

Genocide against the Tamil People

**THE PEACE PROCESS CALLS A HALT TO
THE GENOCIDE**

Submitted by International Human Rights Association Bremen

I. The 1990s – a precursor for the peace process

The signing of the ceasefire agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in February 2002 is the result of national and international developments that have their starting point at the beginning of the 1990s. The peace process is the outcome of fundamental changes on the political, economic and military level in the world and its ramifications for the Sri Lankan conflict.

With the peace process, two lines of developments come together, that have their origin in the beginning of the 1990s. Locally, the LTTE develops into a conventional force pushing for a balance of power as strategic leverage for negotiations. Internationally, the discourse on conflict resolution finds its way into the development policy concepts of the Western industrial powers, specially among the EU.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and its ramifications for the Tamil struggle

The Tamil struggle had developed in the backdrop of the Cold War between the Western alliance and the Soviet block. The strategic importance of Sri Lanka and specially the Tamil regions was to a great extent determined by the East-West confrontation. However, with the fall of the Soviet Union and its final dissolution in 1991 the strategic relevance of the island did not disappear, but rather than that the strategic arena was transformed into a new confrontation between different geopolitical players and a new composition of alliances. India's involvement in the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) and its relationship with the Soviet Union had previously made India a conduit for the humanitarian demands of the Tamils to come out. But the fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent process of realigning India towards the USA, that was initiated under Prime Minister Rao in 1991, closed this political space. As Venugopal states: *“The most important diplomatic interventions took place at official level, primarily through the Indian government, Indian government diplomatic missions and Indian delegates to international state-level meetings such as the UN Commission on Human Rights and the Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and protection of Minorities. But such support from India at official level ended in the late- 1980s, leaving the Tamil Eelam movement without official diplomatic patrons.”*¹ Thus, on the state political level the possibilities to articulate their political aspirations diminished, leaving the

¹ Venugopal, Rajesh (2003): The global Dimensions of Conflict in Sri Lanka. Working Paper Number 99. Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford.

field to the Sri Lankan state. Consequently the international perception of the conflict as such and the LTTE in particular began to rapidly change.

But more important than the loss of political support was for the Tamils, that they lost the existential patronage of a country, that was willing to flex its military muscle against excessive attacks by the Sri Lankan state against the Tamil population when seeing it fit and that checked the influence of the US who until then only clandestinely armed the Sri Lankan forces through proxies like Pakistan and Israel.²

These developments on the political and military level inevitably necessitated a strategic reorganisation of the LTTE, which forced it to concentrate on the military aspect of their struggle, realising that without any outside leverage it would have to deal with the Sinhalese head on. Consequently, in the following period the focus was laid on building the military strength to be able to confront the Sri Lankan state as an equal force. The characteristics of the battle of Pooneryn in November 1993 mark the rapid transformation of the Tamil Tigers from a guerilla movement into a force with conventional capabilities. Concomitant to this reorientation of the Tamil Tigers was an increasingly open support for the Sri Lankan state by the USA. In 1993, during the presidency of Clinton, the US resumed arms sales to Sri Lanka and started to clandestinely train Sri Lankan elite forces inside the country itself.³ In concurrence with the mounting military support the Clinton administration intensified its rhetoric against the LTTE and finally banned the organisation in 1997, effectively de-legitimising its goals as well as negating its causes for existence.

This policy was in line with one of two concurring global trends in the 1990s, the first being the new post-cold war consensus on 'terrorism', which got expression by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/60 on 'Measures to eliminate international terrorism' from December 1994. Of this resolution nine were passed in between 1972 and 1989 under the title 'Measures to prevent international terrorism', but in 1994 the resolution was significantly altered. As Venugopal explains: *"While these resolutions condemned international terrorism, they invariably included wording that recognised the necessity to address legitimate causes underlying it including colonialism, racism, violations of human rights and those involving alien domination and foreign occupation. In addition, each one included a re-affirmation of*

² see Muni, S.D. (1993): Pangs of Proximity. India and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis. Sage Publications, New Delhi

³ see Kaufman, Mark (1996): U.S. quietly expands its role in Sri Lanka. Green Berets help train soldiers, open path for military presence. The Dallas Morning News

the right to self-determination. The 1994 resolution, which was renamed 'Measures to eliminate international terrorism', was considered a breakthrough in international state-level co-operation because for the first time, it did not make mention either of the causes of terrorism, or of the right to self-determination."⁴ In the years to come a new threat was born that would justify the military pursuance of strategic interests against other states or the crack down against its own population.

