 | 15 051 188 | 47 | 56 | 37 576 173 | 7 807 735 | 56 | 58 | 45 442 962 | 10 304 746 |

Notes: Contributions (reimbursements per country) 2002–2007 are based on official records from the Norwegian MFA, with the following exceptions due to incomplete records:

- Contributions for the period Jun–Sep 2002 have been reconstructed based on the year total and monitor numbers
- Contributions 2007 are based on information from participating countries. Norway's contribution toward running costs and investments in 2007 has been estimated and reflects the difference between total costs and the combined contributions from other parties in 2007.

– Contributions to budget:

Each country contributed to the annual budget of the SLMM, covering recurrent expenditure and investment, according to their respective share of the number of monitors.

The CFA stipulated that the RNG should appoint the Head of Mission (HOM) and that he was to be recruited directly by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), who then took it up on themselves to recruit and contract the HOM. With one exception (five months of 2006) all the HOM's were Norwegians and the Norwegian MFA covered salary and contributed to travel costs. In 2006, when the HOM was Swedish, the Swedish MFA covered the corresponding costs.

The annual budgeted expenses of the mission were covered almost entirely by the governments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden; the European Union (EU) commission contributing in 2003 and 2005.

Acting on behalf of the Nordic governments, the Norwegian MFA transferred funding to the SLMM account in Colombo in order to cover running costs as well as investments, according to annual budgets proposed by the HOM and approved by the co-sponsors. The Norwegian MFA was subsequently reimbursed by the other Nordic countries according to their cost-sharing agreement.

Initially, some capital expenditure was covered by the Norwegian MFA and the Norwegian Embassy in Colombo, until the financial system with cost-sharing was fully developed.

According to the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA), entered into between the governments of Sri Lanka and Norway (the latter in effect on behalf of the Nordic countries), the assets of the SLMM were considered property of the RNG.

FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS

The size of financial contributions from the respective Nordic co-sponsors depended on their secondment of monitors in any given period; each country covering the full cost of their respective monitors and a share of the SLMM budget according to their relative portion of the total number of monitors.

Initially, contributions from the co-sponsors followed a system of prepayments based on an estimated cost distribution. However, this proved cumbersome and was replaced with a system in which the Norwegian MFA advanced funds to the mission and requested reimbursements based in actual costs.

In 2002 and 2003, payments from the contributing countries, including funding from the EU in 2003, were based on and covered the SLMM's operating expenditure, while investments were funded by the Norwegian MFA. Records of payments for the period June–September 2002 are incomplete; therefore the numbers in table 2 may consequently differ slightly from the actual payments made by the co-sponsors in 2002.

The financing system was changed as of 2004, when payments covered all expenses, including investments; excess funding of more than NOK 3 million was transferred to 2005. Coverage of both operating expenditure and investment continued in 2005 and 2006. However, in 2005, excess funding was deducted from the actual costs before the Norwegian MFA requested reimbursement; in 2006 reimbursements were based on actual cost, even though the contributions exceeded actual expenditure.

Following the withdrawal of monitors from the EU countries in 2006, Denmark, Finland and Sweden no longer had monitors with the SLMM. Consequently, their contribution in the way of secondments disappeared. However, following an agreement between the Nordic governments, the three countries contributed toward SLMM's annual budget in 2007. Norway continued its practice of advancing funds; reimbursements were distributed according to the number of monitors present prior to the withdrawal of monitors from the EU countries.

It should be noted that Sweden's distribution of monitor costs per year has been estimated, based on the total monitor cost of approx. NOK 31,334.000 for the period 2002–2006. Monitor costs have been compiled using input from the Nordic countries in their respective currencies, which have been translated to NOK using exchange rates as of November 2008.

Norway (at all times having the largest number of monitors) contributed the largest share of the total expenditure of the

| | 2005 | | | | 2006 | | | | 2007 | | | |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Monitors | | Costs | Contributions | Monitors | | Costs | Contributions | Monitors | | Costs | Contributions |
| | Jan-Jun | Jul-Dec | | | Jan-Jun | Jul-Dec | | | Jan-Jun | Jul-Dec | | |
| Denmark | 12 | 12 | 10 649 257 | 2 510 706 | 12 | 3 | 5 690 198 | 1 923 805 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 498 213 |
| Finland | 11 | 11 | 11 935 017 | 2 301 480 | 11 | 4 | 7 385 518 | 1 796 071 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 408 999 |
| Iceland | 4 | 5 | 5 509 602 | 1 046 127 | 5 | 6 | 7 324 974 | 1 256 031 | 11 | 11 | 9 886 753 | 3 313 224 |
| Norway | 17 | 17 | 13 540 902 | 3 625 181 | 16 | 20 | 17 462 604 | 4 060 980 | 19 | 23 | 12 784 404 | 8 603 237 |
| Sweden | 14 | 15 | 8 413 759 | 3 138 382 | 15 | 6 | 6 092 722 | 2 307 004 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 258 257 |
| Total | 58 | 60 | 50 048 538 | 12 621 876 | 59 | 39 | 43 956 016 | 11 343 891 | 30 | 34 | 22 671 157 | 17 081 930 |

Norway's contributions 2002–2007 include external payments made directly by the Norwegian MFA and the Embassy of Norway in Colombo.


Total contributions per year will differ from audited accounts, as calculations of reimbursements and responsibility for investments changed during 2002–2007.

Sweden's distribution of monitor costs per year has been estimated based on the total monitor cost of approx. NOK 31 334 000 for the period 2002–2006.


In addition to payments from the Nordic governments, the EU Commission contributed NOK 3 726 650 million in 2003/2005 (two disbursements).

The number of monitors per contributing country per six months is based on internal SLMM records, as accurate records have not been readily available from all contributing nations. As there was a constant rotation of monitors throughout each year, the six month division is constructed, but gives a clear indication of the number of monitors present throughout the operation.


Graph 1: Operational cost, SLMM 2002–2007, monitors and contributions



Graph 2: Cost development, SLMM 2002–2007, monitors and running costs and investments



Graph 3: Cost components, SLMM 2002–2007



SLMM; in total approx. NOK 117 million (37 per cent) for the operational period, 2002–2007. In addition, Norway covered the cost of the termination in 2008, with contributions in kind from Finland and Sweden. (Graph 1)

In addition to the Nordic governments, the EU Commission in 2003 decided to support the SLMM operation with a total of NOK 3 726 650 million (EUR 442 650), with disbursements in 2003 and 2005.

Funding for the SLMM was transferred (normally four times per year) from the MFA in Oslo to the mission's bank account in Colombo, on the basis of approved budgets.

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

The following is an analysis of the total costs connected to the SLMM during the operational period, 2002–2007, also to some extent including the termination period, 2008. Firstly through an outline of the total expenditure and secondly by an outline and presentation of the accumulated total running costs of the SLMM, as per the organisation's own annual accounts. (Graph 2)

By far the largest expenditure connected to the SLMM was the cost of international monitors. This was substantially reduced with the reduction in the number of monitors from September 2006, following the withdrawal of all monitors from Denmark, Finland and Sweden; increasing slightly again in 2007 due to the partial reinforcement from Iceland and Norway.

The main cost components of the entire operation were those of *human resources*, followed by *logistical requirements*.

Total expenditures

The overview of total expenditure relates to the combined costs of monitors seconded from the Nordic countries, with the respective government covering all costs connected to the monitors, including salaries and insurances, as well as the cost connected to recruitment and training (performed by governmental or non-governmental agencies; see chapter on human resources).

SLMM accounts

The overview of SLMM expenditure relates to the cost of the operation accounted for through the annual accounts of the mission itself, including both recurrent running costs as well as investments. Totalling NOK 87.7 million these costs amount to an average of NOK 14.6 million per year, with peaks in 2002 and 2007. The expenditures in 2002 in particular reflects the high level of investment at the commencement of the operation; the expenditure in 2007, particularly reflects the extra costs due to the serious security situation for SLMM staff, which required a partial withdrawal from the districts and Colombo, the establishing of a temporary HQ, hotel accommodation and additional premises.

Table 3 shows the annual expenditures of the SLMM, divided into some main categories, including human resources and logistical resources; the two main cost categories.

Human Resources

The estimated grand total costs of the SLMM, 2002–2008, is approx. NOK 350 million. By far the greatest component is the cost accrued to the 319 seconded *international monitors*, at NOK 225.5 million, covering about 280 man-labour years, 2002–2007 (excluding the termination process which involved personnel on various short-term/partial-time contracts). The human resource component of monitors represents in total 64.4 per cent of the entire (estimated) expenditure of the SLMM. In comparison, the total cost of covering SLMM's own budget, amounted to NOK 87.7 million (NOK 14.6 million on the average per year, excluding 2008), i.e. 25.1 per cent of the total estimated cost of the mission, 2002–2007.

A main component of the recurrent expenditure in the SLMM's accounts was the costs accrued to *national staff*; their salaries, insurances and payments to the Employees Provident Fund; amounting to NOK 7,431,936 for the period 2002–2007, representing about 8.5 percent of the total SLMM expenditure. On an annual average, there were 56 national staff members (man labour years) with the SLMM. Costs connected to the staff (monitors and nationals) included duty travel, meetings and welfare. The cost of national staff increased year-on-year throughout the operational period, reflecting the increased need for staff and consequently an increase in numbers, as well as the increase in the cost of labour.

Another main component of the recurrent human resources expenditure in the SLMM's accounts was related to other *hired staff* (in particular security guards) and *external expertise*, locally and internationally. The cost of external expertise was limited during the period 2002–2006, with a considerable increase in 2007– reflecting the dire situation following the combined effects of a sharply reduced number of international monitors, the dramatic worsening of the operational environment and including the safety of the staff and the security of the mission. In particular, the urgent need to improve the safety of mission members due to a deteriorating security situation, as well as the operational situation with an urgent need to restructure the organisation and reorient the operation, called for boosting SLMM's own capacity and competence with additional and expert resources.

It should be noted that the reduction in the number of international monitors from 2006 to 2007 did not reduce the total running cost of the SLMM, as the personnel costs of the monitors were covered by the respective countries and not the mission's budget. Furthermore, the reduction in international staff did not alter the mandated tasks of the SLMM, although it changed the way the operation had to be conducted. In addition, the SLMM remained committed (through the CFA) to maintaining a presence in the six designated districts, to retaining a HQ; this required more or less the same number of office and accommodation premises as previously.

[See separate article on 'Human Resources', pages 171–179, and SLMM budget and accounts, pages 188–189, for details](#)

Logistical Resources

Most of the investment made by the SLMM was in logistical equipment; this included vehicles and communications systems and equipment, equipment for offices and accommodation, also security equipment. Logically, the largest single investment was made at the start of the operation, with procurement of basic operational tools. The majority of these initial investments were paid for by the Norwegian government, partly through its embassy in Colombo, whereas investments later on were covered through the annual budget.

The major part of the annual SLMM expenditure was in connection with logistical components crucial to the running of the field operation; both investments and running costs. In total, logistical expenditure represented approx. 80.1 per cent of the annual budget, for the operational period 2002–2007.

Expenses related to communications were particularly high in 2002–2003 due to the acquisition of equipment at the start of the operation. Due to its critical importance, also related to security, subsequent investments had to be made in this area. Likewise, the costs accrued by transportation were particularly high in 2002–2003, when vehicles were acquired. The rising cost of offices and accommodation in 2007 is due to the partial withdrawal of monitors from the districts (following the sharp deterioration of the security situation) and the parallel establishment of an HQ/Operations Centre outside the HQ premises in Colombo, incurring unforeseen extra costs; particularly in the first half of 2007. [\(Graph 3\)](#)

[See separate article on 'Logistical Resources', pages 180–183](#)

ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES

The accounts and budgets 2002–2007 are based on audited accounts for the SLMM for the same period. For information purposes the accounts and budgets have here been modified and structured to reflect the main cost dimensions of human, logistical and financial resources, in accordance with the overall reporting model of this document.

The audited accounts for the year 2007 were completed up to 30 April 2008. To allow for year-on-year comparisons from 2002 to 2007, income and costs related to 2008 have been excluded in the presentation of financial accounts in this report.

The SLMM accounts were prepared on a cash basis and therefore do not include a balance sheet of assets, equity and liabilities.

Conversion of audited accounts from paper records and auditors' files have resulted in minor deviations in the accounts and budgets presented in this report compared to the audited accounts. Adjustments for such deviations are included as financial costs round-downs. All adjustments are within +/- NOK 25.

The SLMM used NOK as its functional currency, which has also been used to present the budgets and accounts in this report. Budgets and accounts, including notes to the accounts, are based on nominal values the given year and have not been adjusted for inflation.

TABLE 3: Budgets and Accounts, SLMM 2002–2007 (NOK)

| | 2002 | | 2003 | | 2004 | |
|---|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Budget | Used | Budget | Used | Budget | Used |
| INCOME | | | | | | |
| Balance | | 0 | | 1 030 420 | | 3 219 313 |
| External payments | | 7 191 901 | 0 | 2 261 529 | 0 | 181 449 |
| Funds received | | 12 000 000 | 12 472 900 | 12 000 000 | 14 363 700 | 10 000 000 |
| Sale of assets | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL INCOME | 0 | 19 191 901 | 12 472 900 | 15 291 949 | 14 363 700 | 13 400 762 |
| COSTS | | | | | | |
| Human resources | | | | | | |
| Duty travels | 150 000 | 116 025 | 485 700 | 392 665 | 494 500 | 284 552 |
| Meetings and representation | 275 000 | 112 622 | 308 200 | 193 133 | 242 400 | 238 900 |
| Payroll and related cost national staff | 480 000 | 360 018 | 752 900 | 828 822 | 1 441 100 | 1 130 592 |
| External expertise | 30 000 | 2 235 | 79 200 | 30 109 | 73 200 | 99 459 |
| Security | 150 000 | 24 383 | 124 700 | 81 198 | 110 200 | 136 449 |
| Welfare and related costs | 705 000 | 577 373 | 158 800 | 82 901 | 408 700 | 271 864 |
| Total human resources | 1 790 000 | 1 192 656 | 1 909 500 | 1 608 828 | 2 770 100 | 2 161 817 |
| Logistical resources | | | | | | |
| Communicaton equipment and expences | 3 485 000 | 4 983 961 | 2 392 100 | 3 105 377 | 3 855 900 | 985 975 |
| IT equipment and expences | 1 023 000 | 1 728 155 | 490 000 | 299 588 | 863 500 | 594 432 |
| Office equipment and expences | 258 000 | 721 955 | 833 700 | 670 270 | 730 600 | 770 054 |
| Offices and accomodation | 2 725 000 | 2 977 458 | 3 330 600 | 2 907 579 | 3 527 600 | 3 250 569 |
| Transportation | 6 625 000 | 6 239 320 | 2 853 900 | 2 794 772 | 1 566 400 | 1 995 359 |
| Utilities | 420 000 | 116 008 | 158 400 | 406 310 | 423 200 | 127 148 |
| Miscellaneous | 2 220 000 | 277 637 | 500 700 | 184 013 | 624 500 | 248 320 |
| Total logistical resources cost | 16 756 000 | 17 044 494 | 10 559 400 | 10 367 909 | 11 591 700 | 7 971 856 |
| Financial costs | | | | | | |
| Foreign exchange loss | 1 000 | -75 669 | | 83 279 | 0 | 89 285 |
| Interests | | | | 246 | 0 | -878 |
| Other financial items | 3 000 | 0 | 4 000 | 93 | 1 900 | 548 |
| Rounddown | | 0 | | 18 | | -3 |
| Total financial costs | 4 000 | -75 669 | 4 000 | 83 636 | 1 900 | 88 952 |
| TOTAL COSTS | 18 550 000 | 18 161 481 | 12 472 900 | 12 060 373 | 14 363 700 | 10 222 625 |
| Excess funds over costs | -18 550 000 | 1 030 420 | 0 | 3 231 576 | 0 | 3 178 137 |

| | 2005 | | 2006 | | 2007 | |
|---|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Budget | Used | Budget | Used | Budget | Used |
| INCOME | | | | | | |
| Balance | | 3 178 137 | | 1 059 023 | | 2 708 714 |
| External payments | 0 | 277 572 | 0 | 165 161 | 0 | 105 490 |
| Funds received | 14 026 100 | 11 000 000 | 15 802 400 | 13 000 000 | 16 290 000 | 15 900 000 |
| Sale of assets | 0 | 989 012 | 0 | 2 412 853 | 2 000 000 | 1 960 544 |
| TOTAL INCOME | 14 026 100 | 15 444 721 | 15 802 400 | 16 637 037 | 18 290 000 | 20 674 748 |
| COSTS | | | | | | |
| Human resources | | | | | | |
| Duty travels | 220 300 | 552 508 | 485 000 | 431 912 | 300 000 | 464 402 |
| Meetings and representation | 272 000 | 273 348 | 316 700 | 306 193 | 350 000 | 295 314 |
| Payroll and related cost national staff | 1 520 400 | 1 501 228 | 2 024 100 | 1 583 560 | 2 330 000 | 2 027 715 |
| External expertise | 76 500 | 4 570 | 72 700 | 55 095 | 2 790 000 | 2 690 590 |
| Security | 175 800 | 148 230 | 219 700 | 217 749 | 240 000 | 284 854 |
| Welfare and related costs | 283 700 | 333 588 | 492 000 | 356 414 | 280 000 | 189 218 |
| Total human resources | 2 548 700 | 2 813 472 | 3 610 200 | 2 950 923 | 6 290 000 | 5 952 093 |
| Logistical resources | | | | | | |
| Communicaton equipment and expences | 1 984 500 | 1 295 145 | 1 808 600 | 987 420 | 1 660 000 | 1 595 652 |
| IT equipment and expences | 1 407 900 | 1 709 494 | 1 299 200 | 1 429 406 | 1 810 000 | 1 651 016 |
| Office equipment and expences | 781 600 | 684 296 | 1 013 600 | 741 479 | 745 000 | 594 134 |
| Offices and accomodation | 3 687 100 | 4 152 662 | 4 824 900 | 3 819 759 | 4 865 000 | 5 847 705 |
| Transportation | 2 778 600 | 2 800 242 | 2 274 500 | 2 927 990 | 2 620 000 | 2 326 526 |
| Utilities | 335 800 | 351 869 | 193 300 | 258 532 | 20 000 | 1 796 |
| Miscellaneous | 500 100 | 596 974 | 776 000 | 798 391 | 275 000 | 328 636 |
| Total logistical resources cost | 11 475 600 | 11 590 682 | 12 190 100 | 10 962 977 | 11 995 000 | 12 345 465 |
| Financial costs | | | | | | |
| Foreign exchange loss | 0 | -18 905 | 0 | 8 094 | 2 000 | 180 210 |
| Interests | 0 | 130 | 0 | 6 110 | 1 000 | 0 |
| Other financial items | 1 800 | 342 | 2 100 | 255 | 2 000 | 459 211 |
| Rounddown | 0 | -22 | 0 | -36 | 0 | 5 |
| Total financial costs | 1 800 | -18 455 | 2 100 | 14 423 | 5 000 | 639 426 |
| TOTAL COSTS | 14 026 100 | 14 385 698 | 15 802 400 | 13 928 324 | 18 290 000 | 18 936 984 |
| Excess funds over costs | 0 | 1 059 023 | 0 | 2 708 713 | 0 | 1 737 764 |

NOTE 1: Income

| NOK | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Balance as at Jan 1 | | 1 030 420 | 3 219 313 | 3 178 137 | 1 059 023 | 2 708 714 |
| Funds received from Norwegian MFA | 12 000 000 | 12 000 000 | 10 000 000 | 11 000 000 | 13 000 000 | 17 918 751 |
| Paid by MFA Norway | 3 088 462 | 2 261 529 | 181 449 | 277 572 | 165 161 | 105 490 |
| Paid by Norwegian Embassy, Colombo | 4 103 439 | | | | | |
| Sale of equipment/assets | | | | 989 012 | 2 412 853 | 409 811 |
| Sale of vehicles | | | | | | 1 550 733 |
| Total | 19 191 901 | 15 291 949 | 13 400 762 | 15 444 721 | 16 637 037 | 22 693 499 |

Income is recognised as government funds transferred to the SLMM; direct payments of goods and services made by other parties; sales of assets and cash holdings (resulting from excess receipts payment the previous accounting year). Excess receipts for payment include cash at bank or in cash in hand at Headquarters and District Offices.

Several investments (particularly IT and communication equipment) were paid for directly by the Norwegian MFA and the Norwegian Embassy in Colombo prior to the mission's arrival in Sri Lanka and during the first two years of the operation.

Income from the sale of assets is primarily related to the sale of vehicles purchased during the initial three years of the mission. In total, 21 vehicles were sold: 2005 (7), 2006 (6) and 2007 (8).

NOTE 2: Payroll and related cost, national staff (NOK)

| NOK | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|-------------------------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Salaries national staff | 335 263 | 693 694 | 896 274 | 1 100 652 | 1 220 203 | 1 490 522 |
| Overtime national staff | 24 755 | 65 262 | 118 867 | 181 507 | 135 610 | 110 416 |
| Casual labour/day by day work | | 18 801 | 21 360 | 12 203 | 24 461 | 38 183 |
| Insurance | | 7 460 | 9 741 | 14 545 | 556 | 13 913 |
| Provident funds | | 43 605 | 84 350 | 192 322 | 202 729 | 374 681 |
| Total | 360 018 | 828 822 | 1 130 592 | 1 501 228 | 1 583 560 | 2 027 715 |

Over the period 2002–2007, the most significant increases in the payroll and related cost for national staff were due to salary levels and payments to employees' provident funds. Unlike the number of monitors, national staff numbers remained relatively stable until 2007, when 14 individuals were made redundant, reflecting a lower activity in the districts.

NOTE 3: External expertise (NOK)

| NOK | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|--------------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|------------------|
| Consultants | 2 235 | 30 109 | 79 743 | 4 570 | 55 095 | 2 690 590 |
| Accrued Audit Fees | 0 | 0 | 19 716 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 2 235 | 30 109 | 99 459 | 4 570 | 55 095 | 2 690 590 |

Costs connected to the crucial use of external expertise in an effort to handle the altered situation following the sharp reduction in mission manpower, late 2006 (parallel with the escalation of the conflict and the subsequent deterioration of the security situation in 2007) rose considerably. These costs were primarily related to hiring of experts in security assessments, measures to increase security of personnel, strategic reorientation and reorganisation of the mission.

NOTE 4: Communication equipment and expenses (NOK)

| NOK | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|
| HF/VHF Radios | 1 092 946 | 699 913 | 167 186 | 59 211 | 5 308 | 836 750 |
| Satellite phones | 1 207 665 | 69 370 | 67 753 | 448 877 | 47 965 | 34 977 |
| Satellite phone use | 1 911 802 | 1 851 825 | 167 180 | 117 146 | 148 464 | 164 239 |
| Mobile phones | 65 004 | | 28 949 | 81 377 | 190 212 | 42 178 |
| Mobile phone use | 214 477 | 210 899 | 277 139 | 386 911 | 432 416 | 398 941 |
| Landline phones | 15 164 | | | | | |
| Landline phone use | 394 151 | 269 612 | 299 368 | 319 286 | 216 779 | 116 930 |
| Private phone use reimbursements | | | -49 791 | -123 828 | -60 556 | -77 804 |
| Communication equipment use | 82 752 | 3 758 | 28 190 | 6 165 | 6 832 | 79 441 |
| Total | 4 983 961 | 3 105 377 | 985 975 | 1 295 145 | 987 420 | 1 595 652 |

The higher costs in 2002–2003 are primarily due to the initial investments in HF radios and satellite phones. Costs for the use of satellite phone dropped significantly after 2003 when the first system (Immarsat) was replaced with a more adequate system (Thuraya). The installation of a VHF system commenced in 2007.

NOTE 5: IT equipment and expenses (NOK)

| NOK | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|-----------------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Computers/printers | 1 197 526 | 105 261 | 263 586 | 1 157 714 | 677 016 | 402 166 |
| Cameras and video equipment | 397 392 | | | | | |
| SLMM data network | | | 54 392 | 249 654 | 198 471 | 48 802 |
| Software investments | | | | | | 565 896 |
| Software | 9 568 | 21 164 | 14 586 | 8 099 | 163 747 | 13 489 |
| Internet | 123 669 | 173 163 | 261 868 | 294 026 | 390 171 | 620 663 |
| Total | 1 728 155 | 299 588 | 594 432 | 1 709 494 | 1 429 406 | 1 651 016 |

In 2005–2006, the data networks in HQ and DO's were renewed. The SLMM Incident Management System (IMS) was developed and implemented in 2005–2006; in 2007 supplementary administrative modules (logistics and personnel) were developed, but not implemented due to the termination of the operation.

NOTE 6: Transportation (NOK)

| NOK | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Vehicles | 5 828 583 | 1 714 156 | 993 107 | 1 438 939 | 1 859 034 | 1 538 265 |
| Fuel, vehicles | 139 782 | 238 247 | 311 339 | 434 453 | 444 263 | 302 084 |
| Rent of transportation | 54 390 | 41 350 | 34 048 | 31 295 | 107 465 | 0 |
| Insurance, vehicles | 139 403 | 202 017 | 189 870 | 305 126 | 194 552 | 223 739 |
| Maintenance, vehicles | 77 162 | 599 002 | 466 995 | 590 430 | 322 675 | 262 438 |
| Total | 6 239 320 | 2 794 772 | 1 995 359 | 2 800 242 | 2 927 990 | 2 326 526 |

Considerable investments in vehicles were made in the initial phases of the mission. By the end of 2005, the mission had a fleet of 43 vehicles, followed by the acquisition of another 19 vehicles in 2006–2007. Increases in fuel costs are reflected in rising fuel prices and consumption; the latter relatively unaffected by the reduced capacity in 2006, due to the resulting increased travel for the remaining monitors. Rising fuel prices also led to increased costs for generator use and electricity.

NOTE 7: Miscellaneous (NOK)

| NOK | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Unforeseen investments | | 118 643 | 109 580 | 180 174 | 152 442 | 5 971 |
| Miscellaneous | 277 637 | 65 370 | 138 740 | 416 800 | 645 948 | 322 665 |
| Total | 277 637 | 184 013 | 248 320 | 596 974 | 798 391 | 328 636 |

Miscellaneous comprise of unforeseen investments and miscellaneous costs. Due to harmonisation of different accounting principles, totals may differ from audited accounts.

NOTE 8: Financial costs

Significant foreign exchange loss were summarised and accounted for in 2007. Other financial items include losses on accounts receivable, which amounted to NOK 459,211 in 2007.

FINANCIAL PROCEDURES

The financial allocations to the SLMM were based on budgets for the upcoming calendar year and forwarded to the Facilitator; funds were, normally, disbursed to the SLMM four times a year.

The annual accounts of the SLMM were audited by PricewaterhouseCoopers, Colombo (2002, 2003) and by KPMG, Oslo (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; all audited in 2008).

For annual reports and audit reports, visit:
www.slmm.info



Throughout 2002–2007, the SLMM monitored the Sri Lanka ceasefire agreement in the field, interacting with both Parties – assisting them in complying with their commitments; inviting contact with society.



APPENDIXES

| | |
|--------------|---------------------------------|
| Appendix 1: | The CFA |
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The Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)

Agreement on a Ceasefire between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Preamble

The overall objective of the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to as the GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (hereinafter referred to as the LTTE) is to find a negotiated solution to the ongoing ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.

The GOSL and the LTTE (hereinafter referred to as the Parties) recognize the importance of bringing an end to the hostilities and improving the living conditions for all inhabitants affected by the conflict. Bringing an end to the hostilities is also seen by the Parties as a means of establishing a positive atmosphere in which further steps towards negotiations on a lasting solution can be taken.

The Parties further recognize that groups that are not directly party to the conflict are also suffering the consequences of it. This is particularly the case as regards the Muslim population. Therefore, the provisions of this Agreement regarding the security of civilians and their property apply to all inhabitants.

With reference to the above, the Parties have agreed to enter into a ceasefire, refrain from conduct that could undermine the good intentions or violate the spirit of this Agreement and implement confidence-building measures as indicated in the articles below.

Article 1:

Modalities of a ceasefire

The Parties have agreed to implement a ceasefire between their armed forces as follows:

1.1 A jointly agreed ceasefire between the GOSL and the LTTE shall enter into force on such date as is notified by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs in accordance with Article 4.2, hereinafter referred to as D-day.

Military operations

1.2 Neither Party shall engage in any offensive military operation. This requires the total cessation of all military action and includes, but is not limited to, such acts as:

- a) The firing of direct and indirect weapons, armed raids, ambushes, assassinations, abductions, destruction of civilian or military property, sabotage, suicide missions and activities by deep penetration units;
- b) Aerial bombardment;
- c) Offensive naval operations.

1.3 The Sri Lankan armed forces shall continue to perform their legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka without engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE.

Separation of forces

1.4 Where forward defence localities have been established, the GOSL's armed forces and the LTTE's fighting formations shall hold their ground positions, maintaining a zone of separation of a minimum of six hundred (600) metres. However, each Party reserves the right of movement within one hundred (100) metres of its own defence localities, keeping an absolute minimum distance of four hundred (400) metres between them. Where existing positions are closer than four hundred (400) metres, no such right of movement applies and the Parties agree to ensure the maximum possible distance between their personnel.

1.5 In areas where localities have not been clearly established, the status quo as regards the areas controlled by the GOSL and the LTTE, respectively, on 24 December 2001 shall continue to apply pending such demarcation as is provided in article 1.6.

1.6 The Parties shall provide information to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) regarding defence localities in all areas of contention, cf. Article 3. The monitoring mission shall assist the Parties in drawing up demarcation lines at the latest by D-day + 30.

1.7 The Parties shall not move munitions, explosives or military equipment into the area controlled by the other Party.

1.8 Tamil paramilitary groups shall be disarmed by the GOSL by D-day + 30 at the latest. The GOSL shall offer to integrate individuals in these units under the command and disciplinary structure of the GOSL armed forces for service away from the Northern and Eastern Province.

Freedom of movement

1.9 The Parties' forces shall initially stay in the areas under their respective control, as provided in Article 1.4 and Article 1.5.

1.10 Unarmed GOSL troops shall, as of D-day + 60, be permitted unlimited passage between Jaffna and Vavunia using the Jaffna-Kandy road (A9). The modalities are to be worked out by the Parties with the assistance of the SLMM.

1.11 The Parties agree that as of D-day individ-

ual combatants shall, on the recommendation of their area commander, be permitted, unarmed and in plain clothes, to visit family and friends residing in areas under the control of the other Party. Such visits shall be limited to six days every second month, not including the time of travel by the shortest applicable route. The LTTE shall facilitate the use of the Jaffna-Kandy road for this purpose. The Parties reserve the right to deny entry to specified military areas.

1.12 The Parties agree that as of D-day individual combatants shall, notwithstanding the two-month restriction, be permitted, unarmed and in plain clothes, to visit immediate family (i.e. spouses, children, grandparents, parents and siblings) in connection with weddings or funerals. The right to deny entry to specified military areas applies.

1.13 Fifty (50) unarmed LTTE members shall as of D-day + 30, for the purpose of political work, be permitted freedom of movement in the areas of the North and the East dominated by the GOSL. Additional 100 unarmed LTTE members shall be permitted freedom of movement as of D-day + 60. As of D-day + 90, all unarmed LTTE members shall be permitted freedom of movement in the North and the East. The LTTE members shall carry identity papers. The right of the GOSL to deny entry to specified military areas applies.

Article 2:

Measures to restore normalcy

The Parties shall undertake the following confidence-building measures with the aim of restoring normalcy for all inhabitants of Sri Lanka:

2.1 The Parties shall in accordance with international law abstain from hostile acts against the civilian population, including such acts as torture, intimidation, abduction, extortion and harassment.

2.2 The Parties shall refrain from engaging in activities or propagating ideas that could offend cultural or religious sensitivities. Places of worship (temples, churches, mosques and other holy sites, etc.) currently held by the forces of either of the Parties shall be vacated by D-day + 30 and made accessible to the public. Places of worship which are situated in "high security zones" shall be vacated by all armed personnel and maintained in good order by civilian workers, even when they are not made accessible to the public.

2.3 Beginning on the date on which this Agreement enters into force, school buildings occupied by either Party shall be vacated and returned to their intended use. This activity shall be completed by D-day + 160 at the latest.

2.4 A schedule indicating the return of all other public buildings to their intended use shall be drawn up by the Parties and published at the latest by D-day + 30.

2.5 The Parties shall review the security measures and the set-up of checkpoints, particularly in densely populated cities and towns, in order to introduce systems that will prevent harassment of the civilian population. Such systems shall be in place from D-day + 60.

2.6 The Parties agree to ensure the unimpeded flow of non-military goods to and from the LTTE-dominated areas with the exception of certain items as shown in Annex A. Quantities shall be determined by market demand. The GOSL shall regularly review the matter with the aim of gradually removing any remaining restrictions on non-military goods.

2.7 In order to facilitate the flow of goods and the movement of civilians, the Parties agree to establish checkpoints on their line of control at such locations as are specified in Annex B.

2.8 The Parties shall take steps to ensure that the Trincomalee-Habarana road remains open on a 24-hour basis for passenger traffic with effect from D-day + 10.

2.9 The Parties shall facilitate the extension of the rail service on the Batticaloa-line to Welikanda. Repairs and maintenance shall be carried out by the GOSL in order to extend the service up to Batticaloa.

2.10 The Parties shall open the Kandy-Jaffna road (A9) to non-military traffic of goods and passengers. Specific modalities shall be worked out by the Parties with the assistance of the Royal Norwegian Government by D-day + 30 at the latest.

2.11 A gradual easing of the fishing restrictions shall take place starting from D-day. As of D-day + 90, all restrictions on day and night fishing shall be removed, subject to the following exceptions: (i) fishing will not be permitted within an area of 1 nautical mile on either side along the coast and 2 nautical miles seawards from all security forces camps on the coast; (ii) fishing will not be permitted in harbours or approaches to harbours, bays and estuaries along the coast.

2.12 The Parties agree that search operations and arrests under the Prevention of Terrorism Act shall not take place. Arrests shall be conducted under due process of law in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code.

2.13 The Parties agree to provide family members of detainees access to the detainees within D-day + 30.

Article 3:

The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission

The Parties have agreed to set up an international monitoring mission to enquire into any instance of violation of the terms and conditions of this Agreement. Both Parties shall fully cooperate to rectify any matter of conflict caused by their respective sides. The mission shall conduct international verification through

on-site monitoring of the fulfilment of the commitments entered into in this Agreement as follows:

3.1 The name of the monitoring mission shall be the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (hereinafter referred to as the SLMM).

3.2 Subject to acceptance by the Parties, the Royal Norwegian Government (hereinafter referred to as the RNG) shall appoint the Head of the SLMM (hereinafter referred to as the HoM), who shall be the final authority regarding interpretation of this Agreement.

3.3 The SLMM shall liaise with the Parties and report to the RNG.

3.4 The HoM shall decide the date for the commencement of the SLMM's operations.

3.5 The SLMM shall be composed of representatives from Nordic countries.

3.6 The SLMM shall establish a headquarters in such place as the HoM finds appropriate. An office shall be established in Colombo and in Vanni in order to liaise with the GOSL and the LTTE, respectively. The SLMM will maintain a presence in the districts of Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai.

3.7 A local monitoring committee shall be established in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai. Each committee shall consist of five members, two appointed by the GOSL, two by the LTTE and one international monitor appointed by the HoM. The international monitor shall chair the committee. The GOSL and the LTTE appointees may be selected from among retired judges, public servants, religious leaders or similar leading citizens.

3.8 The committees shall serve the SLMM in an advisory capacity and discuss issues relating to the implementation of this Agreement in their respective districts, with a view to establishing a common understanding of such issues. In particular, they will seek to resolve any dispute concerning the implementation of this Agreement at the lowest possible level.

3.9 The Parties shall be responsible for the appropriate protection of and security arrangements for all SLMM members.

3.10 The Parties agree to ensure the freedom of movement of the SLMM members in performing their tasks. The members of the SLMM shall be given immediate access to areas where violations of the Agreement are alleged to have taken place. The Parties also agree to facilitate the widest possible access to such areas for the local members of the six above-mentioned committees, cf. Article 3.7.

3.11 It shall be the responsibility of the SLMM to take immediate action on any complaints made by either Party to the Agreement, and

to enquire into and assist the Parties in the settlement of any dispute that might arise in connection with such complaints.

3.12 With the aim of resolving disputes at the lowest possible level, communication shall be established between commanders of the GOSL armed forces and the LTTE area leaders to enable them to resolve problems in the conflict zones.

3.13 Guidelines for the operations of the SLMM shall be established in a separate document.

Article 4:

Entry into force, amendments and termination of the Agreement

4.1 Each Party shall notify its consent to be bound by this Agreement through a letter to the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs signed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe on behalf of the GOSL and by leader Vellupillai Pirabakaran on behalf of the LTTE, respectively. The Agreement shall be initialled by each Party and enclosed in the above-mentioned letter.

4.2 The Agreement shall enter into force on such date as is notified by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

4.3 This Agreement may be amended and modified by mutual agreement of both Parties. Such amendments shall be notified in writing to the RNG.

4.4 This Agreement shall remain in force until notice of termination is given by either Party to the RNG. Such notice shall be given fourteen (14) days in advance of the effective date of termination.

ANNEX A

The Parties agree to ensure the flow of non-military goods to and from LTTE dominated areas of the Northern and Eastern Province, as well as unimpeded flow of such goods to the civilian population in these areas. Non military goods not covered by article 2.6 in the Agreement are listed below:

- Non military arms/ammunition
- Explosives
- Remote control devices
- Barbed wire
- Binoculars/Telescopes
- Compasses
- Penlight batteries

Diesel, petrol, cement and iron rods will be restricted in accordance with the following procedures and quantities:

Diesel and petrol

The Government Agents (GA) will register available vehicles; tractors and motorcycles in the LTTE controlled areas. The GA will calculate the required weekly amount of diesel and petrol based on the following estimate:

- Trucks/Buses 250 litre/week
- 4 wheels tractor 310 litre/week

- 2 wheel tractor 40 litre/week
- Petrol vehicle 30 litre/week
- Motorcycles 7 litre/week
- Fishing vessels 400 litre/week

Cement

Cement required for rehabilitation and reconstruction of Government property; registered co-operatives; or approved housing projects implemented by the GOSL and international NGOs and more affluent members of the society; will be brought in directly by relevant institutions under licenses issued by Government Agents. The GA shall stipulate the monthly quantities permitted for such project based upon planned and reported progress.

Cement required for individual shops/constructions/house owners/rehabilitation-initiatives will be made available through the co-operations on a commercial basis. The monthly import for this purpose will be limited to 5000 bags during the first month and thereafter 10 000 bags/month. Individual sales by the co-operatives will be registered and limited to 25 bags per household.

Iron rods

Iron rods for building constructions will be brought in to the LTTE controlled areas under licenses issued by the GA.

A monthly reassessment will be made to assess the possibilities of removal of the above restrictions.

ANNEX B

Checkpoints agreed in § 2.7 are as follows:

- Mandur
- Paddirupur
- Kaludaveli Ferry Point
- Anbalantivu Ferry Point
- Mamunai Ferry Point
- Vanvunateevu
- Santhiveli Boat Point
- Black Bridge
- Sitandy Boat Point
- Kiran bridge
- Kinniyadi Boat Point
- Valachenai
- Makerni
- Mahindapura
- Muttur
- Ugilankulam
- Omanthai

APPENDIX 2:

Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA)

Based on Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), the Governments of Sri Lanka and Norway concluded a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA), in which the status, privileges and immunities of the SLMM and its members were defined and set out. In writing, the LTTE declared its willingness to fully implement all parts of the SOMA.

Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) on the establishment and management of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM):

Preamble

In accordance with the Ceasefire Agreement, the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to as the GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (hereinafter referred to as the LTTE) have requested the Royal Norwegian Government (hereinafter referred to as RNG) to organize, equip and establish an international mission, called the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (hereinafter referred to as the SLMM), to monitor the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement.

The GOSL and the LTTE have stressed the importance of international monitoring of the ceasefire, expressed their willingness to facilitate and support the establishment and administration of the SLMM, and guaranteed their co-operation with the Mission.

The RNG has accepted this request with the understanding that the SLMM will conduct international verification through on-site monitoring in accordance with the Ceasefire Agreement. It is, however, understood that the effect of the SLMM will depend on the parties' willingness to abide with recommendations from SLMM.

Based on Ceasefire Agreement and the above, the GOSL and the RNG have concluded a Status of Mission Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the SOMA), in which the status, privileges and immunities of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission and its members are defined and set out. The LTTE has in writing declared its willingness to fully implement all parts of this SOMA.

The establishment of SLMM constitutes a Specific Agreement under Article II in the Agreement between Norway and Sri Lanka regarding Cooperation for Promotion of the Economic and Social development of Sri Lanka, dated 3 December 1986 and prolonged by an Addendum dated 7 October 1992 ("the Main Agreement").

Article 1

General Provisions

The RNG undertakes to coordinate, facilitate and lead the establishment of the SLMM. The members of the Mission will be recruited from among citizens of the Nordic countries. The Mission and its members shall have such status, privileges and immunities as are conferred on them by this SOMA and any other applicable instrument of international law.

Article 2

The premises of the SLMM, its property and assets wherever located and by whomsoever held shall enjoy within Sri Lanka, the same inviolability, jurisdictional immunities and fiscal exemptions as are accorded to the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Sri Lanka and for this purpose shall be deemed to be part of the said Embassy

1. The premises of the SLMM shall be inviolable.

2. The property and assets of the Mission, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation and expropriation.

3. The archives of the SLMM and in general all its documents in paper or electronic form, including audio-and videotapes, shall be inviolable wherever located and by whomsoever held.

4. The SLMM's property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from any form of legal process except: (a) In so far as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity in writing. It is, however, understood that such waiver of immunity does not extend to any measure of execution. (b) In the case of a civil action brought by a third party for damages arising from an accident caused by use of equipment, including a motor vehicle, belonging to or operated on behalf of the Mission.