However, the other global trend that was emerging in the 1990s was diametrically opposed to the re-establishment of the military rhetoric of the cold war and countered it with a broad discourse on new approaches for development policy concepts that was aiming specially on conflict resolution and conflict prevention.

Changes in development approaches after end of cold war

During the cold war, international aid was to a large extent subsumed under the global rivalry between US-dominated capitalism and Soviet led socialism. Yet, the end of the cold war and the subsequent intensification of the competition between the remaining and aspiring big powers, namely the EU and the USA at that time, had repercussions on the way development aid was being perceived.

As Stokke (2011) puts it, during the Soviet period aid had no conditionality to human rights from both sides as strategic interests came to the fore, but after the fall of the Soviet Union "*it was increasingly recognised that conflicts pose obstacles to successful development, but also that development could be an instrument for crafting a liberal peace. Furthermore the fear of transnational impacts of localised wars made the resolution of intra-state conflicts a matter of global security. Following from this, international development co-operation has gone through a shift from being conflict blind to offering aid in a conflict sensitive manner and increasingly using development assistance as a tool for transforming conflict and building a liberal peace.*"⁵

This is of course was based on the assumption that certain Western powers thought that peace was in itself a good thing, in other words that free market, liberal peace and global security support each other. However the hope that a "*peaceful world where capital expands its*

⁴ Venugopal (2003)

⁵ Stokke, Christian (2011): Liberal Peace in Question. The Sri Lankan Case. In: Stokke, Christian; Jayadeva Uyangoda: Liberal Peace in Question: Politics of State and Market Reform in Sri Lanka. Anthem Press, London

dominance and liberal democracy prevails in politics”⁶ was short-lived. This was because even in the early Nineties not only did conflicts intensify and new conflicts emerge, but also wars were initiated by parts of the Western alliance. So very soon after the Soviet block collapsed a division appeared and deepened rapidly between parts of the industrial powers standing for free market and liberal peace – and global security that was based on this – and the diametrically opposed position taken by other nations based on the monopoly control of raw materials like energy resources. The political battle between these two parts of the division was reflected in the battle to maintain the liberal peace position by countries like Germany in Sri Lanka. On the one hand stood conflict sensitive aid dispensation – reflected in Sri Lanka by giving priority to maintaining parity of status in negotiations and peace building projects – and in opposition to this stood the US-British policy of rebuilding and strengthening the military capabilities of the state.

In our analysis, the different approaches towards conflict resolution are a reflection of the contrasting economic approaches of the USA and the EU, led by its biggest economic industrial power Germany. As an economic power Germany is interested in stable markets and the secure flow of goods and resources. Germany has one of the strongest export economies worldwide, with a trade surplus of 238 billion US-Dollar in 2013 even exceeding China and Saudi Arabia.⁷ In 2012 Germany exported goods worth 1,1 trillion Euro.⁸ Consequently – from an economic position – Germany pursues the concept of so called ‘liberal peace’, because it is beneficial to its production based economy, where it is strong. In Germany’s thinking liberal peace equals free market equals global security.

This position is diametrically opposed to the approach of the USA and Britain that rests on the control over raw materials and strategic locations as a military based strategy to compete with economically more advanced powers like Germany. For this, these countries need to pursue a military dominated policy in order to compete with the EU and thus are not interested in liberal peace. Hence the US development policy remains more or less the same until today. It is implicitly linked to national interests with USAID being under the policy control of the State department and National Security Council.