Taxes and duties

In accordance with the Main Agreement, the following will apply to the SLMM:

5. The Mission has the right to import operational supplies and equipment free of import taxes and duties.

6. The SLMM will be reimbursed for Value Added Tax (VAT)/Goods and Services Tax on locally procured operational supplies and equipment, and will enjoy privileges concerning taxes on petrol.

7. In meeting its logistical and operational needs, the SLMM may make use (by purchasing and hiring) of local resources, such as communications systems, housing, food, fuel, repairs, medical services, etc.

Equipment

8. As a basis for its reporting activities, the SLMM may use necessary equipment such as maps, compasses, GPS, binoculars, laser range finders, all kind of communications systems, the Internet, e-mail, cameras, videotape recorders, etc.

9. The SLMM is authorized to set up and operate internal communications systems (including mobile-transceiver in all vehicles and to members of the SLMM) and external communication systems (satellite communication).

10. The Government of Sri Lanka will facilitate smooth custom clearance of the SLMM's operational supplies, goods and equipment, including smooth, entries and exits of the SLMM's international personnel.

Article 3

The individual members of the SLMM

All members of the SLMM shall be accorded the same immunities and privileges as are accorded to diplomatic agents under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961. In particular they shall be accorded :

1. Immunity from personal arrest or detention and from legal process in respect of all acts, including words spoken or written, performed by them in the course of duty.

2. Inviolability for all papers and documents.

3. Freedom of movement for the performance of their tasks, including traveling on board GOSL vessels and aircraft. The LTTE has agreed to grant the same access in respect of their vessels.

4. For the purpose of internal and external communications, the SLMM and its members shall have the right to use codes and to receive papers or correspondence by courier or in sealed bags. No official communication directed to the SLMM or to any of its members, nor any outward official communication of the Mission, by whatever means or in whatever form transmitted, shall be detained in any way or suffer any interference with its confidentiality.

Article 4

Laws and regulations

Privileges and immunities are accorded to the SLMM and its members in the interests of efficient and independent fulfillment of the Mission's tasks and not for the personal benefit of the individuals concerned. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, the Mission and its members will take all appropriate steps to ensure respect for and compliance with the laws and regulations of Sri Lanka.

Article 5

Clothing, identification and armament

1. The members of the SLMM will wear plain clothes, and be visually recognized by armbands marked with the SLMM emblem.

2. The members of the SLMM will not carry side arms or any other kind of weapons.

3. All vehicles and premises at the disposal of the Mission will be marked with the SLMM emblem.

Article 6

Security, safety and emergencies

The GOSL is responsible for the protection and security arrangements of all SLMM personnel residing in Sri Lanka. The GOSL will, if necessary provide emergency medical aid and assist in providing emergency medical evacuation of SLMM personnel on Sri Lanka territory. The LTTE has agreed in writing to take upon itself the same responsibilities in the areas under its military dominance.

Article 7

Miscellaneous provisions

1. The GOSL will assist SLMM in finding appropriate office space, free of charge, to the SLMM as required and deemed necessary. The LTTE has agreed in writing to take upon itself the same responsibilities in the areas under its military dominance.

2. The GOSL will assist the SLMM in finding appropriate and suitable accommodation for all international personnel. The LTTE has agreed in writing to take upon itself the same responsibilities in the areas under its military dominance.

3. The Norwegian Government and the Participating Nations will bear all expenses of SLMM, except for those incurred under Article 6.

Final Provisions

This Status of Mission Agreement enters into force on the date of its signature, and shall remain in force for the duration of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission.

Signed: Colombo 18.03.02



No. L/POL/210

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Royal Norwegian Government and has the honour to refer to the Agreement on a "Ceasefire between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)" concluded on 22nd February 2002.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wishes to notify the Royal Norwegian Government, in terms of Article 4:4 of the aforesaid Agreement, of its decision to terminate the Agreement which shall take effect fourteen (14) days from the date of this Note, ie. 16th January 2008.

Accordingly, the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) on the Establishment and the Management of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) dated 18th March 2002, between the Royal Norwegian Government and the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka will also stand terminated with effect from 16th January 2008.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Royal Norwegian Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

03 January 2008

To: The Royal Norwegian Embassy
C o l o m b o



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Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Democratic Socialist Republic
of Sri Lanka

Statement by Hon. Rohitha Bogollagama, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Diplomatic Briefing held at the Foreign Ministry on 4 January 2008

The Government of Sri Lanka yesterday (3rd January 2008) formally notified the Royal Norwegian Government of its decision to terminate the Agreement on a "Ceasefire (CFA) between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam" concluded on 22nd February 2002. This notification was in terms of Article 4:4 of this Agreement and will take effect 14 days from the date of this notice i.e. 16th January 2008.

Accordingly, the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) on the Establishment and the Management of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) dated 18th March 2002 between the Royal Norwegian Government and the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka will also stand terminated with effect from 16th January 2008.

The decision of the Government to terminate the Ceasefire Agreement has been taken after very careful consideration of all relevant facts.

Firstly, it must be underlined that this Agreement with the LTTE was seriously flawed from the very inception. It was entered into without proper consultation by the Government of the day, with even the Cabinet of Ministers not being privy to its contents. Legitimate concerns of the security forces had not even been taken into account. It had the effect of alienating the democratic Tamil political forces and focussed solely on the LTTE. However, notwithstanding these shortcomings evidently made in the hope that sustainable peace could be achieved, at no stage in its six rounds of talks from Sept 2002- March 2003 with the then Government did the LTTE seek to engage in any substantive political discussion aimed at moving towards a political settlement.

On the contrary, under the cover of the CFA, the LTTE continued to take strategic advantage on the ground as they had in all previous peace processes, seeking to dominate areas such as Sampur, as well as continuing to smuggle in large hauls of lethal arms, explosives and ammunition. It must be noted that it is during this period that the LTTE most brazenly assassinated among others, the serving Foreign Minister, moderate Tamil Member of Parliament, Lakshman Kadirgamar on 12th August 2005 and eliminated many of Sri Lanka's intelligence officers through attacks including in Kiribathgoda, Dehiwala, Bambalapitiya and Jaffna.

Secondly, despite the LTTE launching a wave of attacks against the security forces only 14 days after the assumption of office by President Mahinda Rajapaksa in November 2005, every effort was made by the new Government to engage in political negotiations with the LTTE, which had unilaterally pulled out of the peace process since April 2003. This included two rounds of talks held in Geneva and technical talks scheduled in Oslo. Infact, in Oslo, the LTTE delegation having arrived in the city, refused to show-up for negotiations, once again underlying its lack of commitment to the Peace Process. The LTTE spurned all opportunities at discussing the core issues aimed at arriving at a political settlement, and continued its duplicitous action of escalating the violations of the CFA. Notwithstanding LTTE attacks on the Army Commander, Secretary Defence and the assassination of Major General Parami Kulatunge, the third highest ranking officer in the Sri Lanka Army, the Deputy Secretary General of the Government Peace Secretariat Ketheshwaran Loganathan in August 2006 and numerous attacks targeting innocent civilians including bus bombings in Kebitigollawa, Nittambuwa, Seenigama and Cheddikulum, the Government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa remained steadfast in its efforts to seek an honourable peace with the LTTE, even as it pursued negotiations on a political settlement with all political parties represented in the Parliament through the APRC process. It should be noted that it was only following the LTTE blocking of water supply to the East at the Mavilaru anicut, that the Government was

compelled to undertake military operations against the LTTE in order to protect the civilian population and vital strategic assets including the Trincomalee Port.

Thirdly, it must be noted that throughout the period of the CFA, protestations by GOSL to the Norwegian Government as well as to the SLMM, about the increased illegal activities of the LTTE under the cloak of the CFA including development of its air wing and unabated child recruitment by the LTTE amounting to 1743 cases as ruled by the SLMM as at 30 April 2007, were to go unheeded. In addition to the LTTE's thousands of ceasefire violations already committed, by its stepping up of deliberate and indiscriminate targeting of civilians including women and children in recent weeks including bomb blasts in Nugegoda, Kebitigollawa, Slave Island as well as the killing of UNP Parliamentarian T. Maheswaran on the first day of the New Year and the failed assassination attempt using a paraplegic female suicide cadre on Social Services and Social Welfare Minister Douglas Devananda last month, it becomes ominous that the LTTE seeks to continue to engage in provocative activities that could create unrest in the South, making a mockery of the CFA.

In the meantime, I wish to underline that the termination of the CFA does not in anyway hamper the process of moving towards a negotiated political settlement. In fact, it gives us broader space to pursue this goal in a manner that involves all sections of the Sri Lankan polity, which remained sidelined due to the CFA, an agreement solely between the Government and the LTTE. As stated by His Excellency the President Mahinda Rajapaksa on 26 December 2007 in Matara, the doors remain open for the LTTE to join this process. It should be recalled that the Thimpu Talks of 1985, the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987, the 1990 talks between President Premadasa and the LTTE, as well as talks between President Kumaratunga's administration and the LTTE in 1994, were not done with the presence of a CFA.

The Government of Sri Lanka will, while dealing militarily to eliminate the scourge of terrorism from our land, will spare no effort in our bid to arrive at a practical and sustainable political settlement. In doing so, our Government is conscious that the 13th Amendment to the Constitution signed following the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987 itself, yet to be fully implemented.

The Government is appreciative of the Norwegian facilitators and the SLMM as well as the role played by the co-chairs in their efforts to assist the peace process in Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka while re-iterating its sincere commitment to a negotiated political settlement through an inclusive process which includes all minority groups of Sri Lanka, will look forward to the support of the International Community, as we work towards securing a sustainable peace.

The SLMM Final Press Statement

Today, January 16 2008, marks the final day of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) period in Sri Lanka, that has lasted for almost six years.

Status

Today, January 16 2008, marks the final day of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) period in Sri Lanka, that has lasted for almost six years.

The Agreement signed by the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in February 2002 outlined the mandate for the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, as a tool to watch the CFA implementation.

Thus, the abrogation of the CFA also implies the termination of the SLMM. In practical terms, this means that the Nordic monitors will leave Sri Lanka today and early tomorrow morning, leaving behind only a few personnel to wrap up administrative obligations related to the closing down of the mission.

A short recap of history

During the first years of the CFA period, there was seemingly a general spirit of cooperation between the Parties. Violations were relatively few. But lack of progress on critical issues nurtured distrust between Parties, giving set backs in the peace process. Gradually the conflict level increased, involving more military activities, more violence affecting civilians, more signs of insecurity, and more displacement of people.

Today, the ground situation displays a reality very far from what is outlined in the CFA.

The SLMM reality

The purpose of SLMM presence in Sri Lanka has all the way been to support the peace process. Defining how best to implement the potential of the SLMM mechanism, has however at times been a huge challenge. As the conflict level gradually increased, the mission re-evaluated its approach, pursuing strategies and working procedures relevant to the situation.

The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission has been appreciated and slammed, loved and hated, over these six years. Some have expressed their support, saying: “Without the SLMM we will be doomed”, or “Without the SLMM many more lives would have been lost”, or “We are scared for what will happen if SLMM leaves Sri Lanka”. Others have preferred to portray SLMM as powerless, inefficient and utterly biased.

The final report

The SLMM has been present in the North and the East of Sri Lanka, as well as in the capital, every single day for nearly six years. Through on the ground monitoring, we have learned to recognize and respect the complexity of the conflict.

Based on this knowledge, the final report from the operation is this:

The SLMM is absolutely convinced that this complex conflict can not be solved by military means.

The Head of Mission finds it to be his duty to draw this conclusion as the operation is about to be terminated. It is not a task for the SLMM, however, to advise the parties to the CFA, nor other actors, how to find viable solutions. This has to be left to the people of Sri Lanka themselves – supported by facilitating actors of their choice.

Concluding remarks

The Head of the SLMM uses this final opportunity to thank the GOSL and the LTTE for inviting SLMM to serve them, in their search for a negotiated solution to the conflict between them.

It is with sadness that we leave this resourceful and beautiful country at this point of time. It is hard to leave behind people all over the island that we have learned to know, and come to love and respect. We will miss out on the opportunity to further adapt and contribute in the present situation, – and we would like to believe that Sri Lanka misses out on something valuable too.

In the time to come, fortunately, many actors both inside and outside Sri Lanka, will continue to contribute to the search for a solution to the conflict. Hopefully, wise choices will be made at all levels by those who possess the power to make decisions.

Future heroes in Sri Lanka will be those who recognize the complexity of the situation, and prove able to manage this complexity in a way that reduces rather than increases human pain, fear and hopelessness – those capable of respecting people with different perceptions, and bringing them together.

The SLMM will close its operation at 1900 hrs today.

To the people of Sri Lanka;
Thank you and farewell

Colombo, 16 January 2008

Lars J. Solvberg

Major General
Head of Mission
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission

Key Persons

The overview includes key persons within the SLMM as well as in key positions with the Parties to the CFA, and the Norwegian government, Facilitator to the Peace Process.

THE PARTIES

The Government of Sri Lanka

The Office of the President

| PERIOD | PRESIDENT* |
|-----------|------------------------------------|
| 1994–2005 | Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga |
| 2005– | Mahinda Rajapakse |

* Also holding the portfolio of Minister of Defence

The Office of the Prime Minister

| PERIOD | PRIME MINISTER |
|-----------|-------------------------------------|
| 1994–2000 | Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias Bandaranaike |
| 2000–2001 | Ratnasiri Wickramanayake |
| 2001–2004 | Ranil Wickremesinghe |
| 2004–2005 | Mahinda Rajapakse |
| 2005–2010 | Ratnasiri Wickramanayake |

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

| PERIOD | MINISTER |
|-----------|---------------------|
| 1994–2001 | Lakshman Kadirgamar |
| 2001–2004 | Tyrone Fernando |
| 2004–2005 | Lakshman Kadirgamar |
| 2005–2010 | Anura Bandaranaike* |
| 2005–2007 | Mangala Samaraweera |
| 2007–2010 | Rohitha Bogollagama |

* Serving in an interim period following the assassination of Lakshman Kadirgamar

The Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP)

| PERIOD | SECRETARY GENERAL |
|-----------|----------------------|
| 2002–2004 | Bernard Goonetilleke |
| 2004–2005 | Jayantha Dhanapala |
| 2005–2007 | Palitha Kohona |
| 2007–2010 | Rajiva Wijesinha |

THE FACILITATOR

The Government of Norway

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway

| PERIOD | FOREIGN MINISTER | STATE SECRETARY | SPECIAL ENVOY |
|-----------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1997–2000 | Knut Vollebæk | Wegger Strømmen | Erik Solheim (1999–2006)* |
| 2000–2001 | Thorbjørn Jagland | Raymond Johansen | |
| 2001–2005 | Jan Petersen | Vidar Helgesen | |
| 2005– | Jonas Gahr Støre | Raymond Johansen | Jon Hanssen-Bauer (2006–2009) |

* As of 2005, Solheim became a cabinet member, as Minister of International Development, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; as of 2007 also holding the portfolio of Minister of the Environment. In 2005, former HOM, Major General (R) Trond Furuhoide, served as Special Representative of the RNG.

Norway's Ambassadors to Sri Lanka

| PERIOD | AMBASSADOR |
|-----------|----------------|
| 1997–2003 | Jon Westborg |
| 2003–2007 | Hans Brattskar |
| 2007–2010 | Tore Hattrem |

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

LTTE Leadership

| PERIOD | LEADER |
|-----------|-------------------------|
| 1976–2009 | Vellupillai Prabhakaran |

| PERIOD | POLITICAL WING LEADER |
|-----------|-----------------------------|
| 1991–2007 | Suppayya Paramu Tamilselvan |
| 2007–2009 | Balasingham Nadesan |

| PERIOD | SENIOR NEGOTIATOR |
|-----------|-----------------------------|
| 1999–2006 | Anton Balasingham |
| 2006–2007 | Suppayya Paramu Tamilselvan |

| PERIOD | MILITARY WING LEADER |
|-----------|----------------------|
| 1991–2008 | Col. Balraj |

The LTTE Peace Secretariat (PS)

| PERIOD | SECRETARY GENERAL |
|-----------|-----------------------|
| 2002–2009 | Sevaratnam Puleedevan |

THE SLMM

Head of Mission (HOM)

| PERIOD | PERSON | NATIONALITY |
|-------------------|--|-------------|
| Mar 2002–Mar 2003 | Major General (retired) Trond Furuhoide | Norway |
| Mar 2003–Oct 2003 | Major General (retired) Trygve Tellefsen | Norway |
| Oct 2003–Feb 2004 | Brigadier (retired) Hagrup Haukland* | Norway |
| Feb 2004–Feb 2005 | Major General (retired) Trond Furuhoide | Norway |
| Feb 2005–Mar 2006 | Brigadier (retired) Hagrup Haukland | Norway |
| Apr 2006–Aug 2006 | Major General (retired) Ulf Henricsson | Sweden |
| Sep 2006–Dec 2008 | Major General (retired) Lars J. Sølvberg | Norway |

* Serving as acting HOM in the capacity of COS

Chief of Staff (COS)*

| PERIOD | PERSON | NATIONALITY |
|-------------------|------------------|-------------|
| Mar 2002–Nov 2004 | Hagrup Haukland | Norway |
| Nov 2004–Aug 2005 | Wagn Winkel | Denmark |
| Aug 2005–Aug 2006 | Tommy Lekenmyr | Sweden |
| Sep 2006–Mar 2007 | Jon Oskar Solnes | Iceland |
| Mar 2007–Jun 2007 | Jimmy Søland | Norway |
| Jun 2007–Feb 2008 | Jonas Allansson | Iceland |

* The name of the function varied, incl. Deputy HOM and Mission Manager (as of 2007)

Chief Operations Officer (COO)*

| PERIOD | PERSON | NATIONALITY |
|-------------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Mar 2002–Sep 2002 | Tarmo Kaupilla | Finland |
| Sep 2002–Mar 2003 | Jussi Anteroine | Finland |
| Mar 2003–Nov 2003 | Timo Ekdahl | Finland |
| Nov 2003–May 2004 | Erkki Poyhia | Finland |
| May 2004–Feb 2005 | Kalle Liesinen | Finland |
| Mar 2005–Aug 2005 | Leif Brunell | Sweden |
| Aug 2005–Sep 2006 | Mika Sörensen | Sweden |
| Oct 2006–Dec 2006 | Sverre Iversen | Norway |
| Dec 2006–Mar 2007 | Jimmy Søland | Norway |
| Jun 2007–Jul 2007 | Anne Sender | Norway |
| Jul 2007–Jan 2008 | Kjetil Hestad | Norway |

* Operations Manager as of 2007

Press & Information Officer (PIO)*

| PERIOD | PERSON | NATIONALITY |
|-------------------|------------------------|-------------|
| Jun 2002–Mar 2003 | Teitur Torkelsson | Iceland |
| May 2003–May 2004 | Agnes Bragadottir | Iceland |
| May 2004–Aug 2004 | Hjördis Finnbogadottir | Iceland |
| Aug 2004–Dec 2004 | Jon Oskar Solnes | Iceland |
| Dec 2004–Jun 2006 | Helen Olafsdottir | Iceland |
| Jul 2006–Aug 2007 | Thorfinnur Omarsson | Iceland |
| Aug 2007–Sep 2007 | Steinar Sveinsson | Iceland |
| Oct 2007–Jan 2008 | Pia Elizabeth Hansson | Iceland |

* Also serving as Head Spokesperson

Head Liaison Officer to the GOSL*

| PERIOD | PERSON | NATIONALITY |
|-------------------|------------------|-------------|
| Mar 2002–May 2003 | Nils Levi Lundin | Sweden |
| Jul 2007–Dec 2007 | Anne Sender | Norway |
| Dec 2007–Jan 2008 | Paul Clark | Norway |

* Specifically appointed in the function; liaison with the GOSL was otherwise served by SLMM HQ

Head Liaison Officer to the LTTE

| PERIOD | PERSON | NATIONALITY |
|--------------------|----------------------|-------------|
| Mar 2002–Jun 2002 | Perthi Hartikainen | Finland |
| Jun 2002–Jul 2002 | Paul Erik Bjerke | Norway |
| Jul 2002–Jan 2003 | Hans Jørgen Hestvang | Denmark |
| Jan 2003–May 2003 | Håkan Liljeström | Sweden |
| Jun 2003–Sep 2003 | Nils Levi Lundin | Sweden |
| Sep 2003–Jun 2004 | Niels Nikolaisen | Denmark |
| Jun 2004–Sep 2004 | Knut Gundersen | Norway |
| Sep 2004–Nov 2005 | Lars Kjerland | Norway |
| Nov 2005–Mar 2006 | Conny Jenssen | Denmark |
| Mar 2006–Aug 2006 | Matti Vainionpää | Finland |
| Aug 2006–Sept 2006 | Roland Nystad | Norway |
| Sept 2006–May 2007 | Lars Bleymann | Norway |
| May 2007–Aug 2007 | Kristjan Gudmundsson | Iceland |
| Sep 2007–Nov 2007 | Paul Clark | Norway |
| Nov 2007–Jan 2008 | Lodve A. Svare | Norway |

SLMM Heads of Mission

During the six years of operation, five persons – all retired army officers with extensive experience, appointed by the Facilitator – held the position as SLMM Head of Mission (HOM), one serving twice; four were Norwegian nationals, one was Swedish.

TROND FURUHOVDE

Major General (retired) Trond Furuhojde (1939–2006) served as SLMM's *first* HOM, 2002–03, taking up the position again, 2004–05. Furuhojde held an extensive military career before joining the SLMM, including a tour of duty as Force Commander with the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 1993–95, and as Military Advisor with Norway's delegation to the UN, New York, 1995–96. In 2005, he served as the Special Representative of the Norwegian Government to Sri Lanka. Furuhojde also held several key positions with the Norwegian Army, incl. as Inspector General of the Infantry, and heading the District Command Trøndelag, 1996–99.

ULF HENRICSSON

Major General (retired) Ulf Henricsson (1942–) served as SLMM's *fourth* HOM, 2006, his tour of duty being abrogated by the withdrawal of monitors for EU member states. Henricsson joined the SLMM with a broad military experience from the Swedish Army, including peacekeeping operations on the Balkans. He served as Commander of the Swedish/Danish Nordbat battalion in the UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia, 1993–94, as well as head of the OSCE Department for Regional Stabilisation in Bosnia–Herzegovina, 1999–2001. Among several key positions in the Swedish Army, Henricsson served as Commander of its Eastern Army Division

TRYGGVE TELLEFSEN

Major General (retired) Tryggve Tellefsen (1941–) served as SLMM's *second* HOM, in 2003–03. Tellefsen brought with him extensive military experience, not least from peacekeeping operations when joining the SLMM, including a tour of duty as Commander of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, 1997–2001, and as General Officer Commanding the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Macedonia, 1994–95. As part of his service with the Norwegian Army, he also served as the Commander of the Regiment responsible for the selection and of all army units in UN peacekeeping missions and all army personnel serving abroad, 1989–1994.

LARS J. SØLVBERG

Major General (retired) Lars J. Sølvberg (1952–) served as SLMM's *fifth* – and last – HOM, 2006–08, consequently also heading the termination of the operation in Sri Lanka, and of the organisation in Norway. Sølvberg joined the SLMM after an accomplished career with the Norwegian Army, including that of its Chief of Staff, 2003–05, as well as Commanding General of the 6th No Division, 1999–2003, and commanding officer of an independent infantry brigade, mechanized battalion and tank squadron. Sølvberg is a graduate of the US Army War College, 1998, and the US Army Command and General Staff College (1991).

HAGRUP HAUKLAND

Brigadier (retired) Hagrup Haukland (1941–) served as SLMM's *third* HOM, first acting during an intermediate period 2003–04, appointed and serving again 2005–06. Haukland had wide-ranging military experience, including from several peacekeeping operations when joining the SLMM, i.e. the UN peacekeeping forces in Gaza (UNEF) 1961, Lebanon (UNIFIL) 1978–79, Iraq (UNIIMOG) 1989–90, Commander of the Norwegian Battalion with the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 1992–93, and Sector-Commander in former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) 1995. Haukland graduated from the Norwegian Army Staff-college, 1983 and from the British Army Staff-college, 1986.

Sri Lanka Conflict Chronology, 1999–2008

This chronology of the Sri Lanka conflict and peace process covers the period most relevant to the SLMM, i.e. the political process leading up to its establishment, and the operational period, which ended in January 2008.

Several sources have been used in compiling the chronology: For the operational period, primarily Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) reports have been used. In cases where the SLMM itself is the source to numbers of casualties, this is marked with an asterix (*). It should be noted that the number of killed and injured reported here corresponds with what was reported at the time of incident, either by the media or

by the SLMM. The SLMM did not report on victims succumbing to their injuries at a later stage.

The chronology is aimed at giving an overview of major events relating to the conflict and process adding to the understanding of the SLMM, and does not pass as a comprehensive historical chronicle.

1999

| | |
|---------------|--|
| 21 Dec | President C.B. Kumaratunga is re-elected as Head of State, defeating UNP leader R. Wickramasinghe |
| 30 Dec | President Kumaratunga publicly reveals Norway as unofficial communications channel between the GOSL and the LTTE |

2000

| | |
|----------------|---|
| 1 Feb | The GOSL discloses Norway's intermediary, third-party role as peace Facilitator in the conflict with the LTTE |
| 01 Apr | The RNG appoints MP E. Solheim as Special Envoy to Sri Lanka |
| 22 Apr | The LTTE takes control of the Elephant Pass military complex, linking the Jaffna peninsula to the mainland |
| 08 May | President C.B. Kumaratunga rejects a ceasefire offer made by the LTTE to enable the evacuation of troops from Jaffna |
| 07 June | Minister of Industries, C. V. Gooneratne and 19 others are killed in a suicide bomb attack during ceremonies to mark the country's first War Heroes Day |
| 01 Aug | Special Envoy E. Solheim visits Sri Lanka, indicating that Norway is still trying to bring the Parties to the negotiating table |
| 10 Oct | The PA emerges as the largest party in parliamentary elections, followed by the UNP |
| 13 Oct | R. Wickremnayake is sworn in as the new PM of Sri Lanka; Norway invited to continue its role in the peace process |
| 01 Nov | Special Envoy E. Solheim meets with LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran in Vanni, saying the meeting was very useful |
| 13 Nov | The EU extends support to Norwegian peace efforts, calling upon the Parties to seize the opportunity and launch a dialogue |
| 27 Nov | The LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran offers unconditional peace talks – for a political solution – in his Heroes' Day speech |
| 24 Dec | The LTTE declares a one-month unilateral ceasefire (later extended three times); rejected by the GOSL |

2001

| | |
|---------------|---|
| 10 Jan | Norwegian Special Envoy E. Solheim visits Sri Lanka, also meeting the Indian High Commissioner re India's sensitivities towards third-party involvement |
| 01 Feb | Special Envoy E. Solheim meets President C.B. Kumaratunga and Leader of the opposition, R. Wickramasinghe on kick-starting the peace process |
| 04 Feb | President C.B. Kumaratunga, in Independence Day address, declares willingness to enter negotiations to seek peace and unity |
| 28 Feb | The LTTE is proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the United Kingdom; approved by Parliament in March |
| 05 Mar | Special Envoy E. Solheim visits Sri Lanka, meeting President C.B. Kumaratunga, consulting on potential confidence-building measures |
| 07 Apr | The LTTE PW leader S.P. Tamilselvan conveys to the GOSL, through E. Solheim, lifting of ban and reciprocation of ceasefire as preconditions for peace talks |
| 10 May | Sri Lankan Foreign Minister L. Kadirgamar requests Norway renew the peace process on an urgent basis |
| 15 May | Special Envoy E. Solheim arrives in Sri Lanka to revive the peace process, meeting representatives of both sides |
| 24 Jul | The LTTE destroys 14 aircraft at Sri Lanka's main Katunayake airbase and Bandaranaike International Airport north of Colombo |
| Aug 29 | Foreign Minister L. Kadirgamar announces the GOSL's willingness to negotiate a mutually agreed ceasefire with the LTTE; rejected by the latter |
| 05 Dec | The UNF coalition of R. Wickramasinghe wins parliamentary elections ahead of PA; Wickremesinghe of the UNP becoming PM |
| 24 Dec | The LTTE declares unilateral ceasefire, reciprocated by the GOSL, which is assured of India's support in efforts to restart the peace process |
| 27 Dec | PM Wickramasinghe formally requests Norway resume its role as Facilitator in Sri Lanka, supported by the PA |

2002

| | |
|------------------------|---|
| 03 Jan | The LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran writes to Norwegian PM K.M. Bondevik requesting Norway continue acting as Facilitator |
| 10 Jan | Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister V. Helgesen briefs President C.B. Kumaratunga on the LTTE's proposal for a formal ceasefire |
| 11 Jan | President C.B. Kumaratunga says she extends her full support to the ongoing peace initiative |
| 15 Jan | PM Wickramasinghe orders economic sanctions on the LTTE-controlled areas lifted; the LTTE eases travel restrictions for civilians |
| 20 Jan | The LTTE announces a one-month extension of its ceasefire, reciprocated by the GOSL |
| 04 Feb | The GOSL reopens the Vavuniya–Trincomalee road after a decade of closure |
| 06 Feb | The SLA and the LTTE begin de-mining operations in Omanthai, monitored by the ICRC |
| 08 Feb | The Norwegian delegation finalises drafting the permanent ceasefire document of behalf of the Parties |
| 20 Feb | The LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran signs the Norwegian-brokered CFA |
| 22 Feb | PM Wickramasinghe signs the CFA |
| 01 Mar | President C.B. Kumaratunga criticises the CFA for impinging Sri Lanka's national security |
| 02 Mar | The SLMM HOM Maj. Gen. (R) T. Furuhovde arrives in Colombo with first international monitors |
| 11 Mar | The LTTE Senior negotiator, A. Balasingham warns of 'severe punishment' to cadres found violating the CFA terms and modalities |
| 27 Mar | President C.B. Kumaratunga expresses support for direct talks with the LTTE |
| 08 Apr | The last stretch of the A9 highway reopens for public use after 12 years |
| 10 Apr | The LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran says the LTTE is sincerely and seriously committed to peace |
| 09 May | Opposition leader M. Rajapakse, saying the ceasefire is one-sided and favours the LTTE, vows to step up the campaign against it |
| June | UNHCR reports that 100,000 refugees have returned to Sri Lanka |
| 29 Jun | Amnesty International says the CFA has reduced human rights abuses significantly |
| 12 Aug | The GOSL approves sea route for LTTE vessels sailing off Vanni, to be used twice a week with a SLMM monitor on board, under SLN supervision |
| 05 Sep | The GOSL de-proscribes the LTTE to make direct talks possible |
| 16–18 Sep | The 1st round of peace talks is held at Sattahip naval base, Thailand; priority is given to humanitarian issues |
| 25 Oct | The Japanese government appoints senior diplomat Y. Akashi as Special Representative for Sri Lanka |
| 31 Oct | The High Court in Colombo sentences the LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran to 200 years imprisonment for the 1996 bombing of the Central Bank |
| 31 Oct – 03 Nov | The 2nd round of peace talks is held in Nakorn Pathom, Thailand; the Parties agree to set up sub-committees |

| | |
|------------------|--|
| 10 Nov | The first meeting of the Sub-Committee on De-Escalation and Normalization (SDN) is held in Omanthai |
| 18 Nov | The first meeting of the Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs of North East (SIHRN) is held in Kilinochchi |
| 24 Nov | PM R. Wickramasinghe and chief LTTE negotiator A. Balasingham meet in Oslo for the first time |
| 02–05 Dec | The 3rd round of peace talks is held in Oslo, Norway; the Parties agree to explore federal models for a political solution to the conflict |

2003

| | |
|------------------|--|
| 04 Jan | The Norwegian government refutes allegations from President C.B. Karamatunga that it had illegally helped the LTTE import radio equipment |
| 06–09 Jan | The 4th round of peace talks is held in Nakorn Pathom, Thailand; the World Bank is chosen as custodian of foreign aid |
| 07–08 Feb | The 5th round of peace talks is held in Berlin, Germany; the Parties agree to prepare a human rights roadmap |
| 06–06 Mar | The first meeting of the Sub-Committee on Gender Issues (SGI) is held in Kilinochchi |
| 18–21 Mar | The 6th round of peace talks is held in Hakone, Japan; a decision on concrete human rights measures is postponed |
| 14 Apr | A Sri Lanka donors meeting is held in Washington; the LTTE is not invited |
| 21 Apr | The LTTE unilaterally suspends further peace talks |
| 15 May | Norway's Foreign Minister J. Petersen and the LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran meet in Vanni |
| 22 May | The LTTE political wing leader S.P. Tamilselvan states the LTTE's demand for an Interim Administration at a press conference in Kilinochchi |
| 27 May | Norwegian PM K. M. Bondevik says the GOSL should show flexibility in response to the LTTE request to set up an interim administration |
| 29 May | PM R. Wickramasinghe declares that the GOSL will consult the people before a final solution to the conflict is implemented |
| 02 Jun | PM R. Wickramasinghe rejects the LTTE demand for an interim administration in the Northeast |
| 05–10 Jun | Donors pledges USD 4.5 billion in peace-linked aid to Sri Lanka at a conference in Tokyo, boycotted by the LTTE |
| 12 Sep | A follow-up meeting after the Tokyo conference is held in Colombo (also without the LTTE) |
| 02 Oct | The USA re-designates the LTTE a "foreign terrorist organisation" |
| 31 Oct | The LTTE presents a provisional plan Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) for the transfer of political power from Colombo to the northeast |
| 05 Nov | President C.B. Kumaratunga declares a state of emergency and takes direct control of three ministries |
| 14 Nov | Norway suspends its role as Facilitator due to ambiguity in the south over who holds authority in the Peace Process |

2004

| | |
|------------------|---|
| 07 Jan | PM R. Wickramasinghe calls on President C.B. Kumaratunga to take over the handling of the peace process, and to renegotiate the CFA |
| 03 Mar | The LTTE commander K. Amman (Col Karuna) is expelled following an internal split, taking over structures in Batticaloa and Ampara districts |
| 02 Apr | The SLFP coalition led by M. Rajapakse wins parliamentary elections and as PM he forms a new minority government |
| 22 Apr | President C.B. Kumaratunga requests Norway resume its role as Facilitator; Norway responds favourably |
| 03 May | The LTTE says it is ready to resume peace talks with the GOSL |
| 10–11 May | Norwegian Foreign Minister J. Petersen meets separately with President C.B. Kumaratunga and LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran |
| 26 May | The LTTE demands an Interim Self-Governing Authority for the northeast to be institutionalised before discussing core issues of the conflict with the GOSL |
| 01 Jun | The Co-Chairs warn that, without the resumption of talks, international support might shift to other parts of the world |
| 07 Jul | Four police officers are killed, and six officers and three civilians are injured in Colombo, in the first suicide bomb explosion since the signing of the CFA* |
| 14 Aug | Norwegian PM K. M. Bondevik and Sri Lanka PM M. Rajapakse meet in Athens |
| 16 Aug | President C.B. Kumaratunga offers to meet the LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran if the stalled peace process resumed and progress was made |
| 16 Aug | The EU urges the Parties to put the interests of the people first by strictly adhering to the CFA and resuming talks |
| 20 Aug | The USA urges the Parties to take steps to rebuild trust and schedule peace talks as soon as possible |
| 27 Aug | Norway refutes Sri Lankan media reports that the Norwegian government has been giving military training to the LTTE |
| Oct | A high-level political delegation of the LTTE tours Europe with the GOSL approval, and meets with experts and officials in several countries |
| 4 Oct | Norway appeals to the LTTE to do everything possible to stop political killings in Sri Lanka |
| 10–11 Nov | Norwegian Foreign Minister J. Petersen holds separate talks with President C.B. Kumaratunga and the LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran |
| 23 Dec | The LTTE rejects new proposals from President C.B. Karamatunga, conveyed through the Facilitator, to revive peace talks |
| 26 Dec | The Indian Ocean tsunami devastates vast stretches of the island's coastline and kills more than 35,000 Sri Lankans |

2005

| | |
|------------------|---|
| 07–08 Jan | The UN Secretary General K. Annan visits Sri Lanka but is denied the GOSL support to inspect tsunami-struck areas under the LTTE control |
| 07 Feb | The LTTE PW leader in the east, E. Kousalyan, is killed along with four other political members, incl. former MP A.C. Nehru |
| 17 May | The Sri Lanka Development Forum ends in Kandy with international donors pledging over USD 3 billion to tsunami relief and other programmes |
| 24 Jun | A joint tsunami aid mechanism (P-TOMS) is agreed upon by the Parties but never made operative due to a Supreme Court decision on 15 July |
| 19 Jul | The Co-Chairs group raises concern over the deteriorating security situation, demanding immediate action from both Parties to stop killings |
| 12 Aug | Sri Lankan Foreign Minister L. Kadirgamar is assassinated in Colombo; state of emergency is declared |
| 24 Aug | The GOSL rejects the LTTE demand for peace talks to be held in Norway, calling for problems to be discussed in Sri Lanka |
| 08 Sep | The LTTE rejects a Norwegian proposal to hold peace talks at Colombo international airport, having suggested talks in Kilinochchi |
| 19 Sep | The Co-Chairs calls on the LTTE to end political assassinations and on the GOSL to disarm paramilitary groups in the northeast |
| 26 Sep | The EU issues a travel ban prohibiting the LTTE delegates from visiting any of its member states |
| 07 Oct | The Norwegian embassy in Colombo, in a statement, rules out early direct peace talks between the Parties |
| 17 Nov | PM M. Rajapakse defeats UNP leader R. Wickramasinghe in presidential elections with a nominal margin, to become new head of state |
| 20 Nov | The Norwegian government says it is willing to continue its role as Facilitator provided it was asked for by both Parties |
| 28 Nov | President M. Rajapakse invites the LTTE for peace talks, promising to maintain the CFA |
| 07 Dec | President M. Rajapakse meets with Co-Chair representatives and formally invites Norway to resume its facilitative role |
| 09 Dec | Norwegian PM J. Stoltenberg says in New Delhi that Norway is willing to resume its role as Facilitator if the Parties are serious, and respect the CFA |
| 09 Dec | President M. Rajapakse says the facilitators and monitors cannot come from the same country, calling for two entities and for monitors from Asian countries |
| 11 Dec | The Japanese government says it is ready to host direct negotiations between the Parties to review the CFA |
| 25 Dec | Pro-LTTE TNA MP J. Pararajasingham is assassinated in Batticaloa; nine persons are injured |

2006

| | |
|------------------|--|
| 02 Jan | Five Tamil students are shot and killed, and two injured, on the beach in Trincomalee* |
| 22 Jan | President M. Rajapakse calls for immediate talks with the LTTE to halt the increasing violence |
| 22–23 Feb | The Parties meet for the first round of renewed peace talks in Geneva; agreeing on certain issues to be followed up in a subsequent meeting |
| 17 Mar | The Norwegian government appoints J. Hanssen-Bauer new Special Envoy to Sri Lanka |
| 10 Apr | Canada formally proscribes the LTTE as a terrorist organisation |
| 11 Apr | 11 SLN sailors killed in claymore mine attack against bus convoy between Trincomalee and Habarana |
| 12 Apr | A bomb blast in the market in Trincomalee, and subsequent riots, kill 16 civilians and injure many more* |
| 18 Apr | SLMM HOM in a memo to the EU representatives in SL assesses a possible EU ban on the LTTE as counter productive to the peace process under prevailing circumstances |
| 25 Apr | SLA commander S. Fonseka narrowly escapes a suicide bomber in Colombo |
| 11 May | LTTE Sea Tigers attack several SLN vessels off coast Mullaittivu, killing 18 sailors. One SLMM monitor narrowly escapes attack. |
| 27 May | The Norwegian peace envoy E. Solheim warns of a major crisis brewing, and that Sri Lanka could be heading back to full-scale civil war |
| 31 May | The EU officially lists the LTTE as a terrorist organisation |
| 30 May | The Co-Chairs place the full responsibility for halting the soaring violence with the Parties |
| 08 Jun | The LTTE refuses to meet the GOSL delegation directly during talks on monitoring and security issues in Oslo The Facilitator expresses profound concern with the gravity of the situation and doubts about the Parties' commitment to the CFA |
| 12 Jun | The LTTE informs the Facilitator that it cannot guarantee the security of ceasefire monitors from EU member states |
| 15 Jun | 58 civilians die and 45 are injured when a roadside bomb targets a bus carrying civilians near Anuradhapura* |
| 23 Jun | The GOSL states that the LTTE opposition towards the SLMM monitors from the EU (in effect forcing them to leave) is a violation of the CFA |
| 20 Jul | The LTTE cuts the water supply to state-assisted settlements in the Mavil Aru area in the east |
| 04–05 Aug | 17 aid workers of Action Contre la Faim (ACF) are shot and killed in Muttur near Trincomalee* |
| 12 Aug | Deputy Head of the SCOPP K. Loganathan is shot and killed in Colombo |
| 14 Aug | 55 girls aged 15–18 are killed in a SLAF bomb attack near Mullaittivu* |
| 27 Aug | President M. Rajapakse calls for a greater role to be exercised by India in the peace process |
| 31 Aug | Sri Lankan Foreign Minister M. Samaraweera calls for a more independent and more impartial role for the SLMM |
| 16 Sep | Indian PM M. Singh tells President M. Rajapakse that India backs Norway's role as Facilitator |

| | |
|------------------|--|
| 18 Sep | Ten Muslim men and boys are found killed, and one injured, near Pottuvil in Ampara district* |
| 11 Oct | At least 150 SLA soldiers, possibly many more, are killed in an army operation near Muhamalai in the Jaffna peninsula |
| 12 Oct | The SLFP and opposition UNP agree to pursue a policy of national consensus, including a federal solution; signing a MoU on 23 Oct |
| 16 Oct | 104 sailors killed when bus convoy carrying SLN personnel is attacked by suicide bomber near Habarana, SLMM monitor enquiring at scene. Sri Lanka's Supreme Court rules the temporary merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces unconstitutional and null and void |
| 18 Oct | The LTTE Sea Tigers launch a surprise attack against the SLN, penetrating the naval base and harbour of Galle in the south |
| 28–29 Oct | The Parties meet for the second round of peace talks in Geneva; fail to agree on measures that could halt the spiralling violence |
| 03 Nov | President M. Rajapakse appoints the Commission of Inquiry into Serious Violations of Human Rights |
| 08 Nov | IDP camp in Kathiraweli near Batticaloa hit by SLA artillery shelling, 47 persons reported killed and 136 reported injured. 20 dead confirmed by SLMM in nearby hospital. SLMM HOM and ADC narrowly escape SLA artillery attack at Poonaryn in Vanni. |
| 10 Nov | The TNA MP N. Raviraj is assassinated in Colombo |
| 19 Nov | The Co-Chairs issue a statement after meeting in Washington, condemning the systematic CFA violations by both Parties |
| 01 Dec | The Defence Secretary, G. Rajapakse, escapes unhurt from a suicide attack in Colombo; two soldiers are killed |
| 14 Dec | The LTTE political adviser and chief negotiator A. Balasingham passes away in London |