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ see Der Spiegel (2013): Exportboom: Deutschland steuert auf Rekordüberschuss zu. Retrieved from: “<http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/exportboom-deutschland-steuert-auf-rekordueberschuss-zu-a-920607.html>”

⁸ see Statista (2013): Exporte aus Deutschland nach Güterabteilungen. Retrieved from: <http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/151019/umfrage/exportgueter-aus-deutschland/>

However, it would be wrong to limit the advancement of new development policies merely on economic considerations. Although it could be argued that Germany would be bound to compete on a purely economic level as it has not the military capabilities to further its strategic interests and thus would be more open to pursue the concept of 'liberal peace', it would be more true to say that the existing conditions and characteristics of the German economy helped to build acceptance for the new development policy concepts that were being discussed since the beginning of the 1990s. In that way, the economic competition opened political possibilities for the genuinely concerned humanitarian community and gave strength to their ideas, which were soon to become official state policies.

This new discourse had an impact on different levels. *On the global level* this discourse was reflected by the 'Agenda for Peace' by the then UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali and documents by international organisations, like the OECD's 'Shaping the 21 Century' from 1997 or the inclusion of conflict resolution into the DAC Guidelines of OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Several world conferences taking place in the 90s, e.g. the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the Rio Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the World Conference on Human Rights held by the UN in Vienna in 1993 or the World Summit for Social Development held by the UN in Copenhagen in 1995, led to the feeling of a new multi-lateralism which seemed to emphasise the picture of a collective endeavour to solve the problems of the world in a peaceful way.⁹

On the European level the EU council's decision on peace making measures and the inclusion of development policy into the common foreign and security policy of the Maastricht treaty as well as the fact, that the new development approach became official state policy of the UK and Germany after Blair and Schröder came to power indicate that the new approach got wide acceptance and was not limited only to the humanitarian community.¹⁰

On the German level the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) introduced the instrument of so called country concepts as early as 1992. The new country concepts are non-sectoral with an overall approach. This means, for each country a specific

⁹ see Klemp, Ludgera (2001): Entwicklungspolitik am Scheideweg – politische Randerscheinung oder globale Strukturpolitik? In: Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 18-19/2001

¹⁰ *ibid.*

focus will be identified to which all projects are related. The content of the concepts are structured in the following order: 1) Human rights and democracy, poverty reduction and social justice, 2) importance of country for regional and global development, German security and trade interests, 3) crisis prevention and crisis management, 4) commercial development.¹¹

With Schröder coming into power in 1998 the emerging new approach towards conflict resolution was consolidated by restructuring the BMZ and setting up a new department which was responsible for dealing with the subject. Conflict resolution was declared global structural policy by the Schröder government. The development minister of the Schröder administration, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, expressed at that time her conviction, that Germany's development policy should be seen as a peace policy based on conflict prevention and conflict resolution in opposition to military intervention.¹²

Also, there have been several surveys on conflict resolution in the 90s by Germany, Norway, the World Bank and DAC among others. Germany undertook six country surveys in this regard with Sri Lanka one of them.¹³ The activities of the BMZ were examined with regard to their effects on conflict resolution. This resulted in a new overall concept called „Crisis Prevention and Conflict Resolution“ in 2000, and already in 1999 an indicator model to determine the extent and characteristics of conflicts was developed.

II. The involvement of Germany and the EU in the Sri Lankan peace process

Before the peace process

At the end of the 1990s, the conflict in Sri Lanka moved into the focus of German development policy. The conditions in Sri Lanka were regarded as being conducive for the new strategies of conflict resolution that were promoted by the German Development Ministry (BMZ). The decision to get involved in Sri Lanka in a more comprehensive way went hand in hand with the new consciousness based on the concept of 'do no harm' which resulted in dismissing the 'old way' aid programs were implemented.

¹¹ see Kenneweg, Jochen (2000): Länderkonzepte und Förderstrategien. Zur Weiterentwicklung des Instrumentariums des BMZ. In: E+Z – Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit. Nr.9, September 2000

¹² see Thiel, Reinhold E. (1999): Entwicklungspolitik als Friedenspolitik. Interview mit Ministerin Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul. In: E+Z – Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit. Nr.1, Januar 1999

¹³ see Klingebiel, Stephan (1999): Impact on Development Cooperation in Conflict Situations. Cross-section Report on Evaluations of German development Cooperation in Six Countries. German Development Institute, Bonn

It was being recognised that the earlier development aid was having a significant role in fuelling the conflict. This unsatisfactory situation was caused from ignorance towards the root causes of the conflict and the de-linking of aid programs from the conflict. One example is the so called Accelerated Mahaweli Development Programme (AMDP) which was supported by Germany since 1977 with two loans totalling 630 million DM. The Mahaweli Development Programme which existed since the 1960s consisted of several irrigation and hydroelectricity projects to increase the electricity production. But it was also part of a series of colonisation schemes that were being implemented to settle Singhalese peasants from the South in the North. More than 74 percent of the land that was affected by the AMDP was supposed to be given to Singhalese – land that was earlier inhabited by Tamils. According to Klingebiel (2000) in September 1983, two months after the state sponsored massacre of 3.000 Tamils by Singhalese rioters, the German government replied to an interpellation in the Bundestag, that it “*could not see any ramifications the project had on the conflict between the Tamils and Singhalese*”.¹⁴ Though, the concomitant colonisation scheme was being financed and implemented by the Sri Lankan government. This example illustrates the technical way that German development aid was discussed at that time. In that sense, specially the conflict sensitisation and the forming of so called ‘peace alliances’ on the ground moved into the focus.¹⁵

The overall objective of German development policy was poverty alleviation through economic development support. In 1997 though, according to Dr. Reinhardt Bolz, the former director of the GTZ (the implementing agency of the BMZ) in Sri Lanka from 1997 to 2002, a discussion started how to react to the civil war, after Germany agreed already in 1996 to set up projects in Jaffna, Vavuniya and Trincomalee, which marked the beginning of a systematic reorganisation of the German engagement towards conflict resolution. In the period of 1999 to 2000 the whole strategic direction of the Country Programme for Sri Lanka was changed. Two more programmes were initiated, namely rehabilitation measures in the Trincomalee region and Basic Education for children in Disadvantaged Areas (BECARE) in Vavuniya, which later spread out on the whole North East Province, afterwards to the whole country. In this period Sri Lanka was selected as a so-called Partner Country with one designated focal area. As Bolz states, though the overall objective was poverty alleviation, the German

¹⁴ Klingebiel, Stephan; Jakob Rösel (2000): Fallbeispiel: Sri Lanka - Konditionierung

¹⁵ see also Debiel, Tobias; Volker Matthies (2000): Krisenprävention - mehr Fragen als Antworten? Eine Zwischenbilanz zur deutschen Entwicklungs-, Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. In: E+Z – Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit. Nr.9, September 2000

engagement in conflict transformation was regarded as being successful and thus, it was agreed to extend this as a second focal area. Basically, the German two-string approach during this period was based on a 'poverty oriented development process' through market economy and education programmes on the one side and the so-called Poverty Alleviation and Conflict transformation (PACT) programme on the other. The first group of projects made up 80 percent of the development programmes. Though mainly set in the development field all the programmes had been reoriented towards conflict sensitivity in the sense of 'do no harm'. The second group consisted of projects located in the conflict areas of the North East mainly in the fields of rehabilitation and reconciliation but also development.

According to Tania Rödiger-Vorwerk from the German Ministry for Cooperation and Development was one of the few countries that were involved in the North East already during the war, which gave them a better position to extent its programmes once the peace process started.¹⁶

Apart from working directly in the conflict region Germany was among a few countries like Norway, Canada and the Netherlands who provided assistance to civil society organisations working on areas such as human rights, conflict resolution, judicial reforms, etc. As Goodhand (2001) states: "*Although the level of funding is small (...), these bilateral donors have had an important influence by introducing alternative approaches and raising questions on issues like human rights and peace building that the more government focused donors are reluctant to do.*"¹⁷

It seems to be, that the line existing until then, that "*if a link between conflict and development is acknowledged, it is that conflict is an impediment, which can be removed with greater market openness and deregulation*"¹⁸, which the major donors such as Japan and ADB had taken was incorporated in an overall strategy of conflict resolution by Germany, that apart from direct programmes in the conflict region consisted winning the hearts and minds of the South by:

¹⁶ Zunzer, Wofram (2004): Sri Lanka Round Table. New Perspectives in the Sri Lankan Peace Process - The Current Political Situation and the Role of the International Community.