2007

| | |
|------------------|--|
| 02 Jan | 16 civilians, incl. seven small children, are killed and 15 seriously injured in aerial bombardment in Padahuthurai fishing village in Mannar district* |
| 05–06 Jan | 16 civilians are killed and more than 80 injured in two bus bomb explosions in the Galle and Gampaha districts* |
| 12 Feb | The National Bhikku Front of Buddhist monks demand that the GOSL abrogates the CFA |
| 27 Feb | The US and Italian ambassadors are slightly injured by shrapnel from the LTTE shells targeting the SLAF airstrip in Batticaloa |
| 14 Mar | The British PM T. Blair calls for the full implementation of the CFA |
| 26 Mar | The LTTE, using light aircraft, destroy an unknown number of SLAF aircraft at Katunayake air base north of Colombo |
| 02 Apr | A bus bomb kills 16 civilians, injuring 23, near Ampara town* |
| 04 Apr | SLAF aircraft attack the LTTE Sea Tiger HQ in the Pudukudiyirippu area of Mullaithivu, destroying it |
| 12 Apr | Sri Lanka Defence Secretary G. Rajapakse says the ceasefire has no meaning, only left in place to satisfy the international community |
| 24 Apr | The LTTE, using light aircraft, launch attack against the Palaali military complex in the Jaffna peninsula |
| 29 Apr | The LTTE, using light aircraft bombs a Shell storage facility and a Ceylon Petroleum oil depot near Colombo |
| May | A split occurs in the breakaway so-called 'Karuna faction', the two senior commanders Col. Karuna and his deputy Pillayan falling out |
| 19 May | The UNP rules out forming a national government with President M. Rajapakse's administration |
| 28 May | The Army Cdr., Lt. Gen. S. Fonseka, is quoted as saying the plan is to drive the LTTE out of the east and weaken the north, to pave way for talks and a permanent political solution |
| 01 Jun | President M. Rajapakse offers to open peace talks with the LTTE if the group agreed to resume the talks ended in October 2006 |
| 07 Jun | A reported 376 Tamils are forcefully expelled from Colombo, to be transported to the northeast; the expulsion halted by the Supreme Court the next day |
| 25 Jun | The LTTE political head S.P. Tamilselvan states that only the CFA can save the island from disaster |
| 28 Jun | A special government commission finds that 2020 Sri Lankans were either abducted or disappeared between Sep 06 and Feb 07 |
| 11 Jul | President M. Rajapakse declares Thoppigala, the last remaining LTTE-controlled part of the east, captured The LTTE tells Norway that the Co-Chairs have failed to address key humanitarian issues |
| 13 Oct | The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, L. Arbour, describes the prevalence of impunity in Sri Lanka as 'alarming', after visiting the country |
| 22 Oct | With air support, a suicide unit of the LTTE enters the SLAF air base in Anuradhapura and allegedly destroys eight military aircraft |

| | |
|------------------|--|
| 02 Nov | The LTTE PW leader S.P. Tamilselvan is killed with five others in an SLAF air raid at Thiruvaiaru south of Kilinochchi; B. Nadesan is appointed his replacement The LTTE renegade commander Col. Karuna is arrested in the UK bearing a forged diplomatic Sri Lankan passport |
| 27 Nov | Seven schoolgirls and four adults are killed by a roadside bomb at Iyankulam in Vanni* Three staff and seven civilians are killed and 17 injured in aerial bombing against the Voice of Tigers radio station in Kilinochchi* |
| 28 Nov | A bomb blast in a shopping centre at Nugegoda in the outskirts of Colombo kills 17 and injures 34* A suicide attack in Colombo fails to kill EPDP leader and cabinet member D. Devananda, leaving two dead and two wounded* |
| 01–02 Dec | More than 1500 Tamils are arrested in a cordon-and-search operation aimed at the LTTE in Colombo |
| 11 Dec | The Sri Lanka Foreign Minister R. Bogollagama is reported as saying that the GOSL is unwilling to observe a truce ahead of any peace talks with the LTTE |
| 12 Dec | President M. Rajapakse says the offensive against the LTTE is aimed at attempting to force the organisation to come to peace talks |
| 13 Dec | The LTTE says there would be no cadre below 18 years of age within its ranks by 1 January 2008 |

2008

| | |
|---------------|---|
| 02 Jan | The GOSL announces its decision to abrogate the CFA |
| 16 Jan | The SLMM operation is terminated |

* According to SLMM inquiries/reports at the time

SLMM Chronology, 2002–2008

This chronology of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission covers the entire period of the organisation's existence – basically the operational period from March 2002 until the close-down of the organisation in December 2008.

The chronology is by and large based on the records and reports of the SLMM, supplemented by other relevant sources.

The chronology is aimed at giving an overview of major events relating to the monitoring mission, and should be seen in connection to the corresponding Conflict Chronology (Appendix 7) and Part 02 of this

report (Operational Overview). The chronology concentrates the main organisational events and operational changes, and does not pass as a complete historical documentation.

Conflict incidents and developments, also those directly involving or affecting the SLMM, are included in the Conflict Chronology.

2002

| | |
|---------------|--|
| 22 Feb | The CFA is signed, establishing the SLMM |
| 02 Mar | SLMM HOM, Maj Gen (R) T. Furuhoide arrives in Colombo |
| 07 Mar | First group of international monitors arrives |
| 13 Mar | HOM establishes HQ at Hotel Lanka Oberoi, Colombo SLMM receives the first complaint, from the GOSL against the LTTE |
| 26 Mar | Deployment of DO's commences DO4 deploys to Trincomalee |
| 29 Mar | LO LTTE temporarily deployed DO2 deploys to Mannar |
| 30 Mar | DO3 deploys to Vavuniya |
| 01 Apr | DO5 deploys to Batticaloa DO6 deploys to Ampara |
| 03 Apr | DO1 deploys to Jaffna |
| 06 Apr | First HOM Directive is issued |
| 08 Apr | All DO's and the LO LTTE permanently deployed and operational HOM opens remaining stretch of the A9 highway |
| 10 Apr | First naval monitors temporarily deployed to Trincomalee |
| 11 Apr | First naval patrol is conducted |
| 01 May | First incident at sea monitored |
| 30 May | NMT-T operational, conducts first naval patrol |
| 13 Jun | HQ moves to Galle Road 399, Colombo |
| 04 Jul | POC Kayts (DO1) established |
| 12 Jul | Naval monitors deploys to Jaffna as part of DO1 |
| 25 Jul | POC Valaichchenai (DO5) established |
| 18 Aug | SLMM supervises and monitors first sea movement of LTTE troops |
| 25 Sep | Security Plan is issued |
| 23 Oct | POC Delft (DO1) established |
| 05 Nov | POC Muttur (DO4) established |
| 18 Nov | Guidelines to contributing governments is issued |

2003

| | |
|---------------|--|
| 20 Feb | OO ('Hermes') becomes effective |
| 05 Mar | Revised SOP (Operations) becomes effective |
| 07 Mar | Maj Gen (R) T. Tellefsen assumes the position of HOM |
| 18 Mar | The Parties pledges full compliance with the rulings of the SLMM at the Hakone peace talks |
| 01 Jun | Revised OO ('Hermes') becomes effective |
| 01 Aug | Revised OO ('Hermes') becomes effective |
| 01 Oct | Brig (R) Hagrup Haukland temporarily assumes the position of HOM |
| 09 Dec | POC Kilinochchi (DO3) established |

2004

| | |
|---------------|--|
| 01 Feb | Maj Gen (R) T. Furuhoide reassumes the position of HOM |
| 02 Mar | The Ambassador of Norway in Colombo hosts internal seminar on 'SLMM after two years' |
| 20 Aug | Revised SOP (Operations) becomes effective |
| 26 Aug | Revised OO ('Hermes') becomes effective |

2005

| | |
|---------------|--|
| 01 Feb | Brig (R) Hagrup Haukland assumes the position of HOM |
| 01 Jun | Revised SOP (Operations) becomes effective |
| 10 Nov | Revised OO ('Hermes') becomes effective |
| 06 Dec | POC Silavatturai (DO2) established |

2006

| | |
|---------------|---|
| 02 Jan | Revised Security Plan becomes effective |
| 13 Jan | SLMM office in Batticaloa (DO5) is attacked with explosive device |
| 01 Apr | Maj Gen (R) U. Henricsson assumes the position of HOM |
| 13 May | The HOM, Maj Gen (R) U. Henricsson states that the Parties have returned to 'low-intensity war' despite the formal ceasefire |
| 10 Jul | HQ relocates to Ward Place 76, Colombo |
| 11 Jul | Revised SOP (Operations) becomes effective |
| 01 Aug | The withdrawal of monitors from EU member states commences, reducing SLMM strength |
| 31 Aug | Sri Lankan Foreign Minister M. Samaraweera calls for a more independent and more impartial role by the SLMM |
| 01 Sep | Maj Gen (R) L. Sølberg assumes the position of HOM |
| | Redesign of the DO structure and deployment is implemented |
| 21 Nov | The HOM imposes restriction on the movement of mission members due to security concerns |
| 22 Nov | Meeting of Nordic co-sponsors in Reykjavik |
| 05 Dec | Revised SOP (Operations) becomes effective |
| 25 Dec | The HOM orders a temporary withdrawal of all international monitors from the AOR due to the security situation; establishes Consolidation Workshop in Negombo |

2007

| | |
|---------------|---|
| 01 Jan | Workshop at Taj Airport Hotel Seeduwa (Negombo) continues |
| 07 Feb | Introducing the concept of Presence in Districts (PID) and Rapid Reaction Team (RRT) |
| 12 Feb | Introducing adapted structure – Northern and Eastern Regions |
| 03 Mar | Introducing adapted operational concept – monitoring three arenas and central tasking |
| 01 Apr | Operation Centre in Temple Road Negombo operational |
| 14 May | National staff general conference held in Habarana |
| 23 May | Information meeting with SCOPP in Colombo on adapted concept and structure |
| 18 Jun | Meeting with Nordic co-sponsors in Oslo |
| 04 Jul | Information meeting with LTTE PS Killinochi on adapted concept and structure |
| 06 Jul | Designate LO to SCOPP established |
| 06 Jul | Operation Centre relocated to Colombo |

2008

| | |
|---------------|---|
| 03 Jan | GOSL informs of decision to abrogate the CFA |
| 16 Jan | The SLMM field operation terminates following the abrogation of the CFA |
| 20 Feb | The HOM and the last international monitors leave Sri Lanka |
| 03 Mar | Post operation team takes up work in Oslo |
| 01 Apr | Archive and communications equipment container shipped from Colombo arrives in Oslo |
| 21 May | Information visit to Nordic co-sponsors Stockholm |
| 22 May | Information visit to Nordic co-sponsors Copenhagen |
| 04 Jun | Information visit to Nordic co-sponsors Helsinki |
| 06 Jun | Information visit to Nordic co-sponsors Reykjavik |
| 03 Jul | Post-operational SLMM work established as project by NoMFA through NRC |
| 10 Sep | Post-operational SLMM seminar in Helsinki |
| 12 Oct | Termination team member visits Colombo |
| 12 Dec | Protocol on Norwegian custody of SLMM Archives at National Archives of Norway is signed by Nordic governments in Oslo |
| 31 Dec | SLMM organisation is formally closed |

SLMM Operational Statistics

Key statistical data for the SLMM operation are found in Part 02 ('Operational Review') and Part 03 ('Operational Resources') of this report. In addition, a record of recorded complaints re violations of the CFA, and subsequent SLMM rulings, is included in this appendix.

The key numbers on the field operation are found in Part 02, covering complaints received as well as liaising activities by unit, plus sea patrols conducted; for the entire period in the 'Overall Review' and for each year in respective 'Annual Review'. The key numbers on operational resources are found in Part 03, covering human resources and financial resources, mainly.

In this appendix, a summary of complaints on violations of the CFA recorded by the SLMM

| Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission | | | | | | | SLMM | | | | | | | | | | Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission | | | | |
|--|----------------------------------|------|---------|---------------------|------|---------|-------------------------|------|---------|-----------------|------|---------|------------------------|------|---------|-----|------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Summary of recorded complaints and violations from All districts | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Period listed:01-02-2002 to 31-03-2007 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Category | The number of complaints against | | | Ruled as violations | | | Ruled as non violations | | | Ruled-Dismissed | | | Ruled-CFA inapplicable | | | | PENDING | | | | |
| | LTTE | GOSL | Non CFA | LTTE | GOSL | Non CFA | LTTE | GOSL | Non CFA | LTTE | GOSL | Non CFA | LTTE | GOSL | Non CFA | | | | | | |
| CFA | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Violation of CFA preamble | 108 | 215 | 29 | 34 | 64 | 3 | 50 | 123 | 12 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 17 | 21 | 6 | 17 | | | | | |
| FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Denied access to specified military areas | 7 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | | | | |
| MEASURES TO RESTORE NORMALCY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Abduction of adults | 1260 | 276 | 365 | 579 | 22 | 10 | 220 | 21 | 55 | 23 | 15 | 26 | 239 | 21 | 11 | 659 | | | | | |
| Abduction of children | 465 | 29 | 186 | 253 | 3 | 8 | 31 | 2 | 35 | 6 | 4 | 13 | 29 | 0 | 4 | 292 | | | | | |
| Activities at checkpoints | 14 | 11 | 2 | 7 | 5 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 2 | | | | | |
| Assassinations | 481 | 127 | 242 | 117 | 34 | 4 | 7 | 1 | 22 | 30 | 12 | 26 | 98 | 15 | 40 | 444 | | | | | |
| Assault | 625 | 111 | 174 | 209 | 19 | 3 | 7 | 1 | 21 | 74 | 16 | 40 | 88 | 26 | 24 | 382 | | | | | |
| Child recruitment | 2062 | 1 | 18 | 1743 | 0 | 8 | 124 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 125 | 0 | 1 | 71 | | | | | |
| Confiscations | 44 | 9 | 2 | 18 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 13 | 1 | 0 | 13 | | | | | |
| Extortion | 130 | 10 | 26 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 31 | 3 | 5 | 29 | 1 | 14 | 28 | 2 | 1 | 22 | | | | | |
| Failure to vacate places of worship | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | | | | | |
| Failure to vacate public buildings | 0 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 4 | | | | | |
| Failure to vacate school buildings | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | |
| Fam. members denied access to detainees | 4 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | | | | | |
| Fishing restrictions | 6 | 32 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 22 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 8 | | | | | |
| Flow of non military goods | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | | | | | |
| Forced recruitment of adults | 98 | 0 | 1 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 26 | 0 | 1 | 4 | | | | | |
| Harassment | 811 | 649 | 198 | 237 | 80 | 3 | 227 | 217 | 35 | 40 | 44 | 45 | 228 | 163 | 25 | 314 | | | | | |
| Hostile acts against the civilian population | 223 | 105 | 22 | 63 | 23 | 2 | 79 | 37 | 7 | 12 | 7 | 2 | 53 | 21 | 7 | 37 | | | | | |
| Intimidation | 131 | 39 | 13 | 50 | 8 | 0 | 37 | 12 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 33 | 14 | 7 | 12 | | | | | |
| Other restrictions of movement | 24 | 29 | 1 | 11 | 6 | 0 | 8 | 16 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 5 | | | | | |
| Other, Measures to restore normalcy | 405 | 118 | 15 | 155 | 8 | 1 | 177 | 73 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 69 | 33 | 3 | 10 | | | | | |
| Passage between Jaffna and Vavauniya on A9 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | | | | |
| Provocative acts by the Parties | 182 | 24 | 5 | 83 | 5 | 0 | 36 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 35 | 9 | 3 | 28 | | | | | |

is included. The table covers the number of violations against each of the Parties, and the subsequent rulings made by the SLMM. The recordings cover the period from the start of the operation till end of March 2007, which is the latest data such a record was published. The practice of compiling and publishing the record was discontinued because the operational environment changed radically to the worse in 2006–07, i.a. resulting in the number of violations of the CFA increase dramatically, whereas the possibilities of launching com-

plaints by the public were reduced; at the same time, the Parties to the CFA applied different practices regarding launching complaints. Consequently, the records did no longer reflect the actual situation, and no longer served its intended purpose of reporting to the stakeholders and transparency of the operation. To some extent, the compilation turned towards becoming counterproductive, in the sense that these (incomplete) statistics easily could – and were – misused for propaganda purposes.

The enclosed record is a replica of the latest summary published by the SLMM in 2007, and contains no new information.

(Figures in these tables may not entirely correspond with other records/statistics presented in this report, as the latter are the result of a complete recount performed as part of the documentation and reporting carried out as part of the post-operation termination process.)

| Category | The number of complaints against | | | Ruled as violations | | | Ruled as non violations | | | Ruled-Dismissed | | | Ruled-CFA inapplicable | | | |
|---|----------------------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------------|------------|-----------|-------------------------|------------|------------|-----------------|------------|------------|------------------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| | LTTE | GOSL | Non CFA | LTTE | GOSL | Non CFA | LTTE | GOSL | Non CFA | LTTE | GOSL | Non CFA | LTTE | GOSL | Non CFA | PENDING |
| Search operations made under the PoTA | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Torture | 20 | 7 | 5 | 13 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Abduction of military or military related | 13 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| Abductions, military related | 9 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| Firing of weapons | 199 | 33 | 42 | 33 | 6 | 0 | 34 | 6 | 16 | 12 | 2 | 4 | 71 | 3 | 13 | 74 |
| Illegal carrying of arms | 54 | 2 | 16 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 15 | 0 | 4 | 15 |
| Offensive army, air force and STF actions | 8 | 46 | 0 | 2 | 23 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 18 |
| Offensive naval actions | 23 | 4 | 0 | 12 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| Sabotage | 6 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| SEPARATION OF FORCES | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Construction of new positions | 60 | 59 | 1 | 17 | 7 | 0 | 24 | 43 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 0 | 16 |
| Deployment of weapons | 32 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 4 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| Movement in Zone of Separation | 54 | 15 | 2 | 23 | 3 | 0 | 10 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 15 | 4 | 1 | 6 |
| Moving military equipment | 50 | 2 | 3 | 34 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 7 |
| Other (Separation of forces) | 18 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 4 |
| Status quo on 24 Dec 01 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SRI LANKA MONITORING MISSION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Failure to establish comm between GOSL and LTTE | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Failure to protect SLMM Member | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Restriction of movement for SLMM | 26 | 17 | 1 | 26 | 15 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Total | 7656 | 2020 | 1381 | 3827 | 346 | 45 | 1178 | 618 | 242 | 262 | 113 | 179 | 1229 | 359 | 154 | 2505 |

| Casualties | Civilians | Military | Police | LTTE | Paramilitary |
|------------|-----------|----------|--------|------|--------------|
| Killed | 995 | 332 | 58 | 164 | 3 |
| Wounded | 923 | 516 | 175 | 33 | 0 |

Internal Considerations

During the termination process in the Nordic countries, subsequent to the termination of the field operation in Sri Lanka, former SLMM monitors were invited to partake in a survey on key aspects of the operation and their tour of duty – as an input to the final reporting as well as future research and lessons learned initiatives.

The survey was carried out in late 2008, employing a web-based response program. An invitation to participate was mailed to all former monitors reachable, generating a response rate of approximately 50 percent: 160 ex-monitors from all Nordic countries responded. In addition to questions on personal background and positioning within the SLMM, the questionnaire included a set of questions mainly within three dimensions:

- 1) Designing the Mission
- 2) Governing the Mission
- 3) Managing the Mission

A selection of the findings, mainly on general topics, are presented in this appendix; others – including more mission-specific/internal issues, are published on the SLMM historical web site, in the way of complete findings: www.slmm.info.