¹⁷ Goodhand, Jonathan; Phillipa Atkinson (2001): Conflict and Aid: Enhancing the Peacebuilding Impact of International Engagement. International Alert, London

¹⁸ *ibid.*

- 1) strengthening the civil society organisations to promote a peaceful solution and constitutional reforms
- 2) working with the business community which was suffering immensely because of the war
- 3) uplifting the material situation of the Sinhalese Southern population

Germany belongs to a small group of so called ‘likeminded countries’, who “*recognise the link between development and conflict and have an explicit focus of working on conflict. Norway, Canada, Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and UK have all begun to identify programming opportunities for working on conflict.*”, says Goodhand¹⁹. The shift towards conflict resolution on the ground by Germany’s implementing agencies was accompanied by enhanced donor cooperation in this regard among this group of countries and increased diplomatic efforts on the international level to push for greater common involvement, e.g. during the meetings of the so called Paris Aid Group.

These efforts were intensified during the peace process where Germany sought to create strategic alliances with other countries and organizations to enhance its impact on the peace process. Inside the EU, Germany’s policy was to push the alliance to take a clear political position with regard to the peace process in order to strengthen the EU’s role inside the Co-chairs.²⁰

The 2000 cross section report on the impact of development cooperation in conflict situations, which included Sri Lanka, as well, came to the conclusion that there had been a major shift from acting independent of the conflict towards a deliberate attempt to help resolving it.

In fact, different recommendations on development aid instruments applicable in conflict situations were made in this report, that were later taken up by Germany during its involvement in the peace process. For example, direct open support for the government was being seen as a wrong signal to both parties. Also, the lack of access to non-government controlled areas was deemed problematic as it – apart from the political dimension – helped to foster regional imbalances. To tackle this problems, an increased use of the NGO’s ability to operate in rebel controlled areas and the introduction of new forms of cooperation like ‘open funds’ were recommended. Both suggestions were later adopted by the BMZ.

¹⁹ *ibid.*

²⁰ see Zunzer (2004)

Also, the report explicitly mentioned the political dynamics of the international arena in which German development aid has to operate in. It stated, that German development aid was subjected not only to limitations arising from the situation on the ground in the respective host countries but specially to external factors such as coming into confrontation with the interests of other powers. Except for Sri Lanka for all other countries of the survey external interests were identified as major restricting factors on Germany's ability to implement its development policy. In El Salvador, there was massive economic and military support by the USA for the regime. Although Germany intended to play a role in conflict resolution it restricted itself to basic development work. In Rwanda it had to take into account French and American interests whereas in Kenya it were British interests and in Ethiopia again the Americans.

Surprisingly the Sri Lankan conflict was not being regarded as being internationalised at that time – at least officially in the report. This sentiment is predominant throughout nearly all documents published by organisations dealing with Sri Lanka. It was only after the destruction of the LTTE and the ending of the war that the strategic importance of the island was being highlighted. This fact indicates that it is highly probable that Germany has been conscious of the international factors regarding the conflict, but did not want to expose them because of the nature of the developments taking place at that time in Sri Lanka.

Before the peace process in 2002 there had been some serious commitments from the Sri Lankan governments at that time towards a peaceful solution, as the governments realised, that they could not overcome their economic and social disasters by strictly following a military solution with the material and political support from external forces. The conflict was the main reason for failing investments, lacking tourism, etc. They had to discuss with their donors how to solve the core problem. Here the debate began about a new way of cooperation for conflict resolution.

One principle was, that the Government of Sri Lanka had to go ahead and formulate “Policy Frameworks”, in cooperation with the “Donors” (bilateral/multilateral and Civil Society Representatives): 1. “Policy Framework on Poverty Alleviation” and “Poverty Reduction Strategy” (PRS); 2. “Policy Framework on Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation (RRR); this broad-based process took nearly 4 years and the frameworks were the guideline for all projects and programs.

The LTTE opens the way to a peaceful solution

When the German cross section report stated at that time that the external factors were beneficial for greater involvement in Sri Lanka this implied that the international and national support of a military solution had been considerably weakened. What had happened during that time was, that the LTTE had achieved a series of substantial battlefield victories since 1997, which began to discredit the further pursuance of a military solution.

Finally, in April 2000 the LTTE overran the Sri Lankan military complex of Elephant Pass. The garrison located at the gateway to the Jaffna peninsula was deemed impregnable by the US and British military advisers of the Sri Lankan forces. During the course of the attack the LTTE not only overran the US/British organised defences, that had been praised by visiting US and British army officers and diplomats, but also defeated the elite US trained 53rd Division that was quickly brought in to reinforce the base defences.

With this military victory the LTTE not only delivered a decisive blow to the Sri Lankan army but also defeated the American military approach towards the conflict for the time being. What this means is basically that the LTTE opened up the way for other powers, namely Germany, who followed a peaceful strategy to come into the game more openly. The balance of power that the LTTE achieved discredited the military approach among the Sinhala ruling elite and large parts of the Sinhala population as the economic situation deteriorated.

This put Germany and the “like minded” European states into a position to act irrespective of American interests and above all to make it possible, that Germany’s actions had an impact that would exceed the limits of the ordinary competition between the two nations. Considering the fact that Germany’s decision to intensify its involvement in Sri Lanka is taken immediately after the military debacle of the US approach a link between this two events can hardly be considered a mere coincidence but has to be explained with conscious analysis of the existing conditions by Germany.

It is not known if this kind of thinking existed in parts of the German establishment. However it seems that the right people were sent to Sri Lanka – for example with experience from Rwanda who had knowledge of the American involvement there – in order to set into motion its push for conflict resolution on the ground.

After trying several times to use their military achievements to engage in peace talks it was only at the end of the 1990s both the international and local conditions were conducive to the LTTE's peace initiative, because only at that time there existed a strong alliance of countries that would be willing to push their new approach as a feasible alternative to the military solution.

The acceptance of the three premises – no military solution to the Tamil Question, a constitutional settlement and parity of status between the negotiating parties – as a basis for their involvement showed that the Co-Chairs of the peace process accepted the European line over the militaristic approach of the US and Britain.

It was only under these conditions a peaceful solution based on a negotiated settlement could become reality. The decision of the LTTE to offer peace talks to the Sinhalese was based on the confidence, that Europe would grab the chance provided to them after being freed – at least temporarily – from the dominance of the US-British axis by the LTTE and that it would stick to its progressive role it was playing until then.

During the peace process

In our understanding, Germany from the outset understood the sensitive character of the peace process and the necessity to identify and pursue peace promoting measures. It was understood that conflict resolution was not limited to peace negotiations between the protagonists but also required an inclusive approach for the transformation of the dynamics underlying the conflict. This is why apart from some development projects in the conflict zone the main focus of Germany's development policy in Sri Lanka laid on initiatives to bring the Tamils and Sinhalese together and to build a consciousness for peaceful social coexistence. In this sense, a good part of the work was being done on the Sinhala population – by providing some form of material 'peace dividend' and by building sensitivity for peace – in order to strengthen the peace process. Apart from implementing common projects there was strong funding of activities of the Berghof Foundation which collaborated mainly with research centres, like the Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA) in Sri Lanka.