1: DESIGNING THE MISSION

The SLMM was part of a process, serving a purpose – as stipulated and indicated by the Parties to the CFA, through the Agreement. Conducting its operation, the SLMM was influenced by, and had to relate to its environment; to military and political developments. Monitoring and verification being stipulated in the CFA, the Agreement however did not contain a specified mandate, raising the question of the CFA as an adequate framework for directing the operation. Obviously, there was a strong need for a clear and consistent understanding of the very purpose of the SLMM, and that of what is entailed to be a monitoring mission; the monitors necessarily needing to understand the concept of monitoring.

- In the opinion of the monitors; did the SLMM have sufficient understanding of the setting?
- In the opinion of the monitors; did the SLMM have a consistent understanding of its purpose?
- In the opinion of the monitors; did the CFA/mandate constitute an adequate framework?
- In the opinion of the monitors; what did the concept of monitoring entail?

Chart 1: SETTING

Postulate: “The SLMM as an organisation had sufficient understanding of the setting in which it operated.”

As shown in fig. 1, the vast majority of the respondents agree, with an average score of 4.61 (on a 1–6 scale; 6 being the highest).

Chart 2: PURPOSE

Postulate: “To my understanding, the SLMM had a consistent understanding of its purpose.”

As shown in fig. 2, the vast majority of the respondents agree, with an average score of 4.59 (on a 1–6 scale; 6 being the highest), and none disagreeing entirely.

Chart 3: MANDATE

Postulate: “The SLMM mandate in the CFA was an adequate framework directing the SLMM operations.”

As shown in fig. 3, the monitors clearly consider the CFA an adequate framework, with only about one fourth of the respondents disagreeing.

Chart 4: PURPOSE

Question: “To my understanding, monitoring entails the following:”

As shown in fig. 4, the monitors (who could choose more than one option), are clearly consistent in considering observation (99.3%), reporting (99.3%), analysis (88.2%) and registration (86.3%) key features of (field) monitoring, whereas ‘intervention’ and ‘enforcement’ received the lowest scores.

2: GOVERNING THE MISSION

The SLMM was established by the Parties to the CFA, through the Agreement – which was the outcome of a Peace Process facilitated by the Royal Norwegian Government, which was asked by the Parties to serve as Facilitator. However, the CFA did not prescribe any governing structure (body) for the SLMM, and the issue of who ‘owned’ the mission was to quite an extent a matter of perception.

- In the opinion of the monitors; who ‘owned’ the SLMM?
- In the opinion of the monitors; what sort of body should have governed the SLMM?

Chart 5: OWNERSHIP

Postulate: “The following actor(s) owned the SLMM:”

As shown in fig. 5, the monitors (who could choose more than one option), are not entirely consistent in their perception, although there is a clear tendency towards placing the ownership in the Nordic countries and/or Norway (also serving as Facilitator).

Chart 6: GOVERNANCE

Postulate: “During the operation, the SLMM should have been directed by:”

As shown in fig. 6, the monitors indicate no clear preference: although the options ‘the Facilitator’ and ‘the Nordic co-sponsors’ receive high scores, there is an almost equally large disagreement, while the options ‘the Parties’ and ‘the Co-Chairs’ are favoured by only about one in five. The idea of an unspecified ‘governing board’ is favoured by 40.4% of the respondents answering the question.

3: MANAGING THE MISSION

The SLMM was assigned by the CFA, where some operational tasks are specified, others indicated – and the entire Agreement interpreted by the HOM in order to define and decide on operational priorities. Primarily, the SLMM was established to assist the Parties, not least contributing towards the restoration of normalcy, which largely had to be founded on trust, building confidence between the Parties, a process in which the mission carried out extensive liaising, facilitating dialogue. Executing its operation, the mission furthermore had to adapt to changing environments, in order to achieve its (rather undefined) objectives.

- In the opinion of the monitors; which were the main partners of the SLMM?
- In the opinion of the monitors; was the SLMM instrumental in building trust?
- In the opinion of the monitors; what did the SLMM do vs. what it should have done?
- In the opinion of the monitors; was the SLMM able to adapt to the changing environment?
- In the opinion of the monitors; what did the SLMM achieve vs. what it should have achieved?




Fig 1: Setting

The SLMM as an organisation had sufficient understanding of the setting in which it operated




Fig 2: Purpose

To my understanding, the SLMM had a consistent understanding of its purpose




Fig 3: The mandate as a tool

The SLMM mandate in the CFA was an adequate framework directing the SLMM operations




Fig 4: Purpose

To my understanding, monitoring entails the following




Fig 5: Organisation

The following actor(s) owned the SLMM




Fig 6: Governance

During the operation, the SLMM should have been directed by




Fig 7: Relations

The following actors were important partners of the SLMM




Fig 8: Dialogue

The SLMM was instrumental in building trust between the Parties





Fig 9: Ability

The SLMM was supposed to



The SLMM was able to




Fig 10: Adaptability

The SLMM was able to adapt to the changing conflict situation in a relevant manner




Fig 11: Achievements

During my deployment, the SLMM achievements were significantly valuable in the Peace Process




Fig 12: Achievements

The SLMM key achievements were to




Chart 7: RELATIONS

Postulate: “The following actors were important partners of the SLMM:”

As shown in fig. 7, the monitors (who could choose more than one option), are overwhelmingly consistent in pointing at the Parties and the Facilitator as key partners (whereas the Parties were not considered a favoured option as potential governing body, cf. chart 6). Additionally, the Nordic recruitment agencies received a high score.

Chart 8: DIALOGUE

Postulate: “The SLMM was instrumental in building trust between the Parties.”

As shown in fig. 8, the monitors hold a fairly firm belief in the SLMM’s role as contributor to building trust through liaising and dialogue, with almost three thirds (72.8%) agreeing.

Questioned on which dialogue activities the SLMM did perform during the operation, and on which activities the mission should have performed, responses notably indicate that the SLMM should have engaged much more in arranging direct dialogue between officials from the Parties, both on a local and national level, including specifically a higher degree of dialogue between the HOM and the top leadership. Likewise, respondents indicate that there should have been a more extensive liaison between the SLMM and the SCOPP. (Tables are found on the SLMM web site.)

Chart 9: ABILITY

Postulate: “The SLMM was supposed to: / The SLMM was able to:”

As shown in fig. 9, the monitors clearly indicate that the capability of the mission to perform key tasks were inadequate, comparing their responses on what the mission was supposed to do, vs. what, in their opinion, the mission was able to (measured by average scores on a 1–6 scale).

Notably, there is a clear discrepancy on the issue/task of verifying all incidents and complaints, which 67.8% consider that the SLMM was supposed to do, whilst only 26.1% fully agreed that the mission actually was able to carry out this specific task with the said ambition. (Complete tables are found on the SLMM web site.)

In another, related question, the monitors were asked on monitoring activities performed. Considering the contentious issue of human rights monitoring, it is to be noted that 66.0% of the respondents believed the SLMM, during their deployment period, was ‘reviewing the human rights violations’; at the same time, 72.7% answered that the SLMM should have performed this task. (Complete tables are found on the SLMM web site.)

Chart 10: ADAPTABILITY

Postulate: “The SLMM was able to adapt to the changing conflict situation in a relevant manner.”

As shown in fig. 10, a clear majority of the monitors (67.1%) holds the opinion that the SLMM had the adequate ability to adapt.

Chart 11–12: ACHIEVEMENTS

Postulate: “During my deployment, the SLMM achievements were significantly valuable to the Peace Process.”

As shown in fig. 11, a clear majority of the monitors agrees to the significance of the SLMM towards the ongoing Peace Process; over twice as many agreed, as those disagreeing.

Postulate: “The SLMM achievements were to:”

As shown in fig. 12, when asked as to the achievements of the SLMM, the respondents ranked three activities/areas clearly on top, with ‘solving disputes at the lowest level possible’ – entirely in accordance with the stipulation of the CFA – ranking highest.

Questioned on which achievements the SLMM should have seen, compared to what they were perceived to be, it is noteworthy that the highest differences – which could be interpreted as perceived shortcomings – are on the other two activities/areas ranking highest, i.e. ‘build confidence between the Parties’ and ‘assist the Parties to restore normalcy’. Whereas 75.0% found that confidence-building was a key achievement, 89.7% thought it should have been a key achievement. Likewise, 72.3% found that assisting in restoring normalcy was a key achievement, whilst 85.5% thought it should have been. (Tables are found on the SLMM web site.)

APPENDIX 11:

External Considerations

During the course of the operations, various considerations and recommendations regarding the SLMM were presented, mainly from concerned international organisations, partly from researchers, partly from actors partaking in the Peace Process; certainly by the political sphere and civil society in Sri Lanka.

In general, the presence of the *Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)* received considerable attention – nationally as well as internationally – throughout the entire operational period. In Sri Lanka, the mission soon came under criticism, especially from those parts of the local political environment that were opposed to the *Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)* and what was considered political concessions to the *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)* in the first place, including members of what became the new *Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL)*, the other Party to the Agreement, after the 2004 elections. Such sentiments were seconded by substantial parts of the Sinhalese media, while pro-LTTE organisations and media took on a more supportive stance towards the Peace Process, the CFA and the SLMM.

The SLMM was a visible and vocal part of the Peace Process, facing considerable expectations from various stakeholders as to its activities and achievements. Comments – commends and criticism, demands and appreciations – were voiced from a wide range of interested parties, as well as from the prime stakeholders, i.e. the Parties and the Facilitator.

For the purpose of complementing the mission’s own account, as presented in this report, a compilation of opinions and expressions regarding the SLMM, relevant to the topics covered in the report – regarding both the organisation and the operations – has been included in this appendix.

Considering the scope and size of this document, the selection has been narrowed down to international sources mainly, as a representative survey covering Sri Lankan stakeholders, particularly political parties, civil society organisations and media outlets would simply be too extensive. However, opinions voiced from these quarters were well known to the SLMM, and are still possible traceable.

PRIME STAKEHOLDERS

SLMM’s main stakeholders were the *Parties to the CFA* and the *Facilitator of the Peace Process*, with whom the mission enjoyed both a formal and regular relationship.

The Parties belonged to the domestic political scene on Sri Lanka, with a number of political parties and interest groups obviously being preoccupied with the Peace Process as well as the monitoring mission. Whereas one Party to the CFA, the LTTE, remained homogenous in its opinion on the SLMM throughout the operational period, this was not quite the case with the other Party, as the composition of the GOSL changed with the parliamentary elections in 2004, when opponents of the signing of the CFA came to power.

The Facilitator was synonymous with the Royal Norwegian Government (RNG), which was chosen by the Parties to act in this capacity, and subsequently was asked to set up the SLMM and to appoint its Head of Mission (HOM), as soon as the CFA became a reality. Furthermore, the RNG – and the other Nordic governments – were asked to contribute towards financing and manning the mission, the RNG taking upon itself to coordinate the activities of the Nordic co-sponsors. Although there was a change of government also on the Norwegian side during the process (2005), this hardly influenced the role of the RNG as Facilitator.

Norway was also a member of the informal Co-Chairs group, with whom the SLMM did not have any formal or direct relations. The *Co-Chairs* however, demonstrated a keen interest in the SLMM operation as part of the Peace Process, and repeatedly expressed its support of the mission.

Please also see the 'Annual Review' articles in Part 02 for comments from key stakeholders

The Parties

Created by the Parties themselves, the SLMM continued to enjoy the formal endorsement of both the GOSL and the LTTE, until the former abrogated the CFA, with the withdrawal of the mission as a consequence. Although the support from the GOSL towards the SLMM – after the change of cabinet following the 2004 election, and the change of president resulting from the 2005 election – became more wary, the existence of the mission was not formally challenged.

At times expressing their appreciations of the SLMM, both Parties – throughout the operational period – also voiced their criticism of the mission, just as often in public, when this suited their purpose, as directed directly with the HOM. Otherwise, regular meetings and irregular contact between the SLMM and the Parties, on the highest levels, served as a conduit for exchanging opinions. The Parties would also raise issues pertaining the mission with the Facilitator. Naturally, the Parties also tried to exercise their influence on the mission during formal and informal channels and means, as well as to use SLMM information and statements to support respective claims.

Further details on the ongoing relations between the SLMM and the respective Party are found in Part 02 of this report.

The Facilitator

Established with the extensive assistance of the Facilitator, the SLMM received its explicit backing – voiced by the Norwegian government in Oslo and through the Norwegian embassy in Colombo – all throughout the operation.

Externally, the Facilitator supported the SLMM rather unconditionally. For example, on the occasion of the five years anniversary of the signing of the CFA, Norway's minister for International Development, and former Special Envoy, Erik Solheim expressed his high regard for the continued work of the SLMM. Likewise, Norway's Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Hans Brattskar said that the establishment and work of the SLMM was a notable success of the CFA: "The SLMM, working with the parties and the civilian population, has managed to prevent many potential conflicts. In addition, it has played an important role in shedding light on issues that would otherwise have been hidden". The Ambassador added his conviction that SLMM's cooperation with the Parties "has prevented much violence, and prevented the escalation of many dangerous situations", and that it continued its 'valuable work' in 2007.

Internally, the Facilitator would logically engage in exchanges of opinion on the affairs of the mission, including the way the operation was carried out, and – like the Parties, albeit more subtly – at times opt to exert influence on the mission, e.g. at a time on its media policy. This was done through regular channels of communication and reporting established between the mission, principally the HOM, and the RNG.

More details on the relations between the SLMM and the Facilitator (as well as the Nordic co-sponsors and the Co-Chairs), including statements on the mission, are found in Part 02 of this report, as well as being touched upon in the HOM's 'Report & Reflection' article.

PUBLIC STAKEHOLDERS

There were a number of public stakeholders to the Peace Process as well as to the monitoring mission, domestically and internationally. Not least organisations serving as watch-dogs with regards to conflicts and towards governments – and keeping an eye on instruments such as the SLMM – took an interest in developments on Sri Lanka, and interacted with the mission.

From these quarters, the SLMM was criticised not least for perceived shortcomings, and at times being accused of not dealing thoroughly with a major issue such as human rights violations. At the same time, it was commended for its contributions towards the return to normalcy. Human rights organisations in particular were lucid in arguing that the SLMM should take on a broader approach, recommending this in several reports and letters.

By the termination of the operation in 2008, and the subsequent compilation of this report, few studies had yet been made on the Peace Process and on the SLMM; none had yet cov-

ered the entire CFA-period and SLMM operation. Some academic articles had been written, and research was going on. An external evaluation on Norway's peace efforts in Sri Lanka, including the SLMM, was commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 2010.

Comments

On facilitating and monitoring:

Notably, in his background paper with case studies, 'Mechanisms for monitoring ceasefire and peace agreements' prepared for a workshop in Geneva in 2003, *Toby Porter* of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), states that "The characteristic that distinguished the SLMM from other ceasefire monitoring missions is its close relationship to the facilitation efforts".

The close connection between the Facilitator and the monitoring instrument is also noted by professor *John S. Moolakkattu* in his article "Peace Facilitation by Small States – Norway in Sri Lanka", published in the journal 'Cooperation and Conflict' in 2005, pointing at the fact that this close – real or perceived – connection – could backfire: "Although the other Scandinavian states also participate in the SLMM, blame for ceasefire violations is always directed at Norway, which has not responded publicly so far. Norway has to ensure that the various activities undertaken are coordinated to have the maximum effect on the peace process." From their point of view, five academics, *Tyrol Ferdinands, Kumar Rupesinghe, Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, Jayadeva Uyangoda, and Norbert Ropers*, in the joint paper 'The Sri Lankan Peace Process at a Crossroads', from 2004, points at "the possibility of the Norwegian leadership of the SLMM bringing their country into conflicts of interest with their role as the facilitator for the peace negotiations".

In her paper 'Nordic Peace Monitoring in Sri Lanka: The SLMM and Perceptions about the Dual Role of Norway', presented to a workshop on Nordic involvement in Sri Lanka's Peace Process, at the University of Uppsala in January 2009, *Kristine Höglund* explores how the work of the SLMM was influenced by the linkage to the Facilitator, questioning whether the dual role of Norway conflicts with the work carried out by the SLMM – or if it rather strengthened the mission; all considered from the point of view of the monitors. Noting that the SLMM was an independent organisation, yet still closely linked to the Peace Process and the Facilitator in different ways, Höglund finds – based on research among former monitors – that "a linkage between a monitor mission and a peace facilitator is not necessarily of negative consequence, but can in fact be beneficial from the point of view of the monitors". A negative influencing aspect is the confusion caused by close linkages concerning the independence of the mission in relation to the Facilitator, also explained by perceived difficulties in explaining the mandate. A clear positive linkage between the SLMM and Norway was related to the financial and diplomatic backing of the Norwegian

government; another was the ability to carry out the mandate – with close communications facilitating a quick response to crises which had the potential to escalate. Concluding, although she notes that many of the monitors themselves saw the dual role of Norway as problematic, which corresponds with findings in previous studies on the mission, Höglund at the same time points to “the complementarity of monitoring missions and peace facilitation and how the collaboration between the two functions is beneficial to peace promotion”.

On authority and ability:

In her article ‘Whose Mission? Limits and Potentials of the SLMM’ (‘In lines’, August 2004 issue), the Norwegian political scientist *Ingrid Samset* points out that the SLMM “exists at the mercy of the two parties”, arguing that the ‘most dysfunctional’ part of the SLMM setup as “the fact that the instigator of the bulk of violations of people’s rights also is a prime stakeholder in the mechanism...”. “For Sri Lanka’s people to be protected, at least from gross human rights violations,” Samset writes, “mechanisms must be put in place that are less dependent on appeasing the violators – be it the LTTE or Sri Lanka’s government”.

The legal authority and operational means of the SLMM were limited. As *Jonathan Goodhand* and *Bart Klem* state in their 2005 report ‘Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000–2005’: “The SLMM did not have a peacekeeping mandate nor the means to enforce compliance with the terms of the CFA. In this sense, the SLMM is fundamentally different from the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), whose mandate was armed peace enforcement. Yet in terms of achieving its core mandate of helping support the ceasefire arrangements over the last three years, it has been more successful than the IPKF. Nevertheless, there have been numerous flaws, many of which are inherent to the ceasefire arrangements.”

The 2006 issue of the ‘Annual Review of Global Peace Operations’ (covering 2005), a project of the New York University’s *Center on International Cooperation*, noted that the SLMM “operated without enforcement authority in an environment where agreements are flagrantly violated”.

The *International Crisis Group (ICG)* also touched upon the mandate issue. In its November 2006 report ‘Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process’, it notes that “The SLMM was always hampered by a mandate that could be variously interpreted. A maximalist interpretation suggested it should investigate all human rights abuses in addition to straightforward CFA violations. The more minimalist approach it mostly adopted left it open to accusations of ignoring violations by the LTTE against other Tamil groups.” In its June 2007 report ‘Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis’, the ICG followed up by stating that the SLMM was given ‘no enforcement powers’ in the CFA, also noting that “its personnel were not trained or prepared to be human rights monitors”.

Still, a key reflection from *Liam Mahoney* of the HD, in his January 2006 confidential report, ‘Observations on strengthening the civilian protection aspects of the work of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission’, submitted to the HOM, is ‘the need for a more pro-active and rigorous approach to hostilities against civilians’, noting that “SLMM is not occupying the political space that is available”. With what he considers a ‘very broad mandate’ within ‘a powerful agreement’, the SLMM appeared to have chosen “an unnecessarily passive approach to this mandate,” Mahoney states. “The mission is not making use of the many tools available to a monitoring mission to achieve its objectives, even though it is not prevented from using these tools by the CFA. The mission has made many self-constraining decisions about its role and activities.” This ‘minimalist approach’, Mahoney considers, “is an invitation to the parties to constrain it”.

Dealing with the question of authority in the context of its rulings, the *Swedish Embassy in Colombo*, in an internal assessment of the SLMM made in May 2008, notes that “Throughout its lifetime, the SLMM was aggressively accused by both parties for bias in its rulings and for not being able to ensure CFA compliance. But this is nonsense. The SLMM ruled on the basis of circumstantial evidence, and it was not mandated to ensure CFA compliance which would have required an international law enforcement authority that none of the parties ever wanted the SLMM to have”, adding that “The SLMM’s mandate was broadly interpreted on the basis of the full CFA text to include investigation of 37 types of CFA-violations, including crimes under Sri Lankan and international law such as abduction, assault and assassination. This points at the tremendously difficult task of the SLMM to investigate and assign responsibility for a massive number of such crimes without the authority, budget and equipment normally associated with international policing efforts or with special mandates such as those of the UNICEF and the ICRC”.

Referring to the preamble of the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) (“It is, however understood that the effect of the SLMM will depend on the parties’ willingness to abide with recommendations from the SLMM”), *Toby Porter* in his 2003 background paper states that “For this reason, the SLMM has been described as more of a ‘consensual management enterprise’ than an enforcement mechanism”, depending on the consent of the parties to the Agreement. “The lack of enforcement mechanisms, other than the commitment of the parties to abide by its decisions, is both a strength and a weakness,” Porter considers.

Another aspect, additional to the issue of formal authority, was the SLMM’s ability to carry out its assignment in full. In its September 2007 testimony to the European Parliament (‘Return to War: Human Rights Under Siege’), the *Human Rights Watch (HRW)* states that ‘the difficult task’ of the SLMM “has been made

impossible” due to the government’s denial of access to areas where incidents took place. Also, the organisation notes that “both the government and LTTE have frequently failed to act on recommendations of the SLMM”.