Germany contributed to the NERF (North East Rehabilitation Fund) – which came under the custody of the World Bank – that was set up to distribute funds to SIHRN (Sub-committee on

Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs). SIHRN was one of the joint sub committees set up in accordance with the ceasefire agreement (CFA) by both parties of conflict in order to address the urgent humanitarian issues until a final solution is found. As another of the three sub committees collapsed because of non implementation of CFA conditions on the side of the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) SIHRN collapsed after the LTTE was excluded from donor talks in Washington. NERF never got implemented because of alleged constitutional obstacles. It was said that it violated the monetary sovereign rights of Sri Lanka. Among the conflict resolution community NERF was being regarded as one of the two major pillars of the peace process – the PTOMS (Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure) being the other – as they although in terms of the money flow of minor importance were bringing the two conflict parties together on a concrete and practical level. Both structures were explicitly supported by Germany whereas NERF was undermined by the SLA and the PTOMS basically were destroyed in a combined attack by the USA and the Sinhala extremist party JVP.

Apart from providing Berlin as the venue for the 5th round of peace talks there had been a very open approach allowing interactions between the conflict partners in Germany, e.g. the round table meeting in 2004 in Berlin, and the tour of LTTE representatives to explore different forms of federalism in Europe. This approach was shared by the so called like minded countries.

Nevertheless, neither the Co-Chairs nor the ‘like minded’ countries were a monolithic block. Although the Utstein Group (formed by the all female development ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and Norway in 1999) represented the new approach for conflict resolution, the resignation of one of its members, UK development minister Clare Short, from the UK Cabinet in protest of the Iraq War in 2003 highlights the fact that this approach was contested inside the political circles of the respective countries. If these dynamics were existing among the countries of the Utstein Group they were even more prevalent inside the Co-Chairs. The division, that existed among the countries of the Co-Chairs in their position towards the Iraq War, marked also the line of the different approaches towards the conflict in Sri Lanka. As stated by Berghof Foundation in its examination of the transformation of the LTTE (2008) Germany followed the line of engaging and treating both conflict partners as

equals the US followed the traditional line of the counter terrorism approach.²¹ Former US Ambassador Lunstead (2007) acknowledged that since the beginning of the peace process the US deliberately and substantially accelerated its military assistance to the Sri Lankan state.²² And as the Berghof document summarizes: “(...) *major international assistance for the Sri Lankan state to re-arm and re-organise its war-weary armed forces, international efforts to curtail LTTE re-supply (including support for the Sri Lanka Navy to destroy LTTE merchant vessels which might be carrying armaments), provision of massive bilateral and multilateral aid to help stabilise and rebuild Sri Lanka’s war-damaged economy, etc. Over time, the cumulative effect of these steps was simple: to tip the strategic balance that had precipitated the peace process inexorably in favour of the state.*”²³

In our analysis, in the course of the peace process the German approach of conflict resolution got weakened and the approach of a military solution obtained dominance again. At the height of process the EU shifted towards the coercive methods propagated by the US/UK by its decision to ban the LTTE as a terrorist organization. This decision was explicitly opposed by the cease fire observers of the Sri Lanka monitoring Mission (SLMM) as well as by the EU ambassadors to Sri Lanka and the major INGO’s. Two months after the ban the Sri Lankan government returned to war by launching a full scale offensive against LTTE held territory in the East of Sri Lanka. The SLMM condemned the offensive while its former head, Swedish Major General Ulf Henricsson, alleged that the decision to ban the LTTE was taken in the ‘coffee shops’ of Brussels rather than in the EU parliament suggesting that it happened under continuous pressure from the US and Britain.²⁴ Similarly, the former Sri Lankan Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mangala Samaraweera, in April 2012 stated in the Sri Lankan parliament: “*We should not forget the support given by the US when I was the foreign affairs minister for the proscription of the LTTE in Europe. Then, seven countries in the 25-member EU did not agree with the LTTE ban, and it became a difficulty to adopt the ban as an unanimous decision. Therefore, I met [US] Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice several times and*

²¹ see Nadarajah, Suthaharan; Luxshi Vimalarajah (2008): The Politics of Transformation: The LTTE and the 2002-2006 peace process in Sri Lanka. Berghof Transitions Series No. 4

²² see Lunstead, Jeffrey (2007): The United State’s Role in Sri Lanka’s Peace Process 2002-2006. The Asia Foundation

²³ Nadarajah (2008)

²⁴ see e.g. LankaNewspapers (2006): SLMM Head slams EU, says GoSL, LTTE equal partners retrieved from: <http://www.lankanewspapers.com/news/2006/8/8263.html>

through the offices of Deputy Secretary of State Nicholas Burns, got the consent of those seven nations to proscribe the LTTE on 29 May 2006.”²⁵

Although not being one of those countries Germany’s decision to support the ban was taken only a short time before the ban was imposed onto the LTTE. Considering the role Germany was playing until then there had been substantial resistance inside Germany’s government circles who opposed the ban as a step that would inevitably lead to war. Germany was obviously in a dilemma but would not have wanted to risk the relationships with its important Western partners over the Sri Lankan conflict. Of course, this decision had tragic consequences for Germany’s positive engagement in Sri Lanka.

²⁵ Colombo Telegraph (2012): Rajapaksa. Then and Now. Retrieved from: <https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/rajapaksa-then-and-now/>

Sources

Colombo Telegraph (2012): Rajapaksa. Then and Now. Retrieved from:
<https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/rajapaksa-then-and-now/>

Debiel, Tobias; Volker Matthies (2000): Krisenprävention - mehr Fragen als Antworten? Eine Zwischenbilanz zur deutschen Entwicklungs-, Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. In: E+Z – Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit. Nr.9, September 2000

Der Spiegel (2013): Exportboom: Deutschland steuert auf Rekordüberschuss zu. Retrieved from <http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/exportboom-deutschland-steuert-auf-rekordueberschuss-zu-a-920607.html>

Goodhand, Jonathan; Phillipa Atkinson (2001): Conflict and Aid: Enhancing the Peacebuilding Impact of International Engagement. International Alert, London

Kaufman, Mark (1996): U.S. quietly expands its role in Sri Lanka. Green Berets help train soldiers, open path for military presence. The Dallas Morning News

Kenneweg, Jochen (2000): Länderkonzepte und Förderstrategien. Zur Weiterentwicklung des Instrumentariums des BMZ. In: E+Z – Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit. Nr.9, September 2000

Klemp, Ludgera (2001): Entwicklungspolitik am Scheideweg – politische Randerscheinung oder globale Strukturpolitik? In: Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 18-19/2001

Klingebl, Stephan (1999): Impact on Development Cooperation in Conflict Situations. Cross-section Report on Evaluations of German development Cooperation in Six Countries. German Development Institute, Bonn

Klingebl, Stephan; Jakob Rösel (2000): Fallbeispiel: Sri Lanka - Konditionierung

LankaNewspapers (2006): SLMM Head slams EU, says GoSL, LTTE equal partners
retrieved from: <http://www.lankanewspapers.com/news/2006/8/8263.html>

Lunstead, Jeffrey (2007): *The United State's Role in Sri Lanka's Peace Process 2002-2006*. The Asia Foundation

Muni, S.D. (1993): *Pangs of Proximity. India and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis*. Sage Publications, New Delhi

Nadarajah, Suthaharan; Luxshi Vimalarajah (2008): *The Politics of Transformation: The LTTE and the 2002-2006 peace process in Sri Lanka*. Berghof Transitions Series No. 4

Statista (2013): *Exporte aus Deutschland nach Güterabteilungen*. Retrieved from: <http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/151019/umfrage/exportgueter-aus-deutschland/>

Stokke, Christian (2011): *Liberal Peace in Question. The Sri Lankan Case*. In: Stokke, Christian; Jayadeva Uyangoda: *Liberal Peace in Question: Politics of State and Market Reform in Sri Lanka*. Anthem Press, London

Thiel, Reinhold E. (1999): *Entwicklungspolitik als Friedenspolitik. Interview mit Ministerin Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul*. In: *E+Z – Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit*. Nr.1, Januar 1999

Venugopal, Rajesh (2003): *The global Dimensions of Conflict in Sri Lanka*. Working Paper Number 99. Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford.

Zunzer, Wofram (2004): *Sri Lanka Round Table. New Perspectives in the Sri Lankan Peace Process - The Current Political Situation and the Role of the International Community*.