On capability and impact:

Tasked by the SLMM to contribute observations on the civilian protection aspects of its work, *Liam Mahoney*, drawing on experiences from other conflicts when looking into the case of Sri Lanka and the SLMM, found that “the impact of a monitoring presence is closely related to its visibility and proximity to the abuses it might help to deter”. Referring to the words of a military spokesperson, if the monitoring presence is close by, “It creates this guilty feeling that ‘the monitors might catch us’” – reporting persons to their superiors. “Such a fear should have a significant deterrent impact,” Mahoney considers, adding: “But this impact requires that potential perpetrators are constantly aware of the monitoring mission’s presence, and of the possibility that what they do may be witnessed.” This dynamic, argues Mahoney, calls for a larger presence, allowing for greater visibility, with wider geographic deployment and more frequent visits to communities as well as to various levels of both sides’ military commands.

In his HD-report from 2006, ‘Proactive Presence. Field strategies for civilian protection’, *Liam Mahoney* makes a clear point of the value of being visible, devoting an entire chapter to the issue; ‘Conscious visibility’. Noting that part of the protection message is simply visual, he points to the importance of a mission’s presence through regional and local offices, emphasizing that “a mission should visibly project both political power and moral authority”.

In the opinion of *Liam Mahoney*, the monitoring presence has important local impacts, “and could have more”. The most positive feedback he received about the role of the SLMM was related to its active local role in responding to localized situations and tensions that posed a risk of escalation. “The SLMM’s willingness to create and facilitate local dialogue opportunities in situations of rising tensions between Tamil and Muslim communities in the Trinco and Battar regions was highly praised”. Yet, criticism was voiced when the SLMM was unresponsive or too far away, making Mahoney draw the conclusion that “the SLMM is perceived to have a positive impact, and could have greater local impact if it were able to be deployed more widely, and to respond to and follow up on more of the local situations that arise. This requires additional human resources”.

In many conflicts such local impact, Mahoney notes, have proved to be one of the crucial added values of an international mission: the presence of an outside party can defuse a situation of escalating tension, and create neutral spaces in which local parties can look for local solutions. “SLMM has been able to do this in many situations, and could do more”.

Toby Porter of the HD, in 2003 pointed at the limited size of the SLMM as a notable constraint; “Less than 50 monitors to cover the entire country” – arguing that the mission was unable to deal with all incidents in a satisfactory way, which again negatively impacted on public perception. Regarding this issue, he also points to a dilemma: “The SLMM has been criticized for frequently not making clear judgements, yet were they to set precedents by making rulings based on unsubstantiated assumptions the potential damage to the peace process could be far greater”, adding that: “Such constraints have contributed to the most serious and enduring criticism of the SLMM, namely that it has failed to maintain its impartiality when reporting on ceasefire violations”.

In its August 2003 briefing paper ‘Political Killings During the Ceasefire’, the HRW states that lacking a capability for ‘police-style criminal investigations’, there is currently no way for the SLMM to conduct adequate inquiries”.

In its report, ‘The Failure of the Peace Process’, the ICG also touches upon the effect on the ground issue: “The SLMM seems often to have been effective on the field aspect, intervening in informal negotiation among the parties in difficult situations.”

On transparency and response:

A frequent concern heard by Liam Mahoney when looking into the SLMM in 2005, investigating his 2006 report to the HOM, was about the transparency of the mission, frustration being expressed over uncertainty as what happened to the information given to the monitors. “All felt that a better system of reporting back to complainants and keeping civilians informed of activities and results would increase the legitimacy and trust of SLMM in the field.” Particularly, Mahoney notes, individual complainants were frustrated that “they never hear back about their own case, and therefore lose faith that SLMM listened to them”.

Jonathan Goodhand and Bart Klem argue that there was a tension between the two principle tasks of the SLMM: “It’s reporting role – not only to the Norwegians and the parties, but also to the wider public – demands a level of transparency. Even though the monitors cannot enforce compliance, one might expect them to be able to exert leverage by “naming and shaming” in the event of violations. On the other hand, their conflict mediation role demands a low key and pragmatic approach”.

In its internal assessment of the SLMM of May 2008, the *Swedish Embassy in Colombo* notes that “For the family victims of various human rights abuses, the overwhelmingly dominant types of CFA-violations, the SLMM was itself of little help since it had no tracing or follow up mandate. Still, its facilitation of contacts with the UNICEF and the ICRC was presumably helpful to many such victims”.

As a main feature, and a major difference from previous peace efforts in Sri Lanka, Kristine Höglund and Isak Svensson in their paper to the 9th International Conference on Sri Lanka Studies in 2003, ‘Risking Peace: Comparing Mistrust-Reducing Strategies in the Sri Lankan Peace process’ point to the establishment of the SLMM: The SLMM, they note “increased the transparency by monitoring, reporting and spreading information about the activities of the parties on the ground” – standing “in stark contrast” with the role of third parties in 1994/95”, and the cessation of hostilities agreement of the time.

On credibility and opportunities:

The capability and capacity of the SLMM was limited by several factors, including the CFA and its provisions, as well as the mission’s own resources. Still, several commentators draw attention to the relative success of the mechanism, at the same time pointing at inherent opportunities, which, however most likely necessitated a revision or a re-interpretation of the Agreement and its implicit mandate to be fulfilled.

Remarking that “to the extent that there has been a ceasefire for more than three years,” Goodhand and Klem argue that the SLMM should be considered successful, “having helped defuse incidents and maintain the commitment of the key protagonists to the ceasefire”. “However,” they add, “under the guise of a ceasefire, the permissive conditions have been created for pervasive human rights abuses and criminality”, a situation being complicated by the emergence of the Karuna faction. “The credibility of the CFA and its monitors has become increasingly tenuous, as the number and intensity of the violations increase.” Goodhand and Klem add that “Arguably, a broader mandate and greater operational capacities could enable the SLMM to play a more effective role in monitoring and maintaining the ceasefire”. They also hold the opinion that, with a stronger mandate to carry out investigations, the mission might have played a role in “counteracting the culture of impunity”. On the other hand, they continue, referring to Ingrid Samset, “the SLMM’s lack of “sticks” may facilitate cooperation between the parties, as they regard the mission less as a threat than an opportunity to improve their own image and credibility,” adding that the mission did “successfully defuse several incidents that could have escalated without the presence of the SLMM”.

A notable consideration made by Liam Mahoney, regards the understanding and legitimacy of the SLMM in the civilian population in the context of security. The understanding of the SLMM in the civilian population, he considers “full of misinformation and mistrust”, and consequently the mission “cannot count on much protection from the civilian community, as it should be able to do”. Otherwise, he points out, “a positive legitimacy within the civilian population is one of the greatest inhibitions against attacking a mission”.

CRITICISM

Re neutrality and perceptions:

In its 2006 report, ‘The Failure of the Peace Process’, the ICG touches upon the issue of neutrality, noting that whereas the SLMM seems to have been effective on the ground, “It has been less successful overall in developing an aura of neutrality. This may be inevitable in such an environment but it has not always helped itself with a short-sighted media strategy.” Furthermore, the group added that “One structural mistake was to have the SLMM and the Norwegian facilitation so closely linked”.

“From the very outset of the peace process, the neutrality of the third parties – Norway and the SLMM – has been a contested issue”, Kristine Höglund and Isak Svensson state in a 2008 article. The very title of the article in the ‘International Negotiations Journal’ indicates some of the dilemma: “‘Damned if You Do, and Damned if You Don’t’: Nordic Involvement and Images of Third-Party Neutrality in Sri Lanka”. Discussing the role of a third-party actor striving to stay neutral in a situation of asymmetry between the parties, and the strong emphasis placed on the balance of power between the Parties to the CFA from the SLMM HOM, the researchers point at the fact that positions taken – bearing in mind that the Parties had accorded the HOM ‘the final authority’ to interpret the CFA – easily came under criticism from either or the Parties, illustrated by two cases:

One major controversy arose over the position of the LTTE Sea Tigers, which came to involve the SLMM on a policy as well as operational level: The territorial waters were not included in the CFA, neither was the Sea Tigers, which however was a de facto force of one of the Parties at the time of entering the Agreement, and consequently, an element of the existing balance of power. “Although both parties had maritime capacities, only one side’s forces were recognized”, Höglund and Svensson point out; “Hence, a basic problem was that the de facto balance of power was not reflected in the agreement, resulting in an asymmetry of recognition”. The SLMM, they continue held the position that the CFA relied on a balance of forces, a balance important to maintain in order for the agreement to be durable and stable. Despite the fact that the maritime aspect is not included in the CFA, the two researchers argue that “the idea seems to have been central to the conceptual thinking of the Norwegian mediators and the SLMM”.

This interpretation, they deliberate is to quite a degree substantiated by the attempts of the HOM – on the explicit request of the Parties – to develop modalities to regulate the existence and activities of the Sea Tigers in 2003, which eventually backfired when the proposal was heavily criticised by key actors within the media, the navy and the opposition, and notably: the Sri Lankan President. As such, it was not merely a criticism of the HOM; it was part of the ongoing power struggle in the political elite, including the one between the President

and the Prime Minister, who held diverse stands on the LTTE and the CFA. Conclusively, Höglund and Svensson argue that it was “urgent to address one of the limitations of the cease-fire agreement, namely that it did not regulate the interactions between the Sea Tigers and the Sri Lanka Navy. Yet, once the SLMM tried to address this issue, these proposals were seen as biased and the SLMM was severely criticized”.

Toby Porter uses the challenges connected to sea monitoring as an example to demonstrate that the SLMM, like other ceasefire monitoring missions, “has suffered from ambiguity or vagueness in the original MoU, which the mission describes as its ‘bible’”. This was essentially true with regard to the LTTE Sea Tigers”. Noting that “the politicised environment in the South made recognition of the Sea Tigers in the original agreement impossible”, Porter argues that this “seriously damaged the reputation of the SLMM”.

(*Toby Porter* also points to the assumption, at the time, that the LTTE was believed to be the only non-state actor in the world possessing a genuine naval force, and that during the negotiations leading up to the CFA, the RNG consulted with the United Nations to determine whether there was any guiding precedent on the issue; “They found none”.)

Another major controversy regarded the High Security Zones (HSZ), which held a humanitarian as well as a security dimension, and which was one of the issues causing distrust between the Parties to evolve, and the peace talks in 2003 to falter. In line with the HOM’s perception that the balance of forces was the foundation of the CFA, it was the strategy of the SLMM to avoid measures that would risk this balance. Consequently, Höglund and Svensson write, the SLMM considered the dismantling of the HSZ’s “as a tool for changing the balance of power on the ground”. Therefore, the mission argued against this major issue raised by the LTTE – and as a result, drawing harsh criticism, this time from the Tigers. The authors’ assessment is that the SLMM, in the case of the HSZ’s, was not prepared “to suggest or endorse any measures that would jeopardize the status quo, although such measures could be seen as part of the normalization process stipulated in the cease-fire agreement”. Thus, they continue, “the importance of preserving the balance of forces overrode other objectives” in the CFA; a position that gave rise to considerable criticism from the LTTE, “and this time the SLMM was considered as biased in the sense that it took a position that was not considered favourable for the LTTE”.

According to Höglund and Isaksson, the SLMM and the Facilitator both failed to create the sought image of neutrality (“despite their efforts”), and suggest this to be explained by “the inherent asymmetrical context in which the third parties acted”. Holding the position that the ceasefire relied on a balance of forces between the two Parties, the SLMM was con-

fronted with opposition from at least one of the Parties when this very balance was challenged, still insisting that it was important to maintain it. In the eye of an inherently divided population and deeply rooted animosity between the Parties, the SLMM was inevitably accused of not being neutral, but biased – towards either the LTTE or the GOSL, depending on your basic position. Höglund/Isaksson find that “although the SLMM has generally been acting according to its mandate and has been acting even-handedly when it comes to the reporting and rulings of cease-fire violations, this led to accusations of bias”. Their study finds “no clear-cut bias in favour of one or the other side”, and they point at the fact that both Parties criticised the SLMM – also for favouring the other part. In certain circumstances, the researchers state, the third parties “were caught between accusations of biasness and inefficiency” – such as in the case of the controversy over the status of the Sea Tigers.

Clearly, the issue of neutrality is an issue of perception; how the SLMM was perceived by the different stakeholders, which again largely reflects how it was portrayed in the public, not least through the influence of media. In the opinion of Höglund and Isaksson, “The highly politicized media in Sri Lanka has clearly contributed to a negative perception of the SLMM and Norway, through inflammatory and often-times inaccurate reporting about the third parties’ activities”.

In his case study from 2003, *Toby Porter* of the HD considers the failure to maintain impartiality when reporting on ceasefire violations as the most “serious and enduring criticism of the SLMM”, attributed to a lack of clear judgments, making rulings based on “unsubstantiated assumptions” – with the potential to damage the Peace Process.

Re the role of Norway:

Höglund and Svensson point to the fact that the somewhat confusing connection between the Norwegian Facilitator and the Norwegian-led mission did not make the issue clearer or easier for the mission, noting that “while the SLMM and the Norwegian mediators in principle work independently of each other, the perception of the two is commonly confused”. The Swedish researchers relate the issue of bias also to the multi-faceted role of Norway related to the SLMM: “The fact that the Norwegian mediators were responsible for appointing the head of the SLMM, and that the Norwegians formed an important part of the mission, meant that the mediators had a greater risk of being accused of biasness.”

In their 2009 article ‘Mediating between tigers and lions: Norwegian peace diplomacy in Sri Lanka’s civil war’, published in ‘Contemporary South Asia’, Höglund and Svensson comment that by composing the mission with monitors only from the Nordic countries, including Norway, “an awkward situation was created, in that Norway was acting as both a mediator, and an

observer of the peace process implementation”, with one consequence being that many Sri Lankans did not recognise the SLMM as being separate from the mediation effort. This, however, was not the making of the Norwegian government, which wanted a monitoring mechanism independent from it.

Jonathan Goodhand and *Bart Klem* also deal with the dual role of the Norwegian government, noting that “there is arguably a contradiction, at least in the public eye, of having Norway act as both a facilitator of the peace talks and a watchdog of the ceasefire”, especially as far as the distinction, which may have been clear to the Norwegians, was not appreciated in Sri Lanka, and especially in the South, where the two processes “are frequently conflated”.

(At the same time it should be observed, as pointed out, i.a. by *Toby Porter* that the RNG was initially reluctant to take on the task of ceasefire monitoring, but “both parties remained adamant in their request, leaving the RNG no choice but to agree”, which then was mitigated by including nationals from the other Nordic countries into the SLMM.)

Re human rights monitoring:

The SLMM did not have an explicit mission assignment covering the monitoring of human rights abuses, and did not perform such monitoring and reporting per se. Not least human rights organisations, as well as academics and advisors, argued that the mission’s role regarding human rights monitoring and civilian protection was too limited. Discussing the SLMM mandate, *Liam Mahoney* in his confidential report to the HOM, argues that the SLMM could have, and should have, entered into more serious human rights monitoring, which could have been carried out under the mandate. I.a., he refers to the Sri Lankan population and the international community requiring a ‘thorough analysis’ from the SLMM on the “ongoing assassinations, as well as other recurring abuses, even if the level of evidence is insufficient to actually name the individual culprits”. According to Mahoney, CFA Article 2.1 “is in and of itself a powerful and irrefutable civilian protection mandate”. “The SLMM’s avoidance of openly taking on more transparently its mandate to deal with civilian protection concerns in one of the greatest sources of disillusionment and frustration in Sri Lanka with the SLMM,” Mahoney writes.

Alan Keenan, since 2006 the Sri Lanka Project Director and Senior Analyst of the ICG, in his March 2006 comment “Building a Democratic Middle Ground – Professional Civil Society and the Politics of Human Rights in Sri Lanka’s Peace Process”, notes that the response by the various parties involved in the Peace Process to violations so far had been very weak, including from the SLMM: “While the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was expected by many to act as a de facto human rights monitor, this is a role that the SLMM is neither comfortable with nor well equipped to undertake. In addition to

the lack of any enforcement mechanism for its rulings, the SLMM has repeatedly made clear that it views its mandate as preserving the cease-fire agreement – even if this means ignoring or downplaying human rights violations”.

Furthermore, Keenan touches upon the uncooperative stance of the Parties, not least the LTTE, and its unwillingness to act on SLMM’s rulings, particularly with respect to the forcible recruitment of child soldiers, noting that “its rulings have been largely ineffectual”, adding that the Tigers obstructed the work of the SLMM by denying monitors access to its training camps and to its “well-known but hidden prisons”. As time went by, Keenan observes, “it became increasingly clear that none of the parties – not the government, not the Tigers, not the Norwegians, the SLMM, or the “international community” at large – had a very serious commitment to even the most basic of democratic and human rights”.

In their 2009 article ‘Mediating between tigers and lions’, *Kristine Höglund and Isak Svensson* also saw this as a flaw in the approach of the Facilitator, reflecting on the activities of the mission. They write that “the Norwegian mediators were seen as too lax in their responses to the human rights abuses committed, both by the government and the rebels”.

In its February 2006 report ‘A Climate of Fear in the East’, *Amnesty International (AI)* notes that “The Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) [...] has been unable to effectively address the worsening human rights situation in eastern Sri Lanka. The SLMM is mandated to receive and enquire into complaints about breaches of the CFA, including killings and abductions, with parties to the CFA. However it does not have a mandate to independently investigate these breaches and can therefore do little more than raise the complaint with the allegedly responsible party.”

Already in June 2002, AI met with the SLMM in Colombo, raising its ‘major concerns’ about the mission’s work, including the issue of anonymity connected with the role of the Local Monitoring Committees (LMC), fearing harassment of complainants.

From 2002, *HRW* commented on the role of the SLMM on a number of occasions, arguing that the mission was “authorized to monitor the violation of international law”, but did not fully carry out this task. In its August 2003 briefing paper ‘Political Killings During the Ceasefire’, it states that the SLMM interpreted its mandate ‘narrowly’, furthermore that it “has not reported publicly on apparent political killings by the LTTE,” claiming that “No substantial investigation of most of these cases has even been attempted”. In its November 2004 report ‘Living in Fear’ (on child soldiers and the LTTE), *HRW* argues that child recruitment was “clearly within the terms of their mandate”. Here, the organisation also refers to interviews made with SLMM monitors, finding that “child recruit-

ment is not treated consistently as a priority”, however also quoting a monitor in Trincomalee stating “I don’t see child recruitment as anything to do with peace”.

In its June 2007 report ‘Sri Lanka’s Humanitarian Crisis’, the *ICG* argues that “Initially, the SLMM was reluctant to highlight or pursue investigations into political assassinations and intimidation of civilians, despite the CFA’s clear prohibition of these activities. By the time this began to change, it was too late. The SLMM had already let itself look weak and, to many Sri Lankans, biased in favour of the LTTE”.

With the abrogation of the CFA and withdrawal of the SLMM, the global network *Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict*, in its April 2008 report ‘No Safety No Escape’ argues that “Today, the establishment of an independent human rights monitoring system is more critical than ever since the recent dissolution of the cease-fire agreement and the subsequent withdrawal of the Nordic-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM).”

Re the SLMM and the LTTE:

Connected to its approach to monitoring the human rights situation and reporting human rights violations, the SLMM was not least criticized for, as *Toby Porter* puts it, “its failure to take a more firm position with the LTTE for its continuing human rights abuses”, and – even more so – on the question of political killings, where “the SLMM has consistently declined to investigate a series of what are almost universally assumed to be assassinations by the LTTE of political opponents, designating them instead as matters for the police”. “The human rights issue has been exceptionally difficult for the SLMM,” *Porter* states.

In an article in ‘Civil Wars’ in 2005, *Kristina Höglund* of Uppsala University writes that “Norway and the SLMM have been severely criticised for not being harder on the LTTE, but have allowed the rebels to be involved in the peace process in spite of their continued violence and human rights abuses, without any repercussions. Indeed, the continued violence has seriously undermined the legitimacy of the SLMM. However, from the point of view of Norway as the facilitator to the peace talks, it is important to maintain a working relationship with the LTTE in order to be able to put constructive pressure on the rebels.”

The *ICG*, in its 2006 report ‘Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process’, refers to suggestions that “many of the LTTE political killings and suppression of alternative Tamil political groups were deliberately overlooked by the then government and the Norwegians,” adding that “This may be somewhat unfair – certainly SLMM offices were frequently able to intervene when complaints were made against the LTTE. But many people were afraid to complain, knowing that the SLMM would not be able to defend them. And overall there does seem to have been something of a blind eye to LTTE

excesses. “Don’t rock the peace boat”, was the slogan of the day. The SLMM claimed that civilian killings were not part of its mandate, and the government hardly commented on the growing impunity with which the LTTE suppressed all opposition within the Tamil community.”

Alan Keenan, at the time a fellow in peace and conflict studies, later senior analyst of the *ICR*, in the summer 2005 issue of the ‘Boston Review’, writes that parts of the government and large portions of the Sinhalese people “are disturbed by what they see as a pro-LTTE bias on the part of the Norwegian facilitators and Scandinavian-staffed cease-fire monitors (the SLMM). Both are accused of ignoring massive Tiger cease-fire violations, thus allowing the LTTE to increase its military strength and political domination of the north and east”.

The Norwegian political scientist *Ingrid Samset* argues in her 2004 ‘In lines’ article ‘Whose Mission?’, that there was “no evidence that suggests that the LTTE would turn its back against the SLMM or the ‘peace process’ had the monitors been tougher on them – simply because a harder line has not been tried out,” implying that the SLMM shunned away from criticising the Tigers.

COMMENTS

On prevention:

In his background paper to a MFA-hosted workshop in Geneva, in October 2003, *Toby Porter* comments that the SLMM had ‘considerable success’ on two levels: “Firstly, the presence of the SLMM has been instrumental in enabling the two parties to embark on a series of talks aiming at securing a lasting negotiated solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka. These talks, as was always expected, have been slow, and extremely complex. The monitors’ presence has allowed negotiations to proceed without confrontations derailing talks.” *Toby* further argues that “The quick arrival of SLMM monitors on the scene has successfully de-escalated a series of incidents that might well have led to a breakdown of the ceasefire. It is this kind of activity that explains why the SLMM see ‘conflict prevention’ as both their *raison d’être* and their *modus operandi* in Sri Lanka.” The second key achievement, in *Porter*’s opinion “has been the dramatic reduction in both military and civilian loss of life as a direct result of conflict, and an equally significant improvement in the humanitarian and human rights situation in large areas of Sri Lanka”.

In its 2008 assessment of the SLMM, the *Swedish Embassy in Colombo* notes that “It is widely believed that the SLMM’s presence in the conflict affected areas in the first years of the CFA had an important temporary preventive effect on human rights related violations”. Still, the embassy considers that “There is little or nothing, apart mainly from the temporary damper on LTTE’s recruitment and abduction crimes in 2004–2005, that suggests that the SLMM made the intended difference of restrained party behaviour and CFA stability. While this cannot be blamed on the SLMM,

whose difference always and necessarily was intimately linked to the parties' CFA commitment and compliance, the mentioned lack of priority and focus of the monitoring system hardly helped. A focus and priority on core case-fire violations, such as movement of military equipment, construction of new positions and offensive military action would possibly have been more effective in terms of CFA stability."

The Swedish embassy also notes that "There was always a mismatch between the SLMM and its mandate on the one hand, and local expectations and international perceptions on the other. For example, family members of victims of abductions often turned to the SLMM in the hope that they would get help, despite that the SLMM never could help proactively, and although it's interpreted mandate indeed covered such crimes. Similarly, the international community considered the CFA as much more stable and healthy in 2002–2004, when it in fact was massively violated, presumably because the CFA was basically associated with military action rather than human rights crimes."

On violence:

According to *Toby Porter's* assessment as of 2003, a major achievement of the SLMM, was its contribution towards "the dramatic reduction in both military and civilian loss of life as a direct result of conflict, and an equally significant improvement in humanitarian and human rights situations in large areas of Sri Lanka".

In 'Proactive Presence', *Liam Mahoney* argues that "An international field presence can guarantee costly consequences of some attacks. At best, the abuser will accurately foresee this cost and refrain from attacking civilians. Sri Lankan Army officials, for instance, affirmed that their men worry about being observed misbehaving in front of SLMM monitors, and most other observers concurred that the army had been very well-behaved since the monitors' arrival." In his field work, Mahoney notes, "respondents all over Sri Lanka concur that the SLMM presence can deter some violence and reduce misbehavior – and could claim credit for keeping the ceasefire alive".

On 18 January 2008, 21 leading *civil society organisations* in Sri Lanka, concerned about the abrogation of the CFA and the termination of the SLMM, issued a joint statement, saying "We regret that the role played by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) established under the CFA has also come to an end with the abrogation of the Ceasefire Agreement. Although the international monitors of the SLMM were unable to prevent all acts of war and human rights violations from taking place, we recognize that the SLMM was a crucial third party that was able to be physically present in the conflict zones, record incidents, and report them to the conflicting parties and the international community. The presence of the SLMM deterred further violence and violations and the SLMM's removal now puts the populations in both the North and the South more at risk."

On communication:

The *National Peace Council of Sri Lanka (NPC)*, in a press release of October 2004 comments that "At least part of the credit for the continuation of the ceasefire and the no-war situation should go to the Norwegian facilitators and the international monitors. The fact that lines of communication remained open between the government and LTTE due to their presence in the country has been a major factor in the sustenance of the ceasefire".

In their 2008 article, Höglund and Isaksson also point at this crucial role, "although the perception of partiality" in their opinion had undermined the legitimacy of Norway and the Nordics as a channel for "communication and dialogue between the belligerents". This, they ascribe to the fact that the Peace Process was elite-driven, and that "although storms of protests in the public arose against the Nordic third parties, the leadership of the belligerents continued to have confidence that the third parties could play a role". At the same time the elite was not coherent, and the rivalries affected the perception and performance of the SLMM. Pointing at the perceived increase in polarisation between the armed forces and the UNP government, especially regarding the Sea Tigers issue, Höglund and Isaksson writes that "In this sense, the Nordic third-party effort to some extent fell victim to the power division in Southern Sri Lanka. Also, the SLMM was drawn into these intra-party political battles, for instance, between the main Sinhalese antagonists President Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Wickremasinghe".

On information:

The information provided by the mission consisted of statistics, particularly on violations of the CFA, furthermore of reports regarding incidents – and other matters relevant to its mandate. In its report 'Complicit in Crime' from January 2007, *HRW* notes that "The only two organizations publicly keeping track [of boys and young men abducted and forcibly recruited by the Karuna group] are the Norwegian-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) and UNICEF". On its part, the UNICEF at times relied heavily on statistics provided by the SLMM.

Upon the termination of the SLMM operation, the *ICG*, in its February 2008 report 'Sri Lanka's return to war: Limiting the damage', writes that "The withdrawal of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission [...] meant the loss of one of the few remaining sources of information on what is happening in areas near the fighting". However, the *ICG* comments that the SLMM may not have "helped itself with a short-sighted media strategy."

In his 2006 report 'Proactive Presence', *Liam Mahoney* quotes one of the SLMM monitors in the field telling the tale: "The only threat we have is to show the statistics".

RECOMMENDATIONS

On human rights

In her article 'Whose Mission? Limits and Potentials of the SLMM', *Ingrid Samset* states

that, what she calls the 'military' monitoring conducted by the SLMM tended to be given higher priority than the monitoring of human rights violations, arguing: "Since rights monitoring does not deserve to come second, this tendency suggest that part of the monitoring be separated and taken up by another body than the SLMM."

In an open letter to the LTTE, the SLMM and the Sri Lanka police in August 2003, *AI* – expressing its "grave concern over the killing and abduction of tens of Sri Lankan citizens by the LTTE" since the signing of the CFA – called on these parties "to act in accordance with their individual responsibilities in order to stop these human rights abuses, and hold to account those responsible for these abuses". Furthermore, *AI* urged the SLMM "to react promptly and robustly, by conducting investigations into any incident involving the killing, abduction, torture or attack against any civilian by either of the parties to the Agreement. The SLMM should ensure it has enough resources and expertise to conduct such investigations thoroughly and promptly." Also, *AI* expressed concern about the security of witnesses: "The SLMM and police need to ensure at the earliest opportunity the systematic protection of witnesses involved in their investigations in order to guarantee their safety and facilitate the collection of evidence."

Commenting on the potential role of the SLMM regarding human rights monitoring in 2003, at the same time noting that "The human rights issue has been exceptionally difficult for the SLMM", *Toby Porter* writes that "There is no broad agreement that an alternative organization should take on the role of monitoring human rights, [...] independent not only from both parties but also from the peace negotiations".

A part of the way the *HRW* works, is to issue recommendations. Consequently, in November 2004 the organisation recommended to the SLMM, that it should 1) Actively and consistently monitor and report on child recruitment, in accordance with the cease-fire agreement's prohibition on intimidation, abduction, extortion, and harassment of the civilian population; 2) Regularly and consistently raise issues of child recruitment with the LTTE, including specific cases; 3) Establish a human rights unit, dedicated to systematically monitoring the violations of international law stipulated in the cease-fire agreement and staff it with trained human rights monitors.

In its January 2007 report, 'Complicit in Crime', the *HRW* recommended to the Karuna group (TMVP and its military wing) "Allow UNICEF, SLMM, and other domestic and international protection agencies access to all Karuna group camps, military and otherwise, to assess the age of recruits, and to identify children for demobilization". In its August 2007 report, 'Return to War', the *HRW* recommended to the LTTE to "Allow UNICEF, SLMM, and domestic

and international humanitarian and human rights agencies access to all LTTE camps – military and otherwise – to assess the age of recruits, and identify children for demobilization”.

In its June 2007 report, ‘Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis’, the ICG recommended the LTTE to open all prisons and detention centres to inspection by the ICRC and the SLMM.

In a statement from March 2005, the *National Peace Council (NPC)* proposed “the strengthening of human rights monitoring mechanisms pertaining to the peace process by providing the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission or a new human rights monitoring body with a more effective mandate to ensure protection of human rights”.

In his observations on the SLMM, *Liam Mahoney* recommended that the SLMM should be “taking much greater pains to deliver a rapport and relationship with civil society – across the political spectrum, with active and transparent communication with the population at large, and in particular to civil society organizations working with the victims (of both parties), in order to dispel misinformation, develop a better network of information and analysis, and enhance its legitimacy in the country”. Mahoney names a few possibilities as to how the mission could move more in the direction of also being a human rights monitor, including the production of detailed periodic publications outlining the results of its monitoring; developing a list of ongoing recommendations to the parties on matters that affect compliance with and success of the CFA; and – in addition to public reporting – using the same analysis and recommendations in its ‘quiet diplomacy’ with the Parties. Among Mahoney’s chief conclusions is the need for the SLMM to establish a much broader connection and conduct a much wider communication with civil society; to take a “less passive approach to its mandate”; and to promote and participate in discussion of other monitoring modalities, particularly regarding monitoring abuses of civilians.

In their study ‘Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000–2005’, *Jonathan Goodhand* and *Bart Klem* in 2005 note that “there may be a need to consider extending the scope of the CFA to cover the full range of military actors and strengthen its human rights component. In parallel, SLMM’s mandate and capacities may need to be revisited with a view to improving its means of investigation, better public diplomacy, and boosted operational capacity, particularly in the East”.

On Mission Mandate

In January 2004, a group of concerned academics – *Tyrol Ferdinands*, *Kumar Rupesinghe*, *Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu*, *Jayadeva Uyangoda*, and *Norbert Ropers* – jointly published the paper ‘The Sri Lankan Peace Process at a Crossroads’, aimed to inspire an in-depth discussion among all stakeholders on how to enhance the next stage of the process, recommended that

“The mandate of the SLMM should be reviewed and expanded to enable them to address more comprehensively the implementation of the CFA and to respond to complaints from civilian populations as well as from the signatories. This will demand a substantial strengthening of the institutional and personnel resources of the SLMM. The SLMM should encourage the creation of local Citizens Committees and enhance their participation in the problem-solving of all human security issues”.

On Mission Leadership

The same group, in a suggestion regarding the SLMM, addressed to Norway as Facilitator, recommended to “Explore together with the parties how the leadership of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) could be handed over to another country without endangering the stability of the truce, in order to ensure no conflicts of interest between the roles of the facilitator and of the monitor”.

On Mission Strength

In June 2006, the *Sri Lanka Democracy Forum (SLDF)* in a statement pointed at the SLMM as “the only method of accountability envisioned by the CFA” and as such critical to the CFA’s effectiveness, arguing that the Parties should commit themselves to comply with its rulings not to undermine “public confidence in the legitimacy and effectiveness” of the mission. The SLDF called for the number of monitors to be increased, as well as the areas to be covered, with a special attention to human rights, arguing as essential for monitors with human rights expertise to be included in the SLMM.

Based on contacts with a number of stakeholders in Sri Lanka, *Liam Mahoney* in his 2006 report to the HOM, reflecting the situation in 2005, notes that “nearly all respondents concur that given this dynamic [i.e. the internationalisation of the conflict], the SLMM can make a positive difference to civilian society. These same respondents stress that this impact requires that the SLMM should be larger, more present, more responsive and prompt, and more transparent”.

CONCLUSIONS

By 2005, the SLMM was still commended by independent observers, such as *Goodhand and Klem*, writing that “In spite of its inadequacies, the ceasefire has held and the SLMM can take some of the credit for this, even though at times it appears to have had more of a symbolic than a practical role. If the SLMM did not exist in its present form, there would clearly be a continuing role for such a body to provide a reliable channel for communication and negotiation. Therefore, the SLMM has been a successful but flawed experiment in ceasefire monitoring”, adding that “Within the SLMM framework, a stronger mandate (more means for investigation), better public diplomacy (toward the South), and more persistent naming and shaming of the LTTE could possibly have improved the operation”.

Senior Research Fellow *N. Manoharan* at the Indian think-tank, Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies (IPCS) saw the position and role of the SLMM degenerating further in 2006. In his January 2006 article, ‘SLMM: Challenges to Ceasefire Monitoring in Sri Lanka’, Manoharan points out that the very magnitude of violations indicated failure on the part of actors to enforce self-discipline, and that “Ironically, the SLMM has not been taken seriously; monitors are at times threatened and even attacked. If the two parties comply with the CFA sincerely, the job of the monitors would be easy”, also noting that the SLMM, at the structural level, being insufficiently empowered to discharge its responsibilities. In an August article, “Mission Impossible: Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission in Crisis”, the same author points to the deteriorating operational setting, with the Parties restricting SLMM’s access to scenes of incidents, in contravention of their commitments through the CFA. Also, Manoharan notes, “The characteristics of the violations suggests that the two concerned parties have little regard for the CFA and in turn the SLMM”. Along the same lines, in September 2006, the Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and former US Ambassador to Sri Lanka, *Teresita C. Shaffer*, was quoted as saying that the SLMM “has become irrelevant”.

In his 2006 ‘Proactive Presence’, *Liam Mahoney* quotes a SLA officer on the strength of the SLMM: “They need a larger force. They are too far from incidents. They can’t get there fast enough. They need to be more available”.

Glossary / Definitions

Area of Operation (AOO); the entire territory of Sri Lanka, covered by the CFA, in which the SLMM was to work

Area of Responsibility (AOR); the designated area of East and North Sri Lanka (six districts) that the SLMM was responsible to monitor

Ceasefire Agreement (CFA); the agreement entered between the two parties to the conflict, the GOSL and the LTTE, in February 2002

Co-Chairs; an informal group consisting of the EU, the USA, Japan and Norway, est. after the Tokyo donor conference 2003, to monitor the efforts of the Parties' peace efforts and support initiatives underpinning the Peace Process

complaint; a formal protest launched by either Party to the CFA, or members of the public, received and recorded by the SLMM, re alleged violations of the Agreement

District Office (DO); six regional offices were established as described in the CFA in 2002, in Ampara, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Mannar, Trincomalee, and Vavuniya

Daily Situation Report (DSR); a daily report from the DOs to HQ, comprising operational and administrative information, with assessments

enquiry; action taken by the SLMM in order to collect information and consider the course of events connected to a complaint re an alleged violation of the CFA

Facilitator; the Royal Norwegian Government; facilitator of the peace process in Sri Lanka, requested to assist in establishing the SLMM and to appoint the HOM

Forward Defence Localities (FDL); military ground positions est. by the armed forces of the GOSL and the fighting formations of the LTTE, resp. in the conflicted areas in the North and East of the country

hartal; term used in South Asia for various kinds of civic action and mass protests, incl. strikes and demonstrations, and the closure of public buildings and private businesses

Head of Mission (HOM); the top executive leader ('commander') of the mission and the final authority on interpreting the CFA

High Security Zone (HSZ); military areas est. by the GOSL in the North and East of Sri Lanka in order to control movements in areas of conflict, causing displacement of people, and a contested issue in the Peace Process

liaising; one of the chosen modalities of the SLMM – a comprehensive approach aimed to foster dialogue, strengthen confidence and defuse tension, applied on various level with both Parties, centrally and locally

Liaison Office (LO); liaison offices facilitating liaising on behalf of the HOM, to the LTTE (from 2002) and to the GOSL (from 2007), respectively

Local Monitoring Committee (LMC); the local conflict-resolving mechanism designated by the CFA, comprising representatives of the parties, and chaired by the SLMM

mandate; nominally a document/statement giving an official, formalised instruction, authority or obligation – in the case of the SLMM, the CFA mandated the mission, but lacked a specified mandate

monitor; designation of all seconded international staff serving with the SLMM, irrespective of actual function

monitoring; one of the chosen modalities of the SLMM – a multifaceted approach based on on-site and distributed presence, observation and engagement in order to verify the Parties' resp. adherence to the commitments of the CFA

Naval Monitoring Team (NMT); two regional units (located at Jaffna and Trincomalee, resp.), est. to carry out the monitoring at sea, not specifically provided for in the CFA or originally planned for

Parties (to the CFA); the two signatories to the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, i.e. the GOSL and the LTTE

Point of Contact (POC); a mainly temporary structure at fixed localities est. by resp. DO's, mostly manned on a regular but part-time basis to enhance accessibility

Peace Secretariat (PS) (of the LTTE); the executive body of the LTTE dealing with the peace process and the CFA, est. 2003

Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS); a comprehensive structure designed by the Parties in 2005, in order to create a platform for a joint reconstruction effort; agreed on but never implemented

Presence in District Operations (PID); an operational concept implemented in 2007 to ensure the presence of international monitoring in the districts despite the provisional pullout, whereby monitoring teams deployed from the temporary Negombo HQ stayed for 2–5 days

Rapid Response Team Operations (RRT); an operational concept implemented in 2007 to respond to major CFA-related incidents throughout the entire AOO, requiring urgent SLMM attention by a mobile team of monitors deployed on short notice

Regional Office (RO); regional offices est. 2007, consequent to a restructuring of the organisation – one for the North in Vavuniya, another for the East in Trincomalee

reporting; one of the chosen modalities of the SLMM – an essential approach to document and communicate findings and convey guidance to the Parties, and contribute to the transparency of the operation and the relations with key stakeholders

ruling; a system instituted by the SLMM, whereby an enquiry into a complaint was assessed, and a conclusion on findings was conveyed to the Parties and communicated to the public, discontinued 2007

Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP); the Sri Lanka government body coordinating and facilitating the peace process, est. 2002

Special Envoy (of the RNG); the senior diplomat appointed to direct the role of the Facilitator vis-à-vis the Parties to the CFA: 2002–05, Erik Solheim; 2005–09, Jon Hanssen Bauer

Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM); the international, independent and impartial monitoring mechanism established by the parties to the CFA

Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA); document defining the status, privileges and immunities of the SLMM and its members, based on the CFA, signed by the RNG and the GOSL, and endorsed by the LTTE in 2002

Standing Operating Procedures (SOP); the main (internal) governing document, regulating all administrative and operational affairs of the mission

violation; with respect to the CFA, a breach of the stipulations agreed on by the Parties in the Agreement

Weekly Monitoring Report (WMR); a weekly survey reflecting the ongoing monitoring, issued regularly in 2006–07

Zone of Separation (ZOS); an area adjacent to the FDL, separating the fighting formations of the two Parties, normally of minimum 600 metres, allowing for the right of movement within 100 metres of resp. defence localities

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Persons are identified by being written in *italics*; words indexed in photo captions are indicated by underlining.

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SLMM Presence in Sri Lanka, 2002–2008







Sri Lanka

Monitoring Mission

TERMINATION PROCESS, 2008–2009

The *SLMM operation* was terminated on Sri Lanka in January 2008, followed by an administrative wind-up completed on Sri Lanka in February 2008, to be continued with the termination of the *SLMM organisation* in the Nordic countries, directed from Oslo, as of March 2008.

The termination process contained three parallel and integrated parts:

[Accounting and Auditing](#)

The SLMM accounts were completed, and the remaining audits carried out for reporting to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[Filing and Depositing](#)

The SLMM files were secured and sorted, and deposited with the National Archives of Norway on behalf of the Nordic governments.

[Documenting and Reporting](#)

The SLMM history has been recorded through this report and the corresponding web, documenting the history of the operation and organisation.

This process has been carried out by a termination team under the leadership of the last serving HOM, involving all the Nordic contributing countries as well as former HOM's, with all former monitors invited to contribute through an electronic survey.

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ශ්‍රී ලංකා සිටින විරම නිර්නේණ නේමිට්‍රේ இலங்கை போர்நிறுத்தக் கண்காணிப்புக் குழு

THE SRI LANKA MONITORING MISSION (SLMM)
was an independent, international and impartial instrument established by the Parties to the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in Sri Lanka. This report is the official account of the field operation carried out by the SLMM, 2002–2008, and the organisation behind it, compiled as part of the termination of the mission, for the purpose of historical documentation.

**Monitoring the Sri Lankan Ceasefire Agreement,
2002–2008**

